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Preface
This thesis consists of three essays on games on networks, each forming a chapter in
this work. The first essay is entitled Conformist and Anti-conformist Behavior in Social
Networks (Chapter 1), the second essay Conformism under Incomplete Information
(Chapter 2), and the third essay Local Key Player Analysis (Chapter 3). The second
essay is co-authored with Theodoros Rapanos (Stockholm University) and Yves
Zenou (Stockholm University and Monash University). An earlier version of the
third essay circulated under the title Centrality with Vertex Idiosyncracy: Comparative
Statics and Vertex-weighted Key-player Analysis.
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Introduction
Many aspects of our lives are governed by social networks. For example, the decision
to buy a new product, to attend a party, or to commit a crime is often influenced by
acquaintances and friends. The influence can take many forms, for example, the
choices or information sharing of others: A teenager might attend a party only if her
best friend is attending. The decision to upgrade to a new software version might
depend on the expertise of informed acquaintances.
The analysis of social networks is a growing field within economics. Economics
provides an analytical framework to study the behavior of individuals embedded
in a social network. One strand of the literature focuses on how behavior is shaped
by the individuals’ preferences and the structure of their network. The influence
of preferences and network on behavior is often modeled by what is called games
on networks or network games. A network game is a strategic game where finitely
many players (for example, individuals, enterprises, or countries) are connected
by a network. Each player chooses an action (for example, to buy a product, to
choose a level of education, to decide on the time to share with friends or to spend
on sports activities, to engage in criminal activities) in order to maximize his or her
utility or payoff, given the behavior of other players. Players take thereby explicitly
or implicitly the interdependencies induced by the structure of the network into
account.
The present thesis consists of three essays on games on networks, each forming
a chapter in this work. A brief summary of each chapter is given below.
Chapter 1: Conformist and Anti-conformist Behavior in Social Networks
This paper proposes a network game of complete information where the players
have a preference for either conformist or anti-conformist behavior. The network
game admits of nonaffine best reply functions and players without out-neighbors.
Admitting of players without out-neighbors demonstrates that an endogenous ef-
fects matrix is always row-normalized, even in the presence of isolated players. The
paper provides new results on the identification of endogenous and exogenous
effects in a statistical model that is derived from the system of best reply functions
at the Nash equilibrium of the network game. A novel nonidentifying condition in
the form of a kernel condition has its origin in the notion of weakly ex ante homoge-
neous players. It is shown that the typical linear independence condition involving
products or powers of the endogenous and exogenous effects matrices is in general
1
2 Introduction
only necessary but not sufficient for identification through the conditional mean of
endogenous and exogenous effects. Linear independence conditions are, however,
sufficient for identification through the conditional variance and entail restrictions
on the topologies of the digraphs fromwhich the endogenous and exogenous effects
matrices are derived. While such restrictions are in general difficult to characterize, a
complete characterization is possible and related to the notion of a normally regular
digraph in two cases where the conditions involve three matrices. The nonaffine
nature of the network game is instrumental in aligning the support of the statistical
model with the action space of the underlying network game. An important class of
existing linear social interactions models can be reconciled with the network game
by imposing a parameter restriction that is not without loss of generality.
Chapter 2: Conformism under Incomplete Information
Although conformism has been studied in a network setting before, this is one of the
first papers to examine conformism under incomplete information, and it is the first
to provide and discuss a comprehensive theoretical framework. Social interaction is
modelled as a Bayesian network game, which is the natural setting for analyzing
decisions whose potential returns or costs are ex ante uncertain (like, for example,
in education and crime). The paper establishes existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium, characterizes the optimal decisions, and examines conditions under
which policy interventions can be welfare-improving.
Chapter 3: Local Key Player Analysis
Identifying key players is an important aspect in network analysis. Key players are
vertices in a network who are considered important in a certain sense. A precise
definition depends on the context and the purpose to which their identification is
put. In the context of crime, for example, the key player is defined as the criminal
who, once removed from the criminal network, reduces criminal activity most.
This paper introduces formally the concept of a local key player in the context of a
network game where the social planner’s objective is to reduce aggregate activity
of only those players who reside in a certain local area or part of the network. In
the context of crime, where networks of criminals spread across different police
areas, local key player analysis provides a means to identify and neutralize the key
criminal in each police area in order to reduce criminal activity locally (that is, in
each police area) most, thereby taking the criminals’ cross-area connections into
account.
Chapter 1
Conformist and Anti-conformist Behavior
in Social Networks
Abstract
This paper proposes a static, noncooperative network game of complete informa-
tion where the players have a preference for either conformist or anti-conformist
behavior. The network game admits of nonaffine best reply functions and play-
ers without out-neighbors. A special case of the game entails an asymmetric
loss function and endogenous social norms that are asymptotically geomet-
ric means. Admitting of players without out-neighbors demonstrates that an
endogenous effects matrix is always row-normalized, even in the presence of
isolated players. The paper provides new results on the identification of en-
dogenous and exogenous effects in a statistical model that is derived from the
system of best reply functions at the Nash equilibrium of the network game.
A nonidentifying condition in the form of a kernel condition has its origin in
the notion of weakly ex ante homogeneous players. It is shown that the typical
linear independence condition involving products or powers of the endogenous
and exogenous effects matrices (see, for example, Bramoullé, Djebbari, and
Fortin 2009, Propositions 1, 4, and 5; Blume et al. 2015, Theorem 3) is in general
only necessary but not sufficient for identification through the conditional mean
of endogenous and exogenous effects. Linear independence conditions are,
however, sufficient for identification through the conditional variance and entail
restrictions on the topologies of the digraphs from which the endogenous and
exogenous effects matrices are derived. While such restrictions are in general
difficult to characterize, a complete characterization is possible and related to
the notion of a normally regular digraph (Jørgensen 2015) in two cases where
the conditions involve three matrices. The nonaffine nature of the network game
is instrumental in aligning the support of the statistical model with the action
space of the underlying network game. An important class of existing linear
social interactions models can be reconciled with the network game by imposing
a parameter restriction that is not without loss of generality.
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1.1 Introduction
Social interactions are ubiquitous and an important feature of modern life.1 Exam-
ples include cooperative learning in the classroom, the exchange of information,
and the use of social media by groups of individuals with a common interest in
order to find and meet other like-minded people. Social interactions often manifest
in interdependent or even correlated behavior of socially adjacent individuals. One
important example is conformist behavior where an individual’s well-being or util-
ity is decreasing in the distance between his own behavior and the behavior of a
group of socially adjacent individuals, frequently referred to as peers. To give an
instance of conformist behavior, excessive alcohol consumption among Canadian
and U.S. American college students is strongly influenced by peers (Borsari and
Carey 2001).
A rich body of literature has emerged in the last two decades on the economics of
social interactions (for surveys, see, for example, Manski 2000; Blume and Durlauf
2001; Glaeser and Scheinkman 2001; Moffitt 2001; Durlauf 2004; Durlauf and Ioan-
nides 2010; Ioannides 2012). One main strand of the literature is concerned with
identifying and measuring the origins and natures of correlated behavior of in-
dividuals connected in social space (see Blume et al. 2011 for a comprehensive
survey) and has experienced a strong growth ever since Manski (1993) advanced
a taxonomy of hypotheses, referred to as effects, and discussed a related identifi-
cation problem. Manski’s (1993) taxonomy distinguishes between three different
hypotheses for correlated behavior in a group of socially connected individuals:
endogenous effects, exogenous effects, also called contextual effects, and correlated effects.
Endogenous effects arise if an individual’s behavior tends to vary with a statistic
of the behavior of the group; exogenous effects arise if an individual’s behavior
tends to vary with a statistic of the exogenous characteristics of the group; and
correlated effects arise if individuals of the same group tend to behave similarly
because they have similar exogenous characteristics or face a common environment.
As pointed out by Manski (1993) and others, the distinction between endogenous,
exogenous, and correlated effects is important because they have different implica-
tions for policy interventions, in particular, only endogenous effects can generate a
social multiplier.2 Manski’s (1993) taxonomy of hypotheses is reflected in the struc-
tural form of the statistical model, dubbed linear-in-means model, within which
he discusses identification of the three effects, in particular, the non-identification
of endogenous and exogenous effects. Within the class of linear statistical models
that have an uncountable support, most of the models put forward to identify and
measure the origins and natures of correlated behavior of individuals connected
in social space are variations of Manski’s (1993) linear-in-means model. A typical
1. In economics social interactions refer to direct interactions of individuals connected in social space
who exhibit interdependencies in their preferences or beliefs or in the constraints they face. They are
therefore different and distinct from interactions mediated by a market and as such are sometimes
considered externalities (see, for example, Ioannides 2012, chapters 3, 4, and 5).
2. For a discussion of the social multiplier see, for example, Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Sacerdote
(2003).
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linear model relates an individual’s behavioral outcome to his characteristics, to
arithmetic means of the characteristics of socially adjacent individuals, and to a
statistic of their outcomes. The models differ by the statistic used to summarize the
behavioral outcomes of socially adjacent individuals, the constraints imposed on
the topology of the social network by which the individuals are connected, and the
dependence structure and distribution of the error terms. In Manski’s (1993) model,
the statistic is the arithmetic mean, which explains the term linear-in-means model.
The statistic is also the arithmetic mean in numerous extensions and generalizations
of the linear-in-means model (see, for example, Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin
2009; Patacchini and Zenou 2012; Boucher et al. 2014; Fortin and Yazbeck 2015;
Lin 2015; Tatsi 2015). Other statistics than the arithmetic mean include the sum
(see, for example, Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou 2009; Tatsi 2015) and
the minimum or maximum (Tao and Lee 2014; Tatsi 2015). The mode and the
median are also possible statistics but have not been discussed in the literature yet.
So-called hybrid models have also been considered where the behavior of socially
adjacent individuals enters through at least two statistics, for example, two different
sums in case adjacent individuals are partitioned into two sets (Patacchini, Rainone,
and Zenou 2015), the arithmetic mean and the sum (Liu, Patacchini, and Zenou
2014; Liu et al. 2015; Lindquist, Sauermann, and Zenou 2016), or the mean and the
maximum (Tao and Lee 2014; Tatsi 2015).
As noted by Blume et al. (2015, pp. 445–46), the aforementioned strand of the
literature is not well integrated with respect to economic and econometric theory.
This applies in particular to linear models of social interactions (which precludes
discrete choice models) where the individuals have a preference or taste for con-
formist behavior. As regards this class ofmodels, the discrepancy between economic
models and econometric or statistical models takes various forms.3 First and fore-
most, the predictions of economic models, for example, the system of best reply
functions at the Nash equilibrium of a network game, are distinct from the statistical
models used to study parameter identification and estimation and taken to data in
applied work with regard to structural characteristics. This concerns, for example,
the way in which statistical models admit of individuals who are not affected by
other individuals’ actions but whose actions may affect other individuals, which
hereinafter are referred to as players without out-neighbors. Statistical models used
to study parameter identification typically admit of players without out-neighbors
(Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009; Blume et al. 2015), whereas economic mod-
els either do not admit of this type of individuals (Patacchini and Zenou 2012) or
they do so in an inconsistent way (Blume et al. 2015).4 Second, the codomains
of behavioral variables in economic models are often not in alignment with the
supports of (the response variable(s) in) corresponding statistical models.5 The
3. The terms econometric model and statistical model are used synonymously.
4. At the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the network game of Blume et al. (2015), the action of a
player without out-neighbors is decreasing in the endogenous social interactions parameter if his private
marginal benefit is positive.
5. A behavioral variable is a mapping that associates with each individual a value in some set, the
codomain of the mapping.
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supports of linear statistical models have a nonempty intersection with the negative
real line, whereas in economic models, behavioral outcomes are predominantly
and inherently nonnegative, for example, educational achievement, consumption
of substances like alcohol and cigarettes, time spent on recreational activities like
doing sports or playing video games, criminal activity, and labor market outcomes.
Third, statistical models often admit of negative values of the endogenous social
interactions parameter, its domain is often restricted to the open ball (in the real
line) with center zero and radius one.6 It is as yet unclear whether a negative and
statistically significant estimate of the endogenous social interactions parameter
(see, for example, Tao and Lee 2014, Table 7) is reconcilable with an economicmodel,
specifically, with the existence of a Nash equilibrium of a network game, where the
codomain of the behavioral variable is a subset of the nonnegative real line. On top
of these discrepancies, little is known about the properties of an economic model
that underlies a typical statistical model used in applied work. This concerns in
particular results for policy recommendations.
The objective of this paper is to advance the integration of economic and econo-
metric theory for models of social interactions where the players have a preference
or taste for either conformist or anti-conformist behavior, where anti-conformist
behavior is to be understood as the antonym of conformist behavior, that is, an
individual has a preference or taste for anti-conformist behavior if his well-being
or utility is increasing in the distance between own behavior and the behavior of a
group of socially adjacent individuals.
In order to achieve its objective, this paper proposes a static, noncooperative
network game of complete information that admits of nonaffine best reply functions.
The players of the game are characterized by a common action space, which is the
real line, the nonnegative real line, or a compact interval with zero as its lower
bound. Given the majority of behavioral outcomes in applied work is nonnegative,
the real line is the least relevant action space, but it is the most convenient and
tractable one from amathematical and statistical point of view. The compact interval
is particulary suitable for outcomes that involve a natural upper bound like, for
example, hours spent per day on some activity. The nonaffine nature of the game
is interesting for two reasons. First, it admits of an asymmetric loss function that
maps a player’s action and the actions of socially adjacent players to a social cost (in
case of conformist behavior) or benefit (in case of anti-conformist behavior) and
of endogenous social norms that are asymptotically geometric means (as opposed
to arithmetic means in the affine case). Second, it is instrumental in aligning the
action space of the network game with the support of the corresponding statistical
model in case the action space is not the real line.
This paper contributes to the literature on the economics of social interactions in
many respects. First, it demonstrates that a negative endogenous social interactions
parameter is reconcilable with equilibrium behavior in a network game where the
players have a preference for anti-conformist behavior and a common action space
6. In this paper, the endogenous social interactions parameter is called social cost parameter if it is
positive and social benefit parameter if it is negative.
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that is a subset of the nonnegative real line. Second, the network game admits of
players without out-neighbors, for example, players that have no role models but
may serve as role models to other players. Players without out-neighbors yield new
insights on the structural characteristics of a typical linear social interactions model
and give rise to new results on parameter identification. As regards structural char-
acteristics, players without out-neighbors entail an endogenous effects matrix (that
is, a matrix whose components determine endogenous effects) that is structurally
different from an exogenous effects matrix (that is, a matrix whose components
determine exogenous effects). Specifically, if player i has no out-neighbors, then the
ith row of the endogenous effects matrix is the ith unit vector (with a one in the ith
component and zeros elsewhere) and the ith row of the exogenous effects matrix is
the zero vector. The endogenous effects matrix is therefore always row-normalized,
even in the presence of isolated players. This insight is unprecedented in the litera-
ture. Third, the paper introduces the notion of weakly ex ante homogeneous players
and recognizes its role for parameter identification in the form of a kernel condition
that has not been discussed in the literature yet. Fourth, it is shown that the typical
linear independence condition found in the literature involving products or powers
of the endogenous and exogenous effects matrices (see, for example, Bramoullé,
Djebbari, and Fortin 2009, Propositions 1, 4, and 5; Blume et al. 2015, Theorem 3)
is in general only necessary but not sufficient for the identification of endogenous
and exogenous effects through the mean.7 Linear independence conditions are,
however, sufficient for identification through the variance and entail restrictions on
the topologies of the digraphs from which the endogenous and exogenous effects
matrices are derived. While such restrictions are in general difficult to characterize, a
complete characterization is possible and related to the notion of a normally regular
digraph (Jørgensen 2015) in two cases where the conditions involve three matrices.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 discusses related
literature. Section 1.3 is concerned with the baseline economic model of social
interactions. It introduces the aforementioned network game (Section 1.3.1) and
a typology of player heterogeneity (Section 1.3.2). Sufficient conditions for the
existence of a unique and interior Nash equilibrium of the network game are given in
Section 1.3.3. This is followed by a discussion of the properties of Nash equilibrium
actions (Section 1.3.4), a welfare analysis (Section 1.3.5), and a policy analysis (Sec-
tion 1.3.6). Three extensions of the baseline model are discussed in Section 1.3.7;
the most important of all concerns the players’ idiosyncrasies (Section 1.3.7.1) and
admits of idiosyncrasies with local externalities, which give rise to exogenous effects.
Section 1.4 translates the economic model to a statistical model. The assumptions
invoked in the translation (Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2) are guided by the desire to
get a close resemblance of the resulting statistical model with existing models in
the social interactions literature. The identification problem is discussed in Sec-
tion 1.4.3. Section 1.4.4 examines the existence of a statistical model and a nonaffine
7. This result is of course due to differing definitions of the notion of an identified parameter. This
paper’s discussion of the identification problem is based on the statistical notion of identification where
a parameter is called identified if the mapping that associates to any parameter point a probability
distribution of the response variable is injective (see, for example, Koopmans and Reiersol 1950).
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network game such that the supports of the former are in alignment with the action
space of the latter. Section 1.4.5 shows that an important class of existing linear
social interactions models can be reconciled with the network game by imposing
a parameter restriction that is not without loss of generality. Finally, Section 1.5
concludes. A brief review of basic concepts in graph theory is given in Appendix A.
Some basic results in matrix analysis are collected in Appendix B. Tables can be
found in Appendix C and the proofs of all main results in Appendix D.
1.2 Related literature
This paper lies at the intersection of two strands of the literatures on game theory
and the economics of social interactions: games on networks and the identification
of social interactions. Both strands are too vast to survey here.8 Instead, in order to
place this paper into an appropriate context, only selected work is briefly discussed.
As regards games on networks, this paper is closely related to previous work by
Patacchini and Zenou (2012), Sommer and Sulger (2012), and Blume et al. (2015).
The network game of this paper is an extension of Sommer and Sulger’s (2012) gener-
alized local-average conformity game, which in turn is a generalization of Patacchini and
Zenou’s (2012) local average game. The latter network game is a static, noncooperative
game of complete information where the players have a nonnegative action space,
are connected by an undirected network, and have multi-affine best reply functions.
It draws on ideas and concepts from the economics literature on conformism (see,
among others, Jones 1984; Kandel and Lazear 1992; Bernheim 1994; Akerlof 1997;
Fershtman andWeiss 1998). Sommer and Sulger (2012) generalize the local average
game to the case of best reply functions that are not multi-affine. The network game
of this paper is an extension of Sommer and Sulger’s (2012) network game to the
case of players without out-neighbors. The network game of Blume et al. (2015) is
similar in structure to the local average game, but there are important differences.
First, it is a game of incomplete information about the players’ private benefits.
Second, it involves weaker assumptions about the players’ preferences. Third, it is
somewhat less appealing because of an action space that is equal to the real line.
As regards identification of social interactions, the problem of identifying en-
dogenous and exogenous effects was first formally studied by Manski (1993) in
the context of what is commonly known as the linear-in-means model. Subsequent
research has addressed the identification problem in numerous variations and exten-
sions of the linear-in-means model (see, for example, Graham and Hahn 2005; Lee
2007; Graham 2008; Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009; Davezies, D’Haultfoeuille,
and Fougère 2009; De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli 2010; Blume et al. 2015). Of the
more recent research, Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) and Blume et al. (2015)
stand out because their models impose weak assumptions on the individuals’ con-
nections. They share some similarities with the models of this paper, but there are
also notable differences.
8. See, for example, Jackson and Zenou (2015) for a recent survey on games on networks and Blume
et al. (2011) for a survey on the identification of social interactions.
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Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) discuss identification of endogenous
and exogenous effects by two statistical models that may be considered variations
of Manski’s (1993) linear-in-means model and Moffitt’s (2001) model, in particular,
a model without fixed effects and a model with fixed effects. Both models feature a
single so-called interaction matrix whose components determine both endogenous
and exogenous effects, that is, the endogenous effects matrix and the exogenous
effects matrix are the same.9 Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) discuss identifi-
cation of social effects, which subsumes both endogenous and exogenous effects, by
the twomodels. They show that social effects are identified if a parameter restriction
and a linear independence condition involving powers of the interaction matrix are
satisfied (see Propositions 1, 4, and 5).
Blume et al. (2015) discuss identification of endogenous and exogenous effects
by a statistical model without fixed effects that is derived from a network game.
Their model admits of distinct endogenous and exogenous effects matrices.10 Both
matrices have the same structural characteristics, in particular, they are nonnegative
with row sums that are equal to zero or one. They study parameter identification
for the cases of observable individual data and observable aggregate data under
different informational assumptions regarding the two matrices. For example,
for the case of observable individual data and known matrices, they show that
endogenous and exogenous effects are identified if a parameter restriction and a
linear independence condition involving the endogenous and exogenous effects
matrices are satisfied (see Theorem 3).
Although they differ in a variety of respects, Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin
(2009) and Blume et al. (2015) have two features in common. First, their statistical
models admit of individuals without out-neighbors; moreover, their models agree
in the manner they admit of this type of individuals. Specifically, an individual
without out-neighbors corresponds to a row of zeros in both the endogenous and
exogenous effects matrices. Second, their notion of an identified parameter (for the
case of observable individual data) is weaker than—and notably not equivalent
to—the statistical notation of an identified parameter.11 As regards the foregoing
two features, this paper is different. Similar to Blume et al. (2015), the statistical
models admit of distinct endogenous and exogenous effects matrices, but they
are structurally different in the presence of players without out-neighbors. Specifi-
cally, an individual without out-neighbors corresponds to a zero row vector in the
exogenous effects matrix and a unit row vector in the endogenous effects matrix
whose components are all zero except for the component lying on the matrix’s
main diagonal, which is equal to one. This characteristic of the endogenous effects
matrix may seem counter-intuitive, but it is perfectly consistent with economic
9. Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin’s (2009) interaction matrix is structurally identical to what is called
an exogenous effects matrix in this paper (see Definition B).
10. In Blume et al. (2015) the endogenous effects matrix is referred to as the peer-effects sociomatrix
and the exogenous effects matrix as the contextual-effects sociomatrix.
11. Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) call “social effects . . . identified if and only if the . . . structural
parameters can be uniquely recovered from the unrestricted reduced-form parameters” (p. 44). For the
case of observable individual data, Blume et al.’s (2015) notion of an identified parameter is defined via
the injectivity of a certain mapping (see equation (2) and Definition 2).
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theory (see Section 1.3.1). The structural difference between the two effects matrices
carries profound implications for the identification of endogenous and exogenous
effects, the discussion of which is based on the statistical notion of an identified
parameter—thereby pointing to the difference in the second feature.
1.3 The economic model
1.3.1 The nonaffine local average game
The network game to be described hereinafter is a static, noncooperative game of
complete information, where the players take their decisions simultaneously and
independently of one another. The players are assumed to be rational in the sense
that they seek to maximize their well-being.
There are n > 1 players. In what follows, each mathematical object associated
with a particular player will be indexed by an element of the set I := {1, . . . , n}.
Even a playerwill be abstractly represented by an element of I , so that I corresponds
to the set of players of the game.
The players share a common action space, which is denoted by Y . An action of
player i ∈ I is denoted by yi. The set of all possible action profiles y := (y1, . . . , yn)
is equal to Yn. With a slight abuse of terminology, the set Yn is referred to as the
game’s action space.
I consider three different types of action spaces and, hence, three different types
of games: R, R+, and [0, υ¯], where υ¯ > 0. Although [0, υ¯] ⊂ R+ and R+ ⊂ R, a
game with Y = [0, υ¯] is not a special case of a game with Y = R+, and a game with
Y = R+ is not a special case of a game with Y = R. This is mainly due to the fact
that the three sets [0, υ¯], R+, and R are different from a topological point of view,
specifically, ∂[0, υ¯] = {0, υ¯}, ∂R+ = {0}, and ∂R = ∅.
As is characteristic for a game, a player’s well-being depends not only on his
action but may also depend on the actions of other players. This dependence is
made explicit by means of a network by which the players are connected. I assume
that this network is fixed and common knowledge and that it can be represented
by a digraph G on I . The digraph G encodes information about the identities of
the players who directly affect a player’s well-being through their actions. For a
particular player, the set of players who directly affect his well-being is given by
his out-neighborhood. For all i ∈ I , player i’s out-neighborhood in G is denoted
by N+G (i) and its cardinality, the out-degree of i in G, by deg+G (i). Note that, for
all i ∈ I , i /∈ N+G (i), which is a consequence of the definition of a digraph. The
assumption of a digraph implies that a player is not necessarily an out-neighbor of
his out-neighbors, that is, for all i ∈ I , j ∈ N+G (i) does not necessarily imply that
i ∈ N+G (j). In short, the dependence of a player’s well-being on the actions of his
out-neighbors is potentially unidirectional.
Occasionally, I assume that the digraph G is not empty, as stated by the following
condition.
Condition G There exists a player i ∈ I with N+G (i) ̸= ∅.
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Some subsets of I deserve a special notation: Let I0(G) denote the set of all play-
ers that are isolated in G, that is, I0(G) := {i ∈ I | N−G (i) = N+G (i) = ∅}, where
N−G (i) is player i’s in-neighborhood in G, and let I+0 (G) denote the set of all players
whose out-neighborhood in G is empty, that is, I+0 (G) := {i ∈ I | N+G (i) = ∅} =
{i ∈ I | deg+G (i) = 0}. Note that |I0(G)| < n and |I+0 (G)| < n if Condition G is
satisfied.
In order to state the assumption about the players’ preferences over Yn, I in-
troduce a function of quite general but otherwise unspecified form. Let f be a
real-valued function with domain Y . I assume that f satisfies the following assump-
tion.
Assumption F The function f has the following four properties: (i) f is surjective;
(ii) f is strictly increasing; (iii) f is differentiable on its domain with ∂ f := f ′ > 0;
and (iv) f is twice differentiable on the interior of its domain.
The set of all real-valued functions with domain Y that satisfy Assumption F
is denoted by F (Y). Some basic properties of functions in F (Y) are given in the
following result.
Lemma 1.1 If g ∈ F (Y), then (i) g : Y → g(Y) is continuous; (ii) g(Y) ⊂ R is an
interval; (iii) g : Y → g(Y) is bijective; and (iv) g−1 : g(Y)→ Y is continuous (which
implies that g : Y → g(Y) is open), strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable
with ∂g−1 = 1/(∂g ◦ g−1) > 0.
Examples of functions in F (Y) include idY , the identity function on Y , and
y ↦→ 1− exp(−λy), where λ > 0. For Y equal to R+ or [0, υ¯], two functions in
F (Y) other than the identity are the two-parameter Box-Cox transformation (see
Box and Cox 1964, p. 214),
y ↦→

(y+ ϵ)λ − 1
λ
if λ ̸= 0,
log(y+ ϵ) if λ = 0,
and y ↦→ θy + (1 − θ) log(ϵ + y), where λ ∈ R, ϵ > 0 is arbitrary small, and
θ ∈ (0, 1). The principal square root and its restriction to [0, υ¯] are examples of
functions that do not not lie in F (R+) and F ([0, υ¯]), respectively.12
I assume that the players’ preferences over Yn can be represented by a family of
utility functions {ui : Yn → R}i∈I that satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption U For all i ∈ I , player i’s utility function ui : Yn → R is given by
ui(y1, . . . , yn) := p
(
f (yi)
∣∣ αi, β)+ si( f (y1), . . . , f (yn) ∣∣ γ,G),
12. Let f : R+ → R+ be the principal square root function, that is, for all y ∈ R+, f (y) = √y.
The function f is surjective, strictly increasing, and twice differentiable on int(R+) = R++. The first
derivative, ∂ f , is strictly positive on R++. The right first derivative at 0, however, does not exist. Indeed,
for all h > 0, ( f (0+ h)− f (0))/h = 1/√h, and limh↓0 1/
√
h does not exist.
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where (αi, β,γ) ∈ R×R+ ×R is a triple of parameters, the so-called private compo-
nent function p(· | αi, β) : Y → R is given by
p(yi | αi, β) := αiyi − β2 y
2
i ,
and the so-called social component function si(· | γ,G) : Yn → R is given by
si(y1, . . . , yn | γ,G) :=

0, if deg+G (i) = 0,
−γ
2
(
yi −
∑j∈N+G (i) yj
deg+G (i)
)2
if deg+G (i) > 0.
Some comments onAssumptionU are in order. To this end, suppose ConditionG
is satisfied. Let i ∈ I \ I+0 (G), and let (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Yn be an action profile.
Player i’s utility function is symmetric in his out-neighbors’ actions.13 It exhibits
local strategic complements if γ > 0 and local strategic substitutes if γ < 0 because
∀j ∈ I ∂
2ui(y1, . . . , yn)
∂yi∂yj
=

γ∂ f (yi)∂ f (yj)
deg+G (i)
if j ∈ N+G (i),
0 if j /∈ N+G (i),
where ∂ f (yi)∂ f (yj) > 0 (Assumption F). It does, however, not exhibit positive or
negative local externalities.14
The utility that player i ascribes to the action profile (y1, . . . , yn) consists of two
components: the private component and the social component.
The private component is given by αi f (yi)− (β/2) f (yi)2. Under certain condi-
tions, including β > 0, the point f−1(αi/β) is defined and lies in the interior of Y ,
fromwhich it follows that the function yi ↦→ αi f (yi)− (β/2) f (yi)2 is strictly increas-
ing on (−∞, f−1(αi/β)) ∩ int(Y) and strictly decreasing on ( f−1(αi/β),+∞) ∩
int(Y), with a global maximum point at f−1(αi/β).15 The private component can
in turn be decomposed into two parts: the private benefit and the private cost. The pri-
vate benefit is defined as the sum of the positive parts of αi f (yi) and −(β/2) f (yi)2
and the private cost is defined as the sum of the negative parts of αi f (yi) and
−(β/2) f (yi)2. The positive part and the negative part of αi f (yi) are denoted by
(αi f (yi))+ := max{0, αi f (yi)} and (αi f (yi))− := −min{0, αi f (yi)}, respectively.
A similar notation applies to the positive part and the negative part of−(β/2) f (yi)2.
13. That is, for all permutationspi of I with fixed points I \N+G (i), ui(ypi(1), . . . , ypi(n)) = ui(y1, . . . , yn).
14. In accordance with the terminology introduced by Galeotti et al. (2010, pp. 226–27), player i’s utility
function is said to exhibit positive (respectively, negative) local externalities if for all (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Yn and
for all (y˜1, . . . , y˜n) ∈ Yn with y˜i = yi and {j ∈ N+G (i) | y˜j ≥ yj} = N+G (i), ui(y˜1, . . . , y˜n) ≥ ui(y1, . . . , yn)
(respectively, ui(y˜1, . . . , y˜n) ≤ ui(y1, . . . , yn)).
15. If β > 0 and αi/β ∈ f (Y), then f−1(αi/β) is defined. If f−1(αi/β) is defined, then
∂
(
y ↦→ αi f (y)− (β/2) f (y)2
)
(yi)

< 0 if yi > f−1(αi/β),
= 0 if yi = f−1(αi/β),
> 0 if yi < f−1(αi/β).
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It follows from the foregoing that player i’s private component can be written as
follows:
αi f (yi)− β2 f (yi)
2 =
(
αi f (yi)
)+ −((αi f (yi))− + β2 f (yi)2
)
. (1.1)
The social component is given by
−γ
2
(
f (yi)−
∑j∈N+G (i) f (yj)
deg+G (i)
)2
.
The social component represents player i’s social cost (if γ > 0) or social benefit
(if γ < 0) from deviating from a social norm that is defined via his out-neighbors’
actions. If f is the identity function on Y , then player i’s social norm is given by the
arithmetic mean of his out-neighbors’ actions (see Example 1.2 for a discussion).
If f is the composition of an infinitesimal positive translation with the natural
logarithm, which, by abuse of notation, is denoted by f ≈ log, then player i’s social
norm is essentially given by the geometric mean of his out-neighbors’ actions (see
Example 1.3 for a discussion). The distance between player i’s action and his social
norm is referred to as the social distance between player i and his out-neighbors. It is
important to note that player i’s social norm is endogenous because it is defined via
his out-neighbors’ actions. The players’ social norms are potentially heterogeneous
(in equilibrium) because the players may vary in their out-neighborhoods and not
all players may play the same action (in equilibrium).
I discuss the above concepts in more detail for the case f = idY (Example 1.2)
and the case f ≈ log (Example 1.3).
Example 1.2 Suppose Y = R+, Condition G is satisfied, β > 0, γ ̸= 0, and
f = idR+ . Let i ∈ I \ I+0 (G), and suppose αi > 0. The private component of
player i’s utility is given by αiyi − (β/2)y2i . The function yi ↦→ αiyi − (β/2)y2i is
strictly increasing on [0, αi/β) and strictly decreasing on (αi/β,+∞), with a global
maximum point at αi/β > 0. See Figure 1.1 for an illustration. The sum of the
positive parts and the sum of the negative parts of αiyi and −(β/2)y2i are given by
αiyi and (β/2)y2i , respectively. The social component of player i’s utility is given by
−γ
2
(
yi −
∑j∈N+G (i) yj
deg+G (i)
)2
.
Player i’s social norm is given by the arithmetic mean of his out-neighbors’ actions,
and player i’s social cost or benefit is zero if and only if his action is equal to thismean.
The social cost or benefit is strictly increasing in the distance between player i’s
action and his social norm. Two actions that are at the same distance from the social
norm, one below and one above, cause the same social cost or benefit. In summary,
player i’s action and social norm are mapped to a social cost or benefit by means of
a quadratic and therefore symmetric loss function. 
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Figure 1.1. Private component function yi ↦→ αiyi − (β/2)y2i for different posi-
tive αi’s and β = 1 (Example 1.2)
Example 1.3 Suppose Y = R+, Condition G is satisfied, β > 0, γ ̸= 0, and f
satisfies f (y) = log(ϵ+ y), where ϵ ∈ (0, 1) is arbitrary small. Let i ∈ I \ I+0 (G),
and suppose αi > β log(ϵ). The private component of player i’s utility is given by
αi log(ϵ + yi) − (β/2)(log(ϵ + yi))2. The function yi ↦→ αi log(ϵ + yi) −
(β/2)(log(ϵ+ yi))2 is strictly increasing on [0, exp(αi/β)− ϵ) and strictly decreas-
ing on (exp(αi/β)− ϵ,+∞), with a global maximum point at exp(αi/β)− ϵ > 0.
See Figure 1.2 for an illustration of the case αi > 0 and Figure 1.3 for an illustration
of the case αi < 0. The sum of the positive parts and the sum of the negative parts
of αi log(ϵ+ yi) and −(β/2)(log(ϵ+ yi))2 are given by(
αi log(ϵ+ yi)
)+
= αi log(ϵ+ yi) 1Pϵ
(
(αi, yi)
)
and (
αi log(ϵ+ yi)
)−
+
β
2
(
log(ϵ+ yi)
)2
=
β
2
(
log(ϵ+ yi)
)2
− αi log(ϵ+ yi)
(
1− 1Pϵ
(
(αi, yi)
))
,
respectively, where Pϵ := (−∞, 0)× (0, 1− ϵ)∪ [0,+∞)× [1− ϵ,+∞) ⊂ R×R++.
The sum of the negative parts depends thus on αi and β. The social component of
player i’s utility is given by
−γ
2
log
 ϵ+ yi(
∏j∈N+G (i) ϵ+ yj
)1/deg+G (i)


2
. (1.2)
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Figure 1.2. Private component function yi ↦→ αi log(ϵ+ yi)− (β/2)(log(ϵ+ yi))2
for different positive αi’s, β = 1, and ϵ = 1/100 (Example 1.3)
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Figure 1.3. Private component function yi ↦→ αi log(ϵ+ yi)− (β/2)(log(ϵ+ yi))2
for different negative αi’s, β = 1, and ϵ = 1/100 (Example 1.3)
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For the purpose of discussing the term (1.2), let the function d : R2++ → R be
defined by d(x, y) := (log(x/y))2. The function d is a semimetric on R++.16 In
addition, it has the following two properties: (i) for all y ∈ R++, the function
x ↦→ d(x, y) is strictly decreasing on (0, y) and strictly increasing on (y,+∞); and
(ii) for all (x,∆x) ∈ R2++ with∆x < x, the function y ↦→ d(x−∆x, y)− d(x+∆x, y)
is negative on (0,
√
(x−∆x)(x+∆x)) and positive on (√(x−∆x)(x+∆x),+∞).17
In the limit ϵ ↓ 0, provided that {yj | j ∈ N+G (i)} ⊂ R++, player i’s social norm
is given by the geometric mean of his out-neighbors’ actions, and player i’s social
cost or benefit is zero if and only if his action is equal to this mean. The social cost or
benefit is strictly increasing in the distance between player i’s action and his social
norm. Two actions that are at the same distance from the social norm, one below
and one above, cause in general not the same social cost or benefit. If the social
norm exceeds (respectively, falls short of) a certain threshold, an action below the
social norm causes a higher (respectively, lower) social cost or benefit than an action
above the social norm that is at the same distance from the norm as the action below
the norm. In summary, player i’s action and social norm are mapped to a social cost
or benefit by means of an asymmetric loss function. 
I conclude the discussion of Assumption U by extending the existing body of
terms surrounding utility functions.
The parameters {αi | i ∈ I} ∪ {β,γ} are referred to as the players’ preference
parameters. For all i ∈ I , αi is referred to as player i’s idiosyncrasy. Note that an
idiosyncrasy is the only preference parameter that may vary from one player to
another. Note also that a player’s idiosyncrasy is equal to themarginal private benefit
of his own action if f = idY .18 The parameter β is referred to as the players’ common
private cost parameter. Note that a player’s private cost of own actionmay also depend
on his idiosyncrasy.19 The parameter γ is referred to as the players’ common social
cost parameter (if γ ≥ 0) or common social benefit parameter (if γ < 0). If γ > 0, it is
also referred to as the players’ common preference for conformist behavior, and if γ < 0,
it is also referred to as the players’ common preference for anti-conformist behavior. If
γ = 0, the players are said to have a common preference for nonconformist behavior.
Based on the preceding considerations, I introduce the notion of a (generic)
nonaffine local average game.
Definition G A nonaffine local average game, or NALA game for short, is a static,
noncooperative game of complete information. The set of players, I , is finite with
|I| = n > 1. The players are connected to each other by a fixed social network that
is represented by a digraph G of order n. The players have a common action space
Y that is equal to R, R+, or [0, υ¯]. The players’ preferences over Yn are represented
by a family of utility functions {ui : Yn → R}i∈I that satisfies Assumption U,
16. The function d is a semimetric on R++ because it satisfies the following three axioms: (A.1) for
all (x, y) ∈ R2++, d(x, y) ≥ 0 (nonnegativity); (A.2) for all (x, y) ∈ R2++, d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y
(identity of indiscernibles); and (A.3) for all (x, y) ∈ R2++, d(x, y) = d(y, x) (symmetry).
17. See Appendix D for a proof of the properties of d.
18. See Example 1.2.
19. See the decomposition of the private component (1.1) and in particular Example 1.3.
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Figure 1.4. A digraph of order 3 (Example 1.4)
which encompasses Assumption F. A NALA game is denoted by the quintuple
(I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ). ANALA game for whichY is left unspecified is referred
to as a generic NALA game.20
In the remainder of this section, I give a compact representation of the players’
utility functions that dispenses with the distinction between empty and nonempty
out-neighborhoods. To this end, I state the following definition.
Definition A Let sl(G) denote the directed pseudograph that is derived from G by
adding self-loops to all vertices with zero out-degree.21 The endogenous effects matrix
of G is the row-normalized adjacency matrix of sl(G) with respect to the canonical
enumeration of V(G), idV(G), and is denoted by A¯(G). The component in row i and
column j of A¯(G) is denoted by a¯i,j(G).
The endogenous effects matrix of G is a square matrix of order n that satisfies
∀(i, j) ∈ I2 a¯i,j(G) =

δi,j if deg+G (i) = 0,
1N+G (i)(j)
deg+G (i)
if deg+G (i) > 0.
(1.3)
Some properties of A¯(G) follow directly from its definition: (i) A¯(G) is nonnegative;
(ii) A¯(G) is different from On; (iii) for all i ∈ I , if deg+G (i) = 0, then a¯i,i(G) = 1,
and if deg+G (i) > 0, then a¯i,i(G) = 0; (iv) A¯(G)1n = 1n; (v) if G is empty, that is,
A(G) = ∅, then A¯(G) = In; (vi) ρ(A¯(G)) = 1, that is, the spectral radius of A¯(G)
is one, because A¯(G) is nonnegative and row-normalized (Lemma B.8).
I illustrate Definition A with three examples.
Example 1.4 Suppose I = {1, 2, 3} and A(G) = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3)}. See Fig-
ure 1.4 for an illustration of G. Evidently, sl(G) = (I ,A(G) ∪ {(3, 3)}) and
A¯(G) =
1
2
0 1 10 0 2
0 0 2
 . 
Example 1.5 If A(G) = ⋃i∈I\{1}{(i, 1)}, that is, G is star-shaped with arcs from
every peripheral player i ∈ I \ {1} to the central player 1, then A¯(G) = 1neT1 . 
20. The expression “Y is left unspecified” does not implicate that Y can be any subset of R; it is to be
understood as all that is known about Y is that it is equal to R, R+, or [0, υ¯].
21. A directed pseudograph is a graph for which multiple arcs or self-loops are admissible (see, for
example, Bang-Jensen and Gutin 2009, Section 1.2).
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Example 1.6 If G is complete, then A¯(G) = (1/(n− 1))(1n1Tn − In). 
Using Definition A, for all i ∈ I , player i’s utility can be written as
ui(y1, . . . , yn) = αi f (yi)− β2 f (yi)
2 − γ
2
(
f (yi)− ∑
j∈I
a¯i,j(G) f (yj)
)2
. (1.4)
1.3.2 Typology of player heterogeneity
In this section, I discuss different types or, more precisely, degrees of player hetero-
geneity. To this end, let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game.
Let α := (α1, . . . , αn) denote the profile, that is, the (column) vector, of the players’
idiosyncrasies.
The players of Γ can be ex ante heterogeneous in two respects: first, with respect
to their preferences, that is, their idiosyncracies, and second, with respect to their
out-neighborhoods, which define their positions in G, for example, in terms of
in-degrees and out-degrees. The following terminology, however, is predicated on
the players’ idiosyncracies only.
Definition H The players of Γ are called weakly ex ante homogeneous if α = A¯(G)α,
that is, for all i ∈ I \ I+0 (G), αi = (1/deg+G (i))∑j∈N+G (i) αj.
22 The players of Γ are
called strongly ex ante homogeneous if there exists an α¯ ∈ R such that α = α¯1n, that is,
for all i ∈ I , αi = α¯. The players of Γ are called ex ante heterogeneous if they are not
strongly ex ante homogeneous.
The notion of strongly ex ante homogeneous players is stronger than its weaker
form, that is, if the players of Γ are strongly ex ante homogeneous, then they are
weakly ex ante homogeneous. The converse is in general not true. An exception is
the following result.23
Corollary 1.7 Suppose G is complete. The players of Γ are strongly ex ante homogeneous
if and only if they are weakly ex ante homogeneous.
Corollary 1.7 suggests that the connectedness of G or, more generally speaking,
the structure of G affects the extent to which ex ante heterogeneous players can be
weakly ex ante homogeneous. Indeed, the players of Γ cannot be weakly but not
strongly ex ante homogeneous if G is strongly connected (see Corollary 1.9), which
is, for example, the case when G is complete. The following discussion relates the
structure of G to the players’ (potential) homogeneity, thereby giving substance to
the notion of a digraph’s structure.
The players of Γ are weakly ex ante homogeneous if and only if α is a fixed
point of the linear mapping with domain and codomain Rn that is represented by
the matrix A¯(G) with respect to the standard basis for Rn. The set of fixed points
22. For all i ∈ I+0 (G), the ith equation of the system α = A¯(G)α is the identity αi = αi .
23. The result is stated as a corollary because if follows from a more fundamental result, which is stated
in Proposition 1.8 as Result 1.8.2.
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of A¯(G) in Rn is equal to Eig(1, A¯(G)), the eigenspace of A¯(G) associated with the
eigenvalue 1. The eigenspace Eig(1, A¯(G)) is a linear subspace of Rn; it contains 1n
because A¯(G) is row-normalized, from which it follows that its dimension is at
least 1: g.m.(1, A¯(G)) := dimR(Eig(1, A¯(G))) ≥ 1.24 Besides this lower bound,
g.m.(1, A¯(G)) depends on the digraph G only through its structure, that is, its
isomorphism class: if H is a digraph of order n that is isomorphic to G, then
g.m.(1, A¯(H)) = g.m.(1, A¯(G)). The structure of G imposes restrictions on the
(potential) homogeneity of ex ante heterogeneous players; specifically, ex ante
heterogeneous players cannot be weakly ex ante homogeneous if g.m.(1, A¯(G)) = 1
or, equivalently, Eig(1, A¯(G)) = span{1n}. The contrapositive of this statement
and two other properties of Eig(1, A¯(G)) are summarized in the following result.
Proposition 1.8 (1.8.1) If the players of Γ are weakly but not strongly ex ante homoge-
neous, then span{1n} ( span{1n, α} ⊂ Eig(1, A¯(G)), that is,
g.m.
(
1, A¯(G)
)
> 1. (1.5)
(1.8.2) If G is strongly connected, then Eig(1, A¯(G)) = span{1n} or, equivalently,
g.m.(1, A¯(G)) = 1.
(1.8.3) If player x ∈ I is isolated in G, then span{1n, ex} ⊂ Eig(1, A¯(G)), that is,
g.m.(1, A¯(G)) > 1.
The following result follows directly from Result 1.8.2.
Corollary 1.9 Suppose G is strongly connected. The players of Γ are strongly ex ante
homogeneous if and only if they are weakly ex ante homogeneous.
In order to discuss the role of isolated players for the existence of weakly but
not strongly ex ante homogeneous players, consider the following scenario: There
exist a player x ∈ I and an α¯ ∈ R such that αx ̸= α¯ and for all i ∈ I \ {x},
αi = α¯. Let us consider two cases. First, suppose no player of Γ is isolated in G.
It follows that the players of Γ are not weakly ex ante homogeneous. Second,
suppose player x is isolated in G. It follows that the players of Γ are weakly but not
strongly ex ante homogeneous, and all but one of the players of Γ are strongly ex
ante homogeneous. The second case demonstrates that isolated players admit of
weakly ex ante homogeneous players that are not strongly ex ante homogeneous.
As regards inequality (1.5), it may be desirable to take account of this property of
isolated players. Specifically, the inequality
g.m.
(
1, A¯(G)
)− |I0(G)| > 1 (1.6)
may convey information about the existence of weakly but not strongly ex ante
homogeneous players beyond that contained in (1.5).
24. The dimension of the eigenspace Eig(1, A¯(G)) is referred to as the geometric multiplicity of the
eigenvalue 1 of A¯(G) and is denoted by g.m.(1, A¯(G)).
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The preceding discussion shows that G or, more generally, any digraph of or-
der n admits of players that are weakly but not strongly ex ante homogeneous if
at least one of the players is isolated. It is not clear from the outset if this is also
the case in the absence of isolated players. It is therefore of high interest to know if
there exist digraphs or, more precisely, isomorphism classes of digraphs that satisfy
not only inequality (1.5)—and therefore admit of players that are weakly but not
strongly ex ante homogeneous—but also inequality (1.6)—and therefore admit of
nonisolated players that are weakly but not strongly ex ante homogeneous. The
following overview is confined to digraphs of orders at most 4 for reasons of com-
putational complexity; for example, there are 1,048,576 (respectively, 1,073,741,824)
digraphs of order 5 (respectively, 6), which are partitioned into 9,608 (respectively,
1,540,944) isomorphism classes (see, for example, Harary 1969, Table A2).25 For the
sake of completeness, the overview includes digraphs of order 1, which is in conflict
with the assumption that n > 1, and empty digraphs. There is only one digraph of
order 1, namely, the empty digraph ({1},∅), which cannot satisfy (1.5) and (1.6).
Among the 4 digraphs of order 2, which are partitioned into 3 isomorphism classes,
only the empty digraph satisfies (1.5) and (1.6). There are 64 digraphs of order 3.
The digraph isomorphism partitions this set into 16 isomorphism classes. Broadly
speaking, there are 16 digraphs of order 3 that are not isomorphic. The representa-
tives of 4 of these 16 classes (13 digraphs altogether, which corresponds to a share
of approximately 20 per cent of 64) satisfy (1.5). The representatives of one class
(3 digraphs altogether, which corresponds to a share of approximately 5 per cent
of 64) satisfy (1.6). Details on a representative for each class are given in Table C.1
in Appendix C. There are 4,096 digraphs of order 4, which are partitioned into 218
isomorphism classes. The representatives of 33 classes (486 digraphs altogether,
which corresponds to a share of approximately 12 per cent of 4,096) satisfy (1.5).
The representatives of 18 classes (266 digraphs altogether, which corresponds to
a share of approximately 6 per cent of 4096) satisfy (1.6). See again Table C.1 for
more details.
The present discussion of weakly ex ante homogeneous players is rounded off
by an example.
Example 1.10 Suppose I = {1, 2, . . . , 6} and A(G) = {(1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 1), (3, 2),
(3, 4), (4, 3), (4, 5), (4, 6), (5, 6), (6, 5)}. See Figure 1.5 for an illustration of G. Ele-
mentary calculations yield Eig(1, A¯(G)) = span{4e1 + 4e2 + 3e3 + e4, 16} with, for
example,
4
10
e1 +
4
10
e2 +
3
10
e3 +
1
10
e4 +
15
10
16 =
1
10

19
19
18
16
15
15
 ∈ Eig
(
1, A¯(G)
)
.
25. In general, there are 4(n2) different digraphs of order n ∈ Z++.
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1
2
34
5
6
Figure 1.5. A digraph of order 6 (Example 1.10)
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 1.6. A linear digraph of order 5 (Example 1.11)
It follows that g.m.(1, A¯(G)) = 2, so that the players of Γ can be weakly but not
strongly ex ante homogeneous (Proposition 1.8). 
1.3.3 Existence and uniqueness of interior Nash equilibria
This section is concerned with the questions of existence and uniqueness of NEs of
NALA games. The focus is on NEs in pure strategies that lie in the interior of the
n-ary Cartesian power of the players’ common action space.
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, let αmin :=
min{αi | i ∈ I} and αmax := max{αi | i ∈ I}, and let α be defined as in Section 1.3.2.
For a particular action space Y , the NALA game Γ may have multiple NEs or
none at all. This is illustrated in Examples 1.11 and 1.12.
Example 1.11 Suppose Y = [0, υ¯] and A(G) = ⋃n−1i=1 {(i, i + 1)}, that is, G is a
linear digraph. See Figure 1.6 for an illustration of G for the case n = 5. In addition,
suppose α1 = βυ¯, {αi | i ∈ I \ {1}} ⊂ (βυ¯,+∞), β > 0, γ = −β, and f = id[0,υ¯].
The players’ utility functions satisfy
∀i ∈ I ui(y1, . . . , yn) =

(αi + γyi+1)yi − γ2 y
2
i+1 if i < n,
αiyi +
γ
2
y2i if i = n.
It is straightforward to show that Γ has uncountably many NEs, which are given by
{(y⋆1 , υ¯, . . . , υ¯) | y⋆1 ∈ [0, υ¯]}. 
ANE of Γ that involves at least an action at the boundary of the action space, ∂Y ,
is called a boundary NE. For example, (0, υ¯, . . . , υ¯) and (υ¯/2, υ¯, . . . , υ¯) are boundary
NEs of the NALA game Γ of Example 1.11.
Example 1.12 Suppose Y = R+ and A(G) = ⋃n−1i=1 {(i, i + 1)} ∪ {(n, 1)}, that is,
G is a cycle digraph. See Figure 1.7 for an illustration of G for the case n = 4. In
addition, suppose {αi | i ∈ I} ⊂ R++, β = 0, γ > 0, and f = idR+ . Let pi be the
permutation of I defined by
pi(i) :=
{
i+ 1 if i < n,
1 if i = n.
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1
23
4
Figure 1.7. A cycle digraph of order 4 (Example 1.12)
The players’ utility functions satisfy
∀i ∈ I ui(y1, . . . , yn) = αiyi − γ2
(
yi − ypi(i)
)2.
It is straightforward to show that Γ has no NE.26 
The remainder of this section is concerned with sufficient conditions for the
existence of a unique and interior NE of Γ. The conditions depend critically on the
topological properties of Y , which is why they are stated separately for each type of
action space. Proposition 1.13 covers the case Y = R and admits of both a negative
and a nonnegative γ. In the interests of clarity and in order to facilitate comparison,
the case Y = [0, υ¯] is covered by two propositions: Proposition 1.14 deals with the
case of a nonnegative γ and Proposition 1.15 with the case of a negative γ. The same
applies to the case Y = R+. A discussion of Propositions 1.13, 1.14, 1.15, and 1.17
follows in Sections 1.3.3.1 to 1.3.3.4.
The following notation is used to represent the NE of Γ: To any real-valued
function g with domain D ⊂ R and any integer N > 1, there is associated a vector
field gN : DN → g(D)N whose kth component is g ◦ projNk , where projNk : DN → D
denotes the kth projection function that maps a point in DN to its kth component,
in particular, for all x := (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ DN , gN(x) = (g(x1), . . . , g(xN)). Often N
is omitted from the notation gN , and it is simply written as g.
Proposition 1.13 Suppose Y = R. The NALA game Γ has a unique NE y⋆ ∈ Rn, which
is given by
f (y⋆) =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
α, (1.7)
if four conditions are satisfied: (1.13.1) β > 0, (1.13.2) β+ γ > 0, (1.13.3) (β+ γ) /∈
σ(γA¯(G)), and (1.13.4) f is not bounded below and above.
Proposition 1.14 Suppose Y = [0, υ¯]. The NALA game Γ has a unique and interior NE
y⋆ ∈ (0, υ¯)n, which is given by (1.7), if four conditions are satisfied: (1.14.1) β > 0,
(1.14.2) γ ≥ 0, (1.14.3) β f (0) < αmin, and (1.14.4) αmax < β f (υ¯).
Proposition 1.15 Suppose Y = [0, υ¯]. The NALA game Γ has a unique and interior NE
y⋆ ∈ (0, υ¯)n, which is given by (1.7), if four conditions are satisfied: (1.15.1) β > 0,
(1.15.2)−β/2 < γ < 0, (1.15.3) β f (0)+γ( f (0)− f (υ¯)) < αmin, and (1.15.4) αmax <
β f (υ¯) + γ( f (υ¯)− f (0)).
26. See Appendix D for details.
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Proposition 1.16 Suppose Y = R+. The NALA game Γ has a unique and interior NE
y⋆ ∈ Rn++, which is given by (1.7), if four conditions are satisfied: (1.16.1) β > 0,
(1.16.2) γ ≥ 0, (1.16.3) β f (0) < αmin, and (1.16.4) f is not bounded above.27
Proposition 1.17 Suppose Y = R+. The NALA game Γ has a unique and interior NE
y⋆ ∈ Rn++, which is given by (1.7), if six conditions are satisfied: (1.17.1) β > 0,
(1.17.2) −β/2 < γ < 0, (1.17.3) β f (0) < αmin, (1.17.4) β(β + 2γ) f (0) <
(β+γ)αmin+γαmax, (1.17.5) |γ|(β+γ)(αmax− β f (0)) < β(β+ 2γ)(αmin− β f (0)),
and (1.17.6) f is not bounded above.28
The systems of equations that govern equilibrium actions, that is, the systems of
best reply functions, are the same for all three types of action spaces for the focus is
on an interior NE. An equivalent but more compact representation of the common
system of equations (1.7) is given by
f (y⋆) =
(
βIn − γ
(
A¯(G)− In
))−1
α. (1.8)
In order to discuss equilibrium actions, suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2, so that
β+ γ > 0 and |γ/(β+ γ)| < 1. In addition, suppose Γ has a unique and interior
NE y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n), which is given by the system of equations (1.7). It follows
that
f (y⋆) =
1
β+ γ
α+
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G) f (y⋆), (1.9)
that is,
∀i ∈ I f (y⋆i ) =

αi
β
if deg+G (i) = 0,
αi
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ
∑j∈N+G (i) f (y
⋆
j )
deg+G (i)
if deg+G (i) > 0.
(1.10)
Apart from a missing error term, the system of equations (1.9) has the same form
as a stationary spatial autoregressive process of order one with a row-normalized
spatial weights matrix. An explicit expression for y⋆ is given by29
∀i ∈ I y⋆i =

f−1
(
αi
β
)
if deg+G (i) = 0,
f−1
(
αi
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ
∑j∈N+G (i) f (y
⋆
j )
deg+G (i)
)
if deg+G (i) > 0.
27. Sommer and Sulger (2012) prove the same result for the case where all players of Γ have at least
one out-neighbor in G (see Proposition 2.1).
28. For the case where all players of Γ have at least one out-neighbor in G, Sommer and Sulger (2012)
show that Γ has a unique interior NE if Conditions 1.17.1 and 1.17.2 and the inequality
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (0)1n <c
(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α
are satisfied (see Appendix B.2). Sommer and Sulger (2012) do, however, not provide sufficient condi-
tions for the existence of a unique and interior NE of Γ.
29. The function f is bijective (Lemma 1.1).
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In equilibrium, a player’s action depends on the mean of his out-neighbors’ (trans-
formed) actions, provided that the player’s out-neighborhood is not empty. In
general, this average is a local average because it involves only the actions of a
player’s out-neighbors. It is for this reason that the game is called a generic non-
affine local average game. The game is called a generic nonaffine local average game
because it admits of best reply functions that are not multi-affine, as opposed to
the so-called local average game of Patacchini and Zenou (2012), which is char-
acterized by multi-affine best reply functions.30 Patacchini and Zenou’s (2012)
local average game is a special case of a NALA game with Y = R+, where G is
symmetric, I+0 (G) = ∅ (that is, all players have at least one out-neighbor), γ > 0,
and f = idR+ .31
I illustrate the preceding results with an example.
Example 1.18 Suppose Y = [0, υ¯], G is complete, β > 0, {αi | i ∈ I} ⊂ (0, βυ¯),
γ > 0, and f = id[0,υ¯]. The NALA game Γ has a unique and interior NE y⋆ :=
(y⋆1 , . . . , y
⋆
n) (Proposition 1.14), which is given by32
y⋆ =
n
(n− 1)β+ nγ
(
γ
β
〈1n, α〉
n
1n +
(
1− 1
n
)
α
)
, (1.11)
where (1/n)〈1n, α〉 is the arithmetic mean of the players’ idiosyncrasies. It follows
that
max{y⋆i | i ∈ I} −min{y⋆i | i ∈ I} =
1
β+
n
n− 1γ
(αmax − αmin).
Thus, the range of the players’ actions decreases with γ, that is, the stronger the
players’ common preference for conformist behavior or, in other words, the higher
the cost to deviate from the social norm, the more the players conform to each other.
The players’ actions are identical if and only if the players of Γ are strongly ex ante
homogeneous or, equivalently (Corollary 1.7), weakly ex ante homogeneous. 
1.3.3.1 Discussion of Proposition 1.13
Suppose Y = R and Conditions 1.13.1 to 1.13.4 are satisfied. Assumption F and
Condition 1.13.4 imply that f (R) = R. Note that ∂ f > 0 (Assumption F) and f is
bijective with strictly increasing f−1 (Lemma 1.1).
In order to discuss Conditions 1.13.1 and 1.13.2, let k ∈ I . I consider two cases.
First, suppose player k has no out-neighbors. It follows that his utility from playing
action yk ∈ R equals αk f (yk)− (β/2) f (yk)2 and his marginal utility at yk equals
(αk− β f (yk))∂ f (yk). In light of the above, Condition 1.13.1 implies that the function
yk ↦→ αk f (yk)− (β/2) f (yk)2 is strictly increasing on (−∞, f−1(αk/β)) and strictly
decreasing on ( f−1(αk/β),+∞), where f−1(αk/β) is defined because β > 0 and
30. Let i ∈ I . Player i’s best reply function bi : Yn−1 → Y is called multi-affine if for all j ∈ I \ {i} and
for all {y˜k | k ∈ I \ {i, j}} ⊂ Y , yj ↦→ bi(y˜1, . . . , y˜j−1, yj, y˜j+1, . . . , y˜n) is an affine function.
31. The players of Patacchini and Zenou’s (2012) local average game are connected by an undirected
graph, which corresponds to the case of a symmetric digraph.
32. See Appendix D for details.
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f (R) = R. As for the hypothetical case β = 0, the function yk ↦→ αk f (yk) is
strictly decreasing on R if αk < 0, constant on R if αk = 0, and strictly increasing
on R if αk > 0. As for the hypothetical case β < 0, the function yk ↦→ αk f (yk)−
(β/2) f (yk)2 is strictly decreasing on (−∞, f−1(αk/β)) and strictly increasing on
( f−1(αk/β),+∞). Hence, Condition 1.13.1 rules out the possibility that player k
has a preference for decreasing or increasing his action without limits or that he is
indifferent about which action to play. For the special case f = idR, Condition 1.13.1
implies that the function yk ↦→ αk f (yk)− (β/2) f (yk)2 = αkyk − (β/2)y2k is strictly
concave. Second, suppose player k’s out-neighborhood is not empty and the actions
played by his out-neighbors satisfy {yj | j ∈ N+G (k)} ⊂ R.33 It follows that his
utility from playing action yk ∈ R equals
αk f (yk)− β2 f (yk)
2 − γ
2
(
f (yk)−
∑j∈N+G (k) f (yj)
deg+G (k)
)2
(1.12)
and his marginal utility at yk equals(
αk − (β+ γ) f (yk) + γ
∑j∈N+G (k) f (yj)
deg+G (k)
)
∂ f (yk).
In light of the above, Condition 1.13.2 implies that the function yk ↦→ (1.12) is
strictly increasing on (−∞, ck) and strictly decreasing on (ck,+∞), where
ck := f−1
(
αk
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ
∑j∈N+G (k) f (yj)
deg+G (k)
)
∈ R
is defined because β+ γ > 0 and f (R) = R. Analogous to the first case, Condi-
tion 1.13.2 rules out the possibility that player k has a preference for decreasing or
increasing his action without limits or that he is indifferent about which action to
play.
Given the preceding considerations, Conditions 1.13.1, 1.13.2, and 1.13.4 imply
that, for all i ∈ I , player i’s best reply function bi : Rn−1 → R is given by
bi(y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yn)
=

f−1
(
αi
β
)
if deg+G (i) = 0,
f−1
(
αi
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ
∑j∈N+G (i) f (yj)
deg+G (i)
)
if deg+G (i) > 0.
It is important to note that the best reply functions are in general not multi-affine if
Condition G is satisfied and f ̸= idR. A NE y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) ∈ Rn of Γ satisfies
∀i ∈ I y⋆i = bi(y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆i−1, y⋆i+1, . . . , y⋆n). (1.13)
33. The condition {yj | j ∈ N+G (k)} ⊂ R rules out the possibility that one of player k’s out-neighbors
has a preference for decreasing of increasing his action without limits.
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For all i ∈ I , let the function hi : Rn → R be defined by
hi(y1, . . . , yn) := f−1
(
αi
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ ∑j∈I
a¯i,j(G) f (yj)
)
=

f−1
(
αi
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ
f (yi)
)
if deg+G (i) = 0,
f−1
(
αi
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ
∑j∈N+G (i) f (yj)
deg+G (i)
)
if deg+G (i) > 0.
Note that (1.13) is equivalent to, for all i ∈ I , y⋆i = hi(y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n), so that y⋆ is a
fixed point of the mapping h := (h1, . . . , hn) : Rn → Rn, that is, y⋆ = h(y⋆). Also
note that y⋆ = h(y⋆) is equivalent to(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆) =
1
β+ γ
α. (1.14)
Condition 1.13.3 implies that the system of linear equations(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
z⋆ =
1
β+ γ
α (1.15)
has a unique solution z⋆ := (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Rn (Lemma B.3). It is clear from a
comparison of (1.14) and (1.15) that a NE of Γ is a solution to the system of linear
(if f is linear) or nonlinear (if f is nonlinear) equations z⋆ = f (y⋆). This system
has a unique solution y⋆ ∈ Rn because f is bijective (Lemma 1.1) and f (R)n = Rn
(Assumption F and Condition 1.13.4); in particular, y⋆ = f−1(z⋆). An explicit
expression for the players’ equilibrium actions is given by
∀i ∈ I y⋆i = f−1
(
1
β+ γ ∑j∈I
〈
αjei,
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
ej
〉)
.
If Condition 1.13.4 is not satisfied, which implies that f ̸= idR and f (R)n is a proper
subset of Rn, then z⋆ = f (y⋆)may have no solution y⋆.
1.3.3.2 Discussion of Proposition 1.14
Suppose Y = [0, υ¯] and Conditions 1.14.1 to 1.14.4 are satisfied. Assumption F
implies that f ([0, υ¯]) = [ f (0), f (υ¯)]. Note that ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 because A¯(G) is non-
negative and row-normalized (Lemma B.8).
Conditions 1.14.3 and 1.14.4 impose an upper bound on the range of the players’
idiosyncrasies, that is, they entail a restriction as regards the players’ ex ante hetero-
geneity. Indeed, the two conditions are sufficient for αmax − αmin < β( f (υ¯)− f (0)),
where β( f (υ¯)− f (0)) > 0 because β > 0 (Condition 1.14.1) and f is strictly increas-
ing (Assumption F).
An interior NE y⋆ of Γ is a solution to the system of equations (1.14). Analogous
to the case Y = R, the existence and uniqueness of y⋆ is shown in two steps. First,
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by showing that the system of linear equations (1.15) has a unique solution z⋆ ∈ Rn.
Second, by showing that the systemof equations z⋆ = f (y⋆) has a unique solution y⋆
in the interior of [0, υ¯]n. As to the first step, Conditions 1.14.1 and 1.14.2 imply
that 0 ≤ γ/(β+ γ)ρ(A¯(G)) < 1, which in turn implies that (1.15) has a unique
solution z⋆ ∈ Rn (Lemma B.3), where
z⋆ =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
α. (1.16)
As to the second step, Conditions 1.14.1, 1.14.2, and 1.14.3 imply z⋆ ∈ ( f (0),+∞)n.
Similarly, Conditions 1.14.1, 1.14.2, and 1.14.4 imply that z⋆ ∈ (−∞, f (υ¯))n. It
follows that z⋆ = f (y⋆) has a unique solution y⋆ ∈ (0, υ¯)n because f is bijective
(Lemma 1.1) and z⋆ ∈ ( f (0), f (υ¯))n = (−∞, f (υ¯))n ∩ ( f (0),+∞)n. The proof of
z⋆ ∈ ( f (0),+∞)n is as follows. The two inequalities 0 ≤ γ/(β+ γ)ρ(A¯(G)) < 1
do not only imply that In − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G) is nonsingular but also that its inverse
is nonnegative and bounded below by In (Lemma B.6). This result is trivial if γ = 0.
If γ > 0, the result follows from the fact that In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G) is a positive
scalar multiple of (1+ β/γ)In − A¯(G), which is an M-matrix.34 Condition 1.16.3
implies that β f (0)1n <c α. The two inequalities In ≤c (In − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G))−1
and β f (0)1n <c α imply that z⋆ ∈ ( f (0),+∞)n (Lemma B.1). Indeed,
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
α >c
β f (0)
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
1n = f (0)1n
because (In − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G))−11n = ((β+ γ)/β)1n. This concludes the proof of
z⋆ ∈ ( f (0),+∞)n. The proof of z⋆ ∈ (−∞, f (υ¯))n is similar.
Finally, note that Γ has no NEs that involve actions at the boundary of the action
space, ∂[0, υ¯] = {0, υ¯}, in particular, neither 0n nor υ¯1n is a boundary NE of Γ.35
1.3.3.3 Discussion of Proposition 1.15
SupposeY = [0, υ¯] andConditions 1.15.1 to 1.15.4 are satisfied. Note that Conditions
1.15.1 and 1.15.2 imply that β+ γ > 0 and −1 < γ/(β+ γ) < 0, where the latter
inequality is sufficient for |γ/(β + γ)| < 1. Note also that Condition 1.15.3 is
stronger thanCondition 1.14.3 andCondition 1.15.4 is stronger thanCondition 1.14.4,
in particular, β f (0) < β f (0) + γ( f (0)− f (υ¯)) and β f (υ¯) + γ( f (υ¯)− f (0)) < β f (υ¯)
because γ < 0 and f is strictly increasing (Assumption F).
Conditions 1.15.3 and 1.15.4 impose an upper bound on the range of the play-
ers’ idiosyncrasies that is lower than the bound imposed by Conditions 1.14.3
and 1.14.4, that is, the conditions of Proposition 1.15 are more restrictive than those
of Proposition 1.14 as regards the players’ ex ante heterogeneity. Indeed, Conditions
1.15.3 and 1.15.4 are sufficient for αmax − αmin < (β + 2γ)( f (υ¯) − f (0)), where
34. For the definition of M-matrices and their properties see, for example, Berman and Plemmons
(1994, Definition 1.2 on p. 133 and Theorem 2.3 on pp. 134–38).
35. See the proof of Proposition 1.14 for details.
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β( f (υ¯) − f (0)) > (β + 2γ)( f (υ¯) − f (0)) > 0 because β > 0 (Condition 1.15.1),
γ > −β/2 (Condition 1.15.2), and f is strictly increasing (Assumption F).
An interior NE y⋆ of Γ is a solution to the system of equations (1.14). Analogous
to the case Y = R, the existence and uniqueness of y⋆ is shown in two steps. First,
by showing that the system of linear equations (1.15) has a unique solution z⋆ ∈ Rn.
Second, by showing that the systemof equations z⋆ = f (y⋆) has a unique solution y⋆
in the interior of [0, υ¯]n. As to the first step, Conditions 1.15.1 and 1.15.2 imply that
|γ/(β+ γ)| < 1, which in turn implies that In − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G) is nonsingular
(Lemma B.3). It follows that (1.15) has a unique solution z⋆ ∈ Rn, which is given
by (1.16). As to the second step, the inequality |γ/(β + γ)| < 1 does not only
imply that In− γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G) is nonsingular but also that In− γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2
is nonsingular with a nonnegative inverse that is bounded below by In because
0 < γ2/(β+ γ)2ρ(A¯(G)2) = γ2/(β+ γ)2 < 1 (Lemma B.6). The foregoing result
implies that z⋆ has an alternative representation that is given by
z⋆ =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α.
The following result forms the basis for establishing z⋆ ∈ ( f (0), f (υ¯))n.
Lemma 1.19 If Conditions 1.15.1 to 1.15.4 are satisfied, then
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (0)1n <c
(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α <c
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (υ¯)1n (1.17)
and {α¯ ∈ Rn | α¯ satisfies (1.17)} is a convex set.
The inequality In ≤c (In−γ2/(β+γ)2 A¯(G)2)−1 and the left inequality of (1.17)
imply that z⋆ ∈ ( f (0),+∞)n (Lemma B.1). Indeed,
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α
>c
β(β+ 2γ) f (0)
(β+ γ)2
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1
1n = f (0)1n
because (In−γ2/(β+γ)2 A¯(G)2)−11n = (β+γ)2/(β(β+ 2γ))1n. Similarly, the in-
equality In ≤c (In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2)−1 and the right inequality of (1.17) imply
that z⋆ ∈ (−∞, f (υ¯))n. It follows that z⋆ = f (y⋆) has a unique solution y⋆ ∈ (0, υ¯)n
because f is bijective (Lemma 1.1) and z⋆ ∈ ( f (0), f (υ¯))n.
Finally, note that Γ has no NEs that involve actions at the boundary of the action
space, ∂[0, υ¯] = {0, υ¯}, in particular, neither 0n nor υ¯1n is a boundary NE of Γ.36
The preceding discussion demonstrates that Γ has a unique interior NE if condi-
tions less restrictive than those of Proposition 1.15 are satisfied.37 The corresponding
36. See the proof of Proposition 1.15 for details.
37. Note the distinction between a unique and interior NE of Γ and a unique interior NE of Γ.
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result is stated as Remark 1.20, which also highlights the importance of Conditions
1.15.3 and 1.15.4 for the absence of NEs that involve actions at the boundary of the
action space.
Remark 1.20 Suppose Y = [0, υ¯]. The NALA game Γ has a unique interior NE
y⋆ ∈ (0, υ¯)n, which is given by (1.7), if three conditions are satisfied: Conditions
1.15.1 and 1.15.2 and the two inequalities (1.17).
It should be emphasized that Conditions 1.15.1 and 1.15.2 and the two inequal-
ities (1.17) are not too restrictive in the sense that the set of all families {αi}i∈I
that satisfy (1.17) is empty. A simple example for a {αi}i∈I that satisfies (1.17) is
{(β/2)( f (0) + f (υ¯))}i∈I , that is, α = (β/2)( f (0) + f (υ¯))1n.38 Examples with ex
ante heterogeneous players can be constructed on the basis of Lemma 1.19.
In the remainder of this section, I discuss the two inequalities (1.17) in the
context of Remark 1.20, thereby assuming that f = id[0,υ¯]. To this end, I assume
that Conditions 1.15.1 and 1.15.2 and the two inequalities (1.17) are satisfied. As
stated above, Conditions 1.15.1 and 1.15.2 imply that y⋆ can be written as
y⋆ =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α,
where β+ γ > 0, 0 < |γ|/(β+ γ) < 1, and In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2 has an inverse
that is nonnegative and bounded below by In. This shows that y⋆ is positive, that
is, 0n <c y⋆, because (1.17) implies that
0n <c
(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α (1.18)
or, equivalently,
∀i ∈ I αi >

|γ|
β+ γ
αi if deg+G (i) = 0,
|γ|
β+ γ
∑j∈N+G (i) αj
deg+G (i)
if deg+G (i) > 0.
(1.19)
It is important to note that (1.18) is sufficient but not necessary for 0n <c α, that
is, {αi | i ∈ I} ⊂ R++.39 For the purpose of interpreting (1.19), let k ∈ I . First,
consider the case deg+G (k) = 0. The inequality αk > |γ|/(β+ γ)αk is equivalent to
αk > 0, where αk > 0 is both necessary and sufficient for y⋆k > 0 because y⋆k = αk/β.
Second, consider the case deg+G (k) > 0. In this case, too, (1.19) entails a lower
38. Suppose α = (β/2)( f (0) + f (υ¯))1n. It follows that(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α =
(
1− |γ|
β+ γ
)
β
f (0) + f (υ¯)
2
1n =
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (0) + f (υ¯)
2
1n
because A¯(G)1n = 1n. Consequently, α satisfies the two inequalities (1.17).
39. Indeed, premultiplying both sides of (1.18) by the inverse of In − |γ|/(β+ γ)A¯(G) yields 0n <c α
(Lemma B.1).
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bound for αk. This lower bound (i) depends on β, γ, and the average idiosyncrasy
of player k’s out-neighbors; (ii) is strictly decreasing in β and γ; and (iii) can be
well above zero because {αj | j ∈ N+G (k)} ⊂ R++. Besides imposing a lower bound
on αk, for each maximal subset of weakly connected players of Γ, (1.19) entails a
restrictionwith regard to the range of these players’ idiosyncrasies. This is illustrated
in Example 1.21.
Example 1.21 Suppose k ∈ I , β > 0 (Condition 1.15.1), −β/2 < γ < 0 (Con-
dition 1.15.2), and d := deg+G (k) > 0. In addition, suppose Ik := N+G (k) ∪ {k}
constitutes the vertex set of a complete weakly connected component Gk of G, so that
for all i ∈ Ik,N+G (i) = Ik \ {i} and deg+G (i) = d. This means that every player in Gk
is an out-neighbor of every other player in Gk. Note that Gk is of order d+ 1 and
the endogenous effects matrix of Gk (that is, the row-normalized adjacency matrix
of sl(Gk) with respect to the unique order isomorphism h : Ik → {1, . . . , d+ 1}),
A¯(Gk), is equal to (1/d)(1d+11Td+1 − Id+1). Let αmin,Ik := min{αi | i ∈ Ik} and
αmax,Ik := max{αi | i ∈ Ik}. Finally, suppose αmin,Ik > 0 and the αi’s are uniformly
distributed between αmin,Ik and αmax,Ik , that is,
{αi | i ∈ Ik} =
{
αmin,Ik +
αmax,Ik − αmin,Ik
d
(i− 1)
∣∣∣∣ i ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 1}}.
It bears mentioning that this assumption is compatible with the extreme case where
αmin,Ik = αmax,Ik . It is straightforward to show that40
∀i ∈ Ik αi > |γ|β+ γ
∑j∈N+G (i) αj
deg+G (i)
⇔ αmax,Ik − αmin,Ik <
β+ 2γ
|γ|
2d
d+ 1
αmin,Ik (1.20)
⇔ αmax,Ik
αmin,Ik
< 1+
β+ 2γ
|γ|
2d
d+ 1
. (1.21)
It follows that (Ik,Gk, {(αi, β,γ)}i∈Ik ) satisfies (1.19) if and only if the range of{αi | i ∈ Ik} is bounded above by a threshold that is proportional to αmin,Ik , where
the factor of proportionality is strictly increasing in β, γ, and d. This restriction
can be rephrased in terms of an upper bound for αmax,Ik/αmin,Ik , as is evident
from (1.21). Loosely speaking, αmax,Ik must not exceed a multiple of αmin,Ik . Fig-
ure 1.8 illustrates this upper bound for αmax,Ik/αmin,Ik as a function of γ for different
values of d, thereby assuming that β = 1. The graphs for d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 6, 9} and the
limiting case d → ∞ indicate that the upper bound for αmax,Ik/αmin,Ik is close to
one for γ in a small right neighborhood of −1/2. In order that inequality (1.21)
is true, the players must therefore be nearly strongly ex ante homogeneous if γ is
close to its lower bound, −1/2. 
40. See Appendix D for the proofs of (1.20) and (1.21).
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Figure 1.8. Upper bound for αmax/αmin as a function of γ for β = 1 and
d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 6, 9}, including the limiting case d→ ∞ (Example 1.21)
So far, the discussion has emphasized the role of the left inequality of (1.17) for
the positivity of y⋆. The right inequality of (1.17),(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α <c
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
υ¯1n (1.22)
or, equivalently,
∀i ∈ I αi <

|γ|
β+ γ
αi +
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
υ¯ if deg+G (i) = 0,
|γ|
β+ γ
∑j∈N+G (i) αj
deg+G (i)
+
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
υ¯ if deg+G (i) > 0,
(1.23)
ensures that y⋆ <c υ¯1n. Similar to (1.18) and (1.19), (1.22) and (1.23) entail a
restriction with regard to the players’ idiosyncrasies. This is demonstrated in the
continuation of Example 1.21.
Example 1.21 (cont’d) It is straightforward to show that41
∀i ∈ Ik αi < |γ|β+ γ
∑j∈N+G (i) αj
deg+G (i)
+
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
υ¯
⇔ αmax,Ik − αmin,Ik <
β+ 2γ
|γ|
2d
d+ 1
(βυ¯− αmax,Ik ). (1.24)
41. See Appendix D for a proof of (1.24).
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It follows that (Ik,Gk, υ¯, {(αi, β,γ)}i∈Ik ) satisfies (1.23) if and only if the range of{αi | i ∈ Ik} is bounded above by a threshold. If (Ik,Gk, υ¯, {(αi, β,γ)}i∈Ik ) satis-
fies (1.24), then βυ¯ > αmax,Ik must be true because αmax,Ik ≥ αmin,Ik , which implies
that the threshold is strictly increasing in β, γ, d, and υ¯. The threshold of (1.20) is less
than the threshold of (1.24) if υ¯ is sufficiently large, that is, υ¯ > (αmin,Ik + αmax,Ik )/β.
To summarize, both the left and the right inequality of (1.17) entail a restriction
with regard to the range of {αi | i ∈ Ik}, where the restriction imposed by the left
inequality is stronger than that imposed by the right inequality if υ¯ is sufficiently
large. 
It has been argued that the two inequalities (1.17) impose restrictions on the
range of the players’ idiosyncrasies for every maximal subset of weakly connected
players of Γ. These restrictions are of a local nature if G has more than one weakly
connected component. Taken all together, the local restrictions amount to a global
restriction, which is given by β f (0) < αmin ≤ αmax < β f (υ¯). This is stated formally
in Lemma 1.22.
Lemma 1.22 If Conditions 1.15.1 and 1.15.2 and the two inequalities (1.17) are satisfied,
then β f (0)1n <c α <c β f (υ¯)1n, which in turn is equivalent to β f (0) < αmin (Condi-
tion 1.14.3) and αmax < β f (υ¯) (Condition 1.14.4).
Lemma 1.22 shows that the conditions of Remark 1.20 are sufficient for β f (0) <
αmin ≤ αmax < β f (υ¯), and so are the conditions of Proposition 1.14. Both sets of
conditions impose therefore the same restriction on the players’ idiosyncrasies. In
comparison, the conditions of Proposition 1.15 impose a stronger restriction on their
idiosyncrasies, namely,
β f (0) + γ
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)) < αmin ≤ αmax < β f (υ¯) + γ( f (υ¯)− f (0)),
where β f (0) < β f (0) + γ( f (0)− f (υ¯)) and β f (υ¯) + γ( f (υ¯)− f (0)) < β f (υ¯). It
follows that the players of Γ must be more similar in terms of their idiosyncrasies if
γ is negative than if γ is positive in order that a unique and interior NE exists.42
1.3.3.4 Discussion of Proposition 1.17
Suppose Y = R+. The NALA game Γ has a unique interior NE if Conditions 1.17.1
to 1.17.4 and Condition 1.17.6 are satisfied.43 The above conditions ensure that
all players play a positive action. In this respect, Condition 1.17.3 (respectively,
Condition 1.17.4) is critical for players with an empty (respectively, a nonempty)
out-neighborhood. Condition 1.17.4 is equivalent to Condition 1.15.3 with
1
β
(
αmax +
|γ|
β+ 2γ
(αmax − αmin)
)
42. It should be borne in mind, however, that the conditions of Propositions 1.14 and 1.15 are sufficient
but not necessary for the existence of a unique and interior NE of Γ.
43. See the remark in Footnote 37.
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substituted for f (υ¯) (cf. Result 1.31.1 and Remark 1.36 in Section 1.3.4.2). Conditions
1.17.3 and 1.17.4 imply that
αmax − αmin < β+ γ|γ|
(
αmin − β f (0)
)
and therefore entail a restriction with regard to the range of the players’ idiosyn-
crasies, provided that Condition 1.17.2 is satisfied. Condition 1.17.3 ensures that 0n
is not a boundary NE of Γ. Conditions 1.17.3 and 1.17.5 rule out the possibility that
Γ has a boundary NE where some players play zero and the remaining players play
a positive action. Condition 1.17.5 is equivalent to
β(β+ 2γ) f (0) < (β+ γ)αmin + γαmax + γ
(
αmin − β f (0) + γ
β
(
αmax − β f (0)
))
,
from which it follows that Condition 1.17.5 is stronger than Condition 1.17.4 if
αmin − β f (0) ≥ (|γ|/β)(αmax − β f (0)), where |γ|/β < 1/2, provided that Condi-
tions 1.17.1 and 1.17.2 are satisfied. It is important to note that Condition 1.17.5 can-
not be met if |γ|(β+ γ) ≥ β(β+ 2γ) or, equivalently, −β/2 < γ ≤ (√5− 3)β/2 ≈
−0.38β, provided that Conditions 1.17.1, 1.17.2, and 1.17.3 are satisfied.
1.3.4 Properties of interior Nash equilibria
For this section, let Γ(G) := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game,
and let α be defined as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2, so that
β + γ > 0 and |γ/(β + γ)| < 1. In addition, suppose Γ(G) has a unique and
interior NE y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n), which is given by (1.7).
Hereinafter, y⋆ is written as y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,G) in order to emphasize that it is a
mapping of α, β, γ, f , and G. The same applies to the components of y⋆. Depending
on the context and situation, some or all of the arguments of y⋆ and of its compo-
nents may be omitted. In all discussions to follow, actions are to be understood as
equilibrium actions.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. Section 1.3.4.1 studies how
players’ actions respond to changes in their preference parameters and to changes
in the digraph by which they are connected. Section 1.3.4.2 focuses on the actions
of weakly connected players.
1.3.4.1 Comparative statics
First, I discuss the effects of changes in the players’ preference parameters. The
discussion rests upon the following result.
Proposition 1.23 Let (i, j) ∈ I2, and let θ be αj, β, or γ. The partial derivatives of
y⋆i (α, β,γ, f ,G) and y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G) with respect to θ have the same sign. The partial
derivatives of y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G) with respect to α, β, and γ are given by
J(β,γ,G) :=
∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂α
=
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
, (1.25)
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∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂β
= −J(β,γ,G)y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G), (1.26)
and
∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂γ
= J(β,γ,G)
(
A¯(G)− In
)
y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G), (1.27)
respectively. The Jacobian (matrix) J(β,γ,G) has the following properties:
(1.23.1) If −β/2 < γ < 0, then
1
β+ γ
In − |γ|
β(β+ 2γ)
1n1Tn ≤c J(β,γ,G) ≤c
β+ γ
β(β+ 2γ)
1n1Tn
and for all i ∈ I , [J(β,γ,G)]i,i > 0.44
(1.23.2) If γ = 0, then J(β,γ,G) = (1/β)In.
(1.23.3) If γ > 0, then 1/(β+ γ)In ≤c J(β,γ,G) ≤c (1/β)1n1Tn.
(1.23.4) If G is strongly connected and γ > 0, thenOn <c J(β,γ,G).
(1.23.5) Suppose γ > 0. For all (i, j) ∈ I2 with i ̸= j, [J(β,γ,G)]i,j > 0 if and only if
there exists a walk in G from i to j.
(1.23.6) If β > γ ≥ 0, then, for all (i, j, k) ∈ I3 with (i, j) ̸= (k, k), [J(β,γ,G)]i,j <
1/(β+ γ) ≤ [J(β,γ,G)]k,k.45
Proposition 1.23 gives themeans to a first-order approximation of the response of
a player’s action to a change in one of his or another player’s preference parameters.46
It also forms the basis for results on the monotonicity of the players’ actions with
respect to their preference parameters. The presence or absence of a monotonic
dependence is thereby independent of the form of f because ∂ f > 0 (Assumption F).
Some of the monotonicity results given hereinafter are true only locally, that
is, they are true only in a neighborhood of the players’ preference parameters for
which for each of its points the associated NALA game has a unique and interior
NE of the form (1.7). The localness of the results is thereby largely determined by
the type of the action space.
Let (i, j) ∈ I2 with i ̸= j. In general, player i’s action is (i) strictly increasing
in αi (see partial derivative (1.25) and Results 1.23.1, 1.23.2, and 1.23.3); (ii) in-
creasing in αj if γ ≥ 0 (see partial derivative (1.25) and Results 1.23.2 and 1.23.3);
(iii) strictly increasing in αj if γ > 0 and player j is an out-neighbor or a higher-order
out-neighbor of player i in G, so that there exists a walk in G from i to j (see partial
derivative (1.25) and Result 1.23.5);47 (iv) strictly decreasing in β over some interval
44. Note that 1/(β+ γ) < |γ|/(β(β+ 2γ)) if −β/2 < γ < (√5− 3)β/2.
45. If β > γ ≥ 0, then γ/(β+ γ) < 1/2.
46. This follows from the fact that for all i ∈ I , y⋆i (α, β,γ, f ,G) = f−1(y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)).
47. This result underscores the importance of one implication of Result 1.23.5, namely, for all (i, j) ∈ I2
with i ̸= j, if there exists a walk in G from i to j, then [J(β,γ,G)]i,j > 0.
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2 1 3
Figure 1.9. A star-shaped digraph (Examples 1.24, 1.49, and 1.60) or digraph
component (Example 1.32) of order 3
1
23
4
Figure 1.10. A digraph of order 4 (Example 1.25)
I ⊂ R++ if γ ≥ 0, where I is such that for all b ∈ I, y⋆(α, b,γ, idY ,G) ∈ Rn++ (see
partial derivative (1.26) and Results 1.23.2 and 1.23.3);48 and (v) not monotonic in
γ even if γ ≥ 0 (see partial derivative (1.27) and Example 1.24). Player i’s action
may be strictly decreasing in αj, independent of αj, or strictly increasing in αj if
−β/2 < γ < 0 and player j is an out-neighbor or a higher-order out-neighbor of
player i in G (see partial derivative (1.25) and Result 1.23.1 and Example 1.25).
Example 1.24 Suppose I = {1, 2, 3} and A(G) = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 1)}. See
Figure 1.9 for an illustration of G. The endogenous effects matrix of G is given by
A¯(G) =
1
2
0 1 12 0 0
2 0 0
 . (1.28)
In addition, suppose Y = R+, α1 = 3/4, α2 = 5/7, α3 = 4/7, β = 1, γ > 0, and
f = idR+ . Let y⋆(γ) = (y⋆1(γ), y⋆2(γ), y⋆3(γ)) denote the unique and interior NE of
Γ(G). Straightforward calculations yield
y⋆(γ) = α+
1
28
γ
(γ+ 1)(2γ+ 1)
−3γ− 3−γ+ 1
7γ+ 5
 ,
which implies that
∂y⋆2(γ)
∂γ
= − 1
28
5γ2 + 2γ− 1
(γ+ 1)2(2γ+ 1)2
.
It follows that player 2’s action is strictly increasing on (0, (
√
6− 1)/5) and strictly
decreasing on ((
√
6− 1)/5,+∞). 
Example 1.25 Suppose I = {1, 2, 3, 4} and A(G) = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 3),
(4, 1), (4, 3)}. See Figure 1.10 for an illustration of G. In addition, suppose γ =
48. For example, I = R++ if Y = R+, γ ≥ 0, and αmin > 0 (see Proposition 1.16), and
I = (αmax/υ¯,+∞) if Y = [0, υ¯], γ ≥ 0, and αmin > 0 (see Proposition 1.14).
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−(2/5)β. Note that player 3 is an out-neighbor of player 1 in G, so that there exists
a walk in G from player 1 to player 3. Straightforward calculations yield
J(β,γ,G) =
1
15β

27 −6 0 −6
0 25 −10 0
0 0 15 0
−9 2 −5 27
 ,
fromwhich it follows that ∂y⋆1(α, β,γ, f ,G)/∂α3 = 0, ∂y⋆4(α, β,γ, f ,G)/∂α1 < 0, and
∂y⋆4(α, β,γ, f ,G)/∂α2 > 0.49 To sumup, player 1’s action is independent of player 3’s
idiosyncrasy although player 3 is an out-neighbor of player 1 in G, and player 4’s
action is strictly decreasing in player 1’s idiosyncrasy and strictly increasing in
player 2’s idiosyncrasy. 
Apart from the foregoing results, Proposition 1.23 is also instrumental in dis-
cussing the effects of a change in a player’s action on other players’ actions. As
to that, it is important to bear in mind that at the NE of Γ(G) no player has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from his action. The question “How does a change
in a player’s action affect other players’ actions?” can thus not be answered unless
one is willing to admit of exogenous shocks in the players’ preference parameters.
A player’s idiosyncrasy is the only preference parameter that is not common to all
players. It is therefore the only atom of Γ(G) that can bring about an isolated change
in a player’s action. An exogenous shock to a player’s idiosyncrasy always causes
a change in the player’s action that is of the same sign as the shock (see partial
derivative (1.25) and Results 1.23.1, 1.23.2, and 1.23.3). Apart from this direct effect,
the shock may also have an indirect effect on the player’s in-neighbors as it may
affect their social norms and in turn their actions. The indirect effect on a player’s in-
neighbor is different from zero and of the same sign as the shock if γ > 0 (see partial
derivative (1.25) and Result 1.23.5); it may, however, be zero if −β/2 < γ < 0 (see
Example 1.25). The indirect effect on other players’ actions propagates through G
along the inverses of walks if γ > 0 (see partial derivative (1.25) and Result 1.23.5),
where the magnitude of the indirect effect is smaller than that of the direct effect if
β > γ, that is, the common private cost parameter exceeds the common social cost
parameter, and f = idY (see partial derivative (1.25) and Result 1.23.6).
Second, I discuss the effects of changes in the digraph connecting the players.
I confine the analysis to a particular change in the topology of the digraph: the
addition of a single arc. I analyze whether and to what extent the players’ actions
respond to such a change.
Somenotational groundwork is needed to state themain result (Proposition 1.27).
Assume that there is no arc from player x to player y in G. Adding the arc (x, y) to G
yields the digraph G (x, y) := (I ,A(G) ∪ {(x, y)}), which induces the generic
49. Note that
∀(i, j) ∈ I2 ∂y
⋆
i (α, β,γ, f ,G)
∂αj
=
1
∂ f
(
y⋆i (α, β,γ, f ,G)
) ∂y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂αj
,
where ∂ f (y⋆i (α, β,γ, f ,G)) > 0 and ∂y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)/∂αj = [J(β,γ,G)]i,j.
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NALA game Γ(G (x, y)) := (I ,G (x, y),Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ). The unique and
interior NE of Γ(G (x, y)), provided that it exists, is denoted by y⋆(G (x, y)) or
(y⋆1(G (x, y)), . . . , y⋆n(G (x, y))).50 In order to conform to this notation, the NE of
Γ(G) is written as y⋆(G) or (y⋆1(G), . . . , y⋆n(G)) in what follows. The two digraphs
G and G (x, y) have different arc sets, which implies that their endogenous effects
matrices are different. The two matrices are closely related to each other though.
In particular, adding the arc (x, y) to G translates into a change of the xth row of
A¯(G), whereas all other rows remain unaffected. Let ∆(x, y,G) ∈ Rn be defined by
∀i ∈ I [∆(x, y,G)]i :=

δi,y − δi,x if deg+G (x) = 0,
1N+G (x)∪{y}(i)
deg+G (x) + 1
−
1N+G (x)(i)
deg+G (x)
if deg+G (x) > 0.
The endogenous effects matrices of G an G (x, y) are related to each other through
∆(x, y,G) by
A¯
(
G (x, y)
)
= A¯(G) + ex∆(x, y,G)T, (1.29)
where ex = (δ1,x, . . . , δn,x). The Jacobian (matrix) J(β,γ,G) plays a key role in the
characterization of the effects on players’ actions arising from adding (x, y) to G. To
this end, let jx(β,γ,G) denote the xth column of J(β,γ,G), that is,
jx(β,γ,G) := J(β,γ,G)ex = ∂
(
αx ↦→ y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
)
. (1.30)
Some basic properties of jx(β,γ,G) are summarized in the following corollary to
Proposition 1.23.
Corollary 1.26 The vector jx(β,γ,G) has the following properties:
(1.26.1) If −β/2 < γ < 0, then
1
β+ γ
ex − |γ|
β(β+ 2γ)
1n ≤c jx(β,γ,G) ≤c β+ γ
β(β+ 2γ)
1n
and [jx(β,γ,G)]x > 0.
(1.26.2) If γ = 0, then jx(β,γ,G) = (1/β)ex.
(1.26.3) If γ > 0, then 1/(β+ γ)ex ≤c jx(β,γ,G) ≤c (1/β)1n.
(1.26.4) If G is strongly connected and γ > 0, then 0n <c jx(β,γ,G).
(1.26.5) Suppose γ > 0. For all i ∈ I \ {x}, [jx(β,γ,G)]i > 0 if and only if there exists
a walk in G from i to x.
50. Under the maintained assumptions that β > 0, γ > −β/2, and Γ(G) has a unique and interior NE,
Γ(G (x, y)) does not necessarily have a unique and interior NE. If, in addition to β > 0 and γ > −β/2,
Γ(G) satisfies the matching sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique and interior NE (see
Propositions 1.13 to 1.17 in Section 1.3.3), then Γ(G (x, y)) has a unique and interior NE, which is of
the form (1.7).
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(1.26.6) If β > γ ≥ 0, then, for all i ∈ I \ {x}, [jx(β,γ,G)]i < 1/(β + γ) ≤
[jx(β,γ,G)]x.
(1.26.7) If deg+G (x) = 0, then [jx(β,γ,G)]x = 1/β > 0.
The previous definitions and considerations lead to the following result.
Proposition 1.27 If Γ(G (x, y)) has a unique and interior NE, then
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))− f (y⋆(G)) = γ〈∆(x, y,G), f (y⋆(G))〉
1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 jx(β,γ,G) (1.31)
and
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))− A¯(G (x, y)) f (y⋆(G (x, y))) = f (y⋆(G))
− A¯(G) f (y⋆(G))− β〈∆(x, y,G), f (y⋆(G))〉
1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 jx(β,γ,G), (1.32)
where 1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 > 0.51,52
Within the setup of Proposition 1.27, if f = idY , then (1.31) describes the adjust-
ment in y⋆(G) that is caused by the extra arc from player x to player y, otherwise it
describes the adjustment in f (y⋆(G)).53
For the following discussion suppose γ > 0 and f = idY , so that f (y⋆(G)) =
y⋆(G). According to (1.31), the difference y⋆(G (x, y))− y⋆(G) is a scalarmultiple
of jx(β,γ,G), which is a measure of the sensitivity of the players’ actions with
respect to a change in player x’s marginal private benefit, αx. A necessary condition
for player i ∈ I \ {x} to be affected by the extra arc from player x to player y is
that [jx(β,γ,G)]i > 0, which is true if and only if there exists a walk in G from
player i to player x (Result 1.26.5), that is, player x lies in the out-neighborhood or
a higher-order out-neighborhood in G of player i. Since 0n ≤c jx(β,γ,G) if γ > 0
(Result 1.26.3), the sign of the change in action cannot differ across the players who
are affected by the extra arc. According to (1.31), the sign of the change is equal to
the sign of
γ〈∆(x, y,G), y⋆(G)〉
1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 . (1.33)
The denominator of (1.33) is positive. As regards its numerator, if deg+G (x) = 0,
then 〈∆(x, y,G), y⋆(G)〉 = y⋆y(G)− αx/β, and if deg+G (x) > 0, then
〈∆(x, y,G), y⋆(G)〉 =
∑i∈N+G (x)∪{y} y
⋆
i (G)
deg+G (x) + 1
−
∑i∈N+G (x) y
⋆
i (G)
deg+G (x)
51. The inequalities β > 0 and γ > −β/2 are sufficient for 1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 > 0.
52. If deg+G (x) = 0, then 〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 = [jx(β,γ,G)]y − 1/β, and if deg+G (x) > 0, then
〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 = 1
deg+G (x) + 1
(
[jx(β,γ,G)]y −
∑i∈N+G (x)[jx(β,γ,G)]i
deg+G (x)
)
.
53. If Y = R+ and f ≈ log, then, for all i ∈ I , f (y⋆i (G (x, y)))− f (y⋆i (G)) is a first-order approxima-
tion of the relative change in y⋆i (G), y⋆i (G (x, y))/y⋆i (G)− 1.
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=
1
deg+G (x) + 1
(
y⋆y(G)−
∑i∈N+G (x) y
⋆
i (G)
deg+G (x)
)
.
Thus, 〈∆(x, y,G), y⋆(G)〉 is equal to the difference between player y’s and player x’s
action if deg+G (x) = 0 and equal to the change in the average action of player x’s
out-neighbors if deg+G (x) > 0. Under the maintained assumption that γ > 0,
sgn
((1.33)) =

sgn
(
y⋆y(G)−
αx
β
)
if deg+G (x) = 0,
sgn
(
y⋆y(G)−
∑i∈N+G (x) y
⋆
i (G)
deg+G (x)
)
if deg+G (x) > 0.
This result allows to predict the direction of the change in player x’s action that
results from forming a new arc to player y. First, consider the case where player x
has no out-neighbors in G. If his action is less (respectively, greater) than player y’s
action, then he will increase (respectively, decrease) his action. Second, consider
the case where player x has at least one out-neighbor in G. If the average action
of his current out-neighbors, that is, his out-neighbors in G, is less (respectively,
greater) than the action of his newout-neighbor y, then hewill increase (respectively,
decrease) his action. In both cases, all players who are affected by the extra arc will
adjust their actions in the direction of player x’s adjustment; the magnitudes of their
adjustments are thereby smaller than the magnitude of player x’s adjustment if the
common social cost parameter is less than the common private cost parameter (Re-
sult 1.26.6). As regards the second case, the adjustment in player x’s action does not
necessarily imply that the social distance between player x and his out-neighbors,
that is, the distance between his action and the average action of his out-neighbors,
decreases. This can be seen from (1.32), which describes the change in the difference
between a player’s action and the average action of his out-neighbors, provided
that his out-neighborhood in G is not empty.54 Suppose player i ∈ I is affected
by the extra arc from player x to player y and player i’s out-neighborhood in G is
not empty. According to (1.32), if the difference between player i’s action and the
average action of his out-neighbors in G is positive (respectively, negative) and the
extra arc causes player x to decrease (respectively, increase) his action, then the
54. If a player has an empty out-neighborhood in G, then the corresponding equation of the sys-
tem (1.32) does not describe the change in the difference between his action and the average ac-
tion of his out-neighbors that results from adding an extra arc to G. This can be seen as fol-
lows. Suppose γ > 0 and f = idR+ , and let i ∈ I with N+G (i) = ∅. If i = x, then
[A¯(G)y⋆(G)]i = y
⋆
x(G), [A¯(G (x, y))y⋆(G (x, y))]i = y⋆y(G (x, y)) (because N+G (x) = ∅ implies
that N+G(x,y)(x) = {y}), [jx(β,γ,G)]i = 1/β (Result 1.26.7), 〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 = [jx(β,γ,G)]y −
1/β, and 〈∆(x, y,G), y⋆(G)〉 = y⋆y(G)− y⋆x(G), so that the ith equation of the system (1.32) is
y⋆x
(
G (x, y)
)− y⋆y(G (x, y)) = 11− γ([jx(β,γ,G)]y − 1/β)
(
y⋆x(G)− y⋆y(G)
)
.
If i ̸= x, then [A¯(G)y⋆(G)]i = y⋆i (G), [A¯(G (x, y))y⋆(G (x, y))]i = y⋆i (G (x, y)) (because i ̸= x
and N+G (i) = ∅ imply that N+G(x,y)(i) = ∅), and [jx(β,γ,G)]i = 0 (Results 1.26.3 and 1.26.5), so that
the ith equation of the system (1.32) is 0 = 0, a tautology.
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Figure 1.11. A finite sequence of digraphs of order 4 (Example 1.28)
social distance between player i and his out-neighbors increases. If the difference
between player i’s action and the average action of his out-neighbors in G is positive
(respectively, negative) and the extra arc causes player x to increase (respectively,
decrease) his action, then the social distance between player i and his out-neighbors
may decrease (see Example 1.28, in particular, the discussion of (1.34) and (1.35)
that is related to player 3) or increase (see Example 1.28, in particular, the discussion
of (1.34) and (1.35) that is related to player 1). To sum up, adding an arc to the
digraph by which the players are connected does not necessarily imply that the
affected players conform more to the average behavior of their out-neighbors—in
the sense that the social distances between the players and their out-neighbors
decrease—than before the addition of the arc.
Proposition 1.27 and the subsequent discussion are illustrated in Example 1.28.
Besides this, Example 1.28 demonstrates that the NE of a (generic) NALA game is
devoid of the following three comparative statics properties: in general, a player’s
action, the social distance between a player and his out-neighbors, and the players’
aggregate action are monotonic in the number of arcs or, equivalently, in the density
of the digraph by which the players are connected.55
Example 1.28 Suppose I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A(G) = {(2, 3)}, Y = R+, β = 1, γ =
1/3, and f = idR+ . Let (α¯, ϵ) ∈ R++ ×R \ {0} be such that α¯ > max{−3ϵ, ϵ}.
In addition, suppose α1 = α3 = α¯, α2 = α¯ − ϵ, and α4 = α¯ + 3ϵ. Evidently,
{αi | i ∈ I} ⊂ R++. Let G1 := G, G2 := G1  (3, 1), G3 := G2  (1, 2), G4 :=
G3  (3, 2), G5 := G4  (1, 3), G6 := G5  (2, 1), G7 := G6  (1, 4), and G8 :=
G7  (4, 1). Note that, for all g ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, |A(Gg)| = g, in other words, the
subscript g in Gg is equal to the size of Gg, that is, the number of arcs of Gg. The
finite sequence of digraphs (G1, . . . ,G8)may be interpreted as the evolution of the
digraph G over eight periods of time: the digraph G is given by G1 in period 1;
in period 2, player 3 forms an arc to player 1, which results in the digraph G2; in
55. The density of a digraph of order N > 1 is defined as the ratio of the number of its arcs to the
maximum number of its arcs, N(N − 1).
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period 3, player 1 forms an arc to player 2, which results in the digraph G3; in
period 4, player 3 forms an arc to player 2, which results in the digraph G4; finally, in
period 8, player 4 forms an arc to player 1, which results in the digraph G8. See Fig-
ure 1.11 for an illustration of the digraphs G1 to G8, wherein the players who form an
arc are depictedwith a disk in dark gray. For all g ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, let y⋆(Gg) denote the
unique and interior NE of the NALA game Γ(Gg) := (I ,Gg,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ).
Straightforward calculations yield
y⋆(G1) = y⋆(G2) = α¯14 +
1
4
ϵ

0
−3
0
12
 , y⋆(G3) = y⋆(G2)− 184ϵ

16
1
4
0
 ,
y⋆(G4) = y⋆(G3)− 4861ϵ

1
4
16
0
 , y⋆(G5) = y⋆(G4) + 1369ϵ

31
1
4
0
 ,
y⋆(G6) = y⋆(G5), y⋆(G7) = y⋆(G6) +
31
738
ϵ

7
1
1
0
 ,
and
y⋆(G8) = y⋆(G7)− 778,774ϵ

7
1
1
82
 .
Thus, if ϵ > 0, then y⋆(G1) = y⋆(G2) ≥c y⋆(G3) ≥c y⋆(G4) ≤c y⋆(G5) =
y⋆(G6) ≤c y⋆(G7) >c y⋆(G8), so that the mapping g ↦→ y⋆(Gg) is not mono-
tonic. See Figure 1.12 for an illustration, wherein the actions of the players who
form an arc are depicted with a marker in dark gray. In addition, we find
y⋆(G3)− A¯(G3)y⋆(G3) = 1287ϵ

164
−205
41
0

and
y⋆(G4)− A¯(G4)y⋆(G4) = 1287ϵ

168
−189
105
0
 .
The difference between player 3’s action and the average action of his out-neighbors
is equal to (41/287)ϵ in Γ(G3), and therefore positive (respectively, negative) if
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g
Figure 1.12. Actions of players 1 ( ), 2 ( ), 3 ( ), and 4 ( ) in Γ(Gg) for
g ∈ {1, . . . , 8} if ϵ > 0 (Example 1.28)
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g
Figure 1.13. Social distances of players 1 ( ), 2 ( ), and 3 ( ) to their
out-neighbors in Γ(Gg) for g ∈ {1, . . . , 8} (Example 1.28)
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ϵ > 0 (respectively, ϵ < 0). Adding (3, 2) to G3 causes player 3 to decrease (respec-
tively, increase) his action by (64/861)ϵ if ϵ > 0 (respectively, ϵ < 0) because
sgn
y⋆2(G3)− ∑i∈N+G3 (3) y⋆i (G3)deg+G3(3)
 = sgn(y⋆2(G3)− y⋆1(G3)) = sgn(−ϵ).
Consequently, the social distance between player 3 and his out-neighbors increases
from (41/287)|ϵ| to (105/287)|ϵ|, which is in accordance with (1.32). As regards
players 1 and 2, adding (3, 2) to G3 increases the social distance between player 1
and his out-neighbors, whereas the corresponding distance decreases for player 2.
Finally, we find
y⋆(G6)− A¯(G6)y⋆(G6) = 1246ϵ

82
−164
82
0
 (1.34)
and
y⋆(G7)− A¯(G7)y⋆(G7) = 1246ϵ

−135
−195
51
0
 . (1.35)
The difference between player 1’s action and the average action of his out-neighbors
is equal to (82/246)ϵ in Γ(G6), and therefore positive (respectively, negative) if
ϵ > 0 (respectively, ϵ < 0). Adding (1, 4) to G6 causes player 1 to increase (re-
spectively, decrease) his action by (217/738)ϵ if ϵ > 0 (respectively, ϵ < 0). As a
consequence, the difference between player 1’s action and the average action of his
out-neighbors decreases (respectively, increases) from (82/246)ϵ to −(135/246)ϵ if
ϵ > 0 (respectively, ϵ < 0), so that the social distance between player 1 and his out-
neighbors increases from (82/246)|ϵ| to (135/246)|ϵ|. As regards player 3, adding
(1, 4) to G6 decreases his social distance to his out-neighbors from (82/246)|ϵ|
to (51/246)|ϵ|. See Figure 1.13 for an illustration of the social distances between
players 1, 2, and 3 and their out-neighbors in Γ(Gg) for g ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, wherein the
distances of the players who form an arc are depicted with a marker in dark gray.
1.3.4.2 Weakly connected players
The focus of this section is on the actions of weakly connected players. A discussion
of their properties requires an additional assumption and some extra notation,
which I introduce next.
In what follows, suppose Condition G is satisfied. Let Gκ be a weakly connected
component of G of order nκ > 1, and let Iκ := V(Gκ), that is, Iκ represents the
set of weakly connected players.56 The component Gκ induces the generic NALA
56. The existence of a weakly connected component of G of order larger than one follows from Condi-
tion G.
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game Γ(Gκ) := (Iκ ,Gκ ,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈Iκ , f ). Let αmin,Iκ := min{αi | i ∈ Iκ} and
αmax,Iκ := max{αi | i ∈ Iκ}. Let h : Iκ → {1, . . . , nκ} be the unique order isomor-
phism. Finally, let αIκ := (αh−1(1), . . . , αh−1(nκ)) and y⋆Iκ := (y⋆h−1(1), . . . , y⋆h−1(nκ)),
that is, αIκ (respectively, y⋆Iκ) is the vector that lies in the rows of α (respectively,
y⋆, the NE of Γ(G)) indexed by Iκ = {h−1(1), . . . , h−1(nκ)}.
Most results of this section involve equalities or inequalities that are stated in
terms of fnκ (y⋆Iκ ). Since f is surjective and strictly increasing (Assumption F),they can be written equivalently in terms of y⋆Iκ . For example, if R is one of thebinary relations =, ≤, <, ≥, or > andR is the corresponding binary relation on
M(nκ , 1,R) ∼= Rnκ , c ∈ f (int(Y)), and c := (c1, . . . , cnκ ) ∈ f (int(Y))nκ , then
fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ )R c1nκ is equivalent to y⋆Iκ R f−1(c)1nκ and fnκ (y⋆Iκ )R c is equivalent to,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , nκ}, y⋆h−1(i) R f−1(ci).
I discuss five results for y⋆Iκ . The first result (Proposition 1.29) relates y⋆Iκto Γ(Gκ), thereby providing a characterization of y⋆Iκ . The second result (Prop-osition 1.31) establishes a lower and an upper bound on y⋆Iκ in terms of the players’idiosyncrasies and shows that similar players play similar actions. The third result
(Proposition 1.33) states some additional lower bounds for y⋆Iκ in terms of αIκ . Thefourth result (Proposition 1.34) provides a necessary and a sufficient condition for
a symmetric y⋆Iκ .57 The fifth result (Proposition 1.35) is about the actions of weaklyex ante homogeneous players.
Proposition 1.29 The action profile y⋆Iκ is the unique and interior NE of Γ(Gκ) andsatisfies
fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ ) =
1
β+ γ
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)−1
αIκ . (1.36)
A comparison of (1.36) and (1.7) reveals the common structural form of the
systems of equations that govern the actions of weakly connected players and the
actions of the entire set of players. Besides this, Proposition 1.29 shows that a
player’s action is functionally independent of the action played by any player who
is not located in the same weakly connected component.
A statement similar to Proposition 1.29 is in general not true for a strongly
connected component of G. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1.30 Let α¯ > 0 and ϵ > 0. Suppose I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A(G) = {(1, 2), (1, 4),
(2, 3), (3, 1)}, Y = R+, α1 = α2 = α3 = α¯, α4 = α¯ + ϵ, β = 1, γ = 1/2, and
f = idR+ . The digraph G has one weakly connected component, namely, G, and
two strongly connected components, namely, Gs := (Is,As) and ({4},∅), where
Is := {1, 2, 3} and As := A(G) \ {(1, 4)}. See Figure 1.14 (a) for an illustration
of G and Figure 1.14 (b) for an illustration of Gs. The component Gs induces the
NALA game Γ(Gs) := (Is,Gs,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈Is , f ). Both NALA games Γ(G) and
Γ(Gs) satisfy the sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique and interior NE
(Proposition 1.16). Let y⋆(G) = (y⋆1(G), y⋆2(G), y⋆3(G), y⋆4(G)) and y⋆(Gs) denote
57. The action profile y⋆Iκ is called symmetric if y⋆Iκ = y¯1nκ for some y¯ ∈ int(Y).
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1
23
4
(a) G
1
23
(b) Gs
Figure 1.14. A digraph of order 4 (panel (a)) with a strongly connected component
of order 3 (panel (b)) (Example 1.30)
the NEs of Γ(G) and Γ(Gs), respectively. In accordance with the definition of y⋆Iκ ,let y⋆Is := (y⋆1(G), y⋆2(G), y⋆3(G)). Straightforward calculations yield
y⋆(G) = α¯14 +
1
53
ϵ

9
1
3
53
 and y⋆(Gs) = α¯13,
from which
y⋆Is = α¯13 +
1
53
ϵ
91
3
 ̸= α¯13 = y⋆(Gs).
follows. This shows that Proposition 1.29 is not true for Gs. 
Proposition 1.31 (1.31.1) If −β/2 < γ < 0, then
1
β
(
αmin,Iκ −
|γ|
β+ 2γ
(αmax,Iκ − αmin,Iκ )
)
1nκ ≤c fnκ (y⋆Iκ )
≤c 1
β
(
αmax,Iκ +
|γ|
β+ 2γ
(αmax,Iκ − αmin,Iκ )
)
1nκ . (1.37)
If Conditions 1.15.1 to 1.15.4 are satisfied, then the lower bound of fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) isgreater than f (0)1nκ and the upper bound of fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) is less than f (υ¯)1nκ .
(1.31.2) If γ = 0, then fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) = (1/β)αIκ .
(1.31.3) If γ > 0, then (αmin,Iκ/β)1nκ ≤c fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) ≤c (αmax,Iκ/β)1nκ .
Proposition 1.31 establishes a lower and an upper bound on the players’ actions
in terms of their idiosyncrasies. The two bounds coincide if γ = 0 (Result 1.31.2).
A positive γ entails a higher lower bound and a lower upper bound on the players’
actions than does a negative γ, provided that the players of Γ(Gκ) are ex ante
heterogeneous, in which case αmin,Iκ < αmax,Iκ .58 The maximum possible range
58. Note that the sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique and interior NE of Γ(Gκ) are
stronger for a negative γ than for a positive γ with regard to the range of the players’ idiosyncrasies
in case Y = [0, υ¯]; specifically, αmax − αmin < (β + 2γ)( f (υ¯)− f (0)) < β( f (υ¯)− f (0)) if γ < 0 and
αmax − αmin < β( f (υ¯)− f (0)) if γ ≥ 0.
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(which is a measure of potential variation) of the players’ actions for a positive γ
is therefore smaller than for a negative γ. This result is in accordance with As-
sumption U. A positive γ corresponds to the case of conformist behavior where
the players have an incentive to conform to their out-neighbors’ actions, whereas a
negative γ corresponds to the case of anti-conformist behavior where the players
have an incentive to differentiate themselves from their out-neighbors’ actions. It is
therefore to be expected that a negative γ entails a greater variation in the players’
actions than does a positive γ. Both Results 1.31.1 and 1.31.3 imply that similar
players behave similarly. Strictly speaking, if weakly connected players are alike in
that the range of their idiosyncrasies is small, then they play similar actions, where
the range of their actions is deceasing in the range of their idiosyncrasies.
If all players of Γ(Gκ) had no out-neighbors in Gκ , a hypothesis that is in conflict
with the assumption that Gκ is a weakly connected component of G of order nκ > 1,
then fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) = (1/β)αIκ , irrespective of the value of γ.59 It follows that theplayers of Γ(Gκ) act as if they had no out-neighbors if γ = 0 (Result 1.31.2). If
γ ̸= 0, then neither (1/β)αIκ ≤c fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) nor fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) ≤c (1/β)αIκ is true ingeneral; specifically, not all players do necessarily play an action that is larger than
the action they would play in isolation or in case of an empty out-neighborhood.
This is illustrated in Example 1.32.
Example 1.32 Suppose Gκ is of order nκ = 3with vertex set Iκ = {1, 2, 3} and arc
set A(Gκ) = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 1)}. See Figure 1.9 for an illustration of Gκ . In
addition, suppose Y = R+, α1 = 3/4, α2 = 5/7, α3 = 4/7, β = 1, γ > 0, and
f = idR+ . Straightforward calculations yield (see also Example 1.24)
y⋆Iκ = αIκ +
1
28
γ
(γ+ 1)(2γ+ 1)
−3γ− 3−γ+ 1
7γ+ 5
 ,
from which it follows that the inequality αIκ ≤c y⋆Iκ is not true. 
A few inequalities involving αIκ and fnκ (y⋆Iκ ), including (1/β)αIκ ≤c fnκ (y⋆Iκ ),are true under certain conditions, which are stated in the following result.
Proposition 1.33 (1.33.1) If γ > 0, then 0nκ ≤c αIκ is sufficient for 1/(β+ γ)αIκ ≤c
fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ ) and 0nκ <c αIκ is sufficient for 1/(β+ γ)αIκ <c fnκ (y⋆Iκ ).60
(1.33.2) If γ ̸= 0, then sgn(γ) fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) ≤c sgn(γ)A¯(Gκ) fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) is necessary and suffi-cient for (1/β)αIκ ≤c fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) and sgn(γ) fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) <c sgn(γ)A¯(Gκ) fnκ (y⋆Iκ )is necessary and sufficient for (1/β)αIκ <c fnκ (y⋆Iκ ).
Proposition 1.34 (1.34.1) If αIκ = α¯1nκ for some α¯ ∈ R, then y⋆Iκ = f−1(α¯/β)1nκ .
(1.34.2) If y⋆Iκ = y¯1nκ for some y¯ ∈ int(Y), then αIκ = β f (y¯)1nκ .
59. If all players of Γ(Gκ) had no out-neighbors in Gκ , then A¯(Gκ) = Inκ , so that fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) = (1/β)αIκaccording to (1.36).
60. Note that 1/(β+ γ)αIκ <c (1/β)αIκ if β > 0 and γ > 0.
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Result 1.34.1 gives a sufficient condition for a symmetric NE: if the players
of Γ(Gκ) are strongly ex ante homogeneous, then they play the same action.61
Remarkably enough, this result is independent of the topology of Gκ . In particular,
different positions within Gκ , for example, in terms of in-degree and out-degree,
do not imply different actions, provided that the players of Γ(Gκ) are strongly ex
ante homogeneous. Result 1.34.2 gives a necessary condition for a symmetric NE,
thereby complementing Result 1.34.1: if the players of Γ(Gκ) play the same action,
then they must be strongly ex ante homogeneous. Taken together, Results 1.34.1
and 1.34.2 show that the variation in the players’ idiosyncrasies is the primary
source of the variation in the players’ actions. It is for this fact that the notion of ex
ante homogeneity has been defined with respect to the players’ idiosyncrasies only,
thereby ignoring the players’ positions within the digraph.
Proposition 1.35 (1.35.1) If αIκ = A¯(Gκ)αIκ , then fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) = (1/β)αIκ .
(1.35.2) If γ ̸= 0 and fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) = (1/β)αIκ , then αIκ = A¯(Gκ)αIκ .
If the players of Γ(Gκ) are weakly ex ante homogeneous, then they act as if they
had no out-neighbors (Result 1.35.1). In this case, the preference for conformist
or anti-conformist behavior has no bearing on equilibrium actions. If the players
of Γ(Gκ) have a preference for either conformist or anti-conformist behavior, that is,
γ ̸= 0, and they act as if they had no out-neighbors, then they must be weakly ex
ante homogeneous (Result 1.35.2). In summary, weakly connected players act as
if they had no out-neighbors if and only if they are weakly ex ante homogeneous,
provided that γ ̸= 0.
An algebraic interpretation of Result 1.35.1 reads as follows: Suppose f = idY
and the players of Γ(Gκ) are weakly ex ante homogeneous. It follows that
∀i ∈ Iκ y⋆i =
1
β
αi =
1
β
∑j∈N+G (i) αj
deg+G (i)
=
∑j∈N+G (i) y
⋆
j
deg+G (i)
,
that is, each player’s action is equal to the average action of his out-neighbors.62 In
summary, if weakly connected players are similar to their out-neighbors in that their
marginal private benefits are equal to the average of their out-neighbors’ marginal
private benefits, then they act like the average of their out-neighbors.
Remark 1.36 Propositions 1.31, 1.33, 1.34, and 1.35 are true also for y⋆, with the
obvious changes in notation.
1.3.5 Welfare analysis
In this section, I adopt the perspective of a benevolent social planner who acts
on behalf of the players of a NALA game. The planner is benevolent in that his
61. An analogous result has been established for Patacchini and Zenou’s (2012) local average game
(see Proposition 1).
62. Note that, for all i ∈ Iκ ,N+Gκ (i) = N+G (i) anddeg+Gκ (i) = deg+G (i), becauseGκ is aweakly connectedcomponent of G.
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sole objective is to maximize social welfare defined as players’ total utility. This
assumption necessitates that every single aspect of the NALA game in question
is known to the planner. In particular, the planner must have information on the
players’ preference parameters, the function f , and the digraph by which the players
are connected.
The subsequent analysis calls for some additional notation and terminology.
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, α be defined as in
Section 1.3.2, and
S(G) :=
(
In − A¯(G)
)T(In − A¯(G)). (1.38)
Some elementary properties of S(G) are given in Lemma 1.37. The planner’s social
welfare function w : Yn → R is defined by w(y) := ∑i∈I ui(y) and satisfies w(y) =
〈α, f (y)〉− (1/2)〈 f (y), (βIn+γS(G)) f (y)〉. A globalmaximumpoint ofw is called
a social optimum of Γ. The players’ actions that maximize w are called socially optimal
actions.
Lemma 1.37 The matrix S(G) has the following properties:
(1.37.1) If Condition G is satisfied, then S(G) is different fromOn, symmetric, and non-
negative definite with 0 < ρ(S(G)) ≤ 2M(G), where63
M(G) := max
{
1I\I+0 (G)(j) +
deg−G (j)
min
{
deg+G (i)
∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)}
∣∣∣∣∣ j ∈ I
}
.
(1.37.2) If Condition G is not satisfied, then S(G) = On, so that ρ(S(G)) = 0.
The welfare analysis presented hereinafter is confined to the case where Γ has a
unique and interior social optimum for it admits of a closed-form characterization
of socially optimal actions, which is the subject of the following result.
Proposition 1.38 If Γ has a unique and interior social optimum y⋆S, then it is given by
f (y⋆S) =
(
βIn + γS(G)
)−1
α. (1.39)
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. The analysis leads off
with the statement of sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique and interior
social optimum of Γ, followed by a discussion (Section 1.3.5.1). It continues with an
exposition of basic properties of socially optimal actions (Section 1.3.5.2). Following
this, socially optimal actions are compared to NE actions (Section 1.3.5.3). The
analysis concludes with a result that parallels the second fundamental theorem of
welfare economics, namely, a social optimum can be decentralized as a NE (Sec-
tion 1.3.5.4).
63. Condition G implies thatmin{deg+G (i) | i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)} > 0.
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1.3.5.1 Existence and uniqueness of interior social optima
The focus of this section is on sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique and
interior social optimum of Γ. A compact statement of the conditions requires some
extra notation: Let α¯I := (1/n)∑i∈I αi and
s(β,γ,G) :=
1−
|γ|ρ(S(G))
β
if β > 0 and γ < 0,
1 else.
(1.40)
As regards s(β,γ,G), if Condition G is satisfied, β > 0, and γ < 0 is such that
γρ(S(G)) > −β, then 0 < s(β,γ,G) < 1.
The sufficient conditions depend critically on the topological properties of Y . It
is for this reason that they are stated separately for each type of action space.
Proposition 1.39 Suppose Y = R. The NALA game Γ has a unique social optimum if
three conditions are satisfied: (1.39.1) β > 0, (1.39.2) γρ(S(G)) > −β, and (1.39.3) f
is not bounded below and above.
Proposition 1.40 Suppose Y = R+. The NALA game Γ has a unique and interior social
optimum if four conditions are satisfied: (1.40.1) β > 0, (1.40.2) γρ(S(G)) > −β,
(1.40.3) ∑i∈I |αi − α¯I | < s(β,γ,G)(α¯I − β f (0)), and (1.40.4) f is not bounded above.
Proposition 1.41 Suppose Y = [0, υ¯]. The NALA game Γ has a unique and interior social
optimum if three conditions are satisfied: (1.41.1) β > 0, (1.41.2) γρ(S(G)) > −β, and
(1.41.3) ∑i∈I |αi − α¯I | < s(β,γ,G)min{α¯I − β f (0), β f (υ¯)− α¯I}.
Central to the discussion of Propositions 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41—and also central
to their proofs—is an auxiliary function w˜ : f (Y)n → R that is defined by w˜ :=
w ◦ ( f−1, . . . , f−1) and satisfies w˜(z) = 〈α, z〉 − (1/2)〈z, (βIn + γS(G))z〉. The
definition of w˜ suggests that a global maximum point of w˜ is related to a global
maximum point of w. Indeed, (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Yn is a global maximum point of w if
and only if ( f (y1), . . . , f (yn)) ∈ f (Y)n is a global maximum point of w˜. This result
is essential to conceive the logic underlying this discussion.
Aswill be shown below, the domain of w˜, f (Y)n, is convex for each type of action
space. All three sets of sufficient conditions, Conditions 1.39.1, 1.39.2, and 1.39.3,
Conditions 1.40.1 to 1.40.4, and Conditions 1.41.1, 1.41.2, and 1.41.3, have the first
two conditions in common: β > 0 and γρ(S(G)) > −β.64 Taken together, the two
inequalities imply that the symmetric matrix βIn + γS(G) is positive definite (and
therefore nonsingular), which in turn implies that w˜ is strictly concave. If β > 0 and
γρ(S(G)) > −β, then the function z ↦→ w˜(z) with domain Rn (sic) has a unique
global maximum point z⋆ ∈ Rn, which is given by z⋆ = Q(β,γ,G)α, where
Q(β,γ,G) :=
(
βIn + γS(G)
)−1. (1.41)
64. If Condition G is not satisfied, then ρ(S(G)) = 0 (Result 1.37.2), so that γρ(S(G)) > −β is
equivalent to β > 0.
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It should be noted that z⋆ is not necessarily a global maximum point of w˜ be-
cause merely z⋆ ∈ Rn but not necessarily z⋆ ∈ int( f (Y)n). In general, the matrix
Q(β,γ,G) is neither positive nor nonnegative (see Example 1.42), which is rele-
vant for establishing z⋆ ∈ int( f (Y)n) if Y is equal to R+ or [0, υ¯]. The situation
is therefore different from that of the NE of Γ. In particular, if γ > 0, then the
matrix βIn + γS(G) = (β+ γ)In − γ(A¯(G)T + A¯(G)− A¯(G)T A¯(G)) is generally
not an M-matrix because A¯(G)T + A¯(G)− A¯(G)T A¯(G) is generally not nonnega-
tive, so that the inverse of βIn + γS(G) is generally not nonnegative. The matrix
Q(β,γ,G) has, however, properties that can be exploited to find sufficient condi-
tions for z⋆ ∈ int( f (Y)n). A summary of relevant properties of Q(β,γ,G) is given
in Lemma 1.43.
Example 1.42 Suppose I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A(G) = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 1), (2, 3),
(3, 1), (3, 2)}, β = 1, and γ = 1/3. See Figure 1.11 (g) for an illustration of G.
Straightforward calculations yield
Q(β,γ,G) =
1
553

388 64 64 37
64 408 92 −11
64 92 408 −11
37 −11 −11 538
 .
Evidently, Q(β,γ,G) is neither positive nor nonnegative. 
Lemma 1.43 Suppose β > 0 and γρ(S(G)) > −β. The matrix Q(β,γ,G) has the
following properties:
(1.43.1) Q(β,γ,G) is symmetric and positive definite.
(1.43.2) If γ < 0, thenmax σ(Q(β,γ,G)) = 1/(β− |γ|ρ(S(G))) = 1/(βs(β,γ,G)),
andmax σ(Q(β,γ,G)) = 1/β = 1/(βs(β,γ,G)) else.
(1.43.3) For all i ∈ I ,min σ(Q(β,γ,G)) ≤ [Q(β,γ,G)]i,i ≤ max σ(Q(β,γ,G)).
(1.43.4) For all (i, j) ∈ I2 with i ̸= j, |[Q(β,γ,G)]i,j| < max σ(Q(β,γ,G)).
(1.43.5) Q(β,γ,G)1n = (1/β)1n.
For all i ∈ I , let y⋆S,i := f−1(z⋆i ), where z⋆i denotes the ith component of z⋆.65
If z⋆ ∈ int( f (Y)n), then z⋆ = ( f (y⋆S,1), . . . , f (y⋆S,n)) is an interior global maximum
point of w˜, which implies that y⋆S := (y⋆S,1, . . . , y⋆S,n) is an interior global maxi-
mum point of w. Using the notation introduced in Section 1.3.1, z⋆ = f (y⋆S) and
y⋆S = f
−1(z⋆). The conditions specified in Propositions 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41 other
than β > 0 and γρ(S(G)) > −β ensure that z⋆ ∈ int( f (Y)n) or, equivalently,
y⋆S ∈ int(Yn). Two of these conditions, namely, Conditions 1.40.3 and 1.41.3, are
based on Results 1.43.1 to 1.43.4.
65. Since Assumption F is an integral part of the definition of a NALA game, f is bijective (Lemma 1.1).
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In the remainder of this discussion, I show that y⋆S ∈ int(Yn). To this end,
I suppose β > 0 and γρ(S(G)) > −β. First, consider the case Y = R. Assump-
tion F and Condition 1.39.3 together imply that int( f (R)n) = Rn, which is a convex
set. Consequently, z⋆ ∈ int( f (R)n) and y⋆S ∈ Rn.
Second, consider the case Y = R+. Assumption F and Condition 1.40.4 to-
gether imply that int( f (R+)n) = ( f (0),+∞)n, which is a convex set. If the players
of Γ are strongly ex ante homogeneous, so that α = α¯1n for some α¯ ∈ R, then
z⋆ = (α¯/β)1n because Q(β,γ,G)1n = (1/β)1n (Result 1.43.5), which implies that
z⋆ ∈ int( f (R+)n) and y⋆S ∈ int(Rn+) if α¯/β > f (0). This suggests that y⋆S ∈ int(Rn+)
is true even if the players of Γ are ex ante heterogeneous, provided that they are suf-
ficiently similar in terms of their idiosyncrasies and α¯I/β > f (0). Proposition 1.40
confirms this hypothesis. If the players of Γ are strongly ex ante homogeneous, then
∑i∈I |αi − α¯I | = 0, so that Condition 1.40.3 is equivalent to α¯I/β > f (0). If the play-
ers of Γ are ex ante heterogeneous, then ∑i∈I |αi − α¯I | > 0, so that Condition 1.40.3
implies that α¯I/β > f (0). In this case, Condition 1.40.3 entails a restriction re-
garding the dissimilarity of the players’ idiosyncrasies. Indeed, the inequality
∑i∈I |αi − α¯I | < s(β,γ,G)(α¯I − β f (0)) is true if the idiosyncrasies are sufficiently
similar. For example, if for all j ∈ I , |αj − α¯I | < s(β,γ,G)(α¯I − β f (0))/n, then
∑i∈I |αi − α¯I | < s(β,γ,G)(α¯I − β f (0)). The restriction regarding the dissimilarity
of the players’ idiosyncrasies for a negative γ is stronger than for a positive γ, pro-
vided that Condition G is satisfied. Indeed, if γ ≥ 0, then s(β,γ,G) = 1, and if Con-
dition G is satisfied and γ < 0 is such that γρ(S(G)) > −β, then 0 < s(β,γ,G) < 1
because ρ(S(G)) > 0 (Result 1.37.1).
Third, consider the caseY = [0, υ¯]. Since [0, υ¯] is compact, Assumption F by itself
implies that int( f ([0, υ¯])n) = ( f (0), f (υ¯))n, which is a convex set. No assumption is
therefore needed about the boundedness of f . If the players of Γ are strongly ex ante
homogeneous, then Condition 1.41.3 is equivalent to f (0) < α¯I/β < f (υ¯). In this
case, z⋆ = (α¯I/β)1n ∈ int( f ([0, υ¯])n) and y⋆S ∈ int([0, υ¯]n) if f (0) < α¯I/β < f (υ¯).
If the players of Γ are ex ante heterogeneous, Condition 1.41.3 ensures too that
y⋆S ∈ int([0, υ¯]n). Similar to Condition 1.40.3, Condition 1.41.3 entails a restriction
regarding the dissimilarity of the players’ idiosyncrasies. Finally, note that Condi-
tion 1.41.3 is stronger than Condition 1.40.3.
1.3.5.2 Properties of interior social optima
For this section, suppose β > 0. In addition, suppose Γ has a unique and interior
social optimum y⋆S, which is given by (1.39). Some basic properties of y⋆S are given
by the following result.
Proposition 1.44 (1.44.1) If γ = 0, then f (y⋆S) = (1/β)α.
(1.44.2) If α = α¯1n for some α¯ ∈ R, then y⋆S = f−1(α¯/β)1n.
(1.44.3) If y⋆S = y¯1n for some y¯ ∈ int(Y), then α = β f (y¯)1n.
(1.44.4) If α = A¯(G)α, then f (y⋆S) = (1/β)α.
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Results 1.44.1 to 1.44.4 are analogous to those of the interior NE of Γ (Results
1.31.2, 1.34.1, 1.34.2, and 1.35.1 and Remark 1.36), and so are their interpretations.
A representation of f (y⋆S) that is equivalent to (1.39) if β+ γ > 0 is
f (y⋆S) =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)− γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)T
(
In − A¯(G)
))−1
α, (1.42)
where A¯(G)T(In − A¯(G)) ̸= On if Condition G is satisfied (Lemma 1.45). The
representation (1.42) unveils the algebraic similarity between the social optimum
and the NE of Γ, which will be elaborated on in Sections 1.3.5.3 and 1.3.5.4.
Lemma 1.45 If Condition G is satisfied, then A¯(G)T A¯(G) ̸= A¯(G)T.
1.3.5.3 Efficiency of interior Nash equilibria
For this section, suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2. In addition, suppose Γ has a unique
and interior NE y⋆N := (y⋆N,1, . . . , y⋆N,n), which is given by (1.7), and a unique and
interior social optimum y⋆S := (y⋆S,1, . . . , y⋆S,n), which is given by (1.39). The NE of Γ
is called efficient if y⋆N = y⋆S, that is, for all i ∈ I , y⋆N,i = y⋆S,i; otherwise it is called
inefficient.
NE actions, equilibrium actions for short, have much in common with socially
optimal actions, but there are notable differences. This is apparent from a compari-
son of (1.7) to (1.42). Despite its merits, matrix notation might not fully disclose
the nature of the difference between the two types of actions. A close inspection
of the systems of equations that govern equilibrium actions and socially optimal
actions proves useful in this respect. According to (1.7), for all i ∈ I , if deg+G (i) = 0,
then f (y⋆N,i) = (1/β)αi, and if deg+G (i) > 0, then
f (y⋆N,i) =
αi
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ
1
deg+G (i)
∑
j∈N+G (i)
f (y⋆N,j). (1.43)
According to (1.42), for all i ∈ I , if deg+G (i) = 0, then66
f (y⋆S,i) =
αi
β
+
γ
β ∑
j∈N−G (i)
1
deg+G (j)
(
f (y⋆S,j)−
1
deg+G (j)
∑
k∈N+G (j)
f (y⋆S,k)
)
, (1.44)
and if deg+G (i) > 0, then
f (y⋆S,i) =
αi
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ
1
deg+G (i)
∑
j∈N+G (i)
f (y⋆S,j)
+
γ
β+ γ ∑
j∈N−G (i)
1
deg+G (j)
(
f (y⋆S,j)−
1
deg+G (j)
∑
k∈N+G (j)
f (y⋆S,k)
)
. (1.45)
66. For all (i, j) ∈ I2, j ∈ N−G (i) if and only if i ∈ N+G (j), which implies that deg+G (j) > 0 is necessary
for j ∈ N−G (i).
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Aplayer’s action enters the welfare function through two different channels: directly
through his utility function and indirectly through the social component of the
utility functions of the players to whom he is an out-neighbor, that is, the utility
functions of his in-neighbors. As a consequence, a player’s socially optimal action
depends not only on his out-neighbors’ actions (via the direct channel by means
of the social component) but also on his in-neighbors’ actions (via the indirect
channel), which in turn depend on their out-neighbors’ and in-neighbors’ actions,
and so forth. This fact is reflected in (1.45) and also partly in (1.44). In contrast,
a player’s equilibrium action depends exclusively on his out-neighbors’ actions,
if at all, which in turn depend on their out-neighbors’ actions. This is reflected
in (1.43). The foregoing considerations highlight a fundamental difference between
equilibrium actions and socially optimal actions: both an agent’s in-neighborhood
and out-neighborhood shape his socially optimal action, whereas it is an agent’s
out-neighborhood only that matters for his equilibrium action.
In general, equilibrium actions are inefficient. The reason for this is obvious.
In the NE, the players disregard the influence emanating from their in-neighbors’
actions, whereas this influence is accounted for by the social optimum. As a result,
equilibrium actions are in general inefficient. There exist, however, a few cases
where equilibrium actions are efficient. An exhaustive list of these cases is given in
the corollary to the following result.
Proposition 1.46 The NE of Γ is efficient if and only if f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α ∈ ker(A¯(G)T),
where f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α = −(γ/β)( f (y⋆N)− A¯(G) f (y⋆N)).
Corollary 1.47 The NE of Γ is efficient if and only if at least one of the following three condi-
tions is satisfied: (1.47.1) γ = 0, (1.47.2) α = A¯(G)α, or (1.47.3) 0n ̸= f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α
and f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α ∈ ker(A¯(G)T).
If the players of Γ have a preference for nonconformist behavior (Condition
1.47.1), then f (y⋆N) = (1/β)α (Result 1.31.2 and Remark 1.36) and f (y⋆S) = (1/β)α
(Result 1.44.1), from which it follows that equilibrium actions are efficient. If the
players of Γ are weakly ex ante homogeneous (Condition 1.47.2), then f (y⋆N) =
(1/β)α (Result 1.35.1 and Remark 1.36) and f (y⋆S) = (1/β)α (Result 1.44.4). In
this case, too, equilibrium actions are efficient. The same applies in case of strongly
ex ante homogeneous players. Conditions 1.47.1 and 1.47.3 are mutually exclusive
for f (y⋆N) = (1/β)α if γ = 0. If the players of Γ have a preference for conformist
or anti-conformist behavior, that is, γ ̸= 0, then Conditions 1.47.2 and 1.47.3 are
mutually exclusive because α = A¯(G)α is both necessary and sufficient for f (y⋆N) =
(1/β)α if γ ̸= 0 (Results 1.35.1 and 1.35.2 and Remark 1.36). If 0 /∈ σ(A¯(G)), then
ker(A¯(G)T) = {0n}.67 This is, for example, the case if G is complete (Example 1.48).
It follows that 0 ∈ σ(A¯(G)) is necessary for Condition 1.47.3.
Example 1.48 If G is complete, then σ(A¯(G)) = {1/(1− n), 1}. 
For the remainder of this discussion, suppose Condition 1.47.3 is satisfied, which
implies that Conditions 1.47.1 and 1.47.2 are not satisfied. Condition 1.47.3 may
67. The eigenspace of A¯(G)T associated to the eigenvalue 0 is identical to ker(A¯(G)T).
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be interpreted in a number of ways: algebraically, geometrically, and in terms of
players’ in- and out-neighborhoods.
First, the algebraic interpretation. Condition 1.47.3 implies that
A¯(G)T
(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆N) = 0n, (1.46)
which in turn implies that
f (y⋆N) =
1
β+ γ
α+
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G) f (y⋆N) +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)T
(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆N).
Thus, f (y⋆N) satisfies the same system of equations as does f (y⋆S) (see, for example,
(1.42)). It follows that equilibrium actions are efficient.
Second, the geometric interpretation. The vector f (y⋆N)may be decomposed into
two parts, (1/β)α and f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α. If γ = 0, then f (y⋆N) = (1/β)α.68 Hence,
f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α represents the part of f (y⋆N) that is attributable to the players’ pref-
erence for conformist or anti-conformist behavior and their connections in G. A first
geometric result is directly related to f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α. Since f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α lies in
the kernel of A¯(G)T, it is orthogonal to all columns of A¯(G) and therefore orthogonal
to the linear space spanned by the columns of A¯(G), which is denoted by c-sp(A¯(G)).
A second geometric result is indirectly related to f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α. Since ker(A¯(G)T)
is a linear subspace of Rn, f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α ∈ ker(A¯(G)T) and f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α =
−(γ/β)( f (y⋆N)− A¯(G) f (y⋆N)) imply that f (y⋆N)− A¯(G) f (y⋆N) ∈ ker(A¯(G)T), that
is, f (y⋆N)− A¯(G) f (y⋆N) is orthogonal to c-sp(A¯(G)). In other words, A¯(G) f (y⋆N)
is the orthogonal projection of f (y⋆N) onto c-sp(A¯(G)). Specifically, if f = idY , the
vector of social differences in equilibrium, that is, the vector of differences between
the players’ actions and their out-neighbors’ average actions, is orthogonal to the
vector of out-neighbors’ average actions. The interpretation of A¯(G) f (y⋆N) as the
image of an orthogonal projection is also reflected in (1.46). The orthogonal projec-
tion onto c-sp(A¯(G))may be represented by a square matrix Pc-sp(A¯(G)) of order n.
Using this notation, Pc-sp(A¯(G)) f (y⋆N) = A¯(G) f (y⋆N) and (In − Pc-sp(A¯(G))) f (y⋆N) =
(In − A¯(G)) f (y⋆N), where In − Pc-sp(A¯(G)) is the matrix representing the orthogo-
nal projection onto the orthogonal complement to c-sp(A¯(G)), which is denoted
by c-sp(A¯(G))⊥. Since (In − A¯(G)) f (y⋆N) lies in c-sp(A¯(G))⊥, it is orthogonal to
every column of A¯(G), which is exactly what is expressed by (1.46). The foregoing
geometric interpretation of Condition 1.47.3 is illustrated by Example 1.49.
Third, the interpretation in terms of players’ in- and out-neighborhoods. Con-
dition 1.47.3 provides a restriction on the column space of A¯(G), c-sp(A¯(G)), for
( f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α)T A¯(G) = 0Tn shows that some linear combination of the compo-
nents of any column of A¯(G)must be zero.69 The restrictions obeyed by the columns
68. If Condition G is not satisfied, then f (y⋆N) = (1/β)α too.
69. The system of equations ( f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α)T A¯(G) = 0Tn is equivalent to
∀i ∈ I ∑
j∈N−G (i)
1
deg+G (j)
f (y⋆N,j) = ∑
j∈N−G (i)
1
deg+G (j)
αj
β
.
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of A¯(G)—and therefore by every vector in c-sp(A¯(G))—depend on α and A¯(G)
because f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α is a mapping of α and A¯(G). Each column (respectively,
row) of A¯(G) encodes information about a player’s in-neighborhood (respectively,
out-neighborhood) in G. Condition 1.47.3 entails therefore restrictions on the play-
ers’ in-neighborhoods, which are related to the players’ idiosyncracies and their
out-neighborhoods. The restrictions are thereby stronger than the restrictions im-
plied by the canonical relation between the players’ in- and out-neighborhoods in G,
namely, for all (i, j) ∈ I2, j ∈ N+G (i) if and only if i ∈ N−G (j).
Example 1.49 Suppose I = {1, 2, 3}, A(G) = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 1)}, Y = R+,
α1 = 8/3, α2 = 1/3, α3 = 5, β = 1, γ = 3/4, and f = idR+ . See Figure 1.9 for
an illustration of G. The endogenous effects matrix of G is given by (1.28). Note
that σ(A¯(G)) = {−1, 0, 1}. The kernel of A¯(G)T and the column space of A¯(G) are
given by
ker
(
A¯(G)T
)
=
s
 0−1
1
 ∣∣∣∣∣∣ s ∈ R

and
c-sp(A¯(G)) =
s
10
0
+ t
01
1
 ∣∣∣∣∣∣ (s, t) ∈ R2
,
where ker(A¯(G)T) may be represented by a line and c-sp(A¯(G)) by a plane in
Euclidean space R3. Straightforward calculations yield
y⋆N =
1
3
 84
12

and
y⋆N −
1
β
α = −γ
β
(
y⋆N − A¯(G)y⋆N
)
=
 01
−1
 .
Since y⋆N − (1/β)α ∈ ker(A¯(G)T), y⋆S = y⋆N according to Proposition 1.46. This
result is illustrated in Figure 1.15, where the origin of the Euclidian space R3 is
marked by O and the axes represent players’ actions. For all pairs (X,Y) of distinct
points in {A,N,O, P,Q}, #   –XY denotes the Euclidean vector with initial point X
and terminal point Y. Using this notation, the points A, N, P, and Q are such
that #    –OA = (1/β)α, #    –ON = y⋆N ,
#   –
OP = A¯(G)y⋆N ,
#    –
OQ = γ/(β + γ)A¯(G)y⋆N , and
#     –
QN = 1/(β+ γ)α. Evidently, both #   –OP and #    –OQ lie in the plane c-sp(A¯(G)), which
is depicted in gray. According to (1.7), y⋆N = 1/(β + γ)α + γ/(β + γ)A¯(G)y⋆N ,
which translates into #    –ON = #    –OQ+ #     –QN. This is the canonical decomposition of y⋆N .
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player 2’s action
player 3’s action
player 1’s action
pi
2
O
A
N
Q
P
Figure 1.15. Illustration of Condition 1.47.3 of Corollary 1.47 in Euclidian space R3
(Example 1.49)
Alternatively, y⋆N may be written as the sum of A¯(G)y⋆N and y⋆N − A¯(G)y⋆N , in
Euclidean vector notation, #    –ON = #   –OP+ #    –PN. Since y⋆N − A¯(G)y⋆N ∈ ker(A¯(G)T),
y⋆N − A¯(G)y⋆N is orthogonal to A¯(G)y⋆N , that is, the angle (in radians) between
#   –
PO and #    –PN is equal to pi/2.70 Yet another decomposition of y⋆N is given by y⋆N =
(1/β)α+ (y⋆N − (1/β)α), where (1/β)α is the NE of Γ if γ = 0. This decomposition
can be written as #    –ON = #    –OA+ #    –AN, where #    –AN = y⋆N − (1/β)α is orthogonal to
c-sp(A¯(G)). 
In general, if y⋆N is inefficient, neither y⋆S ≤c y⋆N nor y⋆N ≤c y⋆S is true. Even if
equilibrium actions and socially optimal actions are different, they may share a
common property, for example, aggregate action. This is, for example, the case
if the digraph by which the players are connected is complete and f = idY , as
demonstrated by the following result.
Proposition 1.50 If G is complete, the players of Γ are ex ante heterogeneous, and γ ̸= 0,
then equilibrium actions and socially optimal actions have the following properties:71
(1.50.1) Equilibrium actions are inefficient, that is, y⋆N ̸= y⋆S.72
(1.50.2) 〈1n, f (y⋆N)〉 = 〈1n, f (y⋆S)〉 = (1/β)〈1n, α〉.
(1.50.3) If ∑nk=1 αk ∈ O(n) as n→ ∞, then, for all i ∈ I , f (y⋆N,i)− f (y⋆S,i) ∈ O(1) as
n→ ∞.
70. In general, ker(A¯(G)T) is equal to the orthogonal complement to c-sp(A¯(G)).
71. The dependence of y⋆N,i and y⋆S,i on n is suppressed in all statements about the asymptotic behavior
of f (y⋆N,i)− f (y⋆S,i) and y⋆N,i − y⋆S,i as n→ ∞.
72. This result follows directly from Corollaries 1.7 and 1.47 and Example 1.48.
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(1.50.4) If f−1 is Lipschitz continuous and∑nk=1 αk ∈ O(n) as n→ ∞, then, for all i ∈ I ,
y⋆N,i − y⋆S,i ∈ O(1) as n→ ∞.
(1.50.5) If there exists an α¯ ∈ R such that (1/n)∑nk=1 αk − α¯ ∈ O(1) as n → ∞, then,
for all i ∈ I , y⋆N,i − y⋆S,i ∈ O(1) as n→ ∞.
Within the setup of Proposition 1.50, equilibrium actions are inefficient (Re-
sult 1.50.1), yet aggregate equilibrium action and aggregate socially optimal action
are identical, provided that f = idY (Result 1.50.2). Both aggregate actions are
thereby equal to the aggregate action in a NALA game with an arbitrary digraph G
andwhere the players have a preference for nonconformist behavior (cf. Result 1.31.2
and Remark 1.36) or the players are weakly ex ante homogeneous (cf. Result 1.35.1
and Remark 1.36). Even if equilibrium actions and socially optimal actions are
different, the distance between the former and the latter is strictly decreasing in n,
the number of players of Γ, provided that (i) f = idY and the sum of the players’
idiosyncracies, ∑ni=1 αi, is at most of order n (Result 1.50.3); (ii) f−1 is Lipschitz
continuous and ∑ni=1 αi is at most of order n (Result 1.50.4); or (iii) the average of
the players’ idiosyncracies, (1/n)∑ni=1 αi, converges as n→ ∞ (Result 1.50.5).
1.3.5.4 Decentralization of social optima
Suppose Condition G is satisfied and Γ has a unique and interior social optimum y⋆S,
which is given by (1.39).73 The social optimum of Γ may be decentralized as a NE,
as demonstrated by the following result.
Proposition 1.51 Suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2. The social optimum of Γ, y⋆S, can be de-
centralized as the unique and interior NE of the NALA game (I ,G,Y , {(αS,i, β,γ)}i∈I , f ),
where the profile of the players’ idiosyncrasies, αS := (αS,1, . . . , αS,n), is given by αS =
α+ γA¯(G)T(In − A¯(G)) f (y⋆S). If
ρ
(
γA¯(G)T
(
In − A¯(G)
)
J(β,γ,G)
)
< 1, (1.47)
then αS = (In − γA¯(G)T(In − A¯(G))J(β,γ,G))−1α. A sufficient condition for (1.47)
is −β/(2+ 2N(G)) < γ < β/(2N(G)), where74
N(G) := max
{
1I+0 (G)(j) +
deg−G (j)
min
{
deg+G (i)
∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)}
∣∣∣∣∣ j ∈ I
}
.
In general, αS − α is neither nonnegative nor nonpositive, but αS = α if and only
if at least one of the Conditions 1.47.1, 1.47.2, or 1.47.3 is satisfied.
There are—at least theoretically—two ways to decentralize the social optimum
of Γ. First, the social planner may target the players’ idiosyncracies directly. A suit-
able policy measure entails altering each player’s idiosyncrasy from αi to αS,i. Subse-
quently, the players play the generic NALA game (I ,G,Y , {(αS,i, β,γ)}i∈I , f ). Sec-
ond, the social planner may target the players’ idiosyncracies indirectly. Specifically,
73. The question of decentralization does not arise if Condition G is not satisfied for in this case the
interior social optimum of Γ is equal to its interior NE.
74. Condition G implies thatmin{deg+G (i) | i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)} > 0.
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the plannermay subsidize or tax the players’ idiosyncracies within a two-stage game.
In the first stage of the game, the planner announces to subsidize or tax a player’s
private benefit per unit of action (or per unit of transformed action if f ̸= idY)
by ςi := αS,i − αi. In the second stage of the game, the players play a game that
is strategically equivalent to the generic NALA game (I ,G,Y , {(αS,i, β,γ)}i∈I , f ),
where for all i ∈ I , player i’s utility function satisfies (cf. (1.4))
ui(y1, . . . , yn) = ςi f (yi) + αi f (yi)− β2 f (yi)
2 − γ
2
(
f (yi)− ∑
j∈I
a¯i,j(G) f (yj)
)2
.
Both direct and indirect policy measures are individually tailored to each player’s
idiosyncrasy. Needless to say, it depends largely on the context, that is, on the
phenomenon under consideration, which of the two policies, if any, is feasible.
1.3.6 Policy analysis
In this section, I discuss NALA games from the perspective of a policy maker whose
sole objective is to decrease or increase to a degree aggregate equilibrium action,
aggregate action for short, depending on whether action has a negative or a positive
connotation. The analysis rests on the implicit assumption that the policy maker
has measures at his disposal to alter, at least to some extent, the players’ preference
parameters and the topology of the digraph by which the players are connected.
As usual, let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let
α be defined as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2, so that β+ γ > 0
and |γ/(β+ γ)| < 1. In addition, suppose Γ has a unique and interior NE y⋆ :=
(y⋆1 , . . . , y
⋆
n), which is given by (1.7).
Hereinafter, y⋆ is written as y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,G) in order to emphasize that it is a
mapping of α, β, γ, f , and G. The same applies to the components of y⋆. Depending
on the context and situation, some or all of the arguments of y⋆ and of its components
may be omitted. The function of aggregate action is written as 〈1n, y⋆〉 : Yn → nY .75
1.3.6.1 Targeting the players’ preference parameters
The policy maker may consider targeting some or all of the players’ preference
parameters in order to achieve his objective of changing aggregate action in one
direction or the other.
Suppose the policy maker’s target for aggregate action is τ ∈ R. The target τ is
called attainable if there exist α˜ := (α˜1, . . . , α˜n) ∈ Rn, β˜ > 0, and γ˜ > −β˜/2 such
that the generic NALA game (I ,G,Y , {(α˜i, β˜, γ˜)}i∈I , f ) has a unique and interior
NE y⋆(α˜, β˜, γ˜, f ,G) that satisfies τ = 〈1n, y⋆(α˜, β˜, γ˜, f ,G)〉, in which case τ is called
attainable by {(α˜i, β˜, γ˜)}i∈I . The set of attainable targets for aggregate action is
denoted by T ⋆(Y). The target τ is called implementable if it is attainable by some
{(α˜i, β˜, γ˜)}i∈I and there exists a policy measure to alter the players’ preference
parameters from {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I to {(α˜i, β˜, γ˜)}i∈I . A characterization of T ⋆(Y) is
given in the following result.
75. The set nY is equal to {ny | y ∈ Y}; for example, nR = R, nR+ = R+, and n[0, υ¯] = [0, nυ¯].
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Proposition 1.52 A target τ for aggregate action is attainable by {(β f (τ/n), β, 0)}i∈I
if τ ∈ int(nY). It follows that T ⋆(Y) = int(nY).
A target τ in T ⋆(Y) is implementable if the policy maker has measures at his
disposal to alter each player’s idiosyncrasy from αi to β f (τ/n) and the players’
common social cost or benefit parameter from γ to 0. Assuming that the players
of Γ are ex ante heterogeneous, the corresponding policy is necessarily player
tailored and may be particularly difficult to implement if the difference between
β f (τ/n) and αi is negative for some players and positive for others. The difficulty
may be alleviated if τ is attainable by some {(α˜i, β˜, γ˜)}i∈I that is less challenging to
implement than {(β f (τ/n), β, 0)}i∈I . But what is to be done if a target is attainable
but not implementable? This may be the case if at least one of two conditions is
satisfied: First, the policy maker is able to alter some but not all of the players’
preference parameters. Second, the players’ preference parameters can be altered
only to a limited degree. In either case, the policy maker is advised to switch
the original target for an implementable target that decreases the distance to the
original target most. In order to formulate a policy that decreases this distance, it is
important to know whether aggregate action is monotone in some of the players’
preference parameters. The presence or absence of such a monotonic dependence
is the subject of the following result.
Proposition 1.53 The partial derivatives of 〈1n, y⋆〉 with respect to α, β, and γ are given
by
∂〈1n, y⋆〉
∂α
= w( f , y⋆)T J(β,γ,G), (1.48)
∂〈1n, y⋆〉
∂β
= −〈w( f , y⋆), J(β,γ,G) f (y⋆)〉, (1.49)
and
∂〈1n, y⋆〉
∂γ
=
〈
w( f , y⋆), J(β,γ,G)
(
A¯(G)− In
)
f (y⋆)
〉
, (1.50)
where w( f , y⋆) := (1/∂ f (y⋆1), . . . , 1/∂ f (y⋆n)) ∈ Rn++ with w(idY , y⋆) = 1n.
(1.53.1) If γ ≥ 0, then ∂〈1n, y⋆〉/∂α >c 0Tn.
(1.53.2) If γ ≥ 0 and f (y⋆) ∈ Rn+ \ {0n}, then ∂〈1n, y⋆〉/∂β < 0.
(1.53.3) ∂〈1n, y⋆〉/∂γ|γ=0 = (1/β2)〈w( f , (1/β)α), A¯(G)α− α〉.
If the players’ common social cost or benefit parameter is nonnegative, then
aggregate action is strictly increasing in the players’ idiosyncracies (Result 1.53.1)
and strictly decreasing in the players’ commonprivate cost parameter (Result 1.53.2),
where the latter result is true if, for example, equilibrium actions exceed a certain
critical threshold. Aggregate equilibrium action is in general not monotonic in the
players’ common social cost or benefit parameter. This is illustrated by Example 1.54.
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Figure 1.16. Aggregate equilibrium action as a function of γ (Example 1.54)
Example 1.54 Suppose I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A(G) = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 1), (2, 3),
(3, 1), (3, 2)}, Y = [0, 20], α1 = 8, α2 = α4 = 12, α3 = 27/2, β = 1, γ > −1/4, and
f = id[0,20]. See Figure 1.11 (g) for an illustration of G. Let y⋆(γ) denote the unique
and interior NE of Γ. Straightforward calculations yield
y⋆(γ) =
1
3γ3 + 29γ2 + 36γ+ 12

36γ3 + 321γ2 + 342γ+ 96
36γ3 + 324γ2 + 417γ+ 144
36γ3 + 327γ2 + 444γ+ 162
36γ3 + 348γ2 + 432γ+ 144
 ,
from which it follows that
〈1n, y⋆(γ)〉 = 48γ
2 + 408γ+ 273
γ2 + 9γ+ 6
and ∂〈1n, y
⋆(γ)〉
∂γ
=
24γ2 + 30γ− 9
(γ2 + 9γ+ 6)2
,
where both polynomials 3γ3 + 29γ2 + 36γ + 12 and γ2 + 9γ + 6 are positive on
(−1/4,+∞). The polynomial 24γ2 + 30γ− 9 has one positive root in (−1/4,+∞),
which is equal to 1/4. It follows that aggregate action is strictly decreasing on
(−1/4, 1/4) and strictly increasing on (1/4,+∞). This is illustrated in Figure 1.16,
where the solid line represents the graph of aggregate action as a function of γ. 
Of particular interest to the policymakermay be the behavior of aggregate action
as a function of the players’ common social cost parameter in a right neighborhood
of zero. To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario of an egocentric
society. Suppose the members of a (human) population have a preference for
nonconformist behavior, even though they are connected to each other in some way.
In addition, suppose the policy maker has the power to formulate and implement a
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policy aiming at changing the members’ behavior to the effect that they conform
with social norms. In the context of NALA games, this policy corresponds to an
increase in γ from zero to some positive value γ˜. What will be the effect of such
a policy on behavior and in particular on aggregate action? The answer depends
on the magnitude of γ˜ and the characteristics of the underlying NALA game other
than γ (which is zero), specifically, the players’ preference parameters and the
connections among the players. In general, aggregate action may decrease, increase,
or not change at all. This is reflected by Result 1.53.3. For example, if f = idY , then
∂〈1n, y⋆〉/∂γ|γ=0 = (1/β2)〈1n, A¯(G)α− α〉may be negative, zero, or positive. Since
Result 1.53.3 is relevant only for small changes in γ, the difference 〈1n, y⋆(γ˜)〉 −
〈1n, y⋆(0)〉 = 〈1n, y⋆(γ˜)〉 − (1/β)〈1n, α〉 is more appropriate to predict the impact
of the foregoing policy on aggregate action if γ˜ is not small and γ ↦→ 〈1n, y⋆(γ)〉 is
not accurately enough approximated by an affine function. It is hardly surprising
that 〈1n, y⋆(γ˜)〉 − (1/β)〈1n, α〉may be negative, zero, or positive. This is illustrated
in the continuation of Example 1.54.
Example 1.54 (cont’d) Figure 1.16 shows that γ ↦→ 〈1n, y⋆(γ)〉 has a negative slope
at zero, in particular, ∂〈1n, y⋆〉/∂γ|γ=0 = −1/4. Simple algebra yields
〈1n, y⋆(γ)〉 − (1/β)〈1n, α〉 = 5γ
2 − 3γ
2(γ2 + 9γ+ 6)
.
As mentioned before, the polynomial γ2 + 9γ+ 6 is positive on (−1/4,+∞). The
zero set of the polynomial 5γ2 − 3γ is equal to {0, 3/5}. It follows that the dif-
ference between 〈1n, y⋆(γ)〉 and (1/β)〈1n, α〉 is negative on (0, 3/5) and positive
on (−1/4, 0) and (3/5,+∞). In Figure 1.16, 〈1n, y⋆(γ)〉 − (1/β)〈1n, α〉 is equal to
the vertical difference between the solid line and the dashed line, where the latter
represents the graph of the constant function γ ↦→ (1/β)〈1n, α〉. 
Proposition 1.53 and the subsequent discussion can be summarized as follows.
Regardless of the structure of Γ, which is determined by G, Y , α, β, γ, and f ,
aggregate action is strictly increasing in α if γ ≥ 0. It is strictly decreasing in β
if γ ≥ 0 and, for example, Y ∈ {R+, [0, υ¯]} and f = idY . In general, it is not
monotonic in γ. These results suggest that the policy maker should not target the
players’ common social cost or benefit parameter, that is, the players’ common
preference for conformist or anti-conformist behavior, in order to alter aggregate
action in one direction or the other, especially if only part of the structure of Γ is
known to him. Instead, he is advised to target the players’ idiosyncrasies. The
players’ common private cost parameter may also represent a suitable target.
1.3.6.2 Targeting the players’ connections
Besides the players’ preference parameters, the policy maker may also consider
targeting the players’ connections.
Aggregate equilibrium action is in general not monotonic in the density of the
digraph by which the players are connected. This is illustrated in the continuation
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Figure 1.17. Aggregate equilibrium action ( ) and equilibrium welfare ( )
in Γ(Gg) for g ∈ {1, . . . , 8} if ϵ > 0, where c := 2(α¯+ (1/2)ϵ)2 > 0 (Example 1.28)
of Example 1.28. A policy aimed at changing the digraph’s density is therefore
in general not expedient to change aggregate action in one direction or the other.
A policy that decreases the digraph’s density could, for example, consist in isolating
a player (or a group of players) from all other players by cutting all his (or their)
connections to all other players.
Example 1.28 (cont’d) Simple calculations show that if ϵ > 0, then 〈1n, y⋆(G1)〉 =
〈1n, y⋆(G2)〉 > 〈1n, y⋆(G3)〉 > 〈1n, y⋆(G4)〉 < 〈1n, y⋆(G5)〉 = 〈1n, y⋆(G6)〉 <
〈1n, y⋆(G7)〉 > 〈1n, y⋆(G8)〉, that is, the function g ↦→ 〈1n, y⋆(Gg)〉 is not mono-
tonic.76 See Figure 1.17 for an illustration. Let G0 and G12 denote the empty and
complete digraph on I , respectively. The NEs of the corresponding NALA games
satisfy 〈1n, y⋆(G0)〉 = 〈1n, y⋆(G12)〉 = 〈1n, α〉 (see (1.7) and Result 1.50.2). Since
〈1n, y⋆(G3)〉 = 〈1n, y⋆(G5)〉 = 〈1n, y⋆(G6)〉 = 〈1n, α〉, the present example demon-
strates that aggregate action can be lower or higher than the levels corresponding
to an empty and a complete digraph (which are equal in the present example). 
1.3.6.3 Welfare effects of policy measures
A policy measure that alters aggregate action may also affect welfare. More specifi-
cally, if the policy maker alters some of the players’ preference parameters or the
topology of the digraph by which the players are connected, NE actions may change,
aggregate action may change in turn, and welfare is likely to change as well.
Before discussingwelfare effects of policymeasures, a fewwords on notation and
terminology are in order. Welfare at theNE y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,G) of Γ,w(y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,G)),
is called equilibrium welfare or, more precisely, equilibrium welfare in Γ. Depending on
the context and situation, some or all of the arguments of y⋆ in w(y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,G))
may be omitted.
76. Indeed, 〈1n, y⋆(G1)〉 = 〈1n, y⋆(G2)〉 = 4α¯+ (9/4)ϵ, 〈1n, y⋆(G3)〉 = 〈1n, y⋆(G5)〉 = 〈1n, y⋆(G6)〉 =
〈1n, α〉 = 4α¯+ 2ϵ, 〈1n, y⋆(G4)〉 = 4α¯+ (78/41)ϵ, 〈1n, y⋆(G7)〉 = 4α¯+ (195/82)ϵ, and 〈1n, y⋆(G8)〉 =
4α¯+ (169/107)ϵ.
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Suppose the policy maker’s target τ for aggregate action is attainable by some
family of preference parameters {(α˜i, β˜, γ˜)}i∈I . If τ is implementable, equilibrium
welfare changes byw(y⋆(α˜, β˜, γ˜, f ,G))−w(y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,G)) once it is implemented.
This difference may be negative, zero, or positive, depending on the structure
of Γ, which encompasses {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , and {(α˜i, β˜, γ˜)}i∈I . The difference be-
tween w(y⋆(α˜, β˜, γ˜, f ,G)) and w(y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,G)) can be decomposed into three
summands, namely,
w
(
y⋆(α˜, β˜, γ˜, f ,G)
)− w(y⋆(α, β˜, γ˜, f ,G))
+ w
(
y⋆(α, β˜, γ˜, f ,G)
)− w(y⋆(α, β, γ˜, f ,G))
+ w
(
y⋆(α, β, γ˜, f ,G)
)− w(y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,G)),
which motivates the study of the presence or absence of monotonic relationships
between the players’ preference parameters and equilibrium welfare.
The following result characterizes equilibrium welfare in Γ.
Proposition 1.55 The welfare function satisfies
w(y⋆) =
β+ γ
2
‖ f (y⋆)‖22 −
γ
2
‖A¯(G) f (y⋆)‖22. (1.51)
The partial derivatives of w(y⋆) with respect to α, β, and γ are given by
∂w(y⋆)
∂α
= αT J(β,γ,G)T
(
(β+ γ)In − γA¯(G)T A¯(G)
)
J(β,γ,G), (1.52)
∂w(y⋆)
∂β
= −1
2
‖ f (y⋆)‖22 − γR(α, β,γ, f ,G), (1.53)
and
∂w(y⋆)
∂γ
= −1
2
‖ f (y⋆)‖22 +
1
2
‖A¯(G) f (y⋆)‖22 + βR(α, β,γ, f ,G), (1.54)
where R(α, β,γ, f ,G) := 〈(In − A¯(G)) f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉.
(1.55.1) If γ = 0, then ∂w(y⋆)/∂α = (1/β)αT.
(1.55.2) If γ = 0, then ∂w(y⋆)/∂β = −‖α‖22/(2β2). If α ̸= 0n, γ > 0, and
0n ≤c f (y⋆) ≤c (1/β)α, then ∂w(y⋆)/∂β < 0.
(1.55.3) ∂w(y⋆)/∂γ|γ=0 = −‖A¯(G)α− α‖22/(2β2).
In general, equilibrium welfare is not monotonic in α (see (1.52) and Example
1.56) and β (see (1.53) and Example 1.57). There are, however, several special cases
in which a monotonic relationship exists. If γ = 0, then equilibrium welfare is
strictly increasing in the players’ idiosyncracies, provided that they are positive (Re-
sult 1.55.1). If γ = 0, then equilibrium welfare is strictly decreasing in the players’
common private cost parameter β, provided that α ̸= 0n, which is equivalent to
f (y⋆) ̸= 0n (Result 1.55.2). It is also strictly decreasing in β if γ > 0, provided
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that α ̸= 0n and the players’ equilibrium actions are bounded below by f−1(0) and
above by the actions they would play if they were weakly ex ante homogeneous
(Result 1.35.1 and Remark 1.36 and Result 1.55.2).
Example 1.56 Suppose A(G) = ⋃i∈I\{1}{(i, 1)}, that is, G is star-shaped with arcs
from every peripheral player i ∈ I \ {1} to the central player 1. In addition, suppose
Y = R+ and f = idR+ . We have77
∀j ∈ I ∂w(y
⋆)
∂αj
=

γ
β(β+ γ) ∑i∈I\{1}
αi − (n− 2)γ− ββ(β+ γ) αj if j = 1,
γ
β(β+ γ)
α1 +
1
β+ γ
αj if j ̸= 1.
(1.55)
If n > 2, α1 = α¯+ ∆α and α2 = · · · = αn = α¯ for some (α¯,∆α) ∈ R++ ×R with
α¯+∆α > 0, β = 1, and γ > 1/(n− 2), then
∂w(y⋆)
∂α1
< 0 ⇔ ∆α > 1+ γ
(n− 2)γ− 1 α¯. (1.56)
In other words, provided that the number of players is large enough, the peripheral
players have a common idiosyncrasy, the players’ common private cost parameter
is normalized to one, and the players’ common social cost parameter exceeds a
critical threshold, equilibrium welfare is strictly decreasing in the central player’s
idiosyncrasy if and only if the central player’s idiosyncrasy is sufficiently different
from the peripheral players’ common idiosyncrasy. For example, if n = 8, α1 =
1 + ∆α with ∆α ∈ (−1,+∞), α2 = · · · = αn = 1, β = 1, and γ = 3/4, then
∂w(y⋆)/∂α1 < 0 if and only if ∆α > 1/2. In this example, equilibrium welfare
is not monotonic in α1, specifically, it is strictly increasing on (0, 3/2) and strictly
decreasing on (3/2,+∞). 
Example 1.57 Suppose A(G) = ⋃i∈I\{1}{(i, 1)}, Y = R+, and f = idR+ . We
have78
∂w(y⋆)
∂β
=
(n− 2)(2β+ γ)γ− β2
2β2(β+ γ)2
α21
− 1
2(β+ γ)2 ∑i∈I\{1}
α2i −
(2β+ γ)γ
β2(β+ γ)2 ∑i∈I\{1}
α1αi.
(1.57)
If α1 = 1+∆α for some ∆α ∈ (−1,+∞) and α2 = · · · = αn = 1, then
∂w(y⋆)
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=1
> 0 ⇔ (n− 2)(2+ γ)γ− 1
2(1+ γ)2
(∆α)2 −∆α− n
2
> 0. (1.58)
For example, if n = 10, α1 = 1+∆α with ∆α ∈ (−1,+∞), α2 = · · · = αn = 1, and
γ = 5/6, then ∂w(y⋆)/∂β|β=1 > 0 if and if ∆α > 11/7 ≈ 1.57. In this example, the
77. See Appendix D for the proofs of (1.55) and (1.56).
78. See Appendix D for the proofs of (1.57) and (1.58).
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Figure 1.18. Equilibrium welfare as a function of β for different values of ∆α (Ex-
ample 1.57)
local behavior of β ↦→ w(y⋆(β)) in a neighborhood of 1 depends critically on the
value of ∆α. This is illustrated in Figure 1.18. It shows the graph of equilibrium
welfare as a function of β if n = 10, α1 = 1+∆α, α2 = · · · = αn = 1, and γ = 5/6
for three different values of ∆α: ∆α ∈ {10/7, 11/7, 12/7}. As can be seen from the
figure, the slope of equilibrium welfare at β = 1 is negative for ∆α = 10/7, zero
for ∆α = 11/7, and positive for ∆α = 12/7. Besides this, the figure shows that
equilibrium welfare is not monotonic in β for all three values of ∆α. 
As regards equilibrium welfare as a function of γ, Result 1.55.3 characterizes its
behavior in a neighborhood of zero; in particular, equilibrium welfare is constant
if the players of Γ are weakly ex ante homogeneous, and it is strictly decreasing
otherwise. A close inspection of (1.51) or (1.54) reveals that γ ↦→ w(y⋆(γ)) is
constant on its entire domain if the players of Γ are weakly ex ante homogeneous.79
Apart from the preceding cases, more general results about the monotonic behavior
of γ ↦→ w(y⋆(γ)) are difficult to establish.80 A related result about the slope of the
secant line passing through zero and γ ̸= 0 is, however, straightforward to obtain.81
Proposition 1.58 If γ ̸= 0, then
w
(
y⋆(γ)
)− w(y⋆(0)) = − β(β+ γ)
2γ
∥∥∥∥ f (y⋆(γ))− 1βα
∥∥∥∥2
2
,
where w(y⋆(0)) = ‖α‖22/(2β).
79. Indeed, if α = A¯(G)α, then f (y⋆) = (1/β)α = (1/β)A¯(G)α = A¯(G) f (y⋆) (Result 1.35.1 and
Remark 1.36), which implies that w(y⋆) = ‖α‖22/(2β), from which ∂w(y⋆)/∂γ = 0 follows.
80. See Section 1.3.8 for the discussion of an open problem.
81. A line connecting two points on a graph is called a secant line.
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If the players of Γ are weakly ex ante homogeneous, then w(y⋆(γ)) = w(y⋆(0))
because f (y⋆(γ)) = (1/β)α (Result 1.35.1 and Remark 1.36). If the players of Γ are
not weakly ex ante homogeneous and have a preference for conformist (respectively,
anti-conformist) behavior, then w(y⋆(γ)) < w(y⋆(0)) (respectively, w(y⋆(γ)) >
w(y⋆(0))). Thus, in the context of the egocentric society described above, a policy
that fosters conformist behavior will decrease welfare or leave it unchanged.
Apart from the foregoing literal interpretation, Proposition 1.58 also highlights
the special role played by the empty digraph on I in equilibrium welfare be-
cause w(y⋆(α, β,γ, f , (I ,∅))) = w(y⋆(α, β, 0, f ,G)), that is, equilibrium welfare
in a NALA game where all players are isolated is the same as equilibrium welfare
in an otherwise identical NALA game where not all players are isolated and the
players have a common preference for nonconformist behavior. In order to state
the result about the special role of the empty digraph on I in equilibrium welfare,
let D⋆ denote the set of all digraphs D on I for which the generic NALA game
(I ,D,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) has a unique and interior NE y⋆(D) := y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,D).
Corollary 1.59 Suppose (1/β)α ∈ int(Yn) or, equivalently, (I ,∅) ∈ D⋆. If the players
of Γ have a preference for conformist (respectively, anti-conformist) behavior, then (I ,∅) ∈
argmaxD∈D⋆ w(y⋆(D)) (respectively, (I ,∅) ∈ argminD∈D⋆ w(y⋆(D))), that is, the
empty digraph on I maximizes (respectively, minimizes) equilibrium welfare.
The empty digraph on I provides an upper (respectively, lower) bound for
equilibriumwelfare if the players of Γ have a preference for conformist (respectively,
anti-conformist) behavior; in contrast, the complete digraph on I does not provide
a lower (respectively, upper) bound for equilibriumwelfare, as demonstrated by Ex-
ample 1.60. This asymmetry between the empty and complete digraph on I reflects
that equilibrium welfare is in general not monotonic in the density of the digraph
by which the players are connected, as further illustrated in the continuation of
Example 1.28.
Example 1.60 Suppose I = {1, 2, 3}, Y = [0, υ¯], β = 1, γ ∈ {−1/3, 1/3}, and
f = id[0,υ¯]. Let (α¯, ϵ) ∈ R2++ be such that (1/3)υ¯ < α¯ and α¯+ ϵ < (2/3)υ¯, and
suppose α1 = α¯ and α2 = α3 = α¯ + ϵ. Let G4 be the symmetric star-shaped
digraph on I with center 1, that is, A(G4) = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 1)}, and let
G6 be the complete digraph on I . See Figure 1.9 for an illustration of G4. For
all g ∈ {4, 6}, let y⋆(Gg) denote the unique and interior NE of the NALA game
(I ,Gg,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ). Simple calculations yield w(y⋆(G4)) > w(y⋆(G6)) if
γ = −1/3 and w(y⋆(G4)) < w(y⋆(G6)) if γ = 1/3.82 This shows that G6 does
not provide a lower (respectively, upper) bound for equilibrium welfare in case of
conformist (respectively, anti-conformist) behavior. 
Example 1.28 (cont’d) Simple calculations show that w(y⋆(G1)) = w(y⋆(G2)) >
w(y⋆(G3)) > w(y⋆(G4)) < w(y⋆(G5)) = w(y⋆(G6)) > w(y⋆(G7)) > w(y⋆(G8))
82. Indeed, if γ = −1/3, then w(y⋆(G4)) = c+ 4ϵ2 and w(y⋆(G6)) = c+ (5/3)ϵ2, and if γ = 1/3,
then w(y⋆(G4)) = c+ (19/25)ϵ2 and w(y⋆(G6)) = c+ (23/27)ϵ2, where c := (3/2)α¯2 + 2α¯ϵ.
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because ϵ ̸= 0, that is, the function g ↦→ w(y⋆(Gg)) is not monotonic.83 See Fig-
ure 1.17 for an illustration. 
1.3.7 Extensions
In this section, I discuss three extensions of the generic NALA game introduced in
Section 1.3.1. They concern the players’ idiosyncrasies (Section 1.3.7.1), the players’
common social cost or benefit parameter (Section 1.3.7.2), and the definition of the
social component of the players’ utility functions (Section 1.3.7.3).
1.3.7.1 Idiosyncrasies with local externalities
The generic NALA game (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) can be extended to the case
where the players’ idiosyncrasies are not constants but functions of more elementary
idiosyncrasies, which may give rise to local externalities. In order to formalize this
idea, let χ : I → R be a function representing the players’ elementary idiosyncrasies.
A player’s idiosyncrasy is assumed to depend on his own elementary idiosyncrasy
and possibly on other players’ elementary idiosyncrasies whose identities are given
by the player’s out-neighborhood in some digraph H on I , which may or may not
be equal to G. The function representing the players’ idiosyncrasies is denoted by
α(χ,H) : I → R. The way in which α(χ,H) depends on χ and H determines how
a player’s idiosyncrasy is affected by his out-neighbors’ elementary idiosyncrasies.
Of particular interest is the presence or absence of monotonic relationships. Defin-
ition LE introduces related terminology.84
Definition LE Player i’s idiosyncrasy, α(χ,H)(i), is said to exhibit positive (respec-
tively, negative) local externalities if for all functions χ˜ : I → R with χ˜(i) = χ(i)
and {j ∈ N+H (i) | χ˜(j) ≥ χ(j)} = N+H (i), α(χ˜,H)(i) ≥ α(χ,H)(i) (respectively,
α(χ˜,H)(i) ≤ α(χ,H)(i)); and it is said to exhibit strict positive (respectively, strict
negative) local externalities if for all functions χ˜ : I → R with χ˜(i) = χ(i) and
{j ∈ N+H (i) | χ˜(j) ≥ χ(j)} = N+H (i) and {j ∈ N+H (i) | χ˜(j) > χ(j)} ̸= ∅,
α(χ˜,H)(i) > α(χ,H)(i) (respectively, α(χ˜,H)(i) < α(χ,H)(i)).
In what follows, I give three examples of α(χ,H), thereby assuming that H is
not empty, that is, there exists a k ∈ I with deg+H(k) > 0.
Example 1.61 Let α(χ,H) : I → R be defined by
α(χ,H)(i) :=

χ(i) if deg+H(i) = 0,
χ(i) + ζi
∑j∈N+H (i) χ(j)
deg+H(i)
if deg+H(i) > 0,
(1.59)
83. Indeed, w(y⋆(G1)) = w(y⋆(G2)) = c + (35/8)ϵ2, w(y⋆(G3)) = c + (181/42)ϵ2, w(y⋆(G4)) =
c+ (14,449/3,362)ϵ2, w(y⋆(G5)) = w(y⋆(G6)) = c+ (235/54)ϵ2, w(y⋆(G7)) = c+ (64,811/15,129)ϵ2,
and w(y⋆(G8)) = c+ (678,445/206,082)ϵ2, where c := 2(α¯+ (1/2)ϵ)2 > 0.
84. Galeotti et al. (2010) introduced a similar terminology to characterize a player’s payoff function in
a network game with incomplete information (see pp. 226–27).
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where {ζi}i∈I is a family of real parameters. Player k’s idiosyncrasy is independent
of other players’ elementary idiosyncrasies if ζk = 0, and it exhibits strict positive
(respectively, strict negative) local externalities if ζk > 0 (respectively, ζk < 0),
where the magnitude of ζk is a measure of the strength of the local externalities. 
Example 1.62 Let α(χ,H) : I → R be defined by α(χ,H)(i) := χ(i) if deg+H(i) = 0
and α(χ,H)(i) := χ(i)∑j∈N+H (i) χ(j) if deg
+
H(i) > 0. Player k’s idiosyncrasy exhibits
positive local externalities if χ ≥ 0 and strict positive local externalities if χ > 0. 
Example 1.63 Let α(χ,H) : I → R be defined by α(χ,H)(i) := χ(i) if deg+H(i) = 0
and α(χ,H)(i) := χ(i) + ζmax{χ(j) | j ∈ N+H (i)} if deg+H(i) > 0, where ζ ∈ R is a
parameter. Player k’s idiosyncrasy exhibits positive (respectively, negative) local
externalities if ζ > 0 (respectively, ζ < 0). 
The function representing the players’ idiosyncrasies may give rise to exogenous
effects, wherein a player’s NE action (action for short) varies directly with a statistic
of the elementary idiosyncrasies of his out-neighbors in H.85,86 This effect is to be
contrastedwith the dependence of a player’s action on the elementary idiosyncrasies
of his out-neighbors (and higher-order out-neighbors) in G. The dependence on
other players’ elementary idiosyncrasies is thereby a consequence of endogenous
effects, wherein a player’s action varies with the actions of his out-neighbors in G.
Exogenous and endogenous effects represent two different channels through which
a player’s action is affected by other players’ elementary idiosyncrasies, a direct and
an indirect channel. The dependence of a player’s action on his own elementary
idiosyncrasy may give rise to correlated effects, wherein connected players play sim-
ilar actions because they have similar elementary idiosyncrasies. The distinction
between endogenous, exogenous, and correlated effects dates back to the original
work of Manski (1993), who discusses identification of the three aforementioned
effects—in particular, the non-identification of endogenous and exogenous effects—
in the context of a statistical model that is commonly known as the linear-in-means
model.
The theory of generic NALA games is based on the premise that the digraph G
by which the players are connected is fixed. The same applies to the digraph H that
admits of idiosyncrasieswith local externalities. Both digraphsG and Hmay be seen
as the result of a two-stage network formation game of complete information. At the
outset, all players are isolated in G and H. In the first stage of the game, the players
form arcs in G and H to other players. In the second stage of the game, the players
choose their actions by playing a variant of a generic NALA game where the utility
functions include a cost component for arc formation. The players’ equilibrium
utilities in this game represent the payoffs in the first stage of the game, that is,
they define the players’ value functions on the Cartesian square of the set of all
digraphs on I . The conception of a generic NALA game as the second stage of a
85. Exogenous effects are also referred to as contextual effects, especially but not exclusively in the
sociological literature.
86. Examples of statistics include the mean (as in Example 1.61), the median, the mode, the sum (as in
Example 1.62), the minimum, and the maximum (as in Example 1.63).
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network formation game provides a rational for idiosyncrasies that admit of local
externalities. They are necessary for a nonempty digraph to emerge if the first stage
of the game involves only a single digraph, that is, in case G and H are identical,
and the players have a preference for conformist behavior. The remainder of the
section expands on this result.
Let D denote the set of all digraphs on I . Suppose the function representing the
players’ elementary idiosyncrasies χ : I → R, the mapping α(χ, ·) : D → RI , the
parameters β > 0 and γ > 0, and the function f ∈ F (Y) are such that for all D ∈ D,
the generic NALA game Γ(D) := (I ,D,Y , {(α(χ,D)(i), β,γ)}i∈I , f ) has a unique
and interior NE (y⋆1(D), . . . , y⋆n(D)).87 For all (i,D) ∈ I × D, let u⋆i (D) denote
player i’s equilibrium utility in Γ(D), that is, his utility at the NE of Γ(D), and let Di
denote the subdigraph of D in which player i has an empty out-neighborhood.
Proposition 1.64 For all D ∈ D and for all i ∈ I ,
u⋆i (D) =
α(χ,D)(i)2
2β
− β+ γ
2βγ
(
α(χ,D)(i)− β f (y⋆i (D)))2.
If the mapping α(χ, ·) : D → RI is constant, then, for all D ∈ D and for all i ∈ I ,
u⋆i (Di) ≥ u⋆i (D).
If the mapping α(χ, ·) : D → RI is constant, then an empty out-neighborhood is
a weakly dominant strategy for all players. If in addition to the above condition the
players’ utility functions include a cost component for arc formation that is strictly
increasing in a player’s out-degree, then an empty out-neighborhood is a strictly
dominant strategy for all players, which implies that the players remain isolated
in G. Under the premise that the players have a preference for conformist behavior
and arc formation is costly, a necessary condition for a nonempty digraph G to
emerge from the network formation game is that the mapping α(χ, ·) : D → RI is
not constant, which is necessary for idiosyncrasies to admit of strict positive or strict
negative local externalities.88
1.3.7.2 Heterogeneous social cost or benefit parameters
In this section, I generalize the notion of a generic NALA game by relaxing the
assumption that its players have a common social cost or benefit parameter γ. In
particular, I assume that the players’ preferences over Yn can be represented by a
family of utility functions {ui : Yn → R}i∈I that satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption U' For all i ∈ I , player i’s utility function ui : Yn → R is given by
ui(y1, . . . , yn) := p
(
f (yi)
∣∣ αi, β)+ si( f (y1), . . . , f (yn) ∣∣ γi,G),
where (αi, β,γi) ∈ R×R+ ×R is a triple of parameters and f ∈ F (Y).89
87. The set of all functions with domain I and codomain R is denoted by RI .
88. The players’ idiosyncrasies do not admit of strict positive or strict negative local externalities if the
mapping α(χ, ·) : D → RI is constant, that is, for all D ∈ D, α(χ,D) = α(χ, (I ,∅)).
89. See Assumption U for the definition of the private component function p and player i’s social
component function si .
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Assumption U' leads to the notion of a (generic) NAHLA game.
Definition G' A nonaffine heterogeneous local average game, or NAHLA game for short,
is a NALA game where the players’ preferences over Yn are represented by a family
of utility functions {ui : Yn → R}i∈I that satisfies Assumption U'. A NAHLA game
is denoted by the quintuple (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γi)}i∈I , f ). A NAHLA game for which
Y is left unspecified is referred to as a generic NAHLA game.
The remainder of this section is concerned with the existence of a unique and
interior NE of the generic NAHLA game Γ' := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γi)}i∈I , f ). To this
end, let αmin and αmax be defined as in Section 1.3.3, let γmin := min{γi | i ∈ I} and
γmax := max{γi | i ∈ I}, let α be defined as in Section 1.3.2, and letγ := (γ1, . . . ,γn).
In addition, let diag(β1n + γ) and diag(γ) denote the diagonal matrices of order n
with the components in row i and column i equal to β+ γi and γi, respectively.
Analogous to the case of NALA games, I state sufficient conditions for a unique and
interior NE of Γ' separately for each type of action space: Proposition 1.65 covers
the case Y = R and admits of a negative and a nonnegative γmin; Proposition 1.66
covers the case Y = R+ and is limited to a nonnegative γmin; and Proposition 1.67
deals with the case Y = [0, υ¯] and a nonnegative γmin.90
Proposition 1.65 Suppose Y = R. The NAHLA game Γ' has a unique NE y⋆ ∈ Rn,
which is given by
f (y⋆) =
(
In − diag(β1n + γ)−1diag(γ)A¯(G)
)−1diag(β1n + γ)−1α, (1.60)
if three conditions are satisfied: (1.65.1) β > 0, (1.65.2) −β/2 < γmin, and (1.65.3) f is
not bounded below and above.
Proposition 1.66 Suppose Y = R+. The NAHLA game Γ' has a unique and interior
NE y⋆ ∈ Rn++, which is given by (1.60), if four conditions are satisfied: (1.66.1) β > 0,
(1.66.2) γmin ≥ 0, (1.66.3) β f (0) < αmin, and (1.66.4) f is not bounded above.
Proposition 1.67 Suppose Y = [0, υ¯]. The NAHLA game Γ' has a unique and interior
NE y⋆ ∈ (0, υ¯)n, which is given by (1.60), if four conditions are satisfied: (1.67.1) β > 0,
(1.67.2) γmin ≥ 0, (1.67.3) β f (0) < αmin, and (1.67.4) αmax < β f (υ¯).
The conditions of Proposition 1.65 are similar to those of Proposition 1.13: Con-
ditions 1.13.1 and 1.65.1 and Conditions 1.13.4 and 1.65.3 are the same; Conditions
1.65.1 and 1.65.2 imply that β+ γmin > 0, which is similar to Condition 1.13.2; and
Conditions 1.65.1 and 1.65.2 imply that In−diag(β1n+γ)−1diag(γ)A¯(G) is nonsin-
gular, whereas Conditions 1.13.1, 1.13.2, and 1.13.3 imply that In − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G)
90. The two cases where Y is equal to R+ or [0, υ¯] and γmin is negative are omitted from the present
discussion. As regards the caseY = R+ and γmin ≤ γmax < 0, the NAHLA game Γ' has a unique interior
NE if four conditions are satisfied: β > 0, −β/2 < γmin, an inequality that is similar in nature to the left
inequality of (1.17), and f is not bounded above. As regards the case Y = [0, υ¯] and γmin ≤ γmax < 0,
the NAHLA game Γ' has a unique interior NE if three conditions are satisfied: β > 0, −β/2 < γmin, and
two inequalities that are similar in nature to the inequalities (1.17).
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is nonsingular. The conditions of Propositions 1.16 and 1.66 are almost identical.
The same applies to the conditions of Propositions 1.14 and 1.67.
The system of equations governing the players’ NE actions in a NAHLA game
is similar in structure to that of a NALA game. This can be seen from a comparison
of (1.60) and (1.7), where the former system, with both vector diag(β1n + γ)−1α
and diagonal matrix diag(β1n + γ)−1diag(γ) written out in full, reads as follows:
f (y⋆) =
In −

γ1
β+ γ1
0
. . .
0
γn
β+ γn
 A¯(G)

−1
α1
β+ γ1...
αn
β+ γn
 .
An alternative representation of f (y⋆), which is more compact than (1.60), is given
by91
f (y⋆) =
(
βIn − diag(γ)
(
A¯(G)− In
))−1
α. (1.61)
The generic NAHLA game Γ' may be generalized further by relaxing the as-
sumption of a common private cost parameter. The resulting game, which is
denoted by (I ,G,Y , {(αi, βi,γi)}i∈I , f ), is strategically equivalent to the generic
NAHLA game (I ,G,Y , {(αi/βi, 1,γi/βi)}i∈I , f ) if {βi | i ∈ I} ⊂ R++.92 The
generic NAHLA game Γ' is strategically equivalent to the generic NAHLA game
(I ,G,Y , {(αi/β, 1,γi/β)}i∈I , f ) if β > 0. The implicit normalization β = 1 is, how-
ever, not without loss of generality from the perspective of a policy maker because
it involves the loss of a policy variable.
1.3.7.3 Dichotomous neighborhoods
The extension discussed hereinafter is motivated by the works of social anthropolo-
gist A. L. Epstein and sociologist M. S. Granovetter.
91. A representation of f (y⋆) by (1.60) in lieu of (1.61) has several merits, especially if Condi-
tion G is satisfied, which will be assumed hereinafter. First, (1.60) points to the central role played
by the matrix In − diag(β1n + γ)−1diag(γ)A¯(G), which is a nonsingular M-matrix with a nonneg-
ative inverse that is bounded below by In if β > 0 and γmin ≥ 0, in establishing y⋆ ∈ int(Yn)
if Y = R+ or Y = [0, υ¯]. The matrix βIn − diag(γ)(A¯(G) − In) in the representation (1.61) is
by contrast not an M-matrix if β > 0 and γmin ≥ 0 because A¯(G) − In is not nonnegative. Sec-
ond, (1.61) may convey the false impression that γmax must be bounded above for Γ' to have a
unique and interior NE. As to that, Lemma B.3 implies that the matrix βIn − diag(γ)(A¯(G) − In)
is nonsingular if β > 0 and 0 ≤ γmin ≤ γmax < β/2. Indeed, if β > 0 and 0 ≤ γmin ≤
γmax < β/2, then ρ((1/β)diag(γ)(A¯(G) − In)) ≤ (1/β)‖diag(γ)‖∞‖A¯(G) − In‖∞ = 2γmax/β <
1 (Lemma B.7 and (D.96)), which implies that the matrix β(In − (1/β)diag(γ)(A¯(G)− In)) =
βIn − diag(γ)(A¯(G) − In) is nonsingular (Lemma B.3). In contrast, the matrices diag(β1n + γ)
and In − diag(β1n + γ)−1diag(γ)A¯(G) are nonsingular if β > 0 and γmin ≥ 0, in which case
(In − diag(β1n + γ)−1diag(γ)A¯(G))−1diag(β1n + γ)−1 is equal to (βIn − diag(γ)(A¯(G)− In))−1. In-
deed, if β > 0 and γmin ≥ 0, then diag(β1n + γ)−1 exists and ρ(diag(β1n + γ)−1diag(γ)A¯(G)) ≤
‖diag(β1n + γ)−1diag(γ)‖∞‖A¯(G)‖∞ = max{γi/(β+ γi) | i ∈ I} < 1 (Lemmata B.7 and B.8), which
implies that the matrix In − diag(β1n + γ)−1diag(γ)A¯(G) is nonsingular (Lemma B.3).
92. Two games are called strategically equivalent if they have the same sets of NEs.
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In his anthropological study of urban social organization in the Central African
townNdola, Epstein (1961) distinguishes between a person’s effective and extended
network, where the effective network consists of those with whom one “interacts
most intensely andmost regularly, andwho are therefore also likely to come to know
one another” (p. 57) and the remainder of one’s network of social ties constitutes
the extended network. This nomenclature of social ties bears some resemblance
to Granovetter’s (1973) distinction between a person’s weak and strong ties—to
be interpreted as the result of dichotomizing the strength of a tie defined as a
“combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (p. 1361).93 Both
nomenclatures presuppose that a person’s behavior is affected and shaped by two
different types of social ties. In the context of NALA games, this translates into the
assumption that a player can have two types of out-neighbors, the actions of whom
define two social norms, deviations from which bring about different social costs
or benefits. To put it another way, social pressure in social interactions may come
from two different sources, for example friends and acquaintances, and in varying
degree, for example, high and low.
In order to formalize the extension outlined above, consider the standard setup of
a generic NALA game (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ), where the players are connected
by a digraph G on I . Each player’s out-neighborhood in G is divided into two
disjoint sets, following the terminology of Granovetter (1973), a set of weak and
a set of strong out-neighbors.94 It follows that the arc set of G is divided into two
disjoint sets. The corresponding digraphs on I encode the identities of the players’
weak and strong out-neighbors in G and are denoted by Gw and Gs, respectively.
Alternatively, Gw and Gs may result from a partition of I into two subsets of players,
for example, according to gender,95 academic, economic, cultural, national, or
religious affiliation, political allegiance, or ethnical affinity, as illustrated by the
following stylized example.
Example 1.68 Let I be partitioned into blue and green players, and let arcs between
players of the same color be encoded by Gs and those between players of different
color by Gw. 
The players’ preferences over Yn are assumed to be representable by a family of
utility functions {ui : Yn → R}i∈I that satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption U'' For all i ∈ I , player i’s utility function ui : Yn → R is given by
ui(y1, . . . , yn) := p
(
f (yi)
∣∣ αi, β)+ si( f (y1), . . . , f (yn) ∣∣ γw,Gw)
93. Granovetter’s (1973) contribution lies in distinguishing between weak and strong ties and, more
important, in recognizing the importance of weak ties for the diffusion of information about job openings
and for community organization.
94. It is not of importance which attributive adjectives are used to designate the two different types of
out-neighbors, in particular, being a weak or a strong out-neighbor shall not carry a connotation of any
kind whatsoever.
95. For example, Cohen-Cole (2006) argues that “a teenage girl (boy) might care differently about
what other young women (men) do than about what young men (women) do—boys and girls are thus
important to be considered as distinct reference groups. For example, a girl might be more prone to
smoke if girls in her school do so, but less (or more) likely to if the boys do so.” (p. 158)
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+ si
(
f (y1), . . . , f (yn)
∣∣ γs,Gs),
where (αi, β,γw,γs) ∈ R×R+ ×R2 is a quadruple of parameters and f ∈ F (Y).96
Assumption U'' leads to the notion of a (generic) NALA game with weak and
strong ties.
Definition G'' A NALA game with weak and strong ties is a NALA game where the
players are connected by two digraphs Gw and Gs on I whose arc sets are disjoint
and the players’ preferences over Yn are represented by a family of utility functions
{ui : Yn → R}i∈I that satisfies Assumption U''. A NALA game with weak and
strong ties is denoted by the sextuple (I ,Gw,Gs,Y , {(αi, β,γw,γs)}i∈I , f ). A NALA
game with weak and strong ties for which Y is left unspecified is referred to as a
generic NALA game with weak and strong ties.
Let Γ'' := (I ,Gw,Gs,Y , {(αi, β,γw,γs)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game with
weak and strong ties, and let αmin, αmax, and α be defined as in Section 1.3.7.2.
Propositions 1.69, 1.70, and 1.71 give sufficient conditions for the existence of a
unique and interior NE of Γ''. Apart from the case where Y = R, the results are
limited to nonnegative γw and γs.
Proposition 1.69 Suppose Y = R. The NALA game with weak and strong ties Γ'' has a
unique NE y⋆ ∈ Rn, which is given by
f (y⋆) =
1
β+ γw + γs
(
In − 1
β+ γw + γs
(
γw A¯(Gw) + γs A¯(Gs)
))−1
α, (1.62)
if three conditions are satisfied: (1.69.1) β > 0, (1.69.2) (γw,γs) ∈ {(a, b) ∈ R2 |
min{a, b, a+ b} > −β/2} (see Figure 1.19), and (1.69.3) f is not bounded below and
above.
Proposition 1.70 Suppose Y = R+. The NALA game with weak and strong ties Γ'' has a
unique and interior NE y⋆ ∈ Rn++, which is given by (1.62), if four conditions are satisfied:
(1.70.1) β > 0, (1.70.2) γw ≥ 0 and γs ≥ 0, (1.70.3) β f (0) < αmin, and (1.70.4) f is
not bounded above.
Proposition 1.71 Suppose Y = [0, υ¯]. The NALA game with weak and strong ties Γ''
has a unique and interior NE y⋆ ∈ (0, υ¯)n, which is given by (1.62), if four conditions
are satisfied: (1.71.1) β > 0, (1.71.2) γw ≥ 0 and γs ≥ 0, (1.71.3) β f (0) < αmin, and
(1.71.4) αmax < β f (υ¯).
An alternative representation of f (y⋆), which is more compact than (1.62), is
given by
f (y⋆) =
(
βIn − γw
(
A¯(Gw)− In
)− γs(A¯(Gs)− In))−1α. (1.63)
With the normalization β = 1, (1.63) is equivalent to
f (y⋆) = α+ γw
(
A¯(Gw)− In
)
f (y⋆) + γs
(
A¯(Gs)− In
)
f (y⋆).
96. See Assumption U for the definition of the private component function p and player i’s social
component function si .
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Figure 1.19. The set {(a, b) ∈ R2 | min{a, b, a+ b} > −β/2} (Proposition 1.69)
1.3.8 An open problem
In this section, I discuss an open problem about the monotonicity of equilibrium
welfare as a function of the players’ common social cost or benefit parameter.
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be
defined as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2. In addition, suppose Γ
has a unique and interior NE y⋆, which is given by (1.7). In accordance with the
notation introduced in Section 1.3.6.3, equilibrium welfare is written as w(y⋆). The
Jacobian (matrix) J(β,γ,G) is abbreviated to J.
The open problem reads as follows.
Conjecture 1.72 If G is symmetric, then ∂w(y⋆)/∂γ ≤ 0.
If Condition G is not satisfied, then ∂w(y⋆)/∂γ = 0 according to (1.54). Ac-
cording to Result 1.55.3, ∂w(y⋆)/∂γ|γ=0 ≤ 0. Thus, apart from assuming that G
is symmetric, I may also assume that Condition G is satisfied and γ ̸= 0 in what
follows.
The subsequent discussion of Conjecture 1.72 is structured as follows. First,
I show that ∂w(y⋆)/∂γ is a quadratic form in f (y⋆)− A¯(G) f (y⋆). Second, I show
that Conjecture 1.72 is true if the following conjecture is true.
Conjecture 1.73 Let H and K be real square matrices of the same order. If H is sym-
metric and positive definite, K is similar to a symmetric and positive semidefinite
but not positive definite matrix, and σ(HK) ⊂ R, thenmin σ(HK) ≥ 0.
As regards Conjecture 1.73, a similar statement involving stronger assumptions
is true, as the following lemma demonstrates.
Lemma 1.74 Let H and K be real symmetric matrices of the same order. If H is positive
definite and K is positive semidefinite but not positive definite, then σ(HK) ⊂ R and
min σ(HK) ≥ 0.
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The partial derivative of w(y⋆) with respect to γ has a representation as a
quadratic form in f (y⋆)− A¯(G) f (y⋆). Indeed, we have
∂w(y⋆)
∂γ
= −1
2
‖ f (y⋆)‖22 +
1
2
‖A¯(G) f (y⋆)‖22 + β〈 f (y⋆)− A¯(G) f (y⋆), J A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
= −1
2
〈 f (y⋆)− A¯(G) f (y⋆), f (y⋆) + A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
+ β〈 f (y⋆)− A¯(G) f (y⋆), J A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
= −1
2
〈(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆),
(
In + A¯(G)− 2βJ A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆)
〉
= −1
2
〈(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆),
(
2(β+ γ)J − In
)(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆)
〉
= −1
2
〈(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆),
(
(β+ γ)(J + JT)− In
)(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆)
〉
,
where the first equality is according to (1.54), the second equality follows from the
real polarization identity (see, for example, Kubrusly 2011, Proposition 5.4), and
the second to last equality follows from (D.138), in particular,
In + A¯(G)− 2βJ A¯(G) =
(
2(β+ γ)J − In
)(
In − A¯(G)
)
.
Next, I show that the spectrum of (β+ γ)(J + JT)− In, which is a symmetric
matrix of order n, is related to the spectrum of the product of two square matrices H
and K of order 2n, where H is symmetric and positive definite but not diagonal and
K is in general not symmetric but similar to a symmetric and positive semidefinite
but not positive definite matrix.
First, I show that A¯(G) is similar to a symmetric matrix. Let D := D+(sl(G))
denote the out-degree matrix for sl(G), that is, D is a diagonal matrix of order n
with
∀i ∈ I [D]i,i = deg+sl(G)(i) =
{
1 if deg+G (i) = 0,
deg+G (i) if deg+G (i) > 0.
Evidently, D is symmetric and positive definite (and therefore nonsingular). It
follows that D has a unique positive definite (and therefore nonsingular) square
root
√
D, which is diagonal (and therefore symmetric). According to the definitions
of A˙(sl(G)) and A¯(G), A¯(G) = D−1 A˙(sl(G)). We have
√
DA¯(G)
√
D
−1
=
√
DD−1 A˙
(
sl(G)
)√
D
−1
=
√
D
−1
A˙
(
sl(G)
)√
D
−1
, (1.64)
that is, A¯(G) is similar to the symmetric matrix
√
D
−1
A˙(sl(G))
√
D
−1. It follows
that σ(A¯(G)) ⊂ R. Moreover, σ(A¯(G)) ⊂ [−1, 1] because ρ(A¯(G)) = 1.
Second, I show that
Σ1 := σ
((
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
− 1
2
In
)
⊂ R++. (1.65)
We have Σ1 ⊂ R because (In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G))−1 − (1/2)In is similar to the
symmetric matrix (In − γ/(β+ γ)
√
D
−1
A˙(sl(G))
√
D
−1
)−1 − (1/2)In according
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to (1.64). Note that, for all λ ∈ σ(A¯(G)), 1− γλ/(β+ γ) ̸= 0 because γ > −β/2
and σ(A¯(G)) ⊂ [−1, 1]. Let
Σ2 :=
{
1
2
(
1+
γ
β+ γ
λ
)(
1− γ
β+ γ
λ
)−1 ∣∣∣∣ λ ∈ σ(A¯(G))}.
I show that Σ1 = Σ2. Let (µ,w) be an eigenpair of (In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G))−1 −
(1/2)In, that is, (In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G))−1w − (1/2)w = µw with µ ∈ Σ1 and
w ∈ Rn \ {0n}. Straightforward calculations yield
(2µ+ 1)
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)w = (2µ− 1)w. (1.66)
We have 2µ+ 1 ̸= 0 becausew ̸= 0n. Indeed, if 2µ+ 1 = 0, thenwn = 0n according
to (1.66), which contradicts w ̸= 0n. Using (1.66), we find
A¯(G)w =
β+ γ
γ
2µ− 1
2µ+ 1
w,
which implies that
λµ :=
β+ γ
γ
2µ− 1
2µ+ 1
∈ σ(A¯(G)).
We find
µ =
1
2
(
1+
γ
β+ γ
λµ
)(
1− γ
β+ γ
λµ
)−1
∈ Σ2.
This proves Σ1 ⊂ Σ2. Let (λ, v) be an eigenpair of A¯(G), that is, A¯(G)v = λv with
λ ∈ σ(A¯(G)) and v ∈ Rn \ {0n}. Straightforward calculations yield((
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
− 1
2
In
)
v =
1
2
(
1+
γ
β+ γ
λ
)(
1− γ
β+ γ
λ
)−1
v.
This proves Σ2 ⊂ Σ1 and concludes the proof of Σ1 = Σ2. Next, I prove that
Σ2 ⊂ R++. To this end, I define the auxiliary function h(· | β,γ) : [−1, 1]→ R by
h(z | β,γ) := 1
2
(
1+
γ
β+ γ
z
)(
1− γ
β+ γ
z
)−1
.
We find
∂h(z | β,γ) = γ
β+ γ
(
1− γ
β+ γ
z
)−2
.
If γ ∈ (−β/2, 0), then h(· | β,γ) is strictly decreasing on [−1, 1] with a global
minimum point at 1, where h(1 | β,γ) = (β+ 2γ)/(2β) > 0. If γ ∈ (0,+∞), then
h(· | β,γ) is strictly increasing on [−1, 1]with a global minimum point at−1, where
h(−1 | β,γ) = β/(2(β+ 2γ)) > 0. This concludes the proof of Σ2 ⊂ R++ and also
of Σ1 ⊂ R++ because Σ1 = Σ2.
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Third, I show that σ((β+ γ)(J + JT)− In) is contained in σ(HK), where
H := I2 ⊗
((
In − γ
β+ γ
√
D
−1
A˙
(
sl(G)
)√
D
−1
)−1
− 1
2
In
)
and
K :=
(
In D
D−1 In
)
.
Note that H is symmetric because G is symmetric, not diagonal (Condition G), and
positive definite because
σ
((
In − γ
β+ γ
√
D
−1
A˙
(
sl(G)
)√
D
−1
)−1
− 1
2
In
)
= σ
(√
D
((
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
− 1
2
In
)√
D
−1
)
= σ
((
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
− 1
2
In
)
⊂ R++,
where the first equality follows from (1.64), the second equality is according to the
fact that similar matrices have the same spectrum, and the set inclusion is according
to (1.65). Also note that K is in general not symmetric but similar to the symmetric
and positive semidefinite but not positive definite matrix(
2 0
0 0
)
⊗ In
because
K =
1√
2
(
In −In
D−1 D−1
)((
2 0
0 0
)
⊗ In
)(
1√
2
(
In −In
D−1 D−1
))−1
,
where(
1√
2
(
In −In
D−1 D−1
))−1
=
1√
2
(
In D
−In D
)
and σ
((
2 0
0 0
)
⊗ In
)
= {0, 2}.
We have
σ
(
(β+ γ)(J + JT)− In
)
= σ
(√
D
(
(β+ γ)(J + JT)− In
)√
D
−1)
= σ
((
In − γ
β+ γ
√
D
−1
A˙
(
sl(G)
)√
D
−1
)−1
− 1
2
In
+ D
(
In − γ
β+ γ
√
D
−1
A˙
(
sl(G)
)√
D
−1
)−1
D−1 − 1
2
In
)
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= σ
((
In
In
)T ( In On
On D
)
×
(
I2 ⊗
((
In − γ
β+ γ
√
D
−1
A˙
(
sl(G)
)√
D
−1
)−1
− 1
2
In
))
×
(
In On
On D
)−1 (In
In
))
⊂ σ
((
I2 ⊗
((
In − γ
β+ γ
√
D
−1
A˙
(
sl(G)
)√
D
−1
)−1
− 1
2
In
))
×
(
In On
On D
)−1 (In
In
)(
In
In
)T ( In On
On D
))
= σ
((
I2 ⊗
((
In − γ
β+ γ
√
D
−1
A˙
(
sl(G)
)√
D
−1
)−1
− 1
2
In
))(
In D
D−1 In
))
= σ(HK).
The first equality is according to the fact that similar matrices have the same spec-
trum. The second equality follows from
(β+ γ)
√
DJ
√
D
−1
=
(
In − γ
β+ γ
√
D
−1
A˙
(
sl(G)
)√
D
−1
)−1
and
(β+ γ)
√
DJT
√
D
−1
= D
(
In − γ
β+ γ
√
D
−1
A˙
(
sl(G)
)√
D
−1
)−1
D−1.
The remaining equalities are obvious. For the set inclusion see, for example, Horn
and Johnson (2012, Theorem 1.3.22).
To sum up, σ((β + γ)(J + JT) − In) is a subset of σ(HK), which is equal to
σ((β+ γ)(J + JT)− In) ∪ {0} ⊂ R (see, for example, Theorem 1.3.22). I conclude
that if Conjecture 1.73 is true, that is,min σ(HK) ≥ 0, then (β+ γ)(J + JT)− In is
positive semidefinite, which is sufficient for Conjecture 1.72 to be true.
1.4 Statistical models
This section is concerned with statistical models that are derived from the system
of best reply functions at the Nash equilibrium of a NALA game. It is motivated by
the desire to take the economic model of Section 1.3 to data and to test hypotheses
about the players’ common social cost or benefit parameter, in particular, whether a
phenomenon is driven, at least partially, by conformist or anti-conformist behavior.
The main focus of the section lies on the identification problem, which logically pre-
cedes all problems of statistical inference like parameter estimation and hypothesis
testing. A discussion of suitable estimators is left for future research.
There are several important findings in this section. First, the economic model
translates into a statistical model with correlated error terms, specifically, the error
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terms follow a moving average of order one. This dependence is due to the as-
sumption of idiosyncrasies with local externalities. Second, the endogenous effects
matrix, that is, the matrix whose components determine endogenous effects (see
Definition A in Section 1.3.1), and the exogenous effects matrix, that is, the matrix
whose components determine exogenous effects (see Definition B in Section 1.4.1),
are structurally different in the presence of players without out-neighbors. The
endogenous effects matrix is row-normalized with a zero on the main diagonal for a
player with at least one out-neighbor and a one for a player without out-neighbors,
whereas the exogenous effects matrix is not row-normalized in the presence of play-
ers without out-neighbors and has always zeros on its main diagonal, irrespective
of the players’ out-neighborhoods. Third, a nonidentifying condition in the form of
a kernel condition arises if identification is based on the conditional mean of the
distribution of the response variable. Fourth, there are two types of identifying
conditions for endogenous and exogenous effects (to be defined in Section 1.4.3):
rank conditions and linear independence conditions. A rank condition involves
both the model’s design matrix and the endogenous and exogenous effects matrices
and arises if identification is based on the conditional mean. A linear independence
condition involves solely the endogenous or exogenous effects matrices and arises
if identification is based on the conditional variance. Identifying conditions for
endogenous effects that are based on the conditional mean entail without excep-
tion restrictions on the parameter space, whereas this is not always the case for
identifying conditions that are based on the conditional variance. Fifth, identifying
conditions entail restrictions on the topologies of the digraphs from which the
endogenous and exogenous effects matrices are derived. In general, a characteri-
zation of these restrictions is difficult, especially in case a condition involves more
than three matrices that are functions of the endogenous and exogenous effects
matrices. A complete characterization is, however, possible and related to the no-
tion of a normally regular digraph (Jørgensen 2015) for two linear independence
conditions involving three matrices that are functions of either the endogenous
or the exogenous effects matrix. Sixth, players without out-neighbors are critical
for the identification of endogenous and exogenous effects if the endogenous and
exogenous effects matrices are derived from a single digraph. Seventh, the nonaffine
nature of a NALA game admits of aligning a nonnegative action space with the
support of a statistical model. Eighth, an important class of statistical models in the
social interactions literature can be reconciled with a NALA game by imposing a
parameter restriction that is not without loss of generality.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. Section 1.4.1 details on
the NALA game that is translated into two statistical models in Section 1.4.2. The
assumptions invoked in the specification and in the translation of the NALA game
are guided by the desire to get a close resemblance of the resulting statistical models
with existing models in the social interactions literature. Section 1.4.3 is concerned
with the identification problem. The focus of the discussion is on the identification of
endogenous and exogenous effects in the absence of unobservable correlated effects
(Sections 1.4.3.1, 1.4.3.2, 1.4.3.3, and 1.4.3.4) or in the presence of unobservable
correlated effects in the form of digraph component specific fixed effects (Sections
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1.4.3.5, 1.4.3.6, and 1.4.3.7). Section 1.4.4 examines the existence of a statistical model
and a NALA game such that the supports of the former are in alignment with the
action space of the latter. Finally, Section 1.4.5 relates NALA games to an important
class of existing linear social interactions models.
1.4.1 Towards two statistical models
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(α(χ,H)(i), β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game with idio-
syncrasies that admit of local externalities, that is, the players’ idiosyncrasies are
given by a function α(χ,H) : I → R, where χ : I → R is the function representing
the players’ elementary idiosyncrasies and H is a digraph on I .97 Let χ denote the
profile of the players’ elementary idiosyncrasies, which is to be interpreted as a
parameter. The profile of the players’ idiosyncrasies is denoted by α. The following
four assumptions are made with respect to Γ. First, the function α(χ,H) : I → R
satisfies
α(χ,H)(i) =

χ(i) if deg+H(i) = 0,
χ(i) + ζ
∑j∈N+H (i) χ(j)
deg+H(i)
if deg+H(i) > 0,
where ζ ∈ R is a parameter whose magnitude is a measure of the strength of the
local externalities of the players’ idiosyncrasies (cf. Example 1.61). Second, β > 0.
Third, β+ γ > 0. Fourth, Γ has a unique and interior NE y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n), which
is given by (1.8). The following definition is instrumental in representing α as a
function of ζ, χ, and H.
Definition B The exogenous effects matrix of H is the squarematrix of order n defined
by
C¯(H) := A¯(H)− diag(ι+0 (H)),
where ι+0 (H) ∈ {0, 1}n denotes the (column) vector with component in row i equal
to 1{0}(deg+H(i)) and diag(ι+0 (H)) is the diagonal matrix of order n with main
diagonal ι+0 (H).98
It is important to note that C¯(H) is not necessarily row-normalized: its row
sums are zero or one, and it has zeros on its main diagonal, in contrast to A¯(G),
which is row-normalized and has zeros or ones on its main diagonal. Example 1.75
illustrates Definition B.
Example 1.75 If H = ({1, 2, 3}, {(2, 1), (3, 1)}), then
C¯(H) =
1 0 01 0 0
1 0 0
−
1 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 =
0 0 01 0 0
1 0 0
 . 
97. See Section 1.3.7.1 for the definition and a discussion of the notion of idiosyncrasies with local
externalities.
98. If deg+H(i) = 0, then 1{0}(deg+H(i)) = 1, and if deg+H(i) > 0, then 1{0}(deg+H(i)) = 0.
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The assumption about α(χ,H) and Definition B imply that α = (In + ζC¯(H))χ.
Note that ζ need not satisfy the condition −1 /∈ σ(ζC¯(H)), which is both necessary
and sufficient for In + ζC¯(H) to be nonsingular. If −1 ∈ σ(ζC¯(H)), then different
values for χmay be mapped to the same α.
To allow for a more compact notation of the difference A¯(G)− In, let the polyno-
mial q be defined by q(x) := x1 − x0. Note that for any square matrix A of order n,
q(A) = A− In, in particular, q(A¯(G)) = A¯(G)− In.
The assumption of a positive β implies that the two generic NALA games Γ
and (I ,G,Y , {(α(χ,H)(i)/β, 1,γ/β)}i∈I , f ) are strategically equivalent. It follows
that the players’ preference parameters {(α(χ,H)(i), β,γ)}i∈I are not identifiable
without the imposition of a parameter restriction. The normalization β = 1 is a
restriction that is without loss of generality. With this normalization, the profile of
NE actions satisfies
f (y⋆) =
(
In − γq
(
A¯(G)
))−1(
In + ζC¯(H)
)
χ.
This is a system of n equations with n + 2 parameters, namely, γ, ζ, and χ, in
the n variables f (y⋆1), . . . , f (y⋆n). The specification of a statistical model of y⋆ calls
therefore for an approximation or a parsimonious representation of χ. To this end,
assume that all players are attributed with covariates, that is, characteristics, that
span in their entirety a linear subspace L of Rn with dimension K over R, where
0 < K < n− 2. There exists a unique orthogonal decomposition of χ into the sum of
a (column) vector in L and a (column) vector in the orthogonal complement L⊥ to L:
χ = χL+ u, where χL ∈ L and u := χ−χL ∈ L⊥. Letφ denote the (column) vector
of coordinates of χL with respect to a basis {bk}k∈{1,...,K} of L, that is, χL = Xφ
with X := (b1, . . . , bK). The decomposition of χ yields
f (y⋆) =
(
In − γq
(
A¯(G)
))−1(
Xφ+ ζC¯(H)Xφ+
(
In + ζC¯(H)
)
u
)
(1.67)
or, equivalently,
f (y⋆) = γq
(
A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆) + Xφ+ ζC¯(H)Xφ+
(
In + ζC¯(H)
)
u.
The system of equations (1.67) forms the basis for the specification of two statistical
models of the profile of NE actions in a NALA game.
1.4.2 Specification of two statistical models
This section is concerned with the specification of two statistical models, a model
without unobservable correlated effects (Section 1.4.2.1) and amodelwith unobserv-
able correlated effects in the form of component specific fixed effects (Section 1.4.2.2),
of the profile of NE actions in a NALA game with Y = R.99 The cases Y = R+
and Y = [0, υ¯] are briefly discussed in Section 1.4.4. Each of the two models to
99. A statistical model is a family of probability distributions. For a definition of a statistical model in
algebraic terms, using category theory, see McCullagh (2002).
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be specified hereinafter is a parameterized conditional statistical model, that is, a
family of parameterized regular conditional probability distributions, of the profile
of NE actions in a NALA game with Y = R.100 The specification of the two mod-
els involves some technicalities, some of which are introduced only to provide a
consistent probabilistic framework. A few symbols that have been introduced in
Section 1.4.1 and in previous sections will be redefined. Even though their math-
ematical nature changes, they retain to a large extent their original meaning and
interpretation.
Let f ∈ F (R) be bounded neither below nor above (cf. Condition 1.13.4). Let
(Ω,A,P) be a complete probability space. Let G and H be two nonempty random
digraphs on I . Both G and H are observable. Let K > 1 be an integer. For all i ∈ I ,
let xi be a random vector in RK. The K components of xi are random variables in R
and represent player i’s covariates, that is, his characteristics. Let xi,k denote the kth
component of xi, and let X denote the random n× K matrix with component xi,k
in row i and column k. The matrix X is observable and referred to as the design
matrix. Let F ⊂ A denote the σ-field generated by G, H, and X. Let u be a random
vector in Rn. The vector u is unobservable. For all i ∈ I , let ui denote the ith
component of u, and assume that ui ∈ L2(Ω,A,P), that is, ui is square-integrable.
Two assumptions are imposed on X and the first and second conditional moments
of u given F. (All statements that involve or that are based on conditional moments
are understood to be true P-a.s.)
Assumption P-X The design matrix is equal to (1n : X2), where 1n /∈ c-sp(X2),
that is, the first column of X is the constant vector 1n, with X2 denoting all but the
first column of X.
Assumption P-u The first and second conditional moments of u given F satisfy
E(u | F) = 0n and E(uuT | F) = In.
Assumption P-u implies that the design matrix and the endogenous and ex-
ogenous effects matrices are strictly exogenous, that is, E(u | X) = E(u | A¯(G)) =
E(u | C¯(H)) = 0n.
The models’ common parameter space is a subset of R2K+3 that is denoted by Θ.
A typical element of Θ is denoted by a subscripted θ, where the subscript is a
nonnegative integer, for example, θ0, θ1, or θ2, and is called a parameter point in Θ.
A parameter point θ0 inΘ is a quintuple (γ0,φ0,ψ0, ζ0, ς0), where γ0, ζ0, and ς0 are
singles and bothφ0 andψ0 are K-tuples, and it may be considered a (column) vector,
in which case it is written as (γ0,φT0 ,ψT0 , ζ0, ς0)T, where φ0 and ψ0 are considered
(column) vectorswithK components.101 TheK-tuple or (column) vectorφ0without
its first component, which is denoted by φ0, is denoted by φ0,−1. An analogous
notation applies to ψ0.
It is convenient to introduce the notion of a subparameter to state assumptions
about the parameter space Θ and results on identification (Section 1.4.3). A map-
ping gwith domainΘ is called a subparameter (cf. Hájek 1967, p. 140). An element of
100. For an exposition of regular conditional distributions see, for example, Klenke (2014, Section 8.3).
101. A single is a tuple of length one.
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g(Θ), the image ofΘ under g, is called a subparameter point in g(Θ). The eponymous
example of a subparameter is the projection mapping [·]R : Θ→ R|R| that maps a
parameter point θ0 inΘ to the subvector [θ0]R that lies in the rows of θ0 indexed by
R, where R is a nonempty subset of {1, . . . , 2K+ 3}. Some special cases deserve
separate notation. ForR = {1}, let γ := [·]R; forR = {2, . . . ,K+ 1}, let φ := [·]R;
for R = {K + 2, . . . , 2K + 1}, let ψ := [·]R; for R = {2K + 2}, let ζ := [·]R; and
forR = {2K+ 3}, let ς := [·]R, which is referred to as the dispersion parameter. In
addition, for R = {2}, let φ := [·]R; for R = {3, . . . ,K + 1}, let φ−1 := [·]R; for
R = {K + 2}, let ψ := [·]R; and for R = {K + 3, . . . , 2K + 1}, let ψ−1 := [·]R. It
follows that φ = (φ,φ−1) and ψ = (ψ,ψ−1). Finally, for R = {1, . . . , 2K+ 3}, let
θ := [·]R, that is, θ is the identity on Θ. The foregoing definitions imply that for
a parameter point θ0 = (γ0,φ0,ψ0, ζ0, ς0) = (γ0, φ0,φ0,−1,ψ0,ψ0,−1, ζ0, ς0) in Θ,
γ(θ0) = γ0, φ(θ0) = φ0, φ(θ0) = φ0, φ−1(θ0) = φ0,−1, ψ(θ0) = ψ0, ψ(θ0) = ψ0,
ψ−1(θ0) = ψ0,−1, ζ(θ0) = ζ0, and ς(θ0) = ς0.
The parameter space satisfies the following assumptions: ζ(Θ) contains a neigh-
borhood of 0, bothφ(Θ) andψ(Θ) contain a neighborhood of 0K, and the dispersion
parameter is positive, that is, ς(Θ) = R++. The assumption about γ is stated sepa-
rately for easy reference.
Assumption P-γ The set γ(Θ) contains a neighborhood of 0 and all subparameter
points γ0 in γ(Θ) satisfy 1+ γ0 > 0 and (1+ γ0) /∈ σ(γ0 A¯(G)).
AssumptionP-γ (cf. Conditions 1.13.2 and 1.13.3) is sufficient for In−γ0q(A¯(G))
to be nonsingular.
1.4.2.1 A statistical model without unobservable correlated effects
For a given parameter point θ0 = (γ0,φT0 ,ψT0 , ζ0, ς0)T in Θ, let y(θ0) denote the
random vector in Rn that is defined by the system of equations
f
(
y(θ0)
)
=
(
In − γ0q
(
A¯(G)
))−1(
Xφ0 + C¯(H)Xψ0 + ς0
(
In + ζ0C¯(H)
)
u
)
.
(1.68)
The vector y(θ0) is referred to as the response variable at θ0 and represents the profile
of NE actions in a NALA gamewith Y = R. The error term at θ0 is the random vector
inRn defined by ε(θ0) := ς0(In + ζ0C¯(H))u. It is a first-order moving average with
mean E(ε(θ0)) = 0n and variance var(ε(θ0)) = ς20(In + ζ0C¯(H))(In + ζ0C¯(H)T).
If ζ0 = 0, then
f
(
y(θ0)
)
=
(
In − γ0q
(
A¯(G)
))−1(
Xφ0 + C¯(H)Xψ0 + ς0u
)
and var(ε(θ0)) = ς20In, that is, the components of ε(θ0) are uncorrelated.
There exists a regular conditional probability distribution of y(θ0) given F (see,
for example, Klenke 2014, Theorem 8.37), which is denoted by Pθ0,F. The family
P(Θ) := {Pθ1,F}θ1∈Θ is a parameterized conditional statistical model (without
unobservable correlated effects) of the profile of NE actions in a NALA game with
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Y = R. It is of interest to define a submodel of P(Θ) in which the components of
the error term are uncorrelated. To this end, let Θ0 be the largest subset of Θ such
that ζΘ0 = 0. The family P(Θ0) = {Pθ1,F}θ1∈Θ0 is a submodel of P(Θ) with the
desired property.
A comparison of (1.67) to (1.68) suggests that φ, ψ, and ζ are related by the
equality ψ = ζφ. A corresponding hypothesis test can cast some light on the
validity of the theory of generic NALA games and the assumptions involved in the
translation to the statistical models.
1.4.2.2 A statistical model with unobservable correlated effects
Suppose G consists of R > 1 weakly connected components of orders at least 2.
For all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, let Gr denote the rth component of G, and let Ir denote its
vertex set and nr its order, that is, nr = |Ir|. The assumption about the components’
orders, that is, min{nr | r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}} > 1, is equivalent to the assumption that
no player is isolated in G.102 This assumption does not preclude the existence of
players without out-neighbors in G. A player without out-neighbors in G must,
however, have at least one in-neighbor in G. Assume without loss of generality
that for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, Ir = {1+∑r−1j=1 nj, . . . ,∑rj=1 nj}. It follows that A¯(G) is
block diagonal. For all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, let ηr be a random variable in R. The family
{ηr}r∈{1,...,R} represents the unobservable component specific fixed effects. Let
ι :=

1n1 0n1 · · · 0n1
0n2 1n2 · · · 0n2... ... . . . ...
0nR 0nR · · · 1nR
 and η :=

η1
η2
...
ηR
 . (1.69)
For a given parameter point θ0 = (γ0,φT0 ,ψT0 , ζ0, ς0)T inΘ, let y(θ0) be the random
vector in Rn that is defined by the system of equations
f
(
y(θ0)
)
=
(
In − γ0q
(
A¯(G)
))−1(
Xφ0 + C¯(H)Xψ0 + ιη+ ς0
(
In + ζ0C¯(H)
)
u
)
,
(1.70)
where C¯(H)Xψ0 = −ψ0ι+0 (H) + C¯(H)X2ψ0,−1.
There exists a regular conditional probability distribution of y(θ0) given F,
which is denoted by Qθ0,F. The family Q(Θ) := {Qθ1,F}θ1∈Θ is a parameterized
conditional statistical model (with unobservable correlated effects in the form of
component specific fixed effects) of the profile of NE actions in a NALA game with
Y = R. Analogous to Section 1.4.2.1,Q(Θ0) = {Qθ1,F}θ1∈Θ0 is a submodel ofQ(Θ)
in which the components of the error term are uncorrelated.
102. A statistical model with unobservable correlated effects in the form of fixed effects can in principle
be defined without any restriction on the orders of the components of G. Any suitable method to
eliminate the fixed effects from the system of equations upon which the model is defined, like, for
example, differencing, leads, however, to a system of equations where the equation corresponding to an
isolated player is the identity 0 = 0.
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A comparison of (1.70) to (1.68) shows that P(Θ), the model without unob-
servable correlated effects, accommodates the case of a model with unobservable
correlated effects in the form of component specific fixed effects where R = 1
because the constant 1n lies in the column space of X (Assumption P-X).
The unobservable fixed effects can be treated as unknown parameters (as in the
panel econometrics literature). But they may give rise to the incidental parameter
problem (Neyman and Scott 1948) and manifest in inconsistent estimators. Al-
though a discussion of estimators is outside the scope of this paper, the fixed effects
are eliminated from (1.70) for the purpose of discussing the identification problem
(see Section 1.4.3). This enables in particular to relate the results on identification
in this paper to the results in Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009).
The method described hereinafter to eliminate the fixed effects term ιη from
(1.70) is based on differencing by means of what will be called a differencing matrix.
An m× n matrix Q with m ≤ n is called differencing matrix for ιη if Qιη = 0m. In
case m = n, Q is of the form In − P, where P is a block diagonal matrix of order n
with the same block structure as A¯(G). The social interactions literature (see, for
example, Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009; Lee, Liu, and Lin 2010) distinguishes
between two types of differencing (matrices): local differencing, LD for short, and
global differencing. In the current context, where G is a digraph, LD is based on a
player’s out-neighbors in G, whereas global differencing is based on all players of
a given component of G. An example of LD is the matrix In − A¯(G). An example
of global differencing is the matrix In − P, where P is a block diagonal matrix of
order n with the same block structure as A¯(G) and for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, the rth
block of P is equal to (1/nr)1nr1Tnr .
The remainder of this section discusses three examples of differencing in more
detail: two local and one global. The related common mathematical problem can
be described as follows. Let Q be a differencing matrix for ιη. Premultiplying both
sides of (1.70) by Q gives
Qf
(
y(θ0)
)
= Q
(
In − γ0q
(
A¯(G)
))−1
×
(
Xφ0 + C¯(H)Xψ0 + ιη+ ς0
(
In + ζ0C¯(H)
)
u
)
. (1.71)
The problem consists—figuratively speaking—in establishing thatQmoves from the
left to the right side of (In−γ0q(A¯(G)))−1, whereby ιη is eliminated from (1.71).103
A solution to this problemmay, subject to the properties ofQ, call for a modification
or a refinement of Q.
Local differencing The first example of LD is thematrix In− A¯(G). For notational
convenience, the differencing is stated in terms of the matrix q(A¯(G)), that is,
103. Premultiplying both sides of the structural form of (1.70) by Q gives
Qf
(
y(θ0)
)
= γ0Qq
(
A¯(G)
)
f
(
y(θ0)
)
+Q
(
Xφ0 + C¯(H)Xψ0 + ς0
(
In + ζ0C¯(H)
)
u
)
,
which is not suitable for the discussion of the identification problem in Section 1.4.3; for that matter, a
reduced form of Qf (y(θ0)) is indispensable.
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A¯(G)− In instead of −q(A¯(G)), that is, In − A¯(G). It is based on the following
result.
Lemma 1.76 The matrix q(A¯(G)) has the following properties: (1.76.1) it has rank at
most n−R; (1.76.2) q(A¯(G))1n = 0n; (1.76.3) q(A¯(G))ιη = 0n; and (1.76.4) q(A¯(G))
and (In − γ0q(A¯(G)))−1 commute.
It follows from Lemma 1.76 that
q
(
A¯(G)
)
f
(
y(θ0)
)
=
(
In − γ0q
(
A¯(G)
))−1
q
(
A¯(G)
)
×
(
X2φ0,−1 − ψ0ι+0 (H) + C¯(H)X2ψ0,−1 + ς0
(
In + ζ0C¯(H)
)
u
)
. (1.72)
Note that the random vector q(A¯(G)) f (y(θ0)) lies in some subspace of Rn of
dimension at most n− R with probability one because q(A¯(G)) is rank deficient
with rank at most n− R (Result 1.76.1). It follows that q(A¯(G)) f (y(θ0)) cannot
have a density (with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Rn) if u has a density,
even if −1 /∈ σ(ζ0C¯(H)).104 Assuming that f is known, −1 /∈ σ(ζ0C¯(H)), and u
has a density du (with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Rn), this result renders
estimation of the model parameters based on du, for example, maximum likelihood,
impossible. The LD by q(A¯(G)) can, however, be refined to address this problem.
The refinement is based on a spectral decomposition of q(A¯(G))q(A¯(G))T and
constitutes the second example of LD and is the subject of the following result.105
Lemma 1.77 There exists an (n− S)× n matrix Qℓ, where n− S is equal to the rank
of q(A¯(G)) and n − S ≤ n − R, with the following seven properties: (1.77.1) Qℓ has
full row rank; (1.77.2) QℓQTℓ = In−S; (1.77.3) QTℓQℓ is block diagonal with the same
block structure as A¯(G) and satisfies q(A¯(G))QTℓQℓq(A¯(G))
T = q(A¯(G))q(A¯(G))T;
(1.77.4) Qℓ1n = 0n−S; (1.77.5) Qℓιη = 0n−S; (1.77.6) Qℓ A¯(G) = Qℓ A¯(G)QTℓQℓ;
and (1.77.7) Qℓ(In − γ0q(A¯(G)))−1 = (In−S − γ0Qℓq(A¯(G))QTℓ )−1Qℓ.
It follows from Lemma 1.77 that
Qℓ f
(
y(θ0)
)
=
(
In−S − γ0q
(
Qℓ A¯(G)QTℓ
))−1
Qℓ
×
(
X2φ0,−1 − ψ0ι+0 (H) + C¯(H)X2ψ0,−1 + ς0
(
In + ζ0C¯(H)
)
u
)
. (1.73)
If A¯(G) = C¯(H), then Result 1.77.6 implies that
Qℓ f
(
y(θ0)
)
=
(
In−S − γ0q
(
A¯ℓ(G)
))−1
×
(
Xℓφ0,−1 + A¯ℓ(G)Xℓψ0,−1 + ς0
(
In−S + ζ0 A¯ℓ(G)uℓ
))
,
where A¯ℓ(G) := Qℓ A¯(G)QTℓ , Xℓ := QℓX2, and uℓ := Qℓu with variance var(uℓ) =
In−S.106
104. The matrix In + ζ0C¯(H) is nonsingular if and only if −1 /∈ σ(ζ0C¯(H)).
105. Lemma 1.77 is inspired by Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010, Appendix F).
106. If A¯(G) = C¯(H), then ι+0 (H) = 0n (see Lemma 1.83, in particular, Result 1.83.3, on p. 91.)
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Global differencing The global differencing is based on a spectral decomposition
of a block diagonal matrix of order n that has the same block structure as A¯(G) and
where for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, the rth block of thematrix is equal to Inr − (1/nr)1nr1Tnr .
A global differencing can in principle be based on any nonzero scalar multiple of
Inr − (1/nr)1nr1Tnr . A natural choice is
Inr −
1
nr − 1
(
1nr1
T
nr − Inr
)
=
nr
nr − 1
(
Inr −
1
nr
1nr1
T
nr
)
because (1/(nr − 1))(1nr1Tnr − Inr ) is equal to the row-normalized adjacency matrix
of the complete digraph of order nr. The global differencing is, however, based on
Inr − (1/nr)1nr1Tnr and not on Inr − (1/(nr − 1))(1nr1Tnr )− Inr because the former
matrix entails nicer mathematical properties of the corresponding differencing
matrix than does the latter, as the following result demonstrates.107
Lemma 1.78 Let c ̸= 0. There exists an (n− R)× n matrix Qg with the following seven
properties: (1.78.1) Qg has full row rank; (1.78.2) QgQTg = cIn−R; (1.78.3) QTgQg is
block diagonal with the same block structure as A¯(G), where for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, the rth
block is equal to c(Inr − (1/nr)1nr1Tnr ); (1.78.4) Qg1n = 0n−R; (1.78.5) Qgιη = 0n−R;
(1.78.6) cQg A¯(G) = Qg A¯(G)QTgQg; and (1.78.7) Qg(In − γ0q(A¯(G)))−1 is equal to
(In−R − (γ0/c)Qgq(A¯(G))QTg)−1Qg.
It follows from Lemma 1.78 (with c = 1) that
Qg f
(
y(θ0)
)
=
(
In−R − γ0q
(
Qg A¯(G)QTg
))−1
Qg
×
(
X2φ0,−1 − ψ0ι+0 (H) + C¯(H)X2ψ0,−1 + ς0
(
In + ζ0C¯(H)
)
u
)
. (1.74)
If G and H have the same component structure (that is, A¯(G) and C¯(H) have
the same block structure) and I+0 (H) = ∅ (that is, there are no players without
out-neighbors in H) or, equivalently, ι+0 (H) = 0n, then Result 1.78.6 implies that
Qg f
(
y(θ0)
)
=
(
In−R − γ0q
(
A¯g(G)
))−1
×
(
Xgφ0,−1 + C¯g(H)Xgψ0,−1 + ς0
(
In−R + ζ0C¯g(H)ug
))
,
where A¯g(G) := Qg A¯(G)QTg , C¯g(H) := QgC¯(H)QTg , Xg := QgX2, and ug := Qgu
with variance var(ug) = In−R.108
107. Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010) prove results analogous to those of Lemma 1.78 for the case where c = 1,
q(x) = x (see Result 1.78.7), and A¯(G) is a nonnegative and row-normalized block diagonal matrix with
zeros on its main diagonal (see, in particular, Section 3 and Lemma C.1).
108. If G and H have the same component structure and I+0 (H) = ∅, then cQgC¯(H) = QgC¯(H)QTgQg.
The proof is similar to the proof of Result 1.78.6.
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1.4.3 Identification
This section is concerned with the identification problem, that is, the problem of
drawing inferences from the conditional probability distribution of the observable
response variable to the underlying unobservable parameter point. By construction,
a given parameter point is associated with a unique conditional probability distri-
bution of the response variable. A given distribution may, however, be generated
by more than one parameter point; it is generated by exactly one parameter point if
the mapping that associates with each parameter point a probability distribution is
injective. The identification problem and the focus of this section is on finding suffi-
cient conditions—commonly called identifying conditions or identifying restrictions
(see, for example, Hurwicz 1950, p. 248)—for the injectivity of the aforementioned
mapping. Identifying conditions may involve relations between different subpa-
rameters or relations between subparameters and other structural characteristics of
the model, like, for example, the design matrix, the endogenous effects matrix, and
the exogenous effects matrix.
The study of the identification problem is based on the same set of assumptions
that have been introduced to specify the two statistical models P(Θ) and Q(Θ) in
Section 1.4.2. In addition, as a refinement and clarification of these assumption, it
is assumed that the following objects are observable and known a priori: the two
nonempty digraphs G and H; the function f ; and the realized values of the design
matrix and the response variable.
The assumption about G and H posits that survey data are available that include
information on all players’ out-neighborhoods in both G and H. TheAdd Health data
set is an example of survey data with information on G in the form of friendship rela-
tionships.109 At the present time, it appears that no survey data exist that distinguish
between different digraphsG and H.110 In the absence of information on H, onemay
assume that G and H are related, for example, Hmay be equal to G or some suitably
defined symmetric part of G like (I , {(i, j) ∈ I2 | (i, j) ∈ A(G) or (j, i) ∈ A(G)}) or
(I , {(i, j) ∈ I2 | (i, j) ∈ A(G) and (j, i) ∈ A(G)}). The assumption about f being
known a priori is rather strong and made for technical convenience. The relaxation
of this assumption is left for future research.
Apart from the assumptions mentioned above, the study of the identification
problem is based on a hypothetical exact knowledge of the conditional probability
distribution of the response variable rather than a sample of observations. This is
standard practice in the statistical sciences and is reflected in the various notions of
identification by the model P(Θ) given in Definition I (cf. Gouriéroux and Monfort
1995, Definitions 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11). Analogous definitions apply to the models
P(Θ0), Q(Θ), and Q(Θ0).
Definition I (I.1) A parameter point θ1 inΘ is said to be identified by P(Θ) if for all
109. The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) is a longitudinal study
of a nationally representative sample of adolescents in grades 7 to 12 in the United States during the
1994/1995 school year. See Harris et al. (2009) for a description of the study design.
110. Blume et al. (2015, p. 471) share this view: “No survey we know of distinguishes between peer-
and contextual-effects networks.”
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parameter points θ2 in Θ \ {θ1}, Pθ1,F ̸= Pθ2,F. (I.2) The model P(Θ) is said to be
identified if all parameter points inΘ are identified, that is, if themapping θ0 ↦→ Pθ0,F
is injective on Θ. (I.3) A subparameter g is said to be identified by P(Θ) if for all
pairs of parameter points (θ1, θ2) in Θ2, Pθ1,F = Pθ2,F implies that g(θ1) = g(θ2).
ThemodelP(Θ) is identified if and only if θ is identified byP(Θ). The submodel
P(Θ0) is identified if the model P(Θ) is identified. The submodel P(Θ0)may be
identified without P(Θ) being identified.
Among all subparameters γ,φ,ψ, ζ, and ς, including the components φ andφ−1
ofφ and the components ψ andψ−1 ofψ, the identification of γ andψ−1 is of special
interest, which justifies the introduction of extra terminology: endogenous effects
are said to be identified by P(Θ) if γ is identified by P(Θ), and exogenous effects,
also called contextual effects, are said to be identified by P(Θ) if ψ−1 is identified
by P(Θ). Similar definitions apply to the models P(Θ0), Q(Θ0), and Q(Θ). Both
definitions reflect common parlance in the social interactions literature (see, for
example, Manski 1993; Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009; Blume et al. 2015).
The rest of this section is structured as follows. Section 1.4.3.1 considers identifi-
cation of γ, φ,φ−1, ψ andψ−1 through themean byP(Θ). Section 1.4.3.2 revisits the
results of Section 1.4.3.1 under the assumption of a priori exclusion restrictions with
respect to the covariates that appear in the term C¯(H)Xψ0 (see (1.68)). Sections
1.4.3.3 and 1.4.3.4 consider identification through the variance, where identification
of γ and ς by P(Θ0) is discussed in Section 1.4.3.3 and identification of γ, ζ, and ς
by P(Θ) is discussed in Section 1.4.3.4. Sections 1.4.3.5, 1.4.3.6, and 1.4.3.7 con-
sider identification via LD by q(A¯(G)) by Q(Θ0) and Q(Θ), where Section 1.4.3.5
parallels Section 1.4.3.1, Section 1.4.3.6 parallels Section 1.4.3.3, and Section 1.4.3.7
parallels Section 1.4.3.4. The discussion of the identification of γ, φ−1, ψ, ψ−1,
and ς by Q(Θ0) and γ, φ−1, ψ, ψ−1, ζ, and ς by Q(Θ) is confined to the case of LD
by q(A¯(G)). A comparison of the reduced forms (1.72), (1.73), and (1.74) suggests
that identifying conditions similar in nature to those stated in Sections 1.4.3.5, 1.4.3.6,
and 1.4.3.7 hold true for LD by Qℓ and global differencing by Qg.
It is important to note that all results of Sections 1.4.3.1, 1.4.3.2, and 1.4.3.5 are
true under assumptions less restrictive than those put forward in Section 1.4.2 as
regards the latent variable u. It suffices in particular to assume that for all i ∈ I ,
ui ∈ L1(Ω,A,P), that is, ui is integrable, and E(u | F) = 0n (cf. Assumption P-u).
1.4.3.1 Identification through the mean by P(Θ)
A subparameter g is called identified through the mean by P(Θ) if for all pairs of
parameter points (θ1, θ2) in Θ2, g(θ1) = g(θ2) is necessary for E( f (y(θ1)) | F) =
E( f (y(θ2)) | F). If g is identified through the mean by P(Θ), then it is identified
by P(Θ) because, for all pairs of parameter points (θ1, θ2) inΘ2, E( f (y(θ1)) | F) =
E( f (y(θ2)) | F) is necessary for Pθ1,F = Pθ2,F. For all parameter points θ0 in Θ,
E
(
f
(
y(θ0)
) ∣∣ F) = (In − γ(θ0)q(A¯(G)))−1(Xφ(θ0) + C¯(H)Xψ(θ0)),
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from which it follows that the present discussion is confined to the identification of
γ, φ = (φ,φ−1), and ψ = (ψ,ψ−1).
The first result to discuss is a non-identification result (Proposition 1.79). It
originates from the conditional mean E( f (y(θ0)) | F) being functionally indepen-
dent of γ(θ0) if Xφ(θ0) + C¯(H)Xψ(θ0) = A¯(G)(Xφ(θ0) + C¯(H)Xψ(θ0)), which
is the statistical model analogue of the system of equations α = A¯(G)α defining
the notion of weakly ex ante homogeneous players (Definition H). It is therefore
not surprising that γ is not identified through the mean by P(Θ) if there exists a
parameter point θ0 inΘ such that Xφ(θ0) + C¯(H)Xψ(θ0) ∈ ker(q(A¯(G))) because
f (y⋆) = α if β = 1 and α = A¯(G)α in the economic model (Result 1.35.1 and
Remark 1.36).
Proposition 1.79 If
∃θ0 ∈ Θ Xφ(θ0) + C¯(H)Xψ(θ0) ∈ ker
(
q
(
A¯(G)
))
, (1.75)
where the dimension of ker(q(A¯(G))) over R is at least one because q(A¯(G)) is singular,
then γ is not identified through the mean by P(Θ).111
Proposition 1.79 entails a necessary condition for γ to be identified through the
mean by P(Θ): the response variable cannot be functionally independent of all
covariates. A precise statement is given in Corollary 1.80. Corollaries 1.81 and 1.82
cover special cases of Proposition 1.79.
Corollary 1.80 The kernel condition (1.75) cannot be satisfied if γ is identified through
the mean by P(Θ). If I+0 (H) ̸= ∅ (respectively, I+0 (H) = ∅) and the kernel condi-
tion (1.75) is not satisfied, then φ−1 ̸= 0K−1 or ψ ̸= 0K (respectively, φ−1 ̸= 0K−1 or
ψ−1 ̸= 0K−1) must be true.112
Corollary 1.81 Suppose ψ = ζφ. If there exists a parameter point θ0 in Θ such that
φ(θ0) ∈ ker(q(A¯(G))(In + ζ(θ0)C¯(H))X), then γ is not identified through the mean
by P(Θ).
Corollary 1.82 Suppose A¯(G) = C¯(H), ψ = ζφ, and for all subparameter points ζ0
in ζ(Θ), −1 /∈ σ(ζ0 A¯(G)).113 If there exists a parameter point θ0 in Θ such that
φ(θ0) ∈ ker(q(A¯(G))X), then γ is not identified through the mean by P(Θ).114
Corollaries 1.81 and 1.82 hold true under weaker conditions; namely, γ is not
identified through the mean by P(Θ) if there exists a parameter point θ0 in Θ such
that ψ(θ0) = ζ(θ0)φ(θ0) and φ(θ0) ∈ ker(q(A¯(G))(In + ζ(θ0)C¯(H))X), and γ
is not identified through the mean by P(Θ) if A¯(G) = C¯(H) and there exists a
parameter point θ0 in Θ such that ψ(θ0) = ζ(θ0)φ(θ0), −1 /∈ σ(ζ(θ0)A¯(G)), and
φ(θ0) ∈ ker(q(A¯(G))X).
111. Note that q(A¯(G)) ̸= On because G is not empty.
112. Recall that I+0 (H) is the set of all players without out-neighbors in H. If I+0 (H) ̸= ∅, then there is
at least one player without out-neighbors in H.
113. See Footnote 104.
114. The condition φ(θ0) ∈ ker(q(A¯(G))X) is equivalent to Xφ(θ0) = A¯(G)Xφ(θ0).
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The remaining results state identifying conditions for γ, φ = (φ,φ−1), and ψ =
(ψ,ψ−1). The conditions depend critically on the inequality of A¯(G) and C¯(H). It
is therefore important to know when the two matrices are different and when they
are equal, especially in case G = H.
Lemma 1.83 (1.83.1) If G = H and I+0 (H) = ∅, then A¯(G) = C¯(H).
(1.83.2) If G = H and I+0 (H) ̸= ∅, then A¯(G) ̸= C¯(H).
(1.83.3) If A¯(G) = C¯(H), then I+0 (G) = I+0 (H) = ∅.
In case G = H, A¯(G) and C¯(H) are different if and only if I+0 (H) ̸= ∅, that is,
there are players without out-neighbors (Results 1.83.1 and 1.83.2).
The presentation of the remaining results is organized as follows. Propos-
ition 1.84 gives identifying conditions for the case A¯(G) ̸= C¯(H) and Propos-
ition 1.86 for the case A¯(G) = C¯(H). Proposition 1.86 stresses the importance of
players without out-neighbors for identification in case G = H. Proposition 1.89
covers the case of players without out-neighbors (in H) that share a common co-
variate, that is, characteristic. Both Propositions 1.86 and 1.89 may be considered
non-identification results because their identifying conditions entail a strong restric-
tion on the parameter space via γ, φ−1, andψ−1. Proposition 1.90 considers the case
where γ is identified through the variance by P(Θ). All results but Proposition 1.90
entail restrictions on the parameter space (because of the kernel condition (1.75))
and have in common that their identifying conditions involve a rank condition.
Proposition 1.84 Suppose A¯(G) ̸= C¯(H).
(1.84.1) Suppose I+0 (H) ̸= ∅. If the kernel condition (1.75) is not satisfied and the
n× (4K− 1) matrix(
1n : ι+0 (H) : A¯(G)ι
+
0 (H) : X2 : A¯(G)X2 : C¯(H)X2 : A¯(G)C¯(H)X2
) (1.76)
has full column rank, then γ, φ, and ψ are identified by P(Θ).115 If γ, φ, and ψ
are identified through the mean by P(Θ), then In, A¯(G), C¯(H), A¯(G)C¯(H) are
linearly independent.
(1.84.2) Suppose I+0 (H) = ∅. If the kernel condition (1.75) is not satisfied and the
n× (4K− 3) matrix(
1n : X2 : A¯(G)X2 : C¯(H)X2 : A¯(G)C¯(H)X2
) (1.77)
has full column rank, then γ, φ−1, and ψ−1 are identified by P(Θ). If γ,
φ−1, and ψ−1 are identified through the mean by P(Θ), then In, A¯(G), C¯(H),
A¯(G)C¯(H) are linearly independent.
115. Note that, for all i ∈ I , the component of ι+0 (H) in row i is equal to 1 if deg+H(i) = 0 and equal to 0
if deg+H(i) > 0, and the component of A¯(G)ι+0 (H) in row i is equal to 0 if deg+G (i) = 0 and deg+H(i) > 0,
equal to 1 if deg+G (i) = deg+H(i) = 0, and equal to |N+G (i) ∩ I+0 (H)|/deg+G (i) ∈ [0, 1] if deg+G (i) > 0.
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The rank conditions of Results 1.84.1 and 1.84.2 entail three necessary conditions.
First, In, A¯(G), C¯(H), A¯(G)C¯(H) are linearly independent. Their linear indepen-
dence is, however, in general not sufficient for identification through the mean,
as illustrated by Example 1.85. Second, all four matrices X2, A¯(G)X2, C¯(H)X2,
and A¯(G)C¯(H)X2 have full column rank. Third, the order condition n ≥ 4K − 1
(Result 1.84.1) or n ≥ 4K− 3 (Result 1.84.2).
Example 1.85 Suppose I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A(G) = ⋃i∈I\{1}{(i, 1)} and A(H) =⋃
i∈I\{1}{(1, i), (i, 1)}, that is, both G and H are star-shaped, X = (14 : e1), and θ1
and θ2 are two parameter points in Θ with (γ1,φ1,ψ1) = (1/3, 3/4, 4/5, 0, 1) and
(γ2,φ2,ψ2) = (2/3, 13/10, 1/4, 0, 1/2). Note that ker(q(A¯(G))) = {c14 | c ∈ R}
and Xφ1 + C¯(H)Xψ1 /∈ ker(q(A¯(G))) and Xφ2 + C¯(H)Xψ2 /∈ ker(q(A¯(G))) (cf.
the kernel condition (1.75)). The matrices I4, A¯(G), C¯(H), A¯(G)C¯(H) are linearly
independent, but
E
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = 1
20

31
34
34
34
 = E( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). 
A comparison of Results 1.84.1 and 1.84.2 suggests that φ and ψ are not identified
by P(Θ) if I+0 (H) = ∅. This is straightforward to see. If I+0 (H) = ∅, then
C¯(H)1n = 1n, so that there are two constant covariates in (1.68), namely, 1n and
C¯(H)1n, from which it follows that φ and ψ are not identified (through the mean)
by P(Θ). In case I+0 (H) = ∅, one could simply posit that ψ = 0 to overcome non-
identification of φ. The resulting submodel is derived from the following system of
equations:
f
(
y(θ0)
)
=
(
In − γ0q
(
A¯(G)
))−1(
Xφ0 + C¯(H)X2ψ0,−1 + ς0
(
In + ζ0C¯(H)
)
u
)
.
Proposition 1.86 Suppose A¯(G) = C¯(H). If the kernel condition (1.75) is not satisfied,
γφ−1 + (1+ γ)ψ−1 ̸= 0K−1, and the n× (3K− 2) matrix(
1n : X2 : A¯(G)X2 : A¯(G)
2X2
) (1.78)
has full column rank, then γ, φ−1, and ψ−1 are identified by P(Θ). If γ, φ−1, and ψ−1
are identified through the mean by P(Θ), then In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2 are linearly independent.
Proposition 1.86 may be considered a non-identification result because of the in-
equality γφ−1+ (1+ γ)ψ−1 ̸= 0K−1 and the restriction it imposes on the parameter
space Θ. The inequality is not true if, for example, there exists a parameter point θ1
in Θ with γ(θ1) = 0 and ψ−1(θ1) = 0K−1. A hypothesis test with the null hypoth-
esis (γ(θ0),ψ−1(θ0)) = 0K and the alternative hypothesis (γ(θ0),ψ−1(θ0)) ̸= 0K
about the true data generating parameter point, denoted by θ0, is, however, the
most interesting one to carry out in empirical work. In other words, the case where
both endogenous and exogenous effects are not present in the data is not identified
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through the mean by P(Θ). In the light of these considerations, Proposition 1.86
underscores the importance of players without out-neighbors for identification in
case G = H because A¯(G) = C¯(H) if G = H and I+0 (H) = ∅ (Result 1.83.1) but
A¯(G) ̸= C¯(H) if G = H and I+0 (H) ̸= ∅ (Result 1.83.2).
Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) give a sufficient condition for the linear
independence of In, C¯(G), C¯(G)2 in terms of the topology ofG (see Section 2.4.2).116
The result is also true for In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2 and is stated in Lemma 1.87. It is based
on the following notion: a triple (x, y, z) of pairwise distinct vertices of a digraph D
is called intransitive triple in D if both arcs (x, y) and (y, z) are in D but the arc (x, z)
is not in D.
Lemma 1.87 (Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009) If there exists an intransitive
triple in G, then In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2 are linearly independent.
Similar to Proposition 1.84, the linear independence of In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2 is in
general not sufficient for the identification of γ, φ−1, and ψ−1 through the mean
by P(Θ), as illustrated by Example 1.88.
Example 1.88 Suppose I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A(G) = ⋃i∈I\{1}{(1, i), (i, 1)}, that is, G
is symmetric and star-shaped, G = H, X = (14 : e1), and θ1 and θ2 are two pa-
rameter points in Θ with (γ1,φ1,ψ1) = (1/3, 3/4, 4/5, 0, 1) and (γ2,φ2,ψ2) =
(2/3, 19/25, 3/4, 0, 103/100). Note that ker(q(A¯(G))) = {c14 | c ∈ R} and Xφ1 +
C¯(H)Xψ1 /∈ ker(q(A¯(G))) and Xφ2 + C¯(H)Xψ2 /∈ ker(q(A¯(G))) (cf. the kernel
condition (1.75)). The matrices I4, A¯(G), A¯(G)2 are linearly independent because
(2, 1, 3) is an intransitive triple in G (Lemma 1.87), but
E
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = 1
100

159
171
171
171
 = E( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). 
Even though players without out-neighbors are critical for identification in case
G = H, theymay also pose a threat to identification if they share a common covariate,
that is, characteristic. The players without out-neighbors (in H) have a common
covariate if diag(ι+0 (H))x is a scalar multiple of ι+0 (H) for some column x of X2.
In general, players without out-neighbors are a threat to identification if G = H
and some linear combination of the covariates of the players without out-neighbors
is a scalar multiple of ι+0 (G), formally, 0n ̸= ι+0 (G) ∈ c-sp(diag(ι+0 (G))X2).117
The corresponding result is stated in Proposition 1.89. The identifying condition
involves the subparameter restriction of Proposition 1.86. Proposition 1.89 may
for this reason also be considered a non-identification result. The problem of non-
identification does not arise if the players without out-neighbors are sufficiently
different in terms of their characteristics.
116. Note that Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) use a different notation.
117. Note that ι+0 (G) ̸= 0n if and only if I+0 (G) ̸= ∅.
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Proposition 1.89 Suppose G = H and 0n ̸= ι+0 (G) ∈ c-sp(diag(ι+0 (G))X2). If the
kernel condition (1.75) is not satisfied, γφ−1+(1+γ)ψ−1 ̸= 0K−1, and the n× (5K− 4)
matrix (
1n : X2 : A¯(G)X2 : C¯(G)X2 : A¯(G)
2X2 : A¯(G)C¯(G)X2
) (1.79)
has full column rank, then γ, φ, and ψ are identified by P(Θ). If γ, φ, and ψ are
identified through the mean by P(Θ), then In, A¯(G), C¯(G), A¯(G)2, A¯(G)C¯(G) are
linearly independent.
The last result states identifying conditions for the case where γ is identified
through the variance by P(Θ).
Proposition 1.90 Suppose γ is identified by P(Θ).
(1.90.1) Suppose I+0 (H) ̸= ∅. If the n× 2K matrix (1n : ι+0 (H) :X2 : C¯(H)X2) has full
column rank, then φ and ψ are identified by P(Θ).
(1.90.2) Suppose I+0 (H) = ∅. If the n× (2K− 1) matrix (1n : X2 : C¯(H)X2) has full
column rank, then φ−1 and ψ−1 are identified by P(Θ).
Note that Proposition 1.90 does not involve the kernel condition (1.75). Note also
that In and C¯(H) are linearly independent because C¯(H) ̸= In (see Definition B)
and, by assumption, H is not empty, which implies that C¯(H) ̸= On.
1.4.3.2 Identification through the mean by a submodel of P(Θ) involving
a priori exclusion restrictions
The rank conditions of Propositions 1.84 and 1.89 are not satisfied if X2, A¯(G)X2,
or C¯(H)X2 are rank deficient. In empirical work, one may choose covariates that
give rise to a matrix X2 such that 1n /∈ c-sp(X2) and both X2 and A¯(G)X2 have full
column rank. Specifically, given a family of nonconstant and linearly independent
covariates {xk}k∈K with K ⊂ Z+, one may choose a subset {k2, . . . , kK} ⊂ K such
that X2 is equal to (xk2 : . . . : xkK ) and A¯(G)X2 has full column rank. Even if X2 and
A¯(G)X2 have full column rank, C¯(H)X2 need not necessarily have full column rank.
Choosing a subset {k2, . . . , kK} ⊂ K such that X2 is equal to (xk2 : . . . : xkK ) and
both A¯(G)X2 and C¯(H)X2 have full column rank may result in a small value of K
(small in comparison with n) and represent a poor approximation of the profile of
the players’ idiosyncracies. The case of a rank deficient matrix C¯(H)X will for this
reason be addressed below. The exposition rests on the assumptions that K > 2 and
the n× K matrix C¯(H)X has rank r with r < K. Note that r ≥ 1 because H is not
empty and 1n ∈ c-sp(X) (Assumption P-X).
There are at least two solutions to the problem that a rank deficient matrix
C¯(H)X causes for identification. Both of them consist in replacing C¯(H)X in the
system of equations (1.68) with a substitute of full column rank.
The first solution involves a rank decomposition of C¯(H)X. A rank decomposi-
tion of C¯(H)X is a factorization of C¯(H)X into a product of two matrices C and D,
where C is an n× r matrix of full column rank that has the same column space
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as C¯(H)X and D is an r× K matrix of full row rank.118 Given a rank decomposi-
tion CD of C¯(H)X, the term C¯(H)Xψ0 in (1.68) can be written as CψD,0, where
ψD,0 := Dψ0 is a vector in Rr that acts as a new parameter point. Substituting
CψD,0 for C¯(H)Xψ0 in (1.68) is almost without loss of generality because C¯(H)X
and C have identical column spaces, except that ψD,0 may not be as straightforward
to interpret as ψ0.
The second solution involves a priori exclusion restrictions with respect to
the covariates that appear in the term C¯(H)Xψ0, which can be written as a sum
∑Kk=1 C¯(H)xkψ0,k with xk denoting the kth column of X and ψ0,k the kth component
of ψ0. There exists a rank-maximizing n × L submatrix Z of X with 1 ≤ L ≤ r
such that C¯(H)Z has full column rank, specifically, Z = (xk1 : . . . : xkL) for some
maximal subset R := {k1, . . . , kL} ⊂ {1, . . . ,K}. Let ψ¯0 denote the subparameter
point that lies in the rows of ψ0 indexed by R, that is, ψ¯0 := [ψ0]R. Substituting
C¯(H)Zψ¯0 for C¯(H)Xψ0 in (1.68) yields a new system of equations, which may be
considered the result of imposing a priori exclusion restrictions on the summands
in ∑Kk=1 C¯(H)xkψ0,k, namely, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} \ R, ψ0,k = 0. The substitution
is not without loss of generality unless r = L or r < L and the a priori exclusion
restrictions are true in the original model.
Both solutions give rise to statistical models for which results similar to those of
Section 1.4.3.1 can be obtained. This shall be exemplified by the model of the second
solution, denoted by P(Θ1), which is based on the following system of equations:
f
(
y(θ0)
)
=
(
In − γ0q
(
A¯(G)
))−1(
Xφ0 + C¯(H)Zψ¯0 + ς0
(
In + ζ0C¯(H)
)
u
)
.
(1.80)
Let the subparameter φ¯ be defined by φ¯ := [φ]R, where R is the index set
defined above of the covariates that constitute the columns of Z. Let φ¯−1 denote the
subparameter φ¯ without its first component. The two subparameters ψ¯ and ψ¯−1
are defined similarly. Let Θ1 be the largest subset of Θ such that [ψ]{1,...,K}\RΘ1 =
0K−L, that is, all subparameter points (ψ0,1, . . . ,ψ0,K) in ψ(Θ1) satisfy the exclusion
restriction, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} \ R, ψ0,k = 0. The family of regular conditional
probability distributions P(Θ1) = {Pθ1,F}θ1∈Θ1 is a submodel of P(Θ).
To ensure comparability, the main results of Section 1.4.3.1 are restated for the
model P(Θ1) on the basis of the following assumption.
Assumption P-Z The n× L matrix Z is equal to (1n : Z2), that is, the first column
of Z is the constant vector 1n, with Z2 denoting all but the first column of Z.
The definition of Z and Assumptions P-X and P-Z imply that 1n /∈ c-sp(Z2).
Proposition 1.79' If
∃θ0 ∈ Θ1 Xφ(θ0) + C¯(H)Zψ¯(θ0) ∈ ker
(
q
(
A¯(G)
))
, (1.81)
then γ is not identified through the mean by P(Θ1).
118. A rank decomposition of C¯(H)X always exists.
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Corollary 1.80' The kernel condition (1.81) cannot be satisfied if γ is identified through
the mean by P(Θ1). If I+0 (H) ̸= ∅ (respectively, I+0 (H) = ∅) and the kernel condi-
tion (1.81) is not satisfied, then φ−1 ̸= 0K−1 or ψ¯ ̸= 0L (respectively, φ−1 ̸= 0K−1 or
ψ¯−1 ̸= 0L−1) must be true.
Proposition 1.84' Suppose A¯(G) ̸= C¯(H).
(1.84'.1) Suppose I+0 (H) ̸= ∅. If the kernel condition (1.81) is not satisfied and the
n× (2K+ 2L− 1) matrix(
1n : ι+0 (H) : A¯(G)ι
+
0 (H) : X2 : A¯(G)X2 : C¯(H)Z2 : A¯(G)C¯(H)Z2
)
has full column rank, then γ, φ, and ψ¯ are identified by P(Θ1). If γ, φ, and ψ¯
are identified through the mean by P(Θ1), then In, A¯(G), C¯(H), A¯(G)C¯(H)
are linearly independent.
(1.84'.2) Suppose I+0 (H) = ∅. If the kernel condition (1.81) is not satisfied and the
n× (2K+ 2L− 3) matrix(
1n : X2 : A¯(G)X2 : C¯(H)Z2 : A¯(G)C¯(H)Z2
)
has full column rank, then γ, φ−1, and ψ¯−1 are identified by P(Θ1). If γ,
φ−1, and ψ¯−1 are identified through the mean by P(Θ1), then In, A¯(G), C¯(H),
A¯(G)C¯(H) are linearly independent.
Proposition 1.86' Suppose A¯(G) = C¯(H). If the kernel condition (1.81) is not satisfied,
γφ¯−1 + (1+ γ)ψ¯−1 ̸= 0L−1, and the n× (2K+ L− 2) matrix(
1n : X2 : A¯(G)X2 : A¯(G)
2Z2
) (1.82)
has full column rank, then γ, φ−1, and ψ¯−1 are identified by P(Θ1). If γ, φ−1, and ψ¯−1
are identified through the mean by P(Θ1), then In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2 are linearly independent.
Proposition 1.89' Suppose G = H and 0n ̸= ι+0 (G) ∈ c-sp(diag(ι+0 (G))Z2). If the
kernel condition (1.81) is not satisfied, γφ¯−1 + (1 + γ)ψ¯−1 ̸= 0L−1, and the
n× (3K+ 2L− 4) matrix(
1n : X2 : A¯(G)X2 : C¯(G)Z2 : A¯(G)
2X2 : A¯(G)C¯(G)Z2
) (1.83)
has full column rank, then γ, φ, and ψ¯ are identified by P(Θ1). If γ, φ, and ψ¯ are
identified through the mean by P(Θ1), then In, A¯(G), C¯(G), A¯(G)2, A¯(G)C¯(G) are
linearly independent.
Proposition 1.90' Suppose γ is identified by P(Θ1).
(1.90'.1) Suppose I+0 (H) ̸= ∅. If the n× (K+ L) matrix (1n : ι+0 (H) : X2 : C¯(H)Z2)
has full column rank, then φ and ψ¯ are identified by P(Θ1).
(1.90'.2) Suppose I+0 (H) = ∅. If the n× (K+ L− 1) matrix (1n : X2 : C¯(H)Z2) has
full column rank, then φ−1 and ψ¯−1 are identified by P(Θ1).
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1.4.3.3 Identification through the variance by P(Θ0)
A subparameter g is called identified through the variance byP(Θ0) if for all pairs of
parameter points (θ1, θ2) in Θ20, g(θ1) = g(θ2) is necessary for var( f (y(θ1)) | F) =
var( f (y(θ2)) | F). If g is identified through the variance by P(Θ0), then it is identi-
fied by P(Θ0) because, for all pairs of parameter points (θ1, θ2) in Θ20,
var( f (y(θ1)) | F) = var( f (y(θ2)) | F) is necessary for Pθ1,F = Pθ2,F. For all pa-
rameter points θ0 in Θ0,
var
(
f
(
y(θ0)
) ∣∣ F) = ς(θ0)2(In − γ(θ0)q(A¯(G)))−1(In − γ(θ0)q(A¯(G))T)−1,
from which it follows that the present discussion is confined to the identification of
γ and ς.
An identifying condition for γ and ς is stated in Proposition 1.91. An equivalent
condition follows from Lemma 1.92.
Proposition 1.91 If In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T, A¯(G)A¯(G)T are linearly independent, then γ
and ς are identified by P(Θ0). If γ and ς are identified through the variance by P(Θ0),
then In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T, A¯(G)A¯(G)T are linearly independent.
Lemma 1.92 The matrices In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T, A¯(G)A¯(G)T are linearly independent if
and only if In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T, A¯(G)T A¯(G) are linearly independent.
Proposition 1.91 implies that γ and ς are not identified through the variance
by P(Θ0) if G is complete. Indeed, A¯(G) = (1/(n− 1))(1n1Tn− In) if G is complete,
from which it follows that
A¯(G)A¯(G)T =
1
n− 1 In +
n− 2
2(n− 1)
(
A¯(G) + A¯(G)T
)
,
that is, In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T, A¯(G)A¯(G)T are linearly dependent.
The identifying condition of Proposition 1.91 is satisfied if and only if the n2 × 3
matrix (
vecn,n(In) : vecn,n
(
A¯(G) + A¯(G)T
)
: vecn,n
(
A¯(G)A¯(G)T
)) (1.84)
has full column rank.119 Example 1.93 demonstrates the usefulness of this equiva-
lence.
Example 1.93 Suppose A(G) = ⋃i∈I\{1}{(i, 1)}, that is, G is star-shaped with arcs
from every peripheral player i ∈ I \ {1} to the central player 1. The matrices
In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T = 1neT1 + e11Tn, A¯(G)A¯(G)
T = 1n1Tn are linearly independent.
Indeed, the matrix (1.84) has full column rank because it is equal to
e1 e1 + 1n 1n
e2 e1 1n
... ... ...
en e1 1n

119. For any pair (r, s) of positive integers, vecr,s : M(r, s,R)→M(rs, 1,R) denotes the vectorization
operator that maps an r × s matrix A to an rs × 1 matrix vecr,s(A), that is, a column vector with rs
components, by stacking its columns on top of one another.
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Figure 1.20. Nonempty digraphs of orders at least 2 and at most 4 that do not satisfy
the identifying condition of Proposition 1.91 (digraphs in light or dark gray)
and its Gram determinant is equal to 2(n− 1)2n2 and therefore different from zero
or, alternatively, e1, e2, 1n are linearly independent.120 
It is instructive to give an overview of all nonempty digraphs of orders at least 2
and at most 4 that satisfy the identifying condition of Proposition 1.91. (All figures
reported hereinafter refer to nonempty digraphs.) In a negative sense, there are 10
(out of 234) isomorphism classes of digraphs of orders at least 2 and at most 4 that
do not satisfy the condition. A representative of each class is depicted in Figure 1.20.
In a positive sense, any digraph of order at most 4 that is not isomorphic to one of the
digraphs depicted in Figure 1.20 satisfies the condition. Some count statistics may
help complete the picture. Among the 3 digraphs of order 2, which are partitioned
into 2 isomorphism classes, only 2 isomorphic graphs, namely, ({1, 2}, {(1, 2)})
and ({1, 2}, {(2, 1)}), satisfy the condition. There are 63 digraphs of order 3, which
are partitioned into 15 isomorphism classes. The representatives of 12 classes (57
digraphs altogether, which corresponds to a share of approximately 90 per cent of 63)
satisfy the condition. There are 4,095 digraphs of order 4, which are partitioned
into 217 isomorphism classes. The representatives of 211 classes (4,067 digraphs
altogether, which corresponds to a share of approximately 99 per cent of 4,095)
satisfy the condition.
The rest of this section is about a characterization of the identifying condition of
Proposition 1.91 in terms of the topology of G and results that follow therefrom.
The set of all nonempty digraphs of order n can be partitioned into two subsets: a
set for which the condition is satisfied and a set for which it is not satisfied. Prop-
osition 1.95 gives a characterization of the latter set in terms of normally regular
120. Note that an r× smatrix A overRwith r ≥ s has full column rank if and only if its Gramdeterminant
is nonzero, that is, det(ATA) ̸= 0.
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digraphs. The notion of a normally regular digraph was introduced in Jørgensen
(1994) and slightly generalized in Jørgensen (2015). In the current context, only
the definition in latter paper is of interest. Jørgensen’s (2015) theory of normally
regular digraphs requires that in the following definition v be a positive integer, k
be a nonnegative integer, and λ and µ be integers.
Definition NRD (Jørgensen 2015, Definition 1) A normally regular digraph with pa-
rameters (v, k,λ, µ), also denoted by NRD(v, k,λ, µ), is a digraph D of order v for
which the following conditions are satisfied: (NRD.1) all vertices have out-degree k;
(NRD.2) all adjacent vertices x and y for which exactly one of the arcs (x, y) or (y, x)
is in D have λ common out-neighbors; (NRD.3) all adjacent vertices x and y for
which both arcs (x, y) and (y, x) are in D have 2λ− µ common out-neighbors; and
(NRD.4) all nonadjacent vertices x and y have µ common out-neighbors.
AnNRD(v, k,λ, µ) is normal, that is, two distinct vertices have the same number
of common in-neighbors and common out-neighbors, and k-regular, that is, all
vertices have in-degree k and out-degree k (see Jørgensen 2015, Corollary 11).
A normal and regular digraph is, however, not necessarily a normally regular
digraph (see Section 1, p. 3). An NRD(v, k,λ, 0) need not be weakly connected,
but all of its weakly connected components are normally regular digraphs with
the same values of (k,λ) (see Section 4.1, p. 10). Moreover, all weakly connected
components of an NRD(v, k,λ, 0) are strongly connected (see Section 4.1, p. 10).121
Examples of normally regular digraphs of order v include the cycle digraph, for
which (v, k,λ, µ) = (v, 1, 0, 0), and the complete digraph, for which (v, k,λ, µ) =
(v, v− 1, l,m) for a pair of integers (l,m) such that 2l − m = v− 2, for example,
(v, k,λ, µ) = (v, v− 1, (v− 2)/2, 0). Another example of a normally regular digraph
with µ = 0 is given in Example 1.94, which is taken from Jørgensen (2015).
Example 1.94 (Jørgensen 2015, Example 2) Let D be the digraph of order 8 with
adjacency matrix A˙(D) given by
A˙(D) =

0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0

.
See Figure 1.21 for an illustration of D. The digraph D is anNRD(8, 3, 1, 0). It is the
digraph of smallest order among all normally regular digraphs with µ = 0 that are
different from the empty digraph, the cycle digraph, and the complete digraph. 
121. This can be seen as follows. If k = 0, then all weakly connected components of an NRD(v, k,λ, 0)
are of order 1 and therefore strongly connected. If k > 0, then all weakly connected components of an
NRD(v, k,λ, 0) are at least 1-regular, from which it follows that they are strongly connected.
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Figure 1.21. The NRD(8, 3, 1, 0) (Example 1.94)
A digraph D is an NRD(v, k,λ, µ) if and only if its adjacency matrix A˙(D) satis-
fies (see Jørgensen 2015, Proposition 1)
A˙(D)A˙(D)T = kIv + λ
(
A˙(D) + A˙(D)T
)
+ µ
(
1v1Tv − Iv − A˙(D)− A˙(D)T
)
.
(1.85)
In case µ = 0, (1.85) is equivalent to kIv + λ(A˙(D) + A˙(D)T)− A˙(D)A˙(D)T = Ov,
that is, Iv, A˙(D) + A˙(D)T, A˙(D)A˙(D)T are linearly dependent. This result gives
rise to the conjecture that G is a normally regular digraph if I0(G) = ∅ (a nonempty
normally regular digraph cannot have isolated vertices) and In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T,
A¯(G)A¯(G)T are linearly dependent. Proposition 1.95 demonstrates that an even
more general result is true. In order to state the result, let G〈I⋆(G)〉 denote the
subdigraph of G induced by the vertex subset I⋆(G) := I \ I0(G) of I , that is,
G〈I⋆(G)〉 is the largest subdigraph of G that has no isolated vertices. Note that
|I⋆(G)| > 1 and G〈I⋆(G)〉 is not empty because G is not empty.
Proposition 1.95 The matrices In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T, A¯(G)A¯(G)T are linearly dependent
if and only if G〈I⋆(G)〉 is an NRD(|I⋆(G)|, d, (d− 1)/2, 0) for some positive integer d.
It is worthmentioning that one conditional statement of Proposition 1.95, namely,
if In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T, A¯(G)A¯(G)T are linearly dependent, then G〈I⋆(G)〉 is an
NRD(|I⋆(G)|, d, (d− 1)/2, 0) for some positive integer d, does not follow from the
characterization of a normally regular digraph given in (1.85). The reason is that
the adjacency matrix of G〈I⋆(G)〉 and the endogenous effects matrix of G〈I⋆(G)〉
are—although related—distinct mathematical objects unless G〈I⋆(G)〉 is 1-regular.
Proposition 1.95 states that the identifying condition of Proposition 1.91, namely,
In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T, A¯(G)A¯(G)T are linearly independent, is not satisfied if and
only if G〈I⋆(G)〉 is an NRD(|I⋆(G)|, d, (d − 1)/2, 0) for some positive integer d.
Proposition 1.95 therefore constitutes a negative characterization of the topology of
digraphs of order n that satisfy the identifying condition of Proposition 1.91.
Proposition 1.95 entails a necessary and sufficient condition for the linear inde-
pendence of In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T, A¯(G)A¯(G)T in case G consists solely of complete
components.
Corollary 1.96 Suppose G has at least two complete components of orders at least 2.
(1.96.1) If not all complete components are of the same order, then In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T,
A¯(G)A¯(G)T are linearly independent.
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(1.96.2) Suppose G consists solely of complete components. Not all components are of the
same order if and only if In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T, A¯(G)A¯(G)T are linearly indepen-
dent.
In case G has at least two complete components of orders at least 2, γ and ς are
identified by P(Θ0) if not all complete components are of the same order (Propos-
ition 1.91 and Result 1.96.1). In case G consists solely of complete components, γ
and ς are identified by P(Θ0) if not all components are of the same order (Propos-
ition 1.91 and Result 1.96.2), and not all components are of the same order if γ and ς
are identified through the variance byP(Θ0) (Proposition 1.91 and Result 1.96.2).122
The necessary condition for identification of Proposition 1.86 is in general not
stronger than the identifying condition of Proposition 1.91. In other words, there
exist digraphs D with I+0 (D) = ∅ for which In, A¯(D), A¯(D)2 are linearly indepen-
dent and In, A¯(D) + A¯(D)T, A¯(D)A¯(D)T are linearly dependent (see the digraphs
depicted in dark gray in Figure 1.20).123,124 By virtue of Proposition 1.95, the two
conditions are equivalent in case G is symmetric (without imposing the restriction
that I+0 (G) = ∅). For example, friendship may be considered a symmetric relation,
which gives rise to a symmetric digraph G.
Proposition 1.97 Suppose G is symmetric. The matrices In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2 are linearly
independent if and only if In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)T, A¯(G)A¯(G)T are linearly independent.125
122. Lee (2007) and Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) discuss similar results. Lee (2007) discusses
identification by and estimation of a statistical model of social interactions where the individuals interact
in groups, that is, the individuals are connected by a digraph that consists solely of complete components.
He shows that endogenous and exogenous effects are identified in the presence of group specific fixed
effects if there is sufficient variation in group sizes. Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) discuss
identification of endogenous and exogenous effects by two statistical models that may be considered
variations of Manski’s (1993) linear-in-means model and Moffitt’s (2001) model. For the case where
individuals interact in groups, they show that in the absence of group specific fixed effects endogenous
and exogenous effects are identified if not all groups are of the same size and a parameter restriction is
satisfied (see Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009, Proposition 2).
123. Within the setup of Proposition 1.86, A¯(G) = C¯(H), which implies that I0(G) ⊂ I+0 (G) = ∅
(Result 1.83.3), which in turn implies that I⋆(G) = I .
124. It is an open problem whether there exist digraphs D of order n (at least 5) with I+0 (D) = ∅ for
which In, A¯(D), A¯(D)2 are linearly dependent and In, A¯(D) + A¯(D)T, A¯(D)A¯(D)T are linearly inde-
pendent. To this end, note that for a digraph D of order nwith I+0 (D) = ∅ and whose weakly connected
components are strongly connected, if In, A¯(D) + A¯(D)T, A¯(D)A¯(D)T are linearly independent, then In,
A¯(D), A¯(D)2 are linearly independent. The proof is as follows. Suppose D is a digraph of order n with
I+0 (D) = ∅ (and therefore I0(D) = ∅) and all its weakly connected components are strongly connected.
Suppose In, A¯(D), A¯(D)2 are linearly dependent. There do not exist intransitive triples in D because
In, A¯(D), A¯(D)2 are linearly dependent (Lemma 1.87). It follows that D is transitive, which implies
that all of its strongly connected components are transitive. Note that a strongly connected digraph is
transitive if and only if it is complete (see Bang-Jensen and Gutin 2009, p. 37). It follows that all strongly
connected components of D are complete. All complete components of D must be of the same order,
denoted by m, because In, A¯(D), A¯(D)2 are linearly dependent (see Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin
2009, Section 2.4.1.3). It follows that D is an NRD(n,m− 1, (m− 2)/2, 0), from which it follows that In,
A¯(D) + A¯(D)T, A¯(D)A¯(D)T are linearly dependent (Proposition 1.95).
125. Note that A¯(G) is not symmetric if G is symmetric, unless all weakly connected components of G
of order at least 2 are 1-regular.
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Propositions 1.95 and 1.97 allow of a negative characterization of the topology
of symmetric digraphs D of order n that satisfy the necessary condition for iden-
tification of Proposition 1.86: they must not be normally regular digraphs with
parameters (n, d, (d− 1)/2, 0) for some positive integer d (Corollary 1.98).126
Corollary 1.98 Suppose G is symmetric. The matrices In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2 are linearly
dependent if and only if G〈I⋆(G)〉 is anNRD(|I⋆(G)|, d, (d− 1)/2, 0) for some positive
integer d.
Propositions 1.86, 1.91, and 1.97 give rise to the following result, which estab-
lishes a nexus between identification through the mean by P(Θ0) and identification
through the variance by P(Θ0).
Corollary 1.99 Suppose G is symmetric and A¯(G) = C¯(H). If γ, φ−1, and ψ−1 are
identified through the mean by P(Θ0), then ς is identified by P(Θ0).
1.4.3.4 Identification through the variance by P(Θ)
A subparameter g is identified by P(Θ) if it is identified through the variance
by P(Θ). For all parameter points θ0 in Θ,
var
(
f
(
y(θ0)
) ∣∣ F) = ς(θ0)2(In − γ(θ0)q(A¯(G)))−1(In + ζ(θ0)C¯(H))
× (In + ζ(θ0)C¯(H)T)(In − γ(θ0)q(A¯(G))T)−1,
from which it follows that the present discussion is confined to the identification of
γ, ζ, and ς.127
The presentation of the results is organized as follows. Proposition 1.100 gives
an identifying condition for ζ and ς under the premise that γ is identified through
the mean by P(Θ). An equivalent condition follows from Lemma 1.101. Prop-
osition 1.102 gives a sufficient condition for the identifying condition of Propos-
ition 1.100, namely, I+0 (H) ̸= ∅, that is, there are players of Γwithout out-neighbors
in H. A characterization of the identifying condition of Proposition 1.100 in terms
of the topology of H is given in Proposition 1.103. In order to put into context these
results, note that Proposition 1.100 parallels Proposition 1.91, Lemma 1.101 parallels
Lemma 1.92, and Proposition 1.103 parallels Proposition 1.95. Propositions 1.104
and 1.105 state identifying conditions for γ, ζ, and ς, where the former result covers
the case A¯(G) ̸= C¯(H) and the latter the case A¯(G) = C¯(H).
Proposition 1.100 Suppose γ is identified byP(Θ). If In, C¯(H)+ C¯(H)T, C¯(H)C¯(H)T
are linearly independent, then ζ and ς are identified byP(Θ). If ζ and ς are identified through
the variance by P(Θ), then In, C¯(H) + C¯(H)T, C¯(H)C¯(H)T are linearly independent.
Lemma 1.101 The matrices In, C¯(H) + C¯(H)T, C¯(H)C¯(H)T are linearly independent
if and only if In, C¯(H) + C¯(H)T, C¯(H)TC¯(H) are linearly independent.
126. See Footnote 123.
127. Note that var( f (y(θ0)) | F) is positive definite if and only if −1 /∈ σ(ζ(θ0)C¯(H)).
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Figure 1.22. Nonempty digraphs of orders at least 2 and at most 4 that do not satisfy
the identifying condition of Proposition 1.100
Proposition 1.102 If I+0 (H) ̸= ∅, then In, C¯(H) + C¯(H)T, C¯(H)C¯(H)T are linearly
independent.
Note that the condition I+0 (H) ̸= ∅ is not necessary for the linear independence
of In, C¯(H) + C¯(H)T, C¯(H)C¯(H)T.
Proposition 1.103 The matrices In, C¯(H)+ C¯(H)T, C¯(H)C¯(H)T are linearly dependent
if and only if H is an NRD(n, d, (d− 1)/2, 0) for some positive integer d.
If H is anNRD(n, d, (d− 1)/2, 0) for some positive integer d, then it is d-regular,
from which I+0 (H) = ∅ follows. Proposition 1.102 may therefore be considered a
corollary to Proposition 1.103.
Propositions 1.95 and 1.103 imply that the identifying condition of Propos-
ition 1.91 is stronger than the identifying condition of Proposition 1.100 in case
G = H. The two conditions are equivalent if G = H and I+0 (H) = ∅, in which case
A¯(G) = C¯(H) (Result 1.83.1).
There are 6 (out of 234) isomorphism classes of nonempty digraphs of orders at
least 2 and at most 4 whose representatives do not satisfy the identifying condition
of Proposition 1.100. A representative of each class is depicted in Figure 1.22. They
are all normally regular digraphs (Proposition 1.103). The digraphs of Figure 1.22
are a proper subset of those of Figure 1.20 because the identifying condition of
Proposition 1.91 is stronger than that of Proposition 1.100 in case G = H.
Proposition 1.104 Suppose A¯(G) ̸= C¯(H).128 If the nine matrices
In, A¯(G) + A¯(G)
T, A¯(G)A¯(G)T, C¯(H) + C¯(H)T,
C¯(H)C¯(H)T, A¯(G)
(
C¯(H) + C¯(H)T
)
+
(
C¯(H) + C¯(H)T
)
A¯(G)T,
A¯(G)C¯(H)C¯(H)T + C¯(H)
(
A¯(G)C¯(H)
)T, A¯(G)(C¯(H) + C¯(H)T)A¯(G)T,
A¯(G)C¯(H)
(
A¯(G)C¯(H)
)T
are linearly independent, then γ, ζ, and ς are identified by P(Θ).
128. Note that A¯(G) ̸= C¯(H) if G = H and I+0 (H) ̸= ∅ (Result 1.83.2).
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Proposition 1.105 Suppose A¯(G) = C¯(H).129 If γζ ≥ 0 and the six matrices
In, C¯(H) + C¯(H)
T, C¯(H)C¯(H)T, C¯(H)2 + C¯(H)T2,
C¯(H)
(
C¯(H) + C¯(H)T
)
C¯(H)T, C¯(H)2C¯(H)T2
are linearly independent, then γ, ζ, and ς are identified by P(Θ). In general, γ, ζ, and ς
are not identified through the variance by P(Θ), even if the above six matrices are linearly
independent.
The inequality γζ ≥ 0 entails a restriction on the parameter space Θ. It is true if
and only if all pairs of subparameter points (γ0, ζ0) lie in the first or third closed
orthant inR2, in particular, if both γ0 and ζ0 are different from zero, then they must
have the same sign. The discussion of idiosyncrasies that admit of local externalities
(see Section 1.3.7.1) suggests that a positive γ0 (that is, a preference for conformist
behavior) is associated with a positive ζ0 (that is, idiosyncrasies with positive local
externalities) in order that a nonempty digraph G that is identical to H emerges
from a network formation game because arcs in G entail a social cost if γ0 is positive
and arcs in H entail a social benefit in terms of positive local externalities if ζ0 is
positive.
There are 32 (out of 131) isomorphism classes of digraphs H of orders 3 or 4
with I+0 (H) = ∅ whose representatives do not satisfy the identifying condition
of Proposition 1.105. A representative of each class is depicted in Figure 1.23. The
digraphs of Figure 1.22 of orders at least 3 are a proper subset of those of Fig-
ure 1.23 because the identifying condition of Proposition 1.105 is stronger than that
of Proposition 1.100.
1.4.3.5 Identification through the mean byQ(Θ)
A subparameter g is called identified via q(A¯(G))-LD through the mean by Q(Θ)
if for all pairs of parameter points (θ1, θ2) in Θ2, g(θ1) = g(θ2) is necessary for
E(q(A¯(G)) f (y(θ1)) | F) = E(q(A¯(G)) f (y(θ2)) | F). If g is identified via
q(A¯(G))-LD through the mean by Q(Θ), then it is identified by Q(Θ). For all
parameter points θ0 in Θ, if I+0 (H) ̸= ∅, then
E
(
q
(
A¯(G)
)
f
(
y(θ0)
) ∣∣ F) = (In − γ(θ0)q(A¯(G)))−1q(A¯(G))
× (X2φ−1(θ0)− ψ(θ0)ι+0 (H) + C¯(H)X2ψ−1(θ0)),
and if I+0 (H) = ∅, then
E
(
q
(
A¯(G)
)
f
(
y(θ0)
) ∣∣ F) = (In − γ(θ0)q(A¯(G)))−1q(A¯(G))
× (X2φ−1(θ0) + C¯(H)X2ψ−1(θ0)),
129. Note that I+0 (G) = I+0 (H) = ∅ if A¯(G) = C¯(H) (Result 1.83.3).
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Figure 1.23. Digraphs of orders 3 or 4 in which all vertices have positive out-degrees
that do not satisfy the identifying condition of Proposition 1.105
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from which it follows that the present discussion is confined to the identification of
γ, φ−1, ψ, and ψ−1.
Analogous to Proposition 1.79, if
∃θ0 ∈ Θ X2φ−1(θ0)− ψ(θ0)ι+0 (H) + C¯(H)X2ψ−1(θ0) ∈ ker
(
q
(
A¯(G)
))
, (1.86)
then γ is not identified via q(A¯(G))-LD through the mean by Q(Θ). The kernel
condition (1.86) cannot be satisfied if γ is identified via q(A¯(G))-LD through the
mean by Q(Θ). If I+0 (H) ̸= ∅ (respectively, I+0 (H) = ∅) and the kernel condi-
tion (1.86) is not satisfied, then φ−1 ̸= 0K−1 or ψ ̸= 0K (respectively, φ−1 ̸= 0K−1
or ψ−1 ̸= 0K−1) must be true.
The identifying conditions given hereinafter are similar to those of Section 1.4.3.1
(Proposition 1.106 parallels Proposition 1.84, Proposition 1.107 parallels Propos-
ition 1.86, Proposition 1.111 parallels Proposition 1.89, and Proposition 1.112 paral-
lels Proposition 1.90) but entail stronger conditions with respect to the topologies
of G and H.
Proposition 1.106 Suppose A¯(G) ̸= C¯(H).
(1.106.1) Suppose I+0 (H) ̸= ∅. If the kernel condition (1.86) is not satisfied and the
n× (4K− 2)matrix resulting frommatrix (1.76) by eliminating the constant 1n
and premultiplying all blocks by q(A¯(G)) has full column rank, then γ, φ−1,
and ψ are identified by Q(Θ). If γ, φ−1, and ψ are identified via q(A¯(G))-LD
through the mean by Q(Θ), then q(A¯(G)), q(A¯(G))A¯(G), q(A¯(G))C¯(H),
q(A¯(G))A¯(G)C¯(H) are linearly independent.
(1.106.2) Suppose I+0 (H) = ∅. If the kernel condition (1.86) is not satisfied and the
n × (4K − 4) matrix resulting from matrix (1.77) by eliminating the con-
stant 1n and premultiplying all blocks by q(A¯(G)) has full column rank, then
γ, φ−1, and ψ−1 are identified by Q(Θ). If γ, φ−1, and ψ−1 are identified
via q(A¯(G))-LD through the mean by Q(Θ), then q(A¯(G)), q(A¯(G))A¯(G),
q(A¯(G))C¯(H), q(A¯(G))A¯(G)C¯(H) are linearly independent.
Proposition 1.107 Suppose A¯(G) = C¯(H). If the kernel condition (1.86) is not satisfied,
γφ−1 + (1+ γ)ψ−1 ̸= 0K−1, and the n× (3K− 3) matrix resulting from matrix (1.78)
by eliminating the constant 1n and premultiplying all blocks by q(A¯(G)) has full column
rank, then γ, φ−1, and ψ−1 are identified by Q(Θ). If γ, φ−1, and ψ−1 are identified via
q(A¯(G))-LD through the mean byQ(Θ), then q(A¯(G)), q(A¯(G))A¯(G), q(A¯(G))A¯(G)2
are linearly independent.
Within the setup of Proposition 1.107, a necessary condition for identification
is that the threematrices q(A¯(G)), q(A¯(G))A¯(G), q(A¯(G))A¯(G)2 are linearly inde-
pendent, which is true if and only if the four matrices In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2, A¯(G)3 are
linearly independent (Lemma 1.108). It follows that Proposition 1.107 entails a
stronger condition with respect to the topology of G than does Proposition 1.86,
wherein the linear independence of In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2 is necessary for identification.
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Figure 1.24. A digraph of order 4with diameter 3 (Example 1.110)
Lemma 1.108 For all integers p > 1, the p matrices q(A¯(G))A¯(G)0 = q(A¯(G)), . . . ,
q(A¯(G))A¯(G)p−1 are linearly independent if and only if the p+ 1 matrices A¯(G)0 = In,
. . . , A¯(G)p are linearly independent.
Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) give a sufficient condition for the linear
independence of In, C¯(G), C¯(G)2, C¯(G)3 (see Section 3.2) in terms of the diameter
of a subdigraph of G.130,131 The result is also true for In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2, A¯(G)3 and
is stated in Lemma 1.109.
Lemma 1.109 (Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009) If G has a subdigraph of di-
ameter (at least) three, then In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2, A¯(G)3 are linearly independent.132
The linear independence of In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2, A¯(G)3 is in general not sufficient
for the identification of γ,φ−1, andψ−1 via q(A¯(G))-LD through themean byQ(Θ),
as illustrated by Example 1.110.
Example 1.110 Suppose I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, A(G) = {(1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2), (3, 4),
(4, 3)}, G = H, X = (14 : e2+ e3), and θ1 and θ2 are two parameter points inΘwith
(γ1,φ1,ψ1) = (1/3, 3/4, 4/5, 0, 1) and (γ2,φ2,ψ2) = (2/3, 59/60, 3/4, 0, 7/10).
See Figure 1.24 for an illustration of G. Note that ker(q(A¯(G))) = {c14 | c ∈ R}
and Xφ1 + C¯(H)Xψ1 /∈ ker(q(A¯(G))) and Xφ2 + C¯(H)Xψ2 /∈ ker(q(A¯(G))) (cf.
the kernel condition (1.86)). The matrices I4, A¯(G), A¯(G)2, A¯(G)3 are linearly
independent because diam(G) = 3 (Lemma 1.109), but
E
(
q
(
A¯(G)
)
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = 1
10

2
−1
−1
2
 = E(q(A¯(G)) f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). 
Proposition 1.111 Suppose G = H and 0n ̸= ι+0 (G) ∈ c-sp(diag(ι+0 (G))X2). If the
kernel condition (1.86) is not satisfied, γφ−1+(1+γ)ψ−1 ̸= 0K−1, and the n× (5K− 5)
matrix resulting from matrix (1.79) by eliminating the constant 1n and premultiplying all
blocks by q(A¯(G)) has full column rank, then γ, φ−1, and ψ are identified by Q(Θ). If
γ, φ−1, and ψ are identified via q(A¯(G))-LD through the mean by Q(Θ), then q(A¯(G)),
q(A¯(G))A¯(G), q(A¯(G))C¯(G), q(A¯(G))A¯(G)2, q(A¯(G))A¯(G)C¯(G) are linearly inde-
pendent.
130. The diameter of a digraph D, denoted by diam(D), is equal to the length of the longest shortest
path between any two vertices in D.
131. Note that Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) use a different notation. They claim that In, C¯(G),
C¯(G)2, C¯(G)3 are linearly independent if G has diameter at least three (see Section 3.2). This claim is,
however, not necessarily true if the diameter of G is infinite (which is true if and only if G is not strongly
connected).
132. Note that G has a subdigraph of diameter three if G has a subdigraph of diameter at least three.
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Proposition 1.112 Suppose γ is identified by Q(Θ).
(1.112.1) Suppose I+0 (H) ̸= ∅. If the n× (2K− 1) matrix(
q
(
A¯(G)
)
ι+0 (H) : q
(
A¯(G)
)
X2 : q
(
A¯(G)
)
C¯(H)X2
)
has full column rank, then φ−1 and ψ are identified by Q(Θ). If φ−1 and ψ
are identified via q(A¯(G))-LD through the mean by Q(Θ), then q(A¯(G)) and
q(A¯(G))C¯(H) are linearly independent.
(1.112.2) Suppose I+0 (H) = ∅. If the n× (2K− 2) matrix(
q
(
A¯(G)
)
X2 : q
(
A¯(G)
)
C¯(H)X2
)
has full column rank, thenφ−1 andψ−1 are identified byQ(Θ). Ifφ−1 andψ−1
are identified via q(A¯(G))-LD through the mean by Q(Θ), then q(A¯(G)) and
q(A¯(G))C¯(H) are linearly independent.
In case A¯(G) = C¯(H), the two matrices q(A¯(G)) and q(A¯(G))C¯(H) are lin-
early independent if and only if the three matrices In, A¯(G), A¯(G)2 are linearly
independent (Lemma 1.108).
1.4.3.6 Identification through the variance byQ(Θ0)
Asubparameter g is called identified via q(A¯(G))-LD through the variance byQ(Θ0)
if for all pairs of parameter points (θ1, θ2) in Θ20, g(θ1) = g(θ2) is necessary
for var(q(A¯(G)) f (y(θ1)) | F) = var(q(A¯(G)) f (y(θ2)) | F). If g is identified via
q(A¯(G))-LD through the variance by Q(Θ0), then it is identified by Q(Θ0). For all
parameter points θ0 in Θ0,
var
(
q
(
A¯(G)
)
f
(
y(θ0)
) ∣∣ F) = ς(θ0)2(In − γ(θ0)q(A¯(G)))−1q(A¯(G))
× q(A¯(G))T(In − γ(θ0)q(A¯(G))T)−1,
from which it follows that the present discussion is confined to the identification of
γ and ς. Note that var(q(A¯(G)) f (y(θ0)) |F) is positive semidefinite but not positive
definite because q(A¯(G)) is singular.
Proposition 1.113 If q(A¯(G))q(A¯(G))T,
q
(
A¯(G)
)(
q
(
A¯(G)
)
+ q
(
A¯(G)
)T)q(A¯(G))T, q2(A¯(G))q2(A¯(G))T
are linearly independent, then γ and ς are identified by Q(Θ0).
Proposition 1.114 The identifying condition of Proposition 1.113 is stronger than (but
not equivalent to) that of Proposition 1.91.
There are 30 (out of 217) isomorphism classes of digraphs G of orders at least 2
and atmost 4withweakly connected components of orders at least 2whose represen-
tatives do not satisfy the identifying condition of Proposition 1.113. A representative
of each class is depicted in light gray in Figure 1.25.
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Figure 1.25. Digraphs G of orders at least 2 and at most 4with weakly connected
components of orders at least 2 that do not satisfy the identifying condition of
Proposition 1.113 (digraphs in light gray) and that of Proposition 1.115 in case
G = H (digraphs in light or dark gray)
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1.4.3.7 Identification through the variance byQ(Θ)
A subparameter g is identified by Q(Θ) if it is identified via q(A¯(G))-LD through
the variance by Q(Θ). For all parameter points θ0 in Θ,
var
(
q
(
A¯(G)
)
f
(
y(θ0)
) ∣∣ F) = ς(θ0)2(In − γ(θ0)q(A¯(G)))−1q(A¯(G))
× (In + ζ(θ0)C¯(H))(In + ζ(θ0)C¯(H)T)
× q(A¯(G))T(In − γ(θ0)q(A¯(G))T)−1,
from which it follows that the present discussion is confined to the identification of
γ, ζ, and ς.
Proposition 1.115 Suppose γ is identified by Q(Θ). If q(A¯(G))q(A¯(G))T,
q
(
A¯(G)
)(
C¯(H) + C¯(H)T
)
q
(
A¯(G)
)T, q(A¯(G))C¯(H)C¯(H)Tq(A¯(G))T
are linearly independent, then ζ and ς are identified by Q(Θ).
The identifying condition of Proposition 1.115 is stronger than (but not equiva-
lent to) that of Proposition 1.100.
There are 34 (out of 217) isomorphism classes of digraphs G of orders at least 2
and at most 4with weakly connected components of orders at least 2whose rep-
resentatives do not satisfy the identifying condition of Proposition 1.115 in case
G = H. A representative of each class is depicted in light or dark gray in Figure 1.25.
Proposition 1.116 Suppose A¯(G) ̸= C¯(H).133 If the nine matrices
q
(
A¯(G)
)
q
(
A¯(G)
)T, q(A¯(G))(C¯(H) + C¯(H)T)q(A¯(G))T,
q
(
A¯(G)
)
C¯(H)C¯(H)Tq
(
A¯(G)
)T, q(A¯(G))(q(A¯(G))+ q(A¯(G))T)q(A¯(G))T,
q
(
A¯(G)
)(
q
(
A¯(G)
)(
C¯(H) + C¯(H)T
)
+
(
C¯(H) + C¯(H)T
)
q
(
A¯(G)
)T)q(A¯(G))T,
q
(
A¯(G)
)(
q
(
A¯(G)
)
C¯(H)C¯(H)T + C¯(H)C¯(H)Tq
(
A¯(G)
)T)q(A¯(G))T,
q2
(
A¯(G)
)
q2
(
A¯(G)
)T, q2(A¯(G))(C¯(H) + C¯(H)T)q2(A¯(G))T,
q2
(
A¯(G)
)
C¯(H)C¯(H)Tq2
(
A¯(G)
)T
are linearly independent, then γ, ζ, and ς are identified by Q(Θ).
Proposition 1.117 The identifying condition of Proposition 1.116 is stronger than (but
not equivalent to) that of Proposition 1.104.
There are no digraphs G of orders 3 or 4 with weakly connected components
of orders at least 2 and I+0 (G) ̸= ∅ that satisfy the identifying condition of Prop-
osition 1.116 in case G = H. A weakly connected digraph G of order 5 with a
single vertex without out-neighbors that satisfies the identifying condition of Prop-
osition 1.116 in case G = H is depicted in Figure 1.26.
133. See Footnote 128.
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Figure 1.26. A digraph of order 5 that satisfies the identifying condition of Propos-
ition 1.116 in case G = H
Proposition 1.118 Suppose A¯(G) = C¯(H).134 If γζ ≥ 0 and the six matrices
q
(
C¯(H)
)
q
(
C¯(H)
)T,
q
(
C¯(H)
)(
C¯(H) + C¯(H)T
)
q
(
C¯(H)
)T, q(C¯(H))C¯(H)C¯(H)Tq(C¯(H))T,
q
(
C¯(H)
)(
q
(
C¯(H)
)(
C¯(H) + C¯(H)T
)
+
(
C¯(H) + C¯(H)T
)
q
(
C¯(H)
)T)q(C¯(H))T,
q
(
C¯(H)
)(
q
(
C¯(H)
)
C¯(H)C¯(H)T + C¯(H)C¯(H)Tq
(
C¯(H)
)T)q(C¯(H))T,
q2
(
C¯(H)
)
C¯(H)C¯(H)Tq2
(
C¯(H)
)T
are linearly independent, then γ, ζ, and ς are identified by Q(Θ).
Proposition 1.119 The identifying condition of Proposition 1.118 is stronger than (but
not equivalent to) that of Proposition 1.105.
1.4.4 Existence of valid statistical models
This section discusses the existence of a statistical model without unobservable
correlated effects and a NALA game such that the former is a valid model of the
latter for a given action space.135 Definition V gives a precise meaning to the notion
of a valid model.
Definition V A statistical modelM is called a validmodel of a NALA game with
action space Yn if for all distributions µ inM, (V.1) supp(µ) ⊂ Yn ∪ ∂Yn and
(V.2) ∂Yn ∩ Yn is a µ-null set.136
A statistical model is a valid model of a NALA game if every distribution in the
model satisfies two conditions: its support lies in the game’s action space (Condi-
tion V.1) and the boundary of the action space has measure zero (Condition V.2).
The second condition is motivated by the fact that the statistical models of Sec-
tion 1.4.2 are derived from a system of equations characterizing the interior NE of a
NALA game.
Whether and under which conditions a statistical model and a NALA game
exist such that the former is a valid model of the latter depends on the game’s
action space: In case it is Rn, such a pair exists; specifically, the model P(Θ) (see
134. See Footnote 129.
135. The case of a statistical model with unobservable correlated effects is similar.
136. Note that Yn ∪ ∂Yn = Yn and ∂Yn ∩ Yn = ∂Yn because Y is equal to R, R+, or [0, υ¯]. In order
that Definition V also applies to the limit of a sequence of NALA games where the action space of the
limit is int(Y)n, Condition V.1 is stated in terms of Yn ∪ ∂Yn instead of Yn and Condition V.2 in terms
of ∂Yn ∩ Yn instead of ∂Yn.
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Section 1.4.2.1) is a valid model of the NALA game of Section 1.4.1 with Y = R if f
is bounded neither below nor above and, for example, the conditional distribution
of the latent variable u given F is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure on Rn.137 In case it is Rn+ or [0, υ¯]n, there exists a statistical model that is a
valid model of the limit of a sequence of NALA games.
Let Γ(R, f ) denote the NALA game of Section 1.4.1 with Y = R. Let { fm}m∈Z++
be a sequence of functions inF (Y). For allm ∈ Z++, let Γ(Y , fm) denote the generic
NALA game of Section 1.4.1 with f = fm. The sequence {Γ(Y , fm)}m∈Z++ is said to
converge if { fmint(Y)}m∈Z++ converges to a function f∞ that satisfies Assumption F.
If {Γ(Y , fm)}m∈Z++ converges, then its limit is denoted by Γ(int(Y), f∞). Note that
Γ(int(Y), f∞) is not a NALA game unless Y = R. The notion of a NALA game can,
however, be extended to cover the case where the players’ action space is int(Y). If
{Γ(Y , fm)}m∈Z++ convergeswith limit Γ(int(Y), f∞) and for allm ∈ Z++, Γ(Y , fm)
has a unique and interior NE y⋆m, then the sequence {y⋆m}m∈Z++ converges and its
limit is the unique NE of Γ(int(Y), f∞).
Let P1(Θ) denote the model P(Θ) with f = idR. Let B be a nonempty Borel set
onR.138 Let G(B) denote the set of all real-valued functions with domain B that are
bijective and Borel measurable. For any g ∈ G(B), let the statistical model Pg(Θ)
be defined by
Pg(Θ) := {P1im(g) ◦ g |P1 ∈ P1(Θ)},
where g : Bn → g(B)n is the vector field associatedwith the function g that is defined
by, for all x := (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Bn, g(x) := (g(x1), . . . , g(xn)) (see also Section 1.3.3),
P1im(g) is the restriction of P1 to the image of g, and P1im(g) ◦ g is the image
distribution of P1im(g) under the inverse of g.139,140 Note that all distributions Pg
in Pg(Θ) satisfy, by definition, supp(Pg) ⊂ Bn ∪ ∂ Bn (cf. Condition V.1).
In order to shed light on the definition of Pg(Θ), let S ⊂ Rn denote the union
of the supports of the distributions in P1(Θ), let θ0 be a parameter point in Θ, and
let y1(θ0) denote the response variable y(θ0) for the case f = idR (see (1.68) for
the definition of y(θ0)). The function yg(θ0) := g−1 ◦ y1(θ0) : Ω→ Bn is defined
P-almost everywhere on Ω if S ⊂ im(g) (see Figure 1.27 for an illustration), in
which case the conditional distribution of yg(θ0) given F is equal to P1im(g) ◦ g
for some P1 in P1(Θ).141 The model Pg(Θ) is, therefore, the family of conditional
distributions of yg(θ0) given F indexed by Θ if S ⊂ im(g).
Provided that { fmint(Y)}m∈Z++ converges to a function f∞ that satisfiesAssump-
tion F and therefore lies in G(int(Y)), Definition V also applies to the model P f∞(Θ)
and the limit Γ(int(Y), f∞) of {Γ(Y , fm)}m∈Z++ ; specifically, P f∞(Θ) is a valid
137. The distributions in P(Θ) satisfy Condition V.1.
138. In case Y = R, B = R; in case Y = R+, B = R++; and in case Y = [0, υ¯], B = (0, υ¯).
139. Note that P1im(g) is defined and therefore a probability measure because Bn is a Borel set on Rn
and g is injective (see, for example, Kechris 1995, Corollary 15.2).
140. In case Y = R, g = f , and in case Y = R+ or Y = [0, υ¯], g is the limit f∞ of { fmint(Y)}m∈Z++ .
141. More precisely, yg(θ0) is defined on y1(θ0)−1(S) ⊂ Ω, the preimage of S under y1(θ0), and can be
extended toΩ by setting yg(θ0) equal to 0n (or any other vector inRn) on theP-null setΩ \ y1(θ0)−1(S);
the conditional distribution of the resulting random n-vector given F is equal to P1im(g) ◦ g for some P1
in P1(Θ).
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y1(θ0)
yg(θ0)
g
g−1
Figure 1.27. Definition of yg(θ0) under the assumption that S ⊂ im(g)
model of Γ(int(Y), f∞) because int(Y)n ∪ ∂ int(Y)n = Yn (cf. Condition V.1) and
∂ int(Y)n ∩ int(Y)n = ∅ (cf. Condition V.2).
Proposition 1.120 (1.120.1) Suppose Y = R. The model P f (Θ) is a valid model of the
NALA game Γ(R, f ) if f is bounded neither below nor above and Condition V.2
is satisfied.
(1.120.2) Suppose Y = R+ and { fm}m∈Z++ is defined by, for all m ∈ Z++,
fm(y) := log
(
y+
1
m
)
.
The sequence { fmR++}m∈Z++ converges with limit log. The model Plog(Θ) is
a valid model of the limit of the sequence of NALA games {Γ(R+, fm)}m∈Z++ .
(1.120.3) Suppose Y = [0, υ¯] and { fm}m∈Z++ is defined by, for all m ∈ Z++,
fm(y) := log
(
y+
1
m
)
− log
(
υ¯− y+ 1
m
)
.
Let f∞ denote the inverse of the logistic function f−1∞ : R → (0, υ¯) that is defined
by f−1∞ (y) := υ¯/(1+ exp(−y)). The sequence { fm(0,υ¯)}m∈Z++ converges
with limit f∞. The model P f∞(Θ) is a valid model of the limit of the sequence of
NALA games {Γ([0, υ¯], fm)}m∈Z++ .
Result 1.120.1 follows from the definition of P(Θ) because P f (Θ) = P(Θ) if f is
bounded neither below nor above. Results 1.120.2 and 1.120.3 state that there exists
a statistical model that is a valid model of the limit of a sequence of NALA games
in case the action space is Rn+ or [0, υ¯]n; specifically, they show that a logarithm and
the inverse of a logistic function allow for aligning the action spaces Rn+ and [0, υ¯]n
with the supports of the distributions in the corresponding statistical models.142 As
regards Result 1.120.2, note that the condition of Proposition 1.16 involving αmin
and fm is not binding in the limit as m → ∞ if β > 0 (Condition 1.16.1) because
limm→∞ fm(0) = −∞. Likewise, the conditions of Proposition 1.17 involving αmin
or αmax and fm are not binding in the limit as m → ∞ if β > 0 (Condition 1.17.1)
142. Sommer and Sulger (2012) also recognize that a logarithm is instrumental in aligning the nonneg-
ative action space of their network game with the supports of the distributions in the corresponding
statistical model (see pp. 82–85).
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and −0.38β ≈ (√5− 3)β/2 < γ < 0. As regards Result 1.120.3, note that the
conditions of Proposition 1.14 involving αmin or αmax and fm are not binding in
the limit as m→ ∞ if β > 0 (Condition 1.14.1) because limm→∞ fm(0) = −∞ and
limm→∞ fm(υ¯) = +∞. Likewise, the conditions of Proposition 1.15 involving αmin
or αmax and fm are not binding in the limit as m → ∞ if β > 0 (Condition 1.15.1)
and −β/2 < γ < 0 (Condition 1.15.2).
1.4.5 Reconciling existing statistical models with NALA games
The model P(Θ) is a translation of the NALA game Γ of Section 1.4.1 with Y = R
under the assumption that β = 1. A different model arises from Γ when assuming
β+ γ = 1 instead of β = 1, while maintaining the assumption that β > 0.143 In
this respect, it is important to note that the parameter restriction β+ γ = 1 is not
without loss of generality, as opposed to the normalization β = 1.144 Moreover,
β > 0 and β+ γ = 1 imply that γ < 1. In contrast, the normalization β = 1 does not
impose an upper bound on γ. Using the same assumptions as in the translation of Γ
to P(Θ), except for imposing the restriction β+ γ = 1 instead of the normalization
β = 1, the following system of equations emerges for the response variable at a
parameter point θ0 in Θ:
f
(
y(θ0)
)
=
(
In − γ0 A¯(G)
)−1(Xφ0 + C¯(H)Xψ0 + ς0(In + ζ0C¯(H))u). (1.87)
Note that the two systems of equations (1.68) and (1.87) differ only in one respect,
the term involving the subparameter point γ0, which is equal to γ0(A¯(G) − In)
in (1.68) and equal to γ0 A¯(G) in (1.87). Identification results similar to those
discussed in Sections 1.4.3.1 and 1.4.3.4 are true for the model derived from (1.87);
specifically, the restriction β+ γ = 1 does not change the nature of any of the non-
identification results stated in Propositions 1.86 and 1.89.145 Under the assumptions
thatG = H, all players of Γ have at least one out-neighbor inG (that is, I+0 (G) = ∅),
f = idY , and ψ = 0, the structural form of the system of equations (1.87) is given
by
y = γ0C¯(G)y+ 1nφ0 + X2φ0,−1 + C¯(G)X2ψ0,−1 + ϵ, (1.88)
thereby omitting θ0 from the notations ϵ(θ0) = ς0(In + ζ0C¯(H))u and y(θ0). The
system of equations (1.88) has the structure of a spatial autoregressive (SAR) pro-
cess of order one with a row-normalized spatial weights matrix. It is representative
for a family of models discussed in theoretical and applied in empirical work in the
social interactions literature, with the common assumption that for all γ0 ∈ γ(Θ),
143. Sommer and Sulger (2012) also discuss the implication of the parameter restriction β+ γ = 1 for
the system of best reply functions at the NE of their network game and the corresponding statistical
model (see p. 85).
144. The assumption β = 1 does not represent a restriction because the ordinal properties of a utility
function are preserved by monotonic transformations, where a monotonic transformation is a transfor-
mation by a strictly increasing function. The normalization β = 1 corresponds to such a transformation,
with a subsequent relabelling of the players’ preference parameters.
145. For the model derived from (1.87), the analogues of the identifying conditions of Propositions 1.86
and 1.89 involve the subparameter restriction γφ−1 +ψ−1 ̸= 0K−1.
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|γ0| < 1, with varying assumptions on the dependence structure and distribution of
the error term ϵ, and usually supplemented with, for example, component specific,
fixed effects, in which case the constant term 1nφ0 is eliminated from (1.88), in order
to account for the presence of unobservable correlated effects.146 With fixed effects,
which are denoted by ιη, (1.88) reads as follows:147
y = γ0C¯(G)y+ X2φ0,−1 + C¯(G)X2ψ0,−1 + ιη+ ϵ. (1.89)
In the remainder of this section, I briefly discuss theoretical and empirical work
in the social interactions literature that is related to the statistical models of (1.88)
and (1.89). It is important to note that the parameter point θ0 with γ0 = 0 and
ψ0,−1 = 0K−1 (the case where both endogenous and exogenous effects are zero) is
not identified through the mean by these models.
Theoretical work Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) discuss identification
through the mean of social effects, which subsumes both endogenous and exoge-
nous effects, by two statistical models, of which the first (see (1)) is based on (1.88)
and the second (see (9)) is based on (1.89). Their notion of identification is differ-
ent from that used in this paper. They call “social effects . . . identified if and only
if the . . . structural parameters can be uniquely recovered from the unrestricted
reduced-form parameters” (p. 44). What is notably missing from their discussion
is the identification of the reduced-form parameters per se. Lee (2007) consid-
ers identification and estimation in a social interactions model that corresponds
to (1.89), where G consists solely of complete components, with component specific
fixed effects and independent and identically distributed error terms. He discusses
estimation of the model by three estimators: a conditional maximum likelihood es-
timator, a two-stage least squares estimator, and an ordinary least squares estimator
for the case where the orders of the components are large. Lee, Liu, and Lin (2010)
propose a quasi-maximum likelihood (QML for short) approach for the estimation
of a model that is similar to (1.89), but with a row-normalized nonnegative weights
matrix, which has only zeros on its main diagonal, in place of C¯(G), with group
specific fixed effects, andwith a SAR(1) error term, the weights matrix of whichmay
be different from the one in the structural equation.148 They derive the asymptotic
distribution of the QML estimator and provide Monte Carlo evidence on its small
sample properties.
Empirical work Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) complement their theo-
retical findings with a study of peer effects in recreational activities (artistic, sports,
and social activities) using data on secondary schools in the U.S. from the National
146. The matrix In − γ0 A¯(G) is nonsingular if |γ0| < 1.
147. If G consists of two weakly connected components of sizes n1 and n2 := n− n1, then
ι =
(
1n1 0n1
0n2 1n2
)
and η =
(
η1
η2
)
.
148. A group is a complete component.
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Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health for short). Their model
(Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009, see (10)) corresponds to (1.89) with school
specific fixed effects. Patacchini and Zenou (2012) study peer effects in juvenile
delinquency using Add Health data. Their model (see (10)) corresponds to (1.89)
with school specific fixed effects. Boucher et al. (2014) investigate peer effects in
student achievement in four school subjects (French, history, mathematics, and
science) in secondary schools in the Province of Québec (Canada). Their model
(see (4)) corresponds to (1.89) with school specific fixed effects. On account of
missing information on the students’ connections, they assume that the students
of every school constitute a complete component of G. Fortin and Yazbeck (2015)
study peer effects in adolescent weight gain using Add Health data. They pro-
pose a two-equation model, where the first equation (see (2)) agrees with (1.89)
with school specific fixed effects and a SAR(1) error term. Lin (2015) studies peer
influences in four risky behaviors among adolescents (skipping school, cigarette
smoking, alcohol drinking, and physical fighting) using Add Health data. Her
model (see (1)) corresponds to (1.89) with group specific fixed effects and a SAR(1)
error term.
1.5 Concluding remarks
Statistical models of social interactions come in many different flavors as regards
their functional form, their endogenous and exogenous effects matrices, and the
dependence structure and distribution of their error term. This paper offers some
guidance on the specification of such models in terms of economic theory. It pro-
poses a new class of models that are derived from the system of best reply functions
at the Nash equilibrium of a network game, and in consequence, every single aspect
of the models is fully accounted for by economic theory. The models feature an
endogenous effects matrix that is structurally different from the exogenous effects
matrix in the presence of players without out-neighbors, an endogenous effects
parameter that is unbounded above, and a first-order moving average error term
representing unobserved idiosyncrasy. The network game entails testable param-
eter restrictions, in particular, the exogenous effects parameter is proportional to
the individual effects parameter, and the factor of proportionality is equal to the
parameter appearing in themoving average error term. The factor of proportionality
has a clear economic interpretation: its magnitude is a measure of the strength of
the local externalities of the players’ idiosyncrasies. Apart from model specification,
this paper also provides guidance as to the design of policy interventions to increase
welfare or to decrease or increase to a degree aggregate outcomes for phenomena
that are driven by conformism.
An important concern in identifying and measuring the origins and natures of
correlated behavior in social interactions is the endogeneity of the social space, that
is, the digraph(s) by which the individuals are connected. If individuals self-select
into neighborhoods and self-selection is driven by unobservable covariates that
affect behavioral outcomes, then the endogenous and exogenous effects matrices
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may not be strictly exogenous. This endogeneity or selection problem invalidates
statistical inference. A widespread type of self-selection is homophily (Lazarsfeld
and Merton 1954), where individuals tend to bond with other similar individuals.
For this particular type of self-selection, the endogeneity or selection problem may
be mitigated by component specific fixed effects. This is, however, at best, only a
partial solution. Recent research points towards a more comprehensive solution.
As shown by Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) and Hsieh and Lee (2016),
one possible solution to take into account of the endogeneity or selection problem
in a social interactions model is by means of an approach that is similar in nature to
Heckman (1976, 1978, 1979) and the control function approach (for surveys see, for
example, Navarro 2008; Wooldridge 2015). In light of the foregoing, the present
paper constitutes a first step towards measuring endogenous and exogenous effects
in social interactions. The proposed statistical models require adjustments in order
to cope with the perils of self-selection. Such adjustments will most likely leave
the functional form and the structural features of the models unchanged—and it
is these which set the models of this paper apart from existing social interactions
models.

Chapter 2
Conformism under Incomplete Information
Abstract
As a large body of literature in sociology and economics has shown, social inter-
action induces conformism, and—as it has been observed—behaviors deviating
from the social norm tend to be punished. Although conformism has been
studied in a network setting before, this is one of the first papers to examine
conformism under incomplete information, and it is the first to provide and
discuss a comprehensive theoretical framework. Social interaction is modelled
as a Bayesian network game, which is the natural setting for analyzing decisions
whose potential returns or costs are ex ante uncertain (like, for example, in
education and crime). We establish existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium,
characterize the optimal decisions, and examine conditions under which policy
interventions can be welfare-improving.
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2.1 Introduction
Social and professional networks are omnipresent in people’s everyday lives and
directly or indirectly influence their choices and their behavior. The decision of an
individual to pursue college education, consume a product, work hard or shirk,
and even engage in criminal activities, has been shown to be affected by their social
environment.
Games on networks (also referred to as network games) can be used as a tool to
analyze a wide variety of situations where players’ payoffs and, therefore, their be-
havior depend on the actions of their peers.1 According to the standard cost–benefit
analysis, undertaking an action yields some benefit to the actor but at the same time
imposes also a cost on him. This trade-off is captured by the private component of
a player’s utility function. The social component of the utility function determines
how precisely a player’s behavior is affected by the behavior of his peers. Two types
of specifications of the social component stand out in the literature on network
games; they give rise to the so-called class of local-aggregate games (or models) and
the so-called class of local-average games.2 A local-aggregate game is a network
game with local strategic complements, where a player’s marginal benefit from
taking an action increases as his peers increase their actions. It is used to model
situations in which an individual’s return from engaging into an activity depends
on the total prevalence of this activity in his social neighborhood, irrespective of
how this is distributed among the neighbors. A local-average game, on the other
hand, builds on the premise that it is the average rather than the aggregate level of
activity that matters; specifically, it formalizes the idea that, due to social pressure,
individuals who deviate from a social norm (defined as a local average) suffer some
punishment in the form of reputational damage, loss of social status, or even social
exclusion; in short, it is a model of conformist behavior.
The class of local-aggregate models, proposed by Calvó-Armengol and Zenou
(2004) and Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006), has been used to model
peer effects in crime (Ballester, Zenou, and Calvó-Armengol 2010; Lindquist and
Zenou 2014) and in R&D partnerships (König, Liu, and Zenou 2016). The class
of local-average models has received significant empirical attention ever since
Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) discussed identification in such type of
models and proposed an instrumental variables estimator. Empirical applications
of these models cover a wide spectrum of settings where social norms are sus-
pected to play an important role, for example, crime (Lindquist and Zenou 2014;
Liu et al. 2015), education (Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou 2009; De Giorgi,
Pellizzari, and Redaelli 2010; Liu and Lee 2010), and consumption (De Giorgi,
Frederiksen, and Pistaferri 2016).
Despite the fertile and significant literature in this area, there is still a lot of
work that needs to be done in order to gain a deeper understanding of the impact
of peers on individual decisions. First, the majority of empirical studies focus on
1. For a review of the literature on games on networks, see Jackson and Zenou (2015).
2. For an up-to-date review of the theoretical and empirical literature on this area, see Topa and Zenou
(2015).
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the significance and magnitude of peer effects in some setting of interest, assum-
ing the model they use (most commonly the local-average model) is the relevant
one. Although the choice made is rigorously motivated and quite often intuitively
plausible, the use of an alternative model could also be theoretically justifiable in
many cases. In fact, it could be argued that in some settings a hybrid model should
be used. Liu, Patacchini, and Zenou (2014) are the first to test the local-aggregate
and local-average models against each other. They find that, even within the same
network, some choices (for example, study effort) are driven by social norms and,
hence, are better described by the local-average model, while others (for example,
delinquent behavior) are better accounted for by the amount of exposure to peers’
total activity, pointing, thus, towards the local-aggregate model. Second, an im-
portant assumption implicitly underlying the existing literature has been that the
model’s parameters are known, if not by the social planner, at least by the decision
makers. In many of the aforementioned empirical applications this may, however,
be quite a strong assumption. When deciding whether to pursue further education,
high school graduates may not know their financial and non-pecuniary benefits of
college education. Similarly, potential criminals do not know with certainty what
the probability of getting caught is. Uncertainty may apply to the social component
of the utility function as well. Individuals in a society, for example, may not be
fully cognisant of the strength and the enforceability of the social norm, that is,
how tolerant society is towards non-conformist behaviors, and how harsh social
punishment is expected to be.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper to examine social interaction
in the local-average framework with incomplete information is the one by Blume
et al. (2015). Their focus, though, lies more on providing the framework and
the tools that will allow identification and estimation of the local-average model
under incomplete information, rather than studying the theoretical model per se.
Moreover, in their model, incomplete information concerns only the players’ private
benefits. The present paper, in contrast, allows of incomplete information on all
components of the players’ utility functions, in particular, private benefits and
private and social costs. In addition, it studies the implications that the introduction
of uncertainty has for equilibrium behavior. Our work can, therefore, be seen as
complementary to theirs. Understanding the mechanics and the channels through
which peer effects operate in this setting is of primary importance because the
results of the baseline model with complete information do in general not carry
over to the case of incomplete information. The present work aims moreover to
close a gap that exists in the literature as the local-aggregate model has already
been studied in an incomplete information setting by de Martí Beltran and Zenou
(2015). This paper intends, together with the econometric model introduced by
Blume et al. (2015), to give the researcher the necessary tools to study peer effects
in settings where the local-average model has been found to be more relevant.
Wemodel the players’ decision problem as a Bayesian network game. Specifically,
as mentioned above, we allow uncertainty to creep in through any of the three main
parameters of the model: private benefit of an action, private cost, and taste for
conformity, the latter being a parameter that captures the network-induced cost due
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to deviation from the endogenously determined social norm. These parameters are
potentially heterogeneous across players and consist of two components: a global
one, which is common to all players, and an idiosyncratic one, which captures their
individual characteristics. In our model, players receive some signals about the
state of the world and optimally decide their actions. Even though players are
affected directly only by their direct neighbors in the network and need to infer
their actions through the signals received, in equilibrium, they also need to infer
the actions of players in higher order neighborhoods, that is, of players located
more than one link away (higher order beliefs). We establish the existence and
uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, characterize the optimal decisions,
and examine conditions under which policy interventions can be welfare-improving.
We also perform different comparative statics and show, in particular, how social
environment and players’ characteristics affect their actions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces formally
the Bayesian network game outlined above. Section 2.3 studies the complete infor-
mation case, which will serve as a benchmark. Our main results on the incomplete
information case are presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes. A brief review
of basic concepts in graph theory is given in Appendix A. All proofs have been
deferred to Appendix E.
2.2 The Bayesian network game
The Bayesian network game described hereinafter is a static, non-cooperative game
with incomplete information, where the players take their decisions simultaneously
and independently of one another. The players are assumed to be rational in the
sense that they seek to maximize their well-being.
There are n > 1 players. The set of all players is identified with the set I :=
{1, . . . , n}. In what follows, each mathematical object associated with a particular
player will be indexed by an element of I , typically, by i.
Let (Ω,S) be a measurable space with Ω ̸= ∅. The set Ω is called the state
space; it represents all the possible states (of the world) that are relevant to the game.
We assume that the players have a common prior (that is, probability measure) P
on (Ω,S). The probabilistic nature of the game is, therefore, represented by the
probability space (Ω,S,P).
For all i ∈ I , let αi : Ω→ R++, βi : Ω→ R++, and γi : Ω→ R+ be integrable
random variables defined on (Ω,S,P). The triple of functions (αi, βi,γi) is referred
to as player i’s preference parameters (see also the utility function (2.1) below).
For all i ∈ I , let si : Ω→ R3 be a simple random 3-vector defined on (Ω,S,P).3
The function si is called player i’s private signal, whichmay convey some information
about his preference parameters. A player’s signal is said to convey no information
about a preference parameter if the signal and the parameter are stochastically
independent. We assume that the players’ signals have a common support, de-
3. A random variable is called simple if it assumes only a finite number of values. In the present case,
this implies that the range of si , si(Ω) = {si(ω) |ω ∈ Ω}, is a finite set.
2.2 The Bayesian network game 123
noted by Θ, which is also referred to as the players’ common type space. Note that
0 < |Θ| < ∞ because Ω ̸= ∅ and a simple random variable has a finite support.
Hereinafter, we shall writeΘ = {θt | t ∈ {1, . . . , T}}, where T := |Θ| ≥ 1. Player i’s
type is given by an element ϑi of Θ.
Note that, by the very definition of a support, for all (i, r) ∈ I × {1, . . . , T},
P(si = θr) > 0. For ease of exposition, we assume that, for all (i, j) ∈ I2 with i ̸= j
and for all (r, q) ∈ {1, . . . , T}2, P(si = θr, sj = θq) > 0.4
The set of actions available to player i is equal to R+. An action of player i is
denoted by yi. The set of all possible action profiles y := (y1, . . . , yn) is equal to Rn+.
A (pure) strategy of player i is a mapping xi : Θ → R+. A strategy is therefore
a rule that assigns an action to each possible type. The set of all possible (pure)
strategies of player i is denoted by R+Θ. The set of all possible strategy profiles
(x1, . . . , xn) is equal to∏i∈I R+Θ.
As is characteristic for a game, a player’s well-being depends not only on his
action butmay also depend on the actions of other players. This dependence is made
explicit by means of a network by which the players are connected. We assume that
this network is fixed and common knowledge and that it can be represented by a
digraph G on I . The digraph G encodes the information about the identities of all
the players who directly affect a player’s well-being through their actions. For a
particular player, the set of all the players who directly affect his well-being is called
his out-neighborhood. Player i’s out-neighborhood (in G) is denoted by N+G (i) and
its cardinality, the so-called out-degree of i (in G), by deg+G (i). Note that i /∈ N+G (i),
which is a consequence of the definition of a digraph. The assumption of a digraph
implies that a player is not necessarily an out-neighbor of his out-neighbors, that is,
j ∈ N+G (i) does not necessarily imply that i ∈ N+G (j). In short, the dependence of a
player’s well-being on the actions of his out-neighbors is potentially unidirectional.
In many applications, including network games, it is more convenient to repre-
sent a digraph by an adjacency matrix. To this end, let A˙(G) denote the adjacency
matrix of G with respect to the identity mapping on I . The component in row i
and column j of A˙(G) is denoted by a˙i,j(G). If player j is an out-neighbor of player i
(in G), then a˙i,j(G) = 1, and a˙i,j(G) = 0 otherwise. The definition of a digraph
implies that, for all i ∈ I , a˙i,i(G) = 0. We assume that every player has at least one
out-neighbor, as stated by the following assumption.
Assumption G For all i ∈ I , N+G (i) ̸= ∅.
We assume that players’ well-being can be represented by a family of utility
functions {ui : Ω×Rn+ → R}i∈I given by
ui
(
ω, (y1, . . . , yn)
)
:= αi(ω)yi − βi(ω)2 y
2
i −
γi(ω)
2
(
yi −
∑j∈N+G (i) yj
deg+G (i)
)2
, (2.1)
where, as assumed above, αi > 0, βi > 0, and γi ≥ 0.
The common functional form of the players’ utility functions is known to all
players. Incomplete information may, however, arise by the players’ ignorance about
4. This assumption is relevant to the definition of the prediction matrix Γi,j (see Section 2.4).
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the value of some of the preference parameters. A particular preference parameter
can hereby give rise to incomplete information only if it is not a constant function.
Some comments on utility function (2.1) are in order. To this end, let ω be a
state and y := (y1, . . . , yn) an action profile. Player i’s utility function is symmetric
in his out-neighbors’ actions. It exhibits local strategic complements if γi > 0 (that
is, γi is a positive function) because, for all j ∈ I ,
∂2ui(ω, y)
∂yi∂yj
=

γi(ω)
deg+G (i)
if j ∈ N+G (i),
0 if j /∈ N+G (i).
It does, however, not exhibit positive or negative local externalities.5 The utility that
player i ascribes to the action profile y, ui(ω, y), consists of two components: the
private component and the social component. The private component is defined as
αi(ω)yi − (βi(ω)/2)y2i . Since αi > 0 and βi > 0, the point αi(ω)/βi(ω) is defined
and lies in the interior of R+, from which it follows that the private component
function yi ↦→ αi(ω)yi − (βi(ω)/2)y2i is strictly increasing on (0, αi(ω)/βi(ω))
and strictly decreasing on (αi(ω)/βi(ω),+∞), with a global maximum point at
αi(ω)/βi(ω). The private component can in turn be decomposed into two parts:
the private benefit and the private cost. The private benefit is defined as αi(ω)yi and
the private cost as −(βi(ω)/2)y2i . The social component is defined as
−γi(ω)
2
(
yi −
∑j∈N+G (i) yj
deg+G (i)
)2
.
The social component represents player i’s social cost, if any (γi = 0 is possi-
ble), from deviating from a social norm that is given by the arithmetic mean of his
out-neighbors’ actions, (1/deg+G (i))∑j∈N+G (i) yj = (1/deg
+
G (i))∑
n
j=1 a˙i,j(G)yj. The
parameter γi is referred to as the social conformism parameter or the strength of the
social norm; it captures the magnitude of player i’s social cost relative to his private
preference parameters, αi and βi. The distance between player i’s action and his
social norm is referred to as the social distance between player i and his out-neighbors
(see also Akerlof 1997). It is important to note that the players’ social norms are en-
dogenous and potentially heterogeneous (in equilibrium) because the players may
vary in their out-neighborhoods and may choose different actions (in equilibrium).
The following definition is useful in order to give a compact representation of
the players’ utility functions.
Definition A The row-normalized adjacency matrix of G (with respect to the identity
mapping on I) is the square matrix A¯(G) of order n whose component in row i
and column j, denoted by a¯i,j(G), is defined by a¯i,j(G) := a˙i,j(G)/deg+G (i).
5. In accordance with the terminology introduced by Galeotti et al. (2010, pp. 226–27), player i’s
utility function is said to exhibit negative (respectively, positive) local externalities if, for all ω ∈ Ω,
for all (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn+, and for all (y˜1, . . . , y˜n) ∈ Rn+ with y˜i = yi and {y˜j − yj | j ∈ N+G (i)} ⊂ R+,
ui(ω, (y˜1, . . . , y˜n)) ≤ ui(ω, (y1, . . . , yn)) (respectively, ui(ω, (y˜1, . . . , y˜n)) ≥ ui(ω, (y1, . . . , yn))).
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In the remainder of the paper, the component in row i and column j of A¯(G),
a¯i,j(G), is abbreviated to a¯i,j. Using Definition A, player i’s utility function can be
written as
ui
(
ω, (y1, . . . , yn)
)
= αi(ω)yi − βi(ω)2 y
2
i −
γi(ω)
2
(
yi − ∑
j∈I
a¯i,jyj
)2
.
The timing of the Bayesian network game is as follows:
Step 1: Nature moves: A state ω ∈ Ω is realized (but not observed by the players).
Step 2: Players receive information: Each player i observes si(ω), the value of his
private signal si at the state ω, which determines his type ϑi = si(ω) ∈ Θ.
Step 3: Players move: Each player i chooses an action yi = xi(ϑi) ∈ R+ conditional
on his type ϑi.
Step 4: Payoffs are realized: Each player i receives the utility that corresponds to
the realized state (and, hence, the values of the players’ signals and their
types) and the chosen strategy profile, ui(ω, (x1(ϑ1), . . . , xn(ϑn))).
2.3 The case of complete information
This section discusses the case where the players have a complete knowledge of
all the preference parameters. It is assumed, therefore, that the players know with
certainty not only their own preference parameters but also those of all other players.
In some cases, this may not be a bad approximation, since individuals may be aware
of the preferences or characteristics of others or at least of those of their friends.
Even if this assumption may not be very plausible in many settings, it is a case that
is still worthwhile examining. Apart from serving as a benchmark, it also provides
some basic intuition on how the various forces in the model interact to give rise to
an equilibrium, before this is perplexed further by the introduction of uncertainty.
Within the framework introduced in Section 2.2, complete information corre-
sponds to the case |Ω| = 1. It follows that, for all i ∈ I , the preference parameters
αi, βi, and γi are constant, that is, there exists a triple (α¯i, β¯i, γ¯i) ∈ R2++ ×R+ such
that αi(Ω) = {α¯i}, βi(Ω) = {β¯i}, and γi(Ω) = {γ¯i}. It follows also that the play-
ers’ signals are constant and functionally identical, that is, T = 1 and Θ = {θ1}.
Let Γ := (I ,G, (Ω,S,P), {(α¯i, β¯i, γ¯i)}i∈I , {θ1}) denote the Bayesian network game
with complete information, where the players’ constant preference parameters are
common knowledge. Let
α¯ :=
α¯1...
α¯n
 , β¯ :=
β¯1...
β¯n
 , and γ¯ :=
γ¯1...
γ¯n

denote the (column) vectors of the players’ preference parameters. In addition, let
diag(β¯+ γ¯) and diag(γ¯) denote the diagonal matrices of order n with the compo-
nents in row i and column i equal to β¯i+ γ¯i and γ¯i, respectively. Player i’s strategy xi
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is defined by the values it assumes on the type space Θ. Since Θ = {θ1}, xi(θ1) is a
complete description of player i’s strategy. For any strategy profile x := (x1, . . . , xn),
let the (column) vector xθ1 be defined by
xθ1 :=
x1(θ1)...
xn(θ1)
 .
Evidently, xθ1 is a complete description of the strategy profile x.
The following result characterizes the unique and interior (Bayesian) Nash
equilibrium (or (B)NE for short) in Γ.
Proposition 2.1 (BNE in Γ) The network game Γ has a unique and interior (Bayesian)
NE x⋆ := (x⋆1 , . . . , x⋆n), which is given by
x⋆θ1 =
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯. (2.2)
It follows from Proposition 2.1 that the game Γ is strategically equivalent to the
(Bayesian) network game (I ,G, (Ω,S,P), {α¯i/β¯i, 1, γ¯i/β¯i}i∈I , {θ1}).
A player’s equilibrium strategy can also be written as a scalar.
Corollary 2.2 Player i’s strategy in the (Bayesian) NE in Γ is given by
x⋆i (θ1) =
α¯i
β¯i + γ¯i
+
γ¯i
β¯i + γ¯i
eTi A¯(G)
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯,
where ei := (δ1,i, . . . , δn,i) denotes the ith (column) basis vector of the canonical basis
of Rn.6
We now study how equilibrium actions are affected by changes in the players’
preference parameters. We consider two types of changes: individual and global.
In order to facilitate our analysis, we decompose the players’ preference parameters
as follows:
∀i ∈ I α¯i = α¯C + α¯Ii , β¯i = β¯C + β¯Ii , γ¯i = γ¯C + γ¯Ii ,
where α¯C is the global component of α¯i, common to all players, for example, α¯C :=
(1/n)∑nj=1 α¯j, and α¯Ii := α¯i − α¯C is the idiosyncratic component, which may vary
across players. The components β¯C, β¯Ii , γ¯C, and γ¯Ii are defined in a similar way.
The global component of each parameter characterizes some attribute of the
activity in question that does not directly depend on the specific characteristics of an
individual. Consider, for example, the problem of optimal investment in education.
In that case, α¯C can be interpreted as the expected marginal increase in earnings
from an additional year of college attendance, while β¯C captures the additional
(pecuniary or not) cost incurred by the average individual (for example, tuition
fees, average income foregone in the duration of studies). Yet, some students may
6. Note that δk,l denotes Kronecker’s delta of k and l.
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possess skills that enable them to benefit more than the average, while the opposite
may be true for lower-skill students. Costs may vary across agents as well. Students
of higher ability are more likely to receive a scholarship compared to low-ability
students, and their disutility from studying may be lower as well. Alternatively, the
opportunity cost of obtaining a postgraduate degreemay be higher for an individual
who is already employed compared to an individual who is unemployed or has
just finished college. Similarly, γ¯C represents the prevailing strength of the social
norm in society, while some individuals may feel more (γ¯Ii > 0) or less (γ¯Ii < 0)
compelled to adhere to that norm.
Proposition 2.3 (Effects of shifts in idiosyncratic components) Let (i, j) ∈ I2
with i ̸= j.
(2.3.1) Player i’s equilibrium action is strictly increasing in his idiosyncratic private benefit
component (α¯Ii ) and increasing in the idiosyncratic private benefit components of
other players.
(2.3.2) Player i’s equilibrium action is strictly decreasing in his idiosyncratic private cost
component (β¯Ii ) and decreasing in the idiosyncratic private cost components of
other players.
(2.3.3) Player i’s equilibrium action is strictly increasing (respectively, strictly decreas-
ing) in his idiosyncratic strength of social norm (γ¯Ii ) if his equilibrium action is
lower (respectively, higher) than his social norm. Player i’s equilibrium action is
increasing (respectively, decreasing) in player j’s idiosyncratic strength of social
norm (γ¯Ij ) if player j’s equilibrium action is equal to or lower than (respectively,
equal to or higher than) his social norm.
Result 2.3.1 is quite intuitive: if exerting effort becomes more beneficial for
player i, that player will respond by increasing his effort. At a second-order, this
will raise the social norms of player i’s in-neighbors, inducing them to increase their
efforts as well. By the same token, the latter will induce their own in-neighbors
to increase their level of activity, propagating this effect via the network. In many
networks, this effect may end up raising the social norm of player i, leading to a
further increase in his effort. This chain effect will go on dwindling until the new
equilibrium is reached. A similar reasoning, albeit in the opposite direction, applies
to an increase in the idiosyncratic cost component (Result 2.3.2). The intuition
behind Result 2.3.3 is similar, although the mechanics are slightly different. An
increase in the idiosyncratic strength of the social norm of player i causes deviations
from the social norm to be more costly for that player. If player i’s effort is lower
than his social norm, this will cause his effort to increase, giving rise to the chain
process described above. If player i’s effort is higher than his social norm, this effect
will work in the opposite direction.
The following proposition shows how the results of Proposition 2.3 change in
case of shifts in the global components of the preference parameters.
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Proposition 2.4 (Effects of shifts in global components) (2.4.1) All players’ equi-
librium actions are strictly increasing in the global private benefit component (α¯C).
(2.4.2) All players’ equilibrium actions are strictly decreasing in the global private cost
component (β¯C).
(2.4.3) The effect of an increase in the global strength of the social norm (γ¯C) is ex ante
unclear; its sign may vary across players.
Results 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 are quite intuitive, and the consequences of an increase in
a global component are realised in a way similar to the one discussed in the context
of Proposition 2.3. Result 2.4.3, though, presents more interest; in this case, unlike
Results 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, Result 2.3.3 does not carry over to global shifts. The reason is
that an increase in the strength of the social norm will affect players asymmetrically,
and even the aggregate effect may be unclear. At a first-order, players will intensify
their effort if it is relatively low and reduce it if it is relatively high compared to
their social norms. Yet, the higher order effects are indeterminate. Consider, for
example, a player who increases his effort following an increase in the strength of
the social norms. It may well be the case that his out-neighbors reduce their efforts,
reducing thus his social norm. This will offset the first-order increase, changing
again the social norm of that player’s in-neighbors. At the same time, both his in-
and out-neighbors will be affected by other players. The effort of each player in the
new equilibrium will depend of the particular values of the preference parameters
and the structure of the network.
2.4 The case of incomplete information
The previous section studied how a social network influences individuals’ choices
and how changes in the environment, or even in the characteristics of a single player,
can affect the equilibrium outcomes of all individuals. It can, however, be argued
that, in more cases than not, individuals have to make their choices in an uncertain
environment, without knowing ex ante the exact returns or costs of their actions.
This paper admits of three sources of uncertainty: incomplete information about
the benefit deriving from increasing the level of own activity (exerting more effort),
the cost of that additional effort, and the strength of the social norm. Using the
terminology introduced in Section 2.2, there will in general be at least two different
types of players, so that T = |Θ| > 1. In the present section, we use this to model
uncertainty about each of the three aforementioned parameters.
Let Γ(α, β,γ) := (I ,G, (Ω,S,P), {(αi, βi,γi)}i∈I ,Θ) denote the Bayesian net-
work game with incomplete information about the values of the players’ α’s, β’s,
and γ’s. Let
α :=
α1...
αn
 : Ω→ Rn++, β :=
β1...
βn
 : Ω→ Rn++,
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and
γ :=
γ1...
γn
 : Ω→ Rn+
denote the random n-vectors of the players’ α’s, β’s, and γ’s. For all i ∈ I , let
α
µ
i :=
E(αi | si = θ1)...
E(αi | si = θT)
 , βµi :=
E(βi | si = θ1)...
E(βi | si = θT)
 ,
and
γ
µ
i :=
E(γi | si = θ1)...
E(γi | si = θT)
 .
The component in row t of αµi , E(αi | si = θt), is player i’s prediction of αi given
he observes the value θt for his signal si. Note that E(αi | si = θt) is the value that
the conditional expectation E(αi | si) assumes on the event {si = θt}. Note also
that E(αi | si) is the best predictor of αi in terms of mean squared prediction error.
We call E(αi | si = θt) the posterior expectation of player i’s α given {si = θt}. In
addition, let
αµ :=
α
µ
1...
α
µ
n
 , βµ :=
β
µ
1...
β
µ
n
 , and γµ :=
γ
µ
1...
γ
µ
n
 .
For all (i, j) ∈ I2, letΠi,j and Γi,j be the square matrices of orders T with the compo-
nents in row r and column q equal toP(sj = θq | si = θr) andE(γi | si = θr, sj = θq),
respectively; that is, the rth row of Πi,j is essentially the conditional probability
mass function of player j’s signal sj given that player i observes θr for his signal si.
Note that the matrix Πi,j is row-normalized and, in particular, Πi,i = IT . Let Π
and Γ be the square matrices of orders nT defined by
Π :=

Π1,1 . . . Π1,j . . . Π1,n
... ... ...
Πi,1 . . . Πi,j . . . Πi,n
... ... ...
Πn,1 . . . Πn,j . . . Πn,n

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and
Γ :=

Γ1,1 . . . Γ1,j . . . Γ1,n
... ... ...
Γi,1 . . . Γi,j . . . Γi,n
... ... ...
Γn,1 . . . Γn,j . . . Γn,n
 .
A strategy of player i, xi, is defined by the values it assumes on the type space Θ. It
follows that the (column) vector xΘ,i defined by
xΘ,i :=
xi(θ1)...
xi(θT)

is a complete description of player i’s strategy. For any given strategy profile x :=
(x1, . . . , xn), let the (column) vector xΘ be defined by
xΘ :=
xΘ,1...
xΘ,n
 .
It goes without saying that xΘ is a complete description of the strategy profile x.
Note that xΘ is a constant (column) vector with nT components, whereas x is a
random n-vector.
Having laid the requisite notational groundwork, we state the three main results
of this paper: Proposition 2.5 shows that the network game Γ(α, β,γ) has a unique
and interior Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or BNE for short). A characterization of
the BNE strategy profile x⋆ := (x⋆1 , . . . , x⋆n) in terms of the values it assumes on Θn,
that is, in terms of x⋆Θ, is given by the system of equations (2.3). A characterization
of x⋆ in terms of first moments is given in Proposition 2.6. A characterization of
equilibrium welfare in Γ(α, β,γ), denoted by w⋆(Γ(α, β,γ)) and defined as the sum
of the players’ expected equilibrium utilities,
w⋆
(
Γ(α, β,γ)
)
:=
n
∑
i=1
E
(
ui
(
idΩ, (x⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x⋆n ◦ sn)
))
,
is the subject of Proposition 2.7.
Proposition 2.5 The network game Γ(α, β,γ) has a unique and interior BNE x⋆, which
is given by
x⋆Θ =
(
diag
(
βµ + γµ
)− (A¯(G)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π ◦ Γ)−1αµ. (2.3)
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Proposition 2.6 The BNE strategy profile x⋆ in Γ(α, β,γ) satisfies
E
diag(β+ γ)
x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

 = E(α) +E
diag(γ)A¯(G)
x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

.
Proposition 2.7 Equilibrium welfare in Γ(α, β,γ) is given by
w⋆
(
Γ(α, β,γ)
)
=
1
2
n
∑
i=1
E
(
(βi + γi)(x⋆i ◦ si)2
)
− 1
2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
k=1
a¯i,j a¯i,k E
(
γi(x⋆j ◦ sj)(x⋆k ◦ sk)
)
.
In order to discuss the above results, we consider three cases where the players
have only incomplete information about a single type of preference parameter. Sec-
tion 2.4.1 covers the case where the players have incomplete information about their
private benefits, Section 2.4.2 the case of incomplete information about private costs,
and Section 2.4.3 the case of incomplete information about social costs.
2.4.1 Incomplete information about private benefits
We begin with the case where the private benefit of their actions is unknown to the
players. A college student, for example, has to decide on the amount of effort to
put down in studying, without knowing how this will reflect on her performance
in the exams, or even how obtaining a degree will affect her future labour market
outcomes. Similarly, an employee at a firm may be uncertain on whether additional
effort and longer working hours will translate into a higher output and potentially
a higher salary or a promotion.
To formallymodel this, assume that both β andγ are constant, that is, for all i ∈ I ,
there exists a pair (β¯i, γ¯i) ∈ R++ ×R+ such that βi(Ω) = {β¯i} and γi(Ω) = {γ¯i},
and there exists a player k whose marginal private benefit parameter αk is not
constant with probability one. Let Γ(α) := (I ,G, (Ω,S,P), {(αi, β¯i, γ¯i)}i∈I ,Θ)
denote the Bayesian network game with incomplete information about the values of
the players’ α’s only, where the players’ constant preference parameters are common
knowledge. Let β¯, γ¯, diag(β¯+ γ¯), and diag(γ¯) be defined as in Section 2.3.
With the preliminaries in order, we can now proceed to state the main results of
this section. A characterization of the unique and interior BNE strategy profile is
given in Corollary 2.8.
Corollary 2.8 (BNE in Γ(α)) The network game Γ(α) has a unique and interior BNE x⋆,
which is given by
x⋆Θ =
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)⊗ IT −
((
diag(γ¯)A¯(G)
)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π)−1αµ. (2.4)
The system of equations (2.4) is similar in structure to the one derived under
complete information (see Proposition 2.1). There are, however, three important
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differences. The first difference is rather mechanical: Players’ BNE strategies are no
longer constant functions; in general, they assume different values on Θ, the set of
all possible signal values. Player i’s BNE strategy as represented by the vector x⋆Θ,i
will therefore in general not be symmetric.7 This increases the dimension of the
equilibrium by the number T of different signal values (the cardinality of the type
space Θ), and hence the appearance of Kronecker products in (2.4). The second
difference is that the BNE strategies are, unsurprisingly, functions of the players’
predictions of the marginal private benefit parameters in the form of posterior
expectations (αµ). This is rather intuitive since the exact values of the marginal
private benefit parameters depend on the state of the world, which is no longer
known. Note that, based on their private signals, players need to form a posterior
expectation not only of their own marginal private benefit parameters (E(αi | si))
but also of those of other players (E(αj | si)). This remark gives rise to yet another
difference compared to the complete information case. Forming expectations of
other players’ α’s is not enough. Players need to form expectations of their neighbors’
expectations since the strategies of the latter will be based on their expectations.
The same argument goes for the expectations of the expectations of their neighbors,
and so on, ad infinitum. This interdependence is formally introduced in the model
through the matrix Π, which is interacted with the row-normalized adjacency
matrix A¯(G) to channel this effect only through the links stipulated by the network.
In order to see more clearly that a player’s equilibrium action depends on the
entire network structure, we give an explicit representation of his BNE strategy as a
function on Θ (Corollary 2.9).
Corollary 2.9 Player i’s BNE strategy x⋆i in Γ(α) is given by
x⋆i (θr) =
E(αi | si = θr)
β¯i + γ¯i
+
γ¯i
β¯i + γ¯i
ci(θr)T
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)⊗ IT −
((
diag(γ¯)A¯(G)
)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π)−1αµ,
where ci(θr) := (a¯i,1pii,1,r, . . . , a¯i,jpii,j,r, . . . , a¯i,npii,n,r) is a (column) vector with nT com-
ponents and pii,j,r denotes the rth row of Πi,j whose qth component is P(sj = θq | si = θr).
The similarity of the complete information case and the present case of incom-
plete information is also reflected in the system of equations that the first moments
of the players’ BNE strategies satisfy, as it can be seen by a comparison of (2.2)
(Proposition 2.1) and (2.5) (Corollary 2.10).
Corollary 2.10 The BNE strategy profile x⋆ in Γ(α) satisfies
E

x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

 = (diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1E(α). (2.5)
7. A vector a in RT is called symmetric if it is a scalar multiple of 1T .
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To discuss Corollary 2.10, suppose the players’ signals are stochastically indepen-
dent (Assumption S-I). It follows that the players’ BNE strategies are uncorrelated:
for all (j, k) ∈ I2 with j ̸= k, cov(x⋆j ◦ sj, x⋆k ◦ sk) = 0. This result does, however,
not imply that the players’ BNE strategies are unrelated. Indeed, the players are
connected by the network G, which induces a dependence in their BNE strategies.
This dependence is reflected in a functional relation between the first moments of
their strategies, as given by the system of equations (2.5).
Assumption S-I The players’ signals are stochastically independent.
The assumption of stochastically independent signals is also instrumental in
analyzing and discussing equilibrium welfare in Γ(α), of which a characterization
is given in Corollary 2.12, which follows from Proposition 2.7 and Lemma 2.11.
Lemma 2.11 If Assumption S-I is satisfied, then, for all i ∈ I ,
var(x⋆i ◦ si) =
var
(
E(αi | si)
)
(β¯i + γ¯i)2
.
Corollary 2.12 If Assumption S-I is satisfied, then equilibrium welfare in Γ(α) is given by
w⋆
(
Γ(α)
)
=
1
2
n
∑
i=1
var
(
E(αi | si)
)
β¯i + γ¯i
− 1
2
n
∑
i=1
γ¯i
n
∑
j=1
a¯2i,j
var
(
E(αj | sj)
)
(β¯ j + γ¯j)2
+
1
2
n
∑
i=1
(β¯i + γ¯i)E(x⋆i ◦ si)2 −
1
2
n
∑
i=1
γ¯i
( n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j E(x⋆j ◦ sj)
)2
(2.6)
and, for all l ∈ I , ∂w⋆(Γ(α))/∂ var(E(αl | sl)) > 0 if and only if β¯l + γ¯l > ∑ni=1 a¯2i,l γ¯i.
Let us consider two extreme cases. First, suppose player k’s marginal private
benefit parameter αk and his private signal sk are stochastically independent; in
other words, the private signal conveys no information about the private benefit of
own action—it is essentially useless in predicting the value of the marginal private
benefit parameter, which depends on the unknown state of the world. The best
predictor (in terms of mean squared prediction error) of αk is therefore its mean:
E(αk | sk) = E(αk). It follows that var(E(αk | sk)) = var(E(αk)) = 0, which in
turn implies that var(x⋆k ◦ sk) = 0 (Lemma 2.11), that is, player k’s BNE strategy x⋆k
is constant. The reason for this result is clear: since player k’s prediction of αk is
constant across all states of the world, namely, it is equal to E(αk), he will choose
the same action in every state. Second, suppose player k’s marginal private benefit
parameter αk and his private signal sk are almost surely functionally dependent, that
is, αk = f (sk) with probability one for some nonconstant function f : R → R++; in
other words, the value of the marginal private benefit parameter can be observed by
the player. The best predictor of αk is therefore αk itself: E(αk | sk) = E( f (sk) | sk) =
f (sk) = αk. It follows that var(E(αk | sk)) = var(αk) > 0, which in turn implies
that var(x⋆k ◦ sk) > 0 (Lemma 2.11), that is, player k’s BNE strategy x⋆k is not
constant. Intuition suggests that player k will favor the second extreme case over
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the first when confronted with the choice between the two alternatives, that is, to
be informed is better than being uninformed about the true state of the world. This
is indeed true in the present setting if moving from one case to the other leaves
player k’s expectation of αk unchanged: according to Corollaries 2.10 and 2.12, the
difference in player k’s expected equilibrium utility between the second and the
first case is positive and equal to (1/(2(β¯k + γ¯k)) var(αk) if E(αk) remains constant,
in which case also E(xk ◦ sk) remains constant. This difference is in fact maximal
because var(E(αk | sk)) ≤ var(αk).8 The above result does not necessarily hold
true if E(xk ◦ sk) decreases when moving from one extreme case to the other, as
can be seen from (2.6); specifically, the third summand on the right hand side
of (2.6) is strictly increasing in E(xk ◦ sk) because β¯k > 0 and γ¯k ≥ 0. Moreover, as
implied by (2.5), other players’ means of their BNE strategies are likely to change
in response to a change in E(αk). The sign of the overall effect will depend on the
players’ preference parameters and the structure of the network. This applies also
to the case where the players’ signals are stochastically dependent.
Corollary 2.12 has direct implications for the design of welfare-improving pol-
icy measures. In a stylized setting in which the players’ signals are stochastically
independent, a policy measure that increases the accuracy of a single player’s pre-
diction of his marginal private benefit parameter is welfare-improving if the players’
expectations are unaffected by the measure and the sum of the single player’s
private and social cost parameters exceeds a certain threshold, which depends
on his in-neighbors’ social cost parameters. In case of stochastically dependent
signals, a welfare-improving policy measure must not only be tailored to the play-
ers’ preference parameters and the network but also to the nature of the signals’
interdependencies.
2.4.2 Incomplete information about private costs
Adifferent potential source of uncertainty for the individuals lies in the cost entailed
by undertaking some action. One such example is the decision of an individual to
smoke. Smoking is an activity whose intensity is largely affected by social networks,
especially among adolescents (see, for example, Bisin, Moro, and Topa 2011). The
impact of smoking on health is, however, ex ante unknown to the smoker. Similarly,
individuals engaging in a wide range of delinquent or illegal activities, such as
bullying, petty crime (Patacchini and Zenou 2012), hooliganism, or tax evasion, do
not know with certainty the probability of getting caught or the exact punishment
they would face if caught.
In terms of technical analysis, this case is similar to the one with incomplete
information about private benefits (Section 2.4.1). Assume that both α and γ are
constant, that is, for all i ∈ I , there exists a pair (α¯i, γ¯i) ∈ R++ ×R+ such that
αi(Ω) = {α¯i} and γi(Ω) = {γ¯i}. Let Γ(β) := (I ,G, (Ω,S,P), {(α¯i, βi, γ¯i)}i∈I ,Θ)
denote the Bayesian network game with incomplete information about the values of
8. According to the law of total variance, var(αk) = E(var(αk | sk)) + var(E(αk | sk)), which implies
that var(αk) ≥ var(E(αk | sk)).
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the players’ β’s only, where the players’ constant preference parameters are common
knowledge. Let α¯, γ¯, and diag(γ¯) be defined as in Section 2.3.
A characterization of the unique and interior BNE strategy profile in Γ(β) is
given in the following result.
Corollary 2.13 (BNE in Γ(β)) The network game Γ(β) has a unique and interior
BNE x⋆, which is given by
x⋆Θ =
(
diag(βµ + γ¯⊗ 1T)−
((
diag(γ¯)A¯(G)
)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π)−1(α¯⊗ 1T).
The main intuition behind the above formula is similar to the one for Corol-
lary 2.8 presented in Section 2.4.1. Uncertainty in this case, though, concerns the
cost rather than the benefit parameters. A representation of a player’s BNE strategy
as a function on Θ is given below.
Corollary 2.14 Player i’s BNE strategy x⋆i in Γ(β) is given by
x⋆i (θr) =
α¯i
E(βi | si = θr) + γ¯i +
γ¯i
E(βi | si = θr) + γ¯i
× ci(θr)T
(
diag(βµ + γ¯⊗ 1T)−
((
diag(γ¯)A¯(G)
)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π)−1(α¯⊗ 1T),
where ci(θr) is defined as in Corollary 2.9.
A comparison of Corollaries 2.9 and 2.14 shows that player i’s BNE strategies
in Γ(α) and Γ(β) have a common structural form. There is, however, an important
difference. Whereas his strategy is a linear function of the posterior expectations
of his and other players’ α’s in Γ(α), it is a nonlinear function of the posterior
expectations of his and other players’ β’s in Γ(β). This nonlinearity implies that the
welfare results of Section 2.4.1 for the case of stochastically independent signals do
not carry over to the present case. A characterization of equilibrium welfare in Γ(β)
is, nevertheless, given in Corollary 2.15. A welfare-improving policy measure must
be tailored to the players’ preference parameters, the network by which the players
are connected, and the nature of the signals’ interdependencies. The aforementioned
nonlinearity is also reflected in the system of equations obeyed by the first moments
of the players BNE strategies in Γ(β). Note that there does not exist a closed-form
solution of E((x⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x⋆n ◦ sn)), as is evident from Corollary 2.16. By contrast,
E((x⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x⋆n ◦ sn)) = (diag(β¯ + γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1E(α) in Γ(α) (Corol-
lary 2.10).
Corollary 2.15 Equilibrium welfare in Γ(β) is given by
w⋆
(
Γ(β)
)
=
1
2
n
∑
i=1
E
(
βi(x⋆i ◦ si)2
)
+
1
2
n
∑
i=1
γ¯i E
(
(x⋆i ◦ si)2
)
− 1
2
n
∑
i=1
γ¯i
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
k=1
a¯i,j a¯i,k E
(
(x⋆j ◦ sj)(x⋆k ◦ sk)
)
.
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Corollary 2.16 The BNE strategy profile x⋆ in Γ(β) satisfies
E
diag(β)
x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

+ diag(γ¯)(In − A¯(G))E

x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

 = α¯.
2.4.3 Incomplete information about social costs
Finally, we discuss the case where uncertainty stems from ignorance concerning
the social costs of the activity in question. In many cases it may be reasonable to
treat the strength of the social norm as unknown to the individuals. Consider, for
example, a group of freshmen in a college, families moving to a new neighborhood,
or immigrants settling down to a country with different culture. Individuals in
the aforementioned environments most likely understand that behaving very dis-
parately from their peers may entail consequences, ranging from failure to create
a positive image to as far as social marginalization. It may be less clear, however,
how important conformist behavior is regarded in each situation or which aspects
of everyday life it applies to.
Although the formal setup is similar to the cases discussed above, themechanism
through which uncertainty affects individuals’ behavior is slightly different, as it
will be seen. Assume that both α and β are constant, that is, for all i ∈ I , there
exists a pair (α¯i, β¯i) ∈ R++ ×R++ such that αi(Ω) = {α¯i} and βi(Ω) = {β¯i}. Let
Γ(γ) := (I ,G, (Ω,S,P), {(α¯i, β¯i,γi)}i∈I ,Θ) denote the Bayesian network game
with incomplete information about the values of the players’ γ’s only, where the
players’ constant preference parameters are common knowledge. Let α¯ and β¯ be
defined as in Section 2.3.
A characterization of the unique and interior BNE strategy profile in Γ(γ) is
given in the following result.
Corollary 2.17 (BNE in Γ(γ)) The network game Γ(γ) has a unique and interior
BNE x⋆, which is given by
x⋆Θ =
(
diag
(
β¯⊗ 1T + γµ
)− (A¯(G)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π ◦ Γ)−1(α¯⊗ 1T).
As expected, uncertainty in this case has been shifted to the social conformism
parameter γ. The above formula, however, includes an additional term compared
to the cases with incomplete information about the private preference parameters.
The matrix Γ implies that players need to form their expectation about the unknown
parameter based not only on their signal, but also considering every possible signal
of their peers.
Similar to the case of incomplete information about private costs, a player’s BNE
strategy in Γ(γ) is a nonlinear function of the posterior expectations of his and
other players’ γ’s. The implication of this nonlinearity for the design of welfare-
improving policy measures is therefore the same as in Section 2.4.2. For the sake of
completeness, a characterization of the first moments of the players’ BNE strategies
2.5 Concluding remarks 137
in Γ(γ) is given in Corollary 2.18 and a characterization of equilibrium welfare
in Γ(γ) in Corollary 2.19.
Corollary 2.18 The BNE strategy profile x⋆ in Γ(γ) satisfies
diag(β¯)E

x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

+E
diag(γ)(In − A¯(G))
x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

 = α¯.
Corollary 2.19 Equilibrium welfare in Γ(γ) is given by
w⋆
(
Γ(γ)
)
=
1
2
n
∑
i=1
β¯i E
(
(x⋆i ◦ si)2
)
+
1
2
n
∑
i=1
E
(
γi(x⋆i ◦ si)2
)
− 1
2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
k=1
a¯i,j a¯i,k E
(
γi(x⋆j ◦ sj)(x⋆k sk)
)
.
2.5 Concluding remarks
This paper provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for studying the effects
of social conformism when the parameters of the model are unknown to the indi-
viduals. Specifically, uncertainty enters an individual’s decision problem through
three different channels: private benefit of an action, private costs, and costs due
to socially divergent behavior. There is a wide range of potential applications of
our model, including the study of decisions on education, work effort, the practice
of religion, socially delinquent behaviors, and crime. Although the role of social
networks in influencing behavior in these areas has been studied in the recent liter-
ature, it would be interesting to revisit existing results in the light of our findings
since a game with incomplete information appears to constitute a more natural
approach to these kind of decision problems.
We find that an increase in social pressure can have ambiguous effects on the
level of activity in a society, which is in line with findings from the empirical string of
the networks literature (see, for example, Bisin, Moro, and Topa 2011). A reason for
this indeterminacy is that the direction of these effects is contingent on the structure
of the network. Based on our analysis, we conjecture that in networks with strongly
prevalent homophily an increase in the social conformism parameter reinforces
the existing differences in behavior among different groups, while in networks
with milder homophily it may actually dampen them. We believe, moreover, that
the magnitude of these effects is more likely to be larger under higher uncertainty.
Corroborating these conjectures requires further research.

Chapter 3
Local Key Player Analysis
Abstract
This paper introduces formally the concept of a local key player in the context of a
network gamewhere the social planner’s objective is to reduce aggregate activity
of only those players who reside in a certain local area or part of the network.
The players are potentially heterogeneous with respect to the marginal private
benefit from taking an action and the network effects exerted on own behavior
by the actions of connected players, of which the magnitude and sign can vary
across players. Potential areas of applications of local key player analysis include
crime and worker productivity. In the context of crime, where networks of
criminals spread across different police areas, local key player analysis provides
a means to identify and neutralize the key criminal in each police area in order
to reduce criminal activity locally (that is, in each police area) most, thereby
taking the criminals’ cross-area connections into account. In the context of
worker productivity, in a team based organization where co-worker ties are
dense among members of the same team but ties exist also between members
of different teams (that is, the workers of the organization form a universe of
interconnected islands), local key player analysis enables to identify the key
worker of a team who contributes most to overall team productivity, thereby
taking interteam ties and their effects on worker productivity into consideration.
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3.1 Introduction
Identifying key players is an important aspect in network analysis. Key players are
vertices in a network who are considered important in a certain sense. A precise
definition depends on the context and the purpose towhich their identification is put.
The problem of identifying key players arises, for example, in the context of public
health, criminal justice, and marketing. In the public health context, identification
of individuals with higher odds of spreading a disease plays an important role
in targeted immunization schemes to prevent major epidemic outbreaks.1 In the
criminal justice context, one of many possible police strategies to fight crime is
to identify and neutralize (for example, by arresting, exposing, discrediting, or
imposing and enforcing time and location or even residency restrictions) a small
number of offenders in a network to maximally reduce criminal activity. In the
context of marketing, seeding strategies for viral marketing campaigns involve
identifying individuals in a social network, for example, opinion leaders or well-
connected individuals, who ensure rapid diffusion of information about a new
product, technology, or behavior.2
The problem of identifying key players in a social network has a long history
in sociology. Early research has focused on vertex centrality measures to quantify
the importance of individuals in a social network, for example, degree centrality
(Freeman 1978-1979), betweenness centrality (Freeman 1980), closeness centrality
(Bavelas 1950), eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1972a, 1972b), Katz’s (1953) status
index, or Bonacich’s (1987) measure of power and centrality.3,4 The extent to which
a centrality measure is appropriate to quantify an individual’s importance in a social
network depends on the context and the purpose of identification; for example,
individuals in a communication network with high betweenness are considered
important because they can facilitate or inhibit the communication of others, indi-
viduals in a friendship network with high degree are typically considered popular,
and individuals are often considered influential if they are connected to other influ-
ential individuals and, therefore, have a high eigenvector centrality. More recent
1. For a discussion of different population immunization strategies, including targeted immunization,
see, for example, Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (2002) and Madar et al. (2004).
2. For a discussion of viral marketing strategies see, for example, Hinz et al. (2011).
3. For an overview and precise definition of different centrality measures see, for example, Wasserman
and Faust (1994, chapter 5), Koschützki et al. (2005, chapter 3), or Borgatti and Everett (2006). In an
undirected graph, degree centrality is defined as the number of edges incident to a given vertex. The idea
is that centrality increases with the number of neighboring vertices, for example, friends in a friendship
network. In a strongly connected undirected graph, closeness centrality is defined as the reciprocal of
the sum of the distances between a given vertex and all other vertices in the graph. The intuition is that
more central vertices have on average a short distance to other vertices, resulting in a larger centrality. In
a strongly connected undirected graph, betweenness centrality is defined as the sum of the fractions
of the number of shortest paths between any pair of distinct vertices that pass through a given vertex.
The idea is that a vertex’s importance as a junction point increases with the fractions of shortest paths
that pass through it. For a definition of eigenvector centrality, Katz’s (1953) status index, and Bonacich’s
(1987) measure of power and centrality see Section 3.2.2.
4. Although different in nature, all aforementioned centrality measures have in common that they are
based only on information contained in the graph’s edge set and ignore all other aspects that may affect
the importance of an individual.
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research by Borgatti (2003, 2006) has focused on the very problem of identifying key
players. He defines two types of key player problems that are based on measuring
the contribution of a set of vertices to the cohesion or connectedness of a network:
the Key Player Problem/Negative (or KPP-Neg for short) is defined in terms of the
“extent to which the network depends on its key players tomaintain its cohesiveness”
(Borgatti 2006, p. 22), and the Key Player Problem/Positive (or KPP-Pos for short) is
defined in terms of the “extent to which key players are connected to and embedded
in the network around them” (p. 22); specifically, a set of k vertices is a solution
of KPP-Neg if they cause a maximal reduction in the network’s cohesiveness once
removed from the network, and it is a solution of KPP-Pos if they are maximally
connected to all other vertices. Two examples of KPP-Neg are given in the opening
paragraph in the context of public health and criminal justice; the example given
in the context of marketing is a KPP-Pos. The KPP-Neg is defined relative to a
graph property, that is, a function that assigns values to graphs such that they are
preserved under graph isomorphisms. The difference between the value of a graph
property on the graph with and without the set of k vertices is called vitality index
(Koschützki et al. 2005, Defintion 3.6.1) and is a measure of the importance of the
k vertices in the graph. The mapping that assigns to every set of k vertices a vitality
index is called vitality measure (section 3.6). Every graph property yields therefore
a vitality measure, which can be regarded as a new meaningful centrality measure.
The economics approach to identifying key players (see Zenou 2016 for a compre-
hensive survey) is different from the sociological approach in at least one important
respect, namely, the microeconomic foundation of the graph property relative to
which a key player problem is defined, which gives rise to an economically mean-
ingful vitality or centrality measure. Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006)
pioneered the identification of key players in the context of network games, that
is, strategic games on networks. They introduce a static, noncooperative network
game with complete information and interplayer dependent payoff functions that
are linear-quadratic in nature, exhibit local complementarity effects, and have a
global, uniform (in players) substitutability component. The beauty of their the-
ory lies in an appealing characterization of the game’s unique and interior Nash
equilibrium (for the existence of which they give sufficient conditions); it is related
to a variant of Bonacich’s (1987) measure of power and centrality. Apart from
comparative statics, they discuss a policy that consists of targeting the key player
defined as the player who, once removed from the game and thereby removed from
the network, leads to a maximal decrease in aggregate equilibrium action, provided
that action has a negative connotation (like, for example, crime). They give an
explicit characterization of the key player in terms of a vitality measure, which they
call intercentrality measure; specifically, the player with the highest intercentrality
is the key player.5 Subsequent research has extended Ballester, Calvó-Armengol,
and Zenou’s (2006) network game and key player analysis to allow for contextual
effects (Ballester and Zenou 2014), incomplete information (de Martí Beltran and
5. For a definition of the intercentrality measure see Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006,
Definition 2).
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Zenou 2015), and network formation (Liu et al. 2015). Empirical studies of key
player based policies have been conducted in a variety of contexts including crim-
inal networks (Lindquist and Zenou 2014; Liu et al. 2015), co-worker networks
(Lindquist, Sauermann, and Zenou 2016), education (Hahn et al. 2015), networks
of R&D collaborations (König, Liu, and Zenou 2016), financial networks (Denbee
et al. 2016), and diffusion of microfinance loan programs (Banerjee et al. 2013). It is
fair to say that existing empirical evidence is in favor of key player based policies
when compared to other reasonable policies; for example, in the context of criminal
networks, key player based policing policies have proved superior to other policing
policies, such as targeting the most active or prolific criminal, in reducing criminal
activity (Lindquist and Zenou 2014). The reason for this is that key player based
policies take explicitly into account the social multiplier (Glaeser, Scheinkman,
and Sacerdote 2003) emanating from the social network and the interdependent
behavior of its members.
An important feature of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou’s (2006) key
player analysis and of its variants mentioned above is that the smallest (in terms
of set inclusion) part of a network for which a key player can be identified is
a weakly connected component. This paper aims at overcoming this limitation
by introducing formally the concept of the local key player; more specifically, it
discusses identification of local key players in the context of a static, noncooperative
network game with complete information where the players are connected by a
digraph. The players are potentially heterogeneous with respect to their marginal
private benefits from own action and with respect to network effects exerted on own
behavior by the actions taken by connected players; specifically, a player’s utility
or payoff function exhibits either local strategic complements or substitutes. The
notion of a key player is defined relative to a social planner’s objective function.
The focus in this paper is on weighted aggregate equilibrium action defined as a
weighted sum of the players’ actions at the unique Nash equilibrium of the network
game. The qualifier weighted refers thereby to the nonnegative weights the planner
assigns to the players of the game. The profile of weights reflects the importance
the planner attaches to a particular subset of players. A profile of weights where
all components are positive gives rise to a global key player because every player
is accounted for when computing the value of the objective function. A profile
of weights for which only the components corresponding to players residing in a
certain subdigraph are positive gives rise to a local key player, thereby taking into
account that the players in the subdigraph are affected by the actions of neighboring
players not residing in the same subdigraph.
Potential areas of applications of local key player analysis include crime and
worker productivity. As regards crime, sovereign states and other political entities
usually organize their jurisdictions into geographical districts to provide law en-
forcement. For example, there are over forty police areas in England and Wales for
each of which a territorial police force is responsible for policing; there are twenty-
six cantonal police agencies in the Swiss Confederation, which are responsible for
law enforcement in their jurisdictions; the city of Los Angeles is subdivided into
eighteen policing districts, called law enforcement reporting districts. Given that
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networks of criminals spread across different jurisdictions, police areas, or other
geographical areas of political importance or interest, local key player analysis pro-
vides a means to identify and neutralize the key criminal in each area in order to
reduce criminal activity locally (that is, in each geographical area) most, thereby
taking the criminals’ cross-area connections into account. An example of a network
that spreads across different geographical areas, namely, neighborhoods, is the
youth co-offending network analyzed by Schaefer (2012). His analysis draws upon
a random sample of 10,629 youth who were arrested in Maricopa County, Arizona,
in 2000. Neighborhoods are identified with census tracts, which are small geograph-
ical areas with population sizes ranging from 1,500 to 8,000.6 The home address at
the time of arrest was used to assign each youth to one of the census tracts in Mari-
copa County. He finds that cross-tract offending is the norm among youth in the
sample: 72 per cent of the 3,058 co-offending relationships between youth involved
co-offenders residing in different census tracts. As regards worker productivity,
in a team based organization where co-worker ties are dense among members of
the same team but ties exist also between members of different teams (that is, the
workers of the organization form a universe of interconnected islands), local key
player analysis enables to identify the key worker of a team who contributes most to
overall team productivity, thereby taking interteam ties and their effects on worker
productivity into consideration. An example of a co-worker network that has the
structure of a universe of interconnected islands is the network of TV production
teams analyzed by Zaheer and Soda (2009). More specifically, they analyze data on
a co-membership network among 501 production teams in the Italian TV production
industry tracked over a period of 12 years. They find that production teams are
interconnected by virtue of co-memberships of industry specialists in production
teams.7
The Nash equilibrium of the network game discussed in the present paper is
given by a variant or, more precisely, generalization of Katz’s (1953) status index
and Bonacich’s (1987) measure of power and centrality, similar to the network game
of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006); it is for this reason called the
generalized Katz-Bonacich (or GKB for short) centrality measure. Similar to its cognate
measures, the GKB measure is a self-referential centrality measure where a vertex’s
centrality is related to the centralities of neighboring vertices, which in turn are
related to the centralities of their vertices, and so on, possibly ad infinitum. The
generalization concerns two points. First, the GKBmeasure is not only based on net-
work encoded information but accounts also for exogenously given, vertex-specific
information, referred to as vertex idiosyncrasy.8 Second, the relation between a
vertex’s centrality and the centralities of its neighbors is potentially heterogeneous
across vertices, in terms of both sign and magnitude (or intensity). Bonacich (1987)
6. Schaefer (2012, p. 143) points out that census tracts do not necessarily correspond to conventional
definitions of neighborhoods; they have, however, been used frequently to study the ecological settings
of crime and delinquency.
7. See, in particular, Zaheer and Soda (2009, Figure 1).
8. The notion of vertex idiosyncrasy is similar in nature toHubbell’s (1965) exogenous inputs or boundary
conditions that enter the definition of his status score for clique identification.
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was the first to propose a centrality measure that admits of a negative relation
between a vertex’s centrality and the centralities of its neighbors, where the sign and
magnitude of the relation is homogeneous across vertices.9 Despite the prevalence
of Bonacich’s (1987) measure of power and centrality in sociological and economic
research, conditions that ensure its nonnegativity or positivity—either of them a
property that a meaningful centrality measure should exhibit—in case of a neg-
ative relation between a vertex’s centrality and the centralities of its neighboring
vertices have not been discussed in the literature yet. One aim of this paper is to
close this gap, in particular, to state such conditions for the GKB measure, of which
the centrality measure of Bonacich (1987) is a special case. In addition, little is
known about the properties of Bonacich’s (1987) centrality measure. Another aim
is, therefore, to provide and discuss comparative statics results for the GKBmeasure.
The definition of the GKB measure, the discussion of sufficient conditions for its
nonnegativity or positivity, and an exposition of related comparative statics results
are the subject of a self-contained section (Section 3.2) because these results are of
interest outside the context of (local) key player analysis. Almost all results are,
though, relevant for the local key player analysis (Section 3.3), which constitutes
the main contribution of this paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the central-
ity measure and provides a discussion of its properties, including conditions for
nonnegativity and the main results on comparative statics. Section 3.3 introduces
the network game in the context of which the concept of a local key player is defined.
Section 3.4 concludes. A brief review of basic concepts in graph theory is given in
Appendix A. Some basic results in matrix analysis are collected in Appendix B. The
proofs of all main results can be found in Appendix F.
3.2 Centrality with vertex idiosyncrasy
This section is organized in the following way. After laying some notational ground-
work, Section 3.2.1 introduces the generalized Katz-Bonacich centrality measure. It is a
centrality measure with vertex idiosyncrasy because it accounts for exogenously
given information not encoded in the network on which it is defined. Section 3.2.2
gives a brief overview of related centrality measures. Section 3.2.3 discusses suf-
ficient conditions for the nonnegativity and positivity of the centrality measure.
Section 3.2.4 studies comparative statics results. Section 3.2.5 introduces measures
of the degree of idiosyncrasy of the centrality measure.
3.2.1 Definition
Let D be a nonempty digraph of order at least two, and let I(|V(D)|) denote the set
of all integers that are at least one and not larger than the order of D, |V(D)|, that is,
9. Bonacich (1987) argues that a negative relation is, for example, appropriate in bargaining situations
where “it is advantageous to be connected to those who have few options; power comes from being
connected to those who are powerless. Being connected to powerful others who have many potential
trading partners reduces one’s bargaining power.” (p. 1171).
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I(|V(D)|) := {1, . . . , |V(D)|}. Let h : V(D)→ I(|V(D)|) be a bijection, that is, h is
an enumeration of the vertices of D. The vertex set V(D) can be identified with the
set I(|V(D)|) by means of h, the elements of which shall also be called vertices. The
adjacency matrix of D with respect to h is denoted by A˙h(D) and the component
in row i and column j of A˙h(D) by a˙h,i,j(D). Note that A˙h(D) is different from the
zero matrixO|V(D)| because D is not empty.
Every vertex inD (and via h the corresponding vertex in I(|V(D)|)) is equipped
with two characteristics that are represented by real numbers: a vertex idiosyn-
crasy and a localness parameter. Specifically, let α and λ denote two mappings
that assign to every digraph E (of any order) the functions α(E) : V(E) → R
and λ(E) : V(E) → R. The two mappings α and λ satisfy the following consis-
tency condition: if E and F are two digraphs that are isomorphic by means of
the digraph isomorphism f : V(E) → V(F), then α(E) = α(F) ◦ f and λ(E) =
λ(F) ◦ f . The functions α(D) : V(D) → R and λ(D) : V(D) → R assign to every
vertex v ∈ V(D) a vertex idiosyncrasy α(D)(v) and a localness parameter λ(D)(v). For
all i ∈ I(|V(D)|), let αh,i(D) denote the image of vertex i under the composition
α(D) ◦ h−1 : I(|V(D)|) → R, that is, αh,i(D) is the idiosyncrasy of vertex i. The
(column) vector αh(D) := (αh,1(D), . . . , αh,|V(D)|(D)) ∈ R|V(D)| is referred to as the
profile of vertex idiosyncrasies (of Dwith respect to h). The profile of localness parameters
(of D with respect to h), λh(D) := (λh,1(D), . . . ,λh,|V(D)|(D)) ∈ R|V(D)|, is defined
similarly.
Example 3.1 Let α¯ ∈ R++. Suppose α satisfies, for all digraphs E, for all v ∈ V(E),
α(E)(v) = α¯. It follows that αh(D) = α¯1|V(D)|. 
Example 3.2 Suppose α satisfies, for all digraphs E, for all v ∈ V(E), α(E)(v) =
deg+E (v). It follows that αh(D) = A˙h(D)1|V(D)| ≥c 0|V(D)|. If all vertices of D have
at least one out-neighbor, then αh(D) >c 0|V(D)|. If D is d-regular, that is, every
vertex in D has in-degree d and out-degree d, then αh(D) = d1|V(D)|. 
Example 3.3 Suppose α satisfies, for all digraphs E, for all v ∈ V(E), α(E)(v) =
deg−E (v). It follows that αh(D) = A˙h(D)T1|V(D)| ≥c 0|V(D)|. If all vertices of D have
at least one in-neighbor, then αh(D) >c 0|V(D)|. 
Example 3.4 considers the case where the vertices are endowed with K charac-
teristics, each represented by a real number, and a vertex’s idiosyncrasy is defined
as the exponential of a linear combination of these characteristics.
Example 3.4 Let K be a positive integer, β := (β1, . . . , βK) a (column) vector in RK,
and χ a mapping that assigns to every digraph E a function χ(E) : V(E)→ RK. The
function χ(D) : V(D) → RK assigns to every vertex v ∈ V(D) a (column) vector
χ(D)(v) of K characteristics. For all i ∈ I(|V(D)|), let χh,i(D) denote the image of
vertex i under the composition χ(D) ◦ h−1 : I(|V(D)|)→ RK. Suppose α satisfies,
for all digraphs E, for all v ∈ V(E), α(E)(v) = exp(〈χ(E)(v), β〉). It follows that
αh(D) = (exp(〈χh,1(D), β〉), . . . , exp(〈χh,|V(D)|(D), β〉)) >c 0|V(D)|. 
Example 3.5 Let λ¯ ∈ R. Suppose λ satisfies, for all digraphs E, for all v ∈ V(E),
λ(E)(v) = λ¯. It follows that λh(D) = λ¯1|V(D)|. 
146 3 Local Key Player Analysis
Example 3.6 Suppose λ satisfies, for all digraphs E, for all v ∈ V(E),
λ(E)(v) =

0 if deg+E (v) = 0,
φ(E)(v)
deg+E (v)
if deg+E (v) > 0,
where φ is a mapping that assigns to every digraph E a function φ(E) : V(E)→ R.
Suppose φ(D) is positive. It follows that λh(D) ≥c 0|V(D)|. If all vertices of D have
at least one out-neighbor, then λh(D) >c 0|V(D)|. 
Example 3.7 Let L be a positive integer, γ := (γ1, . . . ,γL) a (column) vector in RL,
andψ amapping that assigns to every digraph E a functionψ(E) : V(E)→ RL. The
function ψ(D) : V(D) → RL assigns to every vertex v ∈ V(D) a (column) vector
ψ(D)(v) of L characteristics. For all i ∈ I(|V(D)|), let ψh,i(D) denote the image of
vertex i under the composition ψ(D) ◦ h−1 : I(|V(D)|) → RL. Let Ψh(D) denote
the |V(D)| × Lmatrix whose ith row is equal to ψh,i(D)T. Suppose λ satisfies, for
all digraphs E, for all v ∈ V(E), λ(E)(v) = 〈ψ(E)(v),γ〉. It follows that λh(D) =
Ψh(D)γ. 
Based on the foregoing definitions, I introduce the following (point or vertex)
centrality.
Definition C A generalized Katz-Bonacich (GKB) centrality (measure) in D with
respect to h with profile of vertex idiosyncrasies αh(D) and profile of localness
parameters λh(D) is any (column) vector b := (b1, . . . , b|V(D)|) ∈ R|V(D)| such that
∀i ∈ I(|V(D)|) bi = αh,i(D) + λh,i(D)
|V(D)|
∑
j=1,j ̸=i
a˙h,i,j(D) bj . (3.1)
Note that (3.1) is equivalent to(
I|V(D)| − diag
(
λh(D)
)
A˙h(D)
)
b = αh(D) (3.2)
because all main diagonal elements of A˙h(D) vanish (D has no self-loops), where
diag(λh(D)) denotes the diagonal matrix of order |V(D)| with component in row i
and column i equal to the ith component of λh(D).
In order to advance the reader’s understanding of the idea underlying Defin-
ition C, conceive of the vertices in I(|V(D)|) as agents in an economy or as players
participating in a particular game, where the agents or players are connected by
a (social) network represented by the adjacency matrix of D with respect to h, in
particular, there exists a directed (social) connection from player i to player j if and
only if a˙h,i,j(D) = 1. Within this interpretational framework, Definition C embodies
the idea that every player’s centrality is composed of two parts: an idiosyncratic part
and a part that takes a player’s position within the network into account. Consider
player i ∈ I(|V(D)|). If she has no out-neighbors (in D), that is, N+D (h−1(i)) = ∅
or, equivalently, {j ∈ I(|V(D)|) | a˙h,i,j(D) = 1} = ∅, then her centrality is equal to
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the idiosyncratic part: bi = αh,i(D). If she has at least one out-neighbor, then her
centrality is affected by those of her out-neighbors, where the direction and extent
of the effect depend on the sign and magnitude of λh,i(D), respectively. In case
λh,i(D) = 0, there is no effect, that is, bi = αh,i(D). In case λh,i(D) > 0 (respectively,
λh,i(D) < 0), her centrality depends positively (respectively, negatively) on the
centralities of her out-neighbors, provided that, for all j ∈ I(|V(D)|), bj ≥ 0. The
magnitude of λh,i(D) reflects therefore the degree to which bi is a local or global
(in the sense that the network position is taken into account) measure of centrality
(similar to Bonacich’s (1987) measure of centrality).
Within the foregoing interpretational framework, if connections among agents
have a positive connotation, which is, for example, the case with friendship relation-
ships, agents with a high out-degree are often considered influential and agents
with a high in-degree are said to be prominent or to have high prestige. Example 3.2
is therefore relevant when centrality is associated with influence, and Example 3.3
is of interest when centrality refers to some kind of status.
A GKB centrality in D with respect to h need neither exist nor be unique. The
following result gives sufficient conditions that ensure both existence and unique-
ness.
Proposition 3.8 There exists a unique GKB centrality in D with respect to h with profile
of vertex idiosyncrasies αh(D) and profile of localness parameters λh(D), denoted by
bh
(
αh(D),λh(D),D
)
:=
(
bh,1
(
αh(D),λh(D),D
)
, . . . , bh,|V(D)|
(
αh(D),λh(D),D
))
,
if any of the following conditions is satisfied: (3.8.1) 1 /∈ σ(diag(λh(D))A˙h(D)) or
(3.8.2) ρ(diag(λh(D))A˙h(D)) < 1.10 If Condition 3.8.1 or Condition 3.8.2 are satisfied,
then
bh
(
αh(D),λh(D),D
)
=
(
I|V(D)| − diag
(
λh(D)
)
A˙h(D)
)−1
αh(D).
As regards the notation bh(αh(D),λh(D),D), the third argument of bh, D, and
the subscript h of bh refer to the adjacencymatrix ofDwith respect to h, A˙h(D). Note
that Condition 3.8.2 is stronger than Condition 3.8.1. If Condition 3.8.2 is satisfied
and λh(D) ̸= 0|V(D)|, then bh(αh(D),λh(D),D) has a series representation, namely,
∞
∑
k=0
(
diag
(
λh(D)
)
A˙h(D)
)k
αh(D), (3.3)
which will prove useful in discussing conditions for its nonnegativity or positivity.11
It is worth pointing out that the series (3.3) may converge even if Condition 3.8.2 is
not satisfied, that is, ρ(diag(λh(D))A˙h(D)) ≥ 1. By contrast, the Neumann series
∑∞k=0(diag(λh(D))A˙h(D))
k converges (strongly) if and only if Condition 3.8.2 is
satisfied (Lemma B.2). A necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of
the series (3.3) is given in Lemma 3.9. If the series (3.3) converges, then its limit is
a (not necessarily unique) solution to the system of equations (3.2).
10. Note that σ(diag(λh(D))A˙h(D)) and ρ(diag(λh(D))A˙h(D)) denote the spectrum and the spectral
radius of diag(λh(D))A˙h(D), respectively.
11. The expressions 00 and, for all k ∈ Z++,O0k , are left undefined.
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R R
D = (V(D),A(D)) E = (V(E),A(E))
I(|V(D)|) I(|V(D)|)
idR
α(D) or λ(D)
f
h
α(E) or λ(E)
k
pi
Figure 3.1. Commutative diagram (Proposition 3.11)
Lemma 3.9 (Suzuki 1976) Suppose λh(D) ̸= 0|V(D)|. The series (3.3) converges (re-
spectively, converges strongly) if and only if (diag(λh(D))A˙h(D))kαh(D) converges (re-
spectively, converges strongly) to 0|V(D)| as k→ ∞.
I conclude this section by making two important observations. First, the GKB
centrality is invariant under different enumerations of V(D), that is, it is invariant
under different choices for h. A formal statement is given in Proposition 3.10. Second,
the GKB centralities in two isomorphic digraphs are equal up to permutation. The
corresponding result is stated in Proposition 3.11 and the underlying structure is
illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Proposition 3.10 Suppose Condition 3.8.1 is satisfied. Let k : V(D) → I(|V(D)|) be
a bijection. The GKB centrality in D with respect to h with profile of vertex idiosyn-
crasies αh(D) and profile of localness parameters λh(D) and the GKB centrality in D with
respect to k with profile of vertex idiosyncrasies αk(D) and profile of localness parame-
ters λk(D) are equal up to permutation; specifically, there exists a unique permutation pi of
I(|V(D)|) such that αk(D) = Ppiαh(D), λk(D) = Ppiλh(D), A˙k(D) = Ppi A˙h(D)P−1pi ,
and bk(αk(D),λk(D),D) = Ppibh(αh(D),λh(D),D), where Ppi is the permutation ma-
trix of pi.
Proposition 3.11 Suppose Condition 3.8.1 is satisfied. Let E be a nonempty digraph of
order |V(D)| that is isomorphic to D by means of the digraph isomorphism f : V(D) →
V(E). Let k : V(E)→ I(|V(D)|) be a bijection. There exists a unique permutation pi of
I(|V(D)|) such that αk(E) = Ppiαh(D), λk(E) = Ppiλh(D), A˙k(E) = Ppi A˙h(D)P−1pi ,
and bk(αk(E),λk(E), E) = Ppibh(αh(D),λh(D),D), where Ppi is the permutation matrix
of pi.
Propositions 3.10 and 3.11 imply that the GKB centrality is well-defined. They
also imply that one may assume without loss of generality that V(D) = I(|V(D)|)
and h is the identity mapping on I(|V(D)|), which will be done for the rest of the
paper. As regards notation, the order of D will be denoted by n, that is n := |V(D)|,
and the subscript h will be dropped from λh(D), αh(D), A˙h(D), and bh and their
components. The (column) vector b(α(D),λ(D),D) is referred to as the GKB
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centrality (measure) in D with profile of vertex idiosyncrasies α(D) and profile
of localness parameters λ(D), provided that it exists and it is unique. Often D is
omitted from the notations α(D) and λ(D), and they are simply written as α and λ.
In addition, for the rest of the paper, with one exception, the vertex set of a digraph E
of order k is identified with the set I(k) = {1, . . . , k}, that is, V(E) = I(k).12
3.2.2 Related centrality measures
TheGKB centrality (Definition C) is related to various centralitymeasures discussed
in sociology and economics.
Katz’s (1953) status index (in D) is a scalar multiple of b(λ¯A˙(DT)1n, λ¯1n,DT) =
λ¯(In − λ¯A˙(D)T)−1 A˙(D)T1n, where λ¯ is a scalar (probability) in the interval (0, 1]
such that ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1.13 Note the dependence of the profile of vertex idiosyn-
crasies λ¯A˙(DT)1n and the profile of localness parameters λ¯1n on λ¯.
Bonacich’s (1987) measure of centrality corresponds to b(α¯A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D),
where λ¯ ∈ R is such that ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1.14 It is important to note that λ¯ can be of
any sign. Bonacich (1987) does not make an assumption about the sign of α¯. In
his analysis, α¯ is chosen such that ‖b(α¯A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D)‖22 = n (p. 1173), that is,
|α¯| = √n/‖b(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D)‖2, thereby assuming that b(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) ̸= 0n.
The vertex idiosyncrasies implied by Katz’s (1953) and Bonacich’s (1987) mea-
sures are closely linked to the adjacency matrix A˙(D). Definition C is less restrictive
in this respect. In the absence of information on the vertices’ idiosyncracies beyond
that contained in D, A˙(D)1n or A˙(D)T1n are natural choices for α.
Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) introduce the weighted Bonacich
centrality measure (Remark 1) to characterize the interior Nash equilibrium of their
network game; it corresponds to b(α, λ¯1n,D), where α >c 0n and λ¯ > 0 is such that
λ¯ρ(A˙(D)) < 1.15
TheGKB centrality accommodates eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1972a, 1972b).
Indeed, if α = 0n and λ = λ¯1n for some λ¯ ∈ R \ {0}, then (3.2) reduces to
A˙(D) b =
1
λ¯
b . (3.4)
Apart from 0n, any eigenvector of A˙(D) corresponding to 1/λ¯ solves (3.4). If
1/λ¯ = ρ(A˙(D)), then any eigenvector of A˙(D) corresponding to ρ(A˙(D)) is a
12. This exception applies to the digraph D ⊖ x that emerges from D by removing vertex x (see
Section 3.2.4.2); specifically, the vertex set of D⊖ x is not identified with I(n− 1) but equal to I(n) \ {x}.
13. Katz (1953) does not assume explicitly that λ¯ is such that ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1. He implicitly assumes
that the series ∑∞k=1 λ¯k A˙(D)k converges with limit (In − λ¯A˙(D))−1 − In, which is true if and only if
ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1 (Lemma B.2).
14. Bonacich (1987) does not explicitly assume that λ¯ is such that ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1. He assumes that λ¯ is
such that its absolute value is less than the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of A˙(D) (p. 1178), thereby
implicitly assuming that it is different from zero. His analysis is, however, not explicitly restricted to
cases where D is such that all eigenvalues of A˙(D) are real (which is, for example, the case when D is
symmetric) and the concept of a largest eigenvalue is defined. The largest eigenvalue of A˙(D) should
therefore be interpreted as the spectral radius of A˙(D). In this regard, note that A˙(D) has a nonnegative
real eigenvalue that is equal to its spectral radius (Lemma B.5).
15. In contrast to Definition C, the weighted Bonacich centrality measure is defined by b(α, λ¯1n,D) :=
(In − λ¯A˙(D))−1α.
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nonnegative eigenvector centrality (Lemma B.5), which is positive if D is strongly
connected.16
An example of a centrality measure that cannot be represented as a GKB cen-
trality is The PageRank (Page et al. 1999), which measures the importance of website
pages. In order to define this measure (see Langville and Meyer 2006, chapter 4,
for details), let c be a scalar in the interval (0, 1), I+0 (D) denote the set of all ver-
tices in D with zero out-degree, D¯ denote the directed pseudograph17 with vertex
set I(n) and arc set A(D) ∪⋃i∈I+0 (D){(i, j) | j ∈ I(n)}, and G(D) be the nonnega-
tive, row-normalized, irreducible, and aperiodic matrix of order n defined by
G(D) := cdiag
(
A˙(D¯)1n
)−1 A˙(D¯) + (1− c) 1
n
1n1Tn.
The PageRank (in D) is the unique positive solution pi to the linear homogeneous
system of equations (In −G(D)T)pi = 0n with 〈1n,pi〉 = 1.
An example of a quantity not related to centrality but with a functional form
similar to the GKB centrality is the knowledge index of Calvó-Armengol and de Martí
Beltran (2009, Definition 1):
k(r,Σ) := (1− r)
(
In − rn− 1 Ω(Σ)
)−1
1n,
where r is a scalar in the interval [0, 1), Σ is a covariance matrix of order n with,
for all (i, j) ∈ I(n)2 with i ̸= j, [Σ]i,j ≤ [Σ]i,i, and Ω(Σ) is a square matrix of
order n that depends on Σ and has a zero main diagonal and components off the
main diagonal lying in the interval [0, 1] (which together imply that ρ(Ω(Σ)) ≤
‖Ω(Σ)‖∞ ≤ n− 1).
3.2.3 Conditions for nonnegativity and positivity
There have been a few attempts in the literature to distill axioms for centrality. In
his fundamental paper, Sabidussi (1966, section 4) proposes a set of axioms to be
satisfied by a centrality index of an undirected graph. The index is defined relative to
a given point or vertex centrality (function) that assigns a vector of nonnegative real
numbers to any undirected graph. Other contributions to an axiomatic foundation
of vertex centrality include Harary, Norman, and Cartwright (1966), Nieminen
(1973), and Nieminen (1974). Nieminen (1973, section 2.1) requires the centrality
of a vertex to be a nonnegative integer, thereby referring to a status measure that has
been axiomatized in Harary, Norman, and Cartwright (1966, p. 189). Nieminen
(1974, p. 332) assumes that vertex centrality is a nonnegative real number.18
16. The digraph D is strongly connected if and only if A˙(D) is irreducible (see, for example, Berman
and Plemmons 1994, Theorem 2.7 on p. 30), in which case ρ(A˙(D)) is a simple eigenvalue of A˙(D) to
which there corresponds a positive eigenvector (Perron 1907; Frobenius 1912).
17. A directed pseudograph is a graph for which multiple arcs or self-loops are admissible (see, for
example, Bang-Jensen and Gutin 2009, Section 1.2).
18. More recent contributions on axiomatic foundations of certain classes of centrality measures include
Dequiedt and Zenou (2015) and Bloch, Jackson, and Tebaldi (2016), where the authors of the former
paper stipulate that a vertex’s centrality is a nonnegative real number and the authors of the latter admit
of negative values.
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I concur with the views expressed by the aforenamed authors: a reasonable
theory of point or vertex centrality should impose a lower bound on the measure;
moreover, zero is a natural choice for the lower bound. On account of this, I will
discuss sufficient conditions under which the GKB centrality is nonnegative. I shall
also discuss conditions for its positivity. The interest in the latter conditions is
motivated by the key player analysis (Section 3.3).
The GKB centrality (measure) in D with profile of vertex idiosyncracies α and
profile of localness parameters λ, b(α,λ,D), is given by (In − diag(λ)A˙(D))−1α if
ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1 (Proposition 3.8). Suppose, for simplicity of exposition, λ =
λ¯1n for some λ¯ ∈ R. If λ¯ = 0, then b(α,λ,D) = α, and if λ¯ ̸= 0 and vertex i ∈ I(n)
has no out-neighbors (in D), that is, N+D (i) = ∅, then bi(α,λ,D) = αi. It is, there-
fore, reasonable to restrict attention to cases where α is either nonnegative or posi-
tive in order to establish conditions for the nonnegativity or positivity of b(α,λ,D).
Provided that α is nonnegative, a sufficient condition for the nonnegativity of
b(α,λ,D) is that (In − λ¯A˙(D))−1 is nonnegative. Two results of matrix analysis are
of interest in this regard (Lemma B.2). First, the Neumann series ∑∞k=0 λ¯k A˙(D)k
converges if and only if ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1. Second, the matrix In − λ¯A˙(D) is non-
singular with inverse ∑∞k=0 λ¯k A˙(D)k if ∑∞k=0 λ¯k A˙(D)k converges. If λ¯ ≥ 0 is such
that ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, then every term in the Neumann series ∑∞k=0 λ¯k A˙(D)k is non-
negative, so that the limit of the series, (In − λ¯A˙(D))−1, is nonnegative. If λ¯ < 0,
then (In − λA˙(D))−1 is not necessarily nonnegative, even if ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1. This
is evident from the Neumann series representation of (In − λ¯A˙(D))−1. Note that
∑∞k=0 λ¯
k A˙(D)k = ∑∞k=0 λ¯
2k A˙(D)2k +∑∞k=0 λ¯
2k+1 A˙(D)2k+1 if ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, where
the first series on the right-hand side of the equality is nonnegative and the second
series is nonpositive. If λ¯ < 0 is too large in magnitude, then the second series
dominates the first and their sum, (In − λ¯A˙(D))−1, is nonpositive. We conclude
that a lower bound must be imposed on λ¯ < 0 in order that (In − λA˙(D))−1 is
nonnegative. In the general case where λ is not a scalar multiple of 1n, a similar
result applies; specifically, the negative components of λ must not be less than a
certain lower bound for b(α,λ,D) to be nonnegative.
Nonsingular M-matrices play an important role in establishing results on the
nonnegativity or positivity of the GKB centrality because their inverses are non-
negative and bounded below by the identity matrix. A square matrix of order n
overR is calledM-matrix if it is of the form sIn− B, where B is a nonnegative matrix
(of order n over R) and s ∈ R+ is not less than the spectral radius of B, that is,
s ≥ ρ(B). An M-matrix sIn − B is nonsingular if and only if s > ρ(B), in which
case its inverse is nonnegative and bounded below by In (see also Lemma B.6).19
Proposition 3.12 gives a representation of the inverse of In − diag(λ)A˙(D) in
terms of nonsingular M-matrices. The result is instrumental in establishing condi-
tions for the nonnegativity or positivity of b(α,λ,D). The representation is based on
the following decomposition of the profile of localness parameters λ: λ = λ+ − λ−,
where λ+ and λ− denote the componentwise positive and negative parts of λ, re-
spectively. Note that |λ| = λ+ + λ−, where |λ| denotes the profile or (column)
19. For a discussion of M-matrices see, for example, Berman and Plemmons (1994, chapter 6).
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vector whose components are the absolute values of the components of λ. The
conditions for the representation to exist are stated separately in Condition C-ρ for
easy reference. Corollary 3.13 deals with the special cases λ ≥c 0n (or, equivalently,
λ− = 0n) and λ ≤c 0n (or, equivalently, λ+ = 0n).
Condition C-ρ ρ(diag(λ+)A˙(D)) < 1 (which implies that In − diag(λ+)A˙(D) is
nonsingular) and ρ(diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1) < 1.
Proposition 3.12 If Condition C-ρ is satisfied, then In − diag(λ)A˙(D) is nonsingular
with inverse(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1(
In −
(
diag(λ−)A˙(D)
(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1)2)−1
×
(
In − diag(λ−)A˙(D)
(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1),
where In − diag(λ+)A˙(D), In − (diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1)2, and
In − diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1 are nonsingular M-matrices.
Corollary 3.13 (3.13.1) If λ ≥c 0n and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, then
In − diag(λ)A˙(D) is a nonsingular M-matrix.
(3.13.2) If λ ≤c 0n and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, then In − diag(λ)A˙(D) is nonsingular
with inverse(
In −
(
diag(λ)A˙(D)
)2)−1(In − diag(|λ|)A˙(D)),
where In − (diag(λ)A˙(D))2 and In − diag(|λ|)A˙(D) are nonsingular
M-matrices.20
Proposition 3.14 gives sufficient conditions for the nonnegativity (Result 3.14.1)
and positivity (Result 3.14.2) of b(α,λ,D). Corollary 3.15 is concerned with the
two cases λ ≥c 0n and λ ≤c 0n.
Proposition 3.14 (3.14.1) If Condition C-ρ is satisfied,
diag(λ−)A˙(D)
(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1
α ≤c α
(and α ̸= 0n), then b(α,λ,D) ≥c 0n (and b(α,λ,D) ̸= 0n).
(3.14.2) If Condition C-ρ is satisfied and
diag(λ−)A˙(D)
(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1
α <c α,
then b(α,λ,D) >c 0n.
20. If λ ≤c 0n, then |λ| = λ− = −λ, which implies that ρ(diag(|λ|)A˙(D)) = ρ(diag(λ−)A˙(D)) =
ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) (Lemma B.9).
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Corollary 3.15 (3.15.1) If λ ≥c 0n, α ≥c 0n (and α ̸= 0n), and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1,
then b(α,λ,D) ≥c α ≥c 0n (and b(α,λ,D) ̸= 0n).
(3.15.2) If λ ≥c 0n, α >c 0n, and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, then b(α,λ,D) ≥c α >c 0n.
(3.15.3) If λ ≤c 0n, diag(|λ|)A˙(D)α ≤c α (and α ̸= 0n), and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1,
then b(α,λ,D) ≥c 0n (and b(α,λ,D) ̸= 0n).
(3.15.4) If λ ≤c 0n, diag(|λ|)A˙(D)α <c α, and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, then
b(α,λ,D) >c 0n.
The conditions of Result 3.14.1 (respectively, Result 3.14.2) entail a nonnegativity
(respectively, positivity) restriction for the profile of vertex idiosyncrasies; namely,
if Condition C-ρ is satisfied and diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1α ≤c α
(respectively, diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1α <c α), then α ≥c 0n (re-
spectively, α >c 0n).21
The inequality diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1α <c α imposes a lower
bound on the negative components of λ if α >c 0n and ρ(diag(λ+)A˙(D)) < 1.
This can best be seen if α = α¯1n and λ = λ¯1n for some α¯ > 0 and λ¯ < 0. In
this case, diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1α <c α reduces to |λ¯|A˙(D)1n <c
1n, which implies that λ¯ > −1/max{deg+D(i) | i ∈ I(n)}.22 Likewise, the in-
equality ρ(diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1) < 1 imposes a lower bound
on the negative components of λ if ρ(diag(λ+)A˙(D)) < 1. Under the foregoing
assumptions about α and λ, ρ(diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1) < 1 re-
duces to |λ¯|ρ(A˙(D)) < 1, which implies that λ¯ > −1/ρ(A˙(D)) if ρ(A˙(D)) > 0.
The lower bound imposed on the negative components of λ by the inequality
diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1α <c α is not less than that imposed by
the inequality ρ(diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1) < 1 under the stated as-
sumptions (Lemma 3.16). Specifically, −1/max{deg+D(i) | i ∈ I(n)} is not less
than −1/ρ(A˙(D)).23
Lemma 3.16 (Debreu and Herstein 1953) For all a ∈ Rn+ and for all A ∈ M(n,R)
nonnegative, if Aa <c a, then ρ(A) < 1.
There exists by virtue of Lemma 3.16 a set of conditions that is equivalent to the
sufficient conditions of Result 3.14.2. The result is stated in Corollary 3.17. A similar
result applies to Result 3.15.4 and is stated in Corollary 3.18.
21. The proof of the statement involving strict inequalities is as follows. Suppose Condition C-ρ is
satisfied and Aα <c α, where A := diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1. Note that Aα <c α is
equivalent to (In − A)α >c 0n and In − A is a nonsingular M-matrix whose inverse is bounded below
by In (Lemma B.6 with c = 1). Premultiplying both sides of the inequality (In − A)α >c 0n by the
inverse of In − A yields α >c 0n (Lemma B.1).
22. Note thatmax{deg+D(i) | i ∈ I(n)} ≥ 1 because D is not empty.
23. This result also shows that ρ(A˙(D)) is bounded above by max{deg+D(i) | i ∈ I(n)}, which is a
well-known result in graph theory.
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Corollary 3.17 The following two sets of conditions are equivalent in the sense that Con-
ditions 3.17.1 are satisfied if and only if Conditions 3.17.2 are satisfied:
(3.17.1) ρ(diag(λ+)A˙(D)) < 1, diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1α <c α,
and ρ(diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1) < 1.
(3.17.2) ρ(diag(λ+)A˙(D)) < 1, diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1α <c α,
and α >c 0n.
Corollary 3.18 The following two sets of conditions are equivalent in the sense that Con-
ditions 3.18.1 are satisfied if and only if Conditions 3.18.2 are satisfied:
(3.18.1) λ ≤c 0n, diag(|λ|)A˙(D)α <c α, and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1.
(3.18.2) λ ≤c 0n, diag(|λ|)A˙(D)α <c α, and α >c 0n.
3.2.4 Comparative statics
This section is concerned with the response of the components of the GKB centrality
b(α,λ,D) to changes in the profile of vertex idiosyncrasies α, the profile of localness
parameters λ, or the arc set A(D) of D. General statements about the signs of the
responses necessitate conditions that ensure the nonnegativity or positivity of the
components of b(α,λ,D)—without such conditions, anything goes.
Some of the comparative statics results stated below refer to Condition I-α-λ to
rule out a dependence between the mappings α(D) and λ(D) or Conditions C-α
and C-λ, which introduce the notions of constant mappings α and λ.
Condition I-α-λ The mappings α and λ are independent in the following sense:
for all digraphs E, the functions α(E) and λ(E) are functionally independent.24
Katz’s (1953) status index is an example of functionally dependent α and λ.
Condition C-α The mapping α is constant in the following sense: for all pairs of
digraphs (E, F) of the same order, α(E) = α(F).
Condition C-λ The mapping λ is constant in the following sense: for all pairs of
digraphs (E, F) of the same order, λ(E) = λ(F).
The presentation of the results is organized as follows. The first result (Prop-
osition 3.22) is concerned with the change in the GKB centrality in response to
changes in the vertex idiosyncrasies. The second result (Proposition 3.23) deals
with the effects of changes in the localness parameters. Both results apply only to
cases where Condition I-α-λ is satisfied and the vertex idiosyncrasies and localness
parameters vary continuously. The two results state conditions under which the
components of the GKB centrality are strictly increasing in the vertex idiosyncrasies
24. Suppose the digraph E is of order n. The functions α(E) : I(n)→ R and λ(E) : I(n)→ R are called
functionally dependent if there exists a nonzero function g : R2 → R such that i ↦→ g(α(E)(i),λ(E)(i)) is
identically zero on I(n). If no such g exists, then α(E) and λ(E) are called functionally independent.
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1 2 3
Figure 3.2. A digraph of order 3 and size 4 (Examples 3.20, 3.28, and 3.33)
or localness parameters. The monotonicity results follow from the respective partial
derivatives and Lemma 3.19. As regards Lemma 3.19 (and also Propositions 3.22
and 3.23), note that, for all (i, j) ∈ I(n)2,
bi
(
ej,λ,D
)
= eTi
(
In − diag(λ)A˙(D)
)−1ej = [(In − diag(λ)A˙(D))−1]i,j,
where {ek}nk=1 denotes the canonical basis of Rn with ek := (δk,1, . . . , δk,n), where
δk,l is Kronecker’s delta of k and l. The third result (Proposition 3.24) is about the
change in the GKB centrality in response to a change in the digraph’s arc set or,
equivalently, in its adjacencymatrix. The remainder of the section covers two special
cases that involve changes in the digraph’s arc set and changes in the digraph’s
vertex set and analyzes their effects on the GKB centrality; specifically, Section 3.2.4.1
discusses the effects resulting from isolating a vertex from all over vertices in D and
Section 3.2.4.2 those resulting from completely removing a vertex from D.
Lemma 3.19 Let (i, j) ∈ I(n)2 with i ̸= j.
(3.19.1) If λ ≥c 0n and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, then bi(ei,λ,D) ≥ 1 and
bi(ej,λ,D) ≥ 0.
(3.19.2) If λ ≥c 0n, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, and there exists a walk (i0, . . . , ip) in D of
length p from i to j such that (λi0 , . . . ,λip−1) >c 0p, then bi(ej,λ,D) > 0.
(3.19.3) If λ ≥c 0n, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, and there does not exist a walk in D from i
to j, then bi(ej,λ,D) = 0.
Examples 3.20 and 3.21 demonstrate that the inequalityλ ≥c 0n is a key condition
for Results 3.19.1 and 3.19.2, respectively.
Example 3.20 Suppose D = {{1, 2, 3}, {(1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2)}}. See Figure 3.2
for an illustration of D. Suppose λ = (−λ¯, λ¯, λ¯) for some λ¯ ∈ R \ {0}. Note that
I3 − diag(λ)A˙(D) is nonsingular with inverse1− λ¯2 −λ¯ −λ¯2λ¯ 1 λ¯
λ¯2 λ¯ 1+ λ¯2

because ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) = 0 < 1 (Lemma B.3). We find b1(e1,λ,D) < 0 if
λ¯ ∈ (−∞,−1) ∪ (1,+∞), b1(e1,λ,D) = 0 if λ¯ ∈ {−1, 1}, and 0 < b1(e1,λ,D) < 1
if λ¯ ∈ (−1, 1) \ {0}. 
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1
23
4
Figure 3.3. A digraph of order 4 and size 6 (Examples 3.21 and 3.53)
Example 3.21 Suppose D = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 3), (4, 1), (4, 3)}}.
See Figure 3.3 for an illustration of D. Suppose λ = (λ1,λ2,λ3,λ4) is such that
λ1 > 0, λ2 < 0, λ4 > 0, and λ1λ4 < 1. Note that I4 − diag(λ)A˙(D) is nonsingular
with inverse
1
1− λ1λ4

1 λ1 λ1(1+ λ2 + λ4) λ1
0 1− λ1λ4 λ2(1− λ1λ4) 0
0 0 1− λ1λ4 0
λ4 λ1λ4 λ4(1+ λ1 + λ1λ2) 1

because ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) = √λ1λ4 < 1 (Lemma B.3). We find b1(e3,λ,D) = 0
if λ2 = −(1 + λ4), b4(e3,λ,D) = 0 if λ2 = −(1 + λ1)/λ1, and b1(e3,λ,D) =
b4(e3,λ,D) = 0 if λ2 = −(1+ λ1)/λ1 and λ4 = 1/λ1. Note that there exist walks
in D from 1 to 3 and from 4 to 3. 
Proposition 3.22 Suppose Condition I-α-λ is satisfied. If 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D)), then
∀(i, j) ∈ I(n)2 ∂ bi(α,λ,D)
∂αj
= bi(ej,λ,D). (3.5)
Let (i, j) ∈ I(n)2 with i ̸= j.
(3.22.1) If λ ≥c 0n and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, then bi(α,λ,D) is strictly increasing
in αi.
(3.22.2) If λ ≥c 0n, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, and there exists a walk (i0, . . . , ip) in D of
length p from i to j such that (λi0 , . . . ,λip−1) >c 0p, then bi(α,λ,D) is strictly
increasing in αj.
The statement of the second result calls for some extra notation: for any i ∈ I(n),
let the function gi(λ,D) : R+ → R+ be defined by
gi(λ,D)(t) := ρ
(
diag
(
(λ1, . . . ,λi−1, t,λi+1, . . . ,λn)
)
A˙(D)
)
.
Note that gi(λ,D) is continuous. If [λ]−i ≥c 0n−1, then gi(λ,D) is increasing and
the following set is an (empty or proper) interval:25
Γi(λ,D) := gi(λ,D)−1
(
[0, 1)
)
= {t ∈ R+ | 0 ≤ gi(λ,D)(t) < 1}.
25. The spectral radius of a nonnegative matrix is increasing in any of its components (see, for example,
Varga 2000, Theorem 2.20).
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Proposition 3.23 Suppose Condition I-α-λ is satisfied. If 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D)), then
∀(i, j) ∈ I(n)2 ∂ bi(α,λ,D)
∂λj
= bi(ej,λ,D) ∑
k∈N+D (j)
bk(α,λ,D). (3.6)
Let (i, j) ∈ I(n)2 with i ̸= j.
(3.23.1) If [λ]−i ≥c 0n−1, α ≥c 0n, and there exists a k ∈ N+D (i) with αk > 0, then
bi(α,λ,D) is strictly increasing in λi on Γi(λ,D).
(3.23.2) If [λ]−j ≥c 0n−1, α ≥c 0n, there exists a k ∈ N+D (j)with αk > 0, and there exists
a walk (i0, . . . , ip) in D of length p from i to j such that (λi0 , . . . ,λip−1) >c 0p,
then bi(α,λ,D) is strictly increasing in λj on Γj(λ,D).
Proposition 3.24 Let E be any digraph of order n that is different from D.26
If 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ(D))A˙(D)) ∪ σ(diag(λ(E))A˙(E)), then
b
(
α(E),λ(E), E
)− b(α(D),λ(D),D) = b(α(E)− α(D),λ(D),D)
+ b
((
diag
(
λ(E)
)
A˙(E)− diag(λ(D))A˙(D))b(α(E),λ(E), E),λ(D),D). (3.7)
(3.24.1) If E is a superdigraph of D, α(E) ≥c α(D), α(E) ≥c 0n, λ(E) ≥c λ(D) ≥c 0n,
and ρ(diag(λ(E))A˙(E)) < 1, then b(α(E),λ(E), E) ≥c b(α(D),λ(D),D).
(3.24.2) If E is a superdigraph of D with, for all i ∈ I(n), deg+E (i) > deg+D(i), α(E) ≥c
α(D), α(E) >c 0n, λ(E) ≥c λ(D) ≥c 0n, and ρ(diag(λ(E))A˙(E)) < 1, then
b(α(E),λ(E), E) >c b(α(D),λ(D),D).
The key insight from Proposition 3.24 is that the change in the GKB centrality
in response to a change in the digraph’s arc set or, equivalently, adjacency matrix,
can be decomposed into two summands (see the right-hand side of (3.7)). The
first summand represents the change in response to the change in idiosyncracies
that is induced by the change in the arc set from A(D) to A(E). This summand is
zero if α(E) = α(D), which is true if Condition C-α is satisfied. Without specific
assumptions about the mapping α, the components of α(E)− α(D) can be of any
sign, in which case no general statement about the sign of any of the components of
b(α(E)− α(D),λ(D),D) is possible. The second summand represents the change
in response to a ceteris paribus change (that is, the idiosyncracies are fixed at
α(E) = α(D)) in the localness parameters and the adjacency matrix. Predictions
about the signs of its components are possible if, inter alia, E is a superdigraph
of D; specifically, Result 3.24.1 (respectively, Result 3.24.2) states conditions under
which the components of the GKB centrality are increasing (respectively, strictly
increasing) in the digraph’s arc set (in terms of set inclusion).
26. It follows that the digraphs D and E have the same vertex set, namely, I(n), but different arc sets,
that is, A(D) ̸= A(E), and therefore different adjacency matrices, that is, A˙(D) ̸= A˙(E).
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3.2.4.1 Effects from isolating a vertex
This section analyzes the effects of a particular change in the digraph’s arc set
on the GKB centrality: the isolation of a vertex. To this end, let x be an arbitrary
vertex in D, and let D x denote the digraph of order n that emerges from D by
removing all arcs incident to x, that is, D x is the subdigraph of D with vertex
set I(n) and arc set {(u, v) ∈ A(D) | 1{u,v}(x) = 0}. The effects of a change in the
digraph’s arc set from A(D) to A(D x) on the components of the GKB centrality
are given by (3.7). A discussion of the directions and magnitudes of the effects, that
is, the signs and magnitudes of the components of b(α(D x),λ(D x),D x)−
b(α(D),λ(D),D), calls for additional assumptions. The focus is on two cases. The
first case (Proposition 3.25) assumes that α and λ are constant (Conditions C-α
and C-λ). The second case (Proposition 3.31) assumes that α is as in Example 3.2
and λ as in Example 3.5 and, therefore, constant.
I introduce the following notation to facilitate a compact representation of the
results: ∆(D x,D) := b(α(D x),λ(D x),D x)− b(α(D),λ(D),D), and, for
all i ∈ I(n), ∆ i(D x,D) denotes the ith component of ∆(D x,D).
Proposition 3.25 Suppose Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied.
If 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) ∪ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D x)), then bx(ex,λ,D) ̸= 0 and
∆(D x,D) = αxex − bx(α,λ,D)bx(ex,λ,D)b(ex,λ,D), (3.8)
specifically, for all i ∈ I(n),
∆ i(D x,D) = δi,x
(
αx − bx(α,λ,D)
)− (1− δi,x) bi(ex,λ,D)bx(ex,λ,D) bx(α,λ,D). (3.9)
Let i ∈ I(n) \ {x}.
(3.25.1) If λ ≥c 0n, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, and α ≥c 0n, then ∆x(D x,D) ≤ 0 and
∆ i(D x,D) ≤ 0.
(3.25.2) If λx > 0, [λ]−x ≥c 0n−1, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, there exists a k ∈ N+D (x)
with αk > 0, and [α]−k ≥c 0n−1, then ∆x(D x,D) < 0.
(3.25.3) If λ ≥c 0n, there exists a walk (i0, . . . , ip) in D of length p from i to x such that
(λi0 , . . . ,λip−1) >c 0p, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, αx > 0, and [α]−x ≥c 0n−1,
then ∆ i(D x,D) < 0.
A sufficient condition for 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) ∪ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D x)) is given
in Lemma 3.26.
Lemma 3.26 Suppose Condition C-λ is satisfied. If ρ(diag(|λ|)A˙(D)) < 1, then
1 /∈ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) ∪ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D x)).
In what follows, I discuss Proposition 3.25. Certain changes in the GKB centrality
are obvious, without referring to (3.8) or (3.9), and are related to three simple cases.
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First, if λ = 0n, then ∆(D x,D) = 0n because b(α,λ,D) = α = b(α,λ,D x).
Second, if x is isolated in D, then ∆(D x,D) = 0n because deg−D(x) = deg+D(x) =
0 implies that D = D x. Third,∆x(D x,D) = αx− bx(α,λ,D).27 This difference
is nonpositive if λ ≥c 0n, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, and α ≥c 0n (Result 3.25.1); it is
negative if λx > 0, [λ]−x ≥c 0n−1, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, there exists a k ∈ N+D (x)
with αk > 0, and [α]−k ≥c 0n−1 (Result 3.25.2). As regards the general case,
according to (3.9),
∀i ∈ I(n) \ {x} ∆ i(D x,D) = − bi(ex,λ,D)bx(ex,λ,D) bx(α,λ,D). (3.10)
The change in the GKB centrality of vertex i ̸= x is proportional to the centrality
of vertex x, bx(α,λ,D), where the factor of proportionality is given by the additive
inverse of the quotient with dividend bi(ex,λ,D) and divisor bx(ex,λ,D). In light
of Lemma 3.19 and Examples 3.20 and 3.21, this quotient can be of any sign without
assuming λ ≥c 0n and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1. The subsequent discussion is for this
reason confined to the case where λ ≥c 0n is such that ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1. In
order to interpret the aforementioned quotient, note that if λ = λ¯1n for some λ¯ ≥ 0
with λ¯ρ(A˙(D)) < 1, then
∀i ∈ I(n) \ {x} bi(ex,λ,D)
bx(ex,λ,D)
=

0 if λ¯ = 0,
∑∞k=0 λ¯
kdkD,i→x
∑∞k=0 λ¯kd
k
D,x→x
if λ¯ > 0,
(3.11)
where d0D,i→j := δi,j and, for all k ∈ Z++, dkD,i→j denotes the number of walks in D
of length k from i to j.28 Note also that the more walks (in D) of any length from i
to x exist, the larger is the limit of the series of weighted walks, ∑∞k=0 λ¯kdkD,i→x. The
larger the limit ∑∞k=0 λ¯kdkD,i→x, the stronger is vertex i said to be connected (in D)
to vertex x. The quotient with dividend ∑∞k=0 λ¯kdkD,i→x and divisor ∑∞k=0 λ¯kdkD,x→x
may therefore be interpreted as a measure of how strongly vertex i is connected
(in D) to vertex x relative to how strongly vertex x is connected (in D) to itself. The
foregoing considerations motivate the following definition.
Definition CS Let i ∈ I(n) \ {x}. The connection strength of (i, x) in D is the func-
tion SD,i,x : {λ˜ ∈ Rn+ | ρ(diag(λ˜)A˙(D)) < 1} → R defined by29
SD,i,x(λ˜) :=
bi
(
ex, λ˜,D
)
bx
(
ex, λ˜,D
) .
27. Indeed, bx(α,λ,D x) = αx + λx ∑j∈I(n) a˙x,j(D x) bj(α,λ,D x) = αx because deg+Dx(x) = 0
implies that, for all j ∈ I(n), a˙x,j(D x) = 0.
28. Indeed, if λ = λ¯1n for some λ¯ ≥ 0with λ¯ρ(A˙(D)) < 1, then
bi(ex ,λ,D)
bx(ex ,λ,D)
=
[(
In − λ¯A˙(D)
)−1]
i,x[(
In − λ¯A˙(D)
)−1]
x,x
=
∑∞k=0 λ¯
k[A˙(D)k]i,x
∑∞k=0 λ¯k
[
A˙(D)k
]
x,x
=
∑∞k=0 λ¯
kdkD,i→x
∑∞k=0 λ¯kd
k
D,x→x
,
where bx(ex ,λ,D) ≥ 1 (Result 3.19.1).
29. If λ˜ ∈ Rn+ is such that ρ(diag(λ˜)A˙(D)) < 1, then bx(ex , λ˜,D) ≥ 1 (Result 3.19.1).
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The range of the connection strength of (i, x) inD is a subset ofR+ (Result 3.19.1)
containing zero (bi(ex, 0n,D) = δi,x = 0 because i ̸= x). The range of its restriction
to {λ˜ ∈ Rn+ | diag(λ˜)A˙(D)1n ≤c 1n} is a subset of [0, 1] (Proposition 3.27), which
renders connection strength easy to interpret. The connection strength of (i, x) in D
at the point (λ˜1, . . . , λ˜n) is positive if there exists a walk (i0, . . . , ip) in D of length p
from i to x such that (λ˜i0 , . . . , λ˜ip−1) >c 0p (Results 3.19.1 and 3.19.2), and it is zero
if there does not exist a walk in D from i to x (Result 3.19.3), which is, for example,
the case when i and x lie in two different weakly connected components of D.
Proposition 3.27 For all i ∈ I(n) \ {x} and for all λ˜ ∈ Rn+ with ρ(diag(λ˜)A˙(D)) < 1
and diag(λ˜)A˙(D)1n ≤c 1n, SD,i,x(λ˜) ∈ [0, 1].
I make three comments on the inequality diag(λ˜)A˙(D)1n ≤c 1n of Propos-
ition 3.27, where λ˜ := (λ˜1, . . . , λ˜n) ∈ Rn+. First, note that diag(λ˜)A˙(D)1n ≤c 1n
is equivalent to (In − diag(λ˜)A˙(D))1n ≥c 0n, which is a nonnegativity condition
for the row sums of In − diag(λ˜)A˙(D). Second, note that the strict inequality
diag(λ˜)A˙(D)1n <c 1n implies that ρ(diag(λ˜)A˙(D)) < 1 (Lemma 3.16). Third,
note that diag(λ˜)A˙(D)1n ≤c 1n imposes an upper bound on a vertex’s out-degree in
terms of the corresponding localness parameter, presuming it is positive; specifically,
for all i ∈ I(n) with λ˜i > 0, diag(λ˜)A˙(D)1n ≤c 1n implies that deg+D(i) ≤ 1/λ˜i.
Example 3.28 illustrates Definition CS and Proposition 3.27.
Example 3.28 Consider the digraph D of Example 3.20. Suppose λ(D) = λ¯13
for some λ¯ > 0. Note that {λ˜ ∈ R+ | ρ(λ˜A˙(D)) < 1} = [0, 1/
√
2) because
ρ(A˙(D)) =
√
2, and {λ˜ ∈ R+ | λ˜A˙(D)13 ≤c 13} = [0, 1/2] (cf. Proposition 3.27).
If λ¯ = 1/2, then
(
I3 − diag
(
λ(D)
)
A˙(D)
)−1
=
1
2
3 2 12 4 2
1 2 3
 ,
from which
SD,1,1
(
λ(D)
)
= 1, SD,1,2
(
λ(D)
)
= 1/2, SD,1,3
(
λ(D)
)
= 1/3,
SD,2,1
(
λ(D)
)
= 2/3, SD,2,2
(
λ(D)
)
= 1, SD,2,3
(
λ(D)
)
= 2/3,
SD,3,1
(
λ(D)
)
= 1/3, SD,3,2
(
λ(D)
)
= 1/2, SD,3,3
(
λ(D)
)
= 1
follow. If λ¯ = 2/3, then
(
I3 − diag
(
λ(D)
)
A˙(D)
)−1
=
5 6 46 9 6
4 6 5
 ,
from which
SD,1,1
(
λ(D)
)
= 1, SD,1,2
(
λ(D)
)
= 2/3, SD,1,3
(
λ(D)
)
= 4/5,
SD,2,1
(
λ(D)
)
= 6/5, SD,2,2
(
λ(D)
)
= 1, SD,2,3
(
λ(D)
)
= 6/5,
SD,3,1
(
λ(D)
)
= 4/5, SD,3,2
(
λ(D)
)
= 2/3, SD,3,3
(
λ(D)
)
= 1
follow (note that SD,2,1(λ(D)) = SD,2,3(λ(D)) > 1). 
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Propositions 3.29 and 3.30 state results about the monotonicity of the connection
strength of (i, x) in D.
Proposition 3.29 For all i ∈ I(n) \ {x}, if there exists a walk in D from i to x, then
the restriction of the connection strength of (i, x) in D to {λ˜1n | λ˜ ∈ R++} is strictly
increasing.
Proposition 3.30 Let i ∈ I(n) \ {x}.
(3.30.1) The connection strength of (i, x) in D is constant in its xth argument; specif-
ically, for all λ˜ := (λ˜1, . . . , λ˜n) in the domain of SD,i,x, the function t ↦→
SD,i,x(λ˜1, . . . , λ˜x−1, t, λ˜x+1, . . . , λ˜n) is constant on Γx(λ˜,D).
(3.30.2) For all j ∈ I(n) \ {x}, the connection strength of (i, x) in D is increasing in its
jth argument; specifically, for all λ˜ := (λ˜1, . . . , λ˜n) in the domain of SD,i,x, the
function t ↦→ SD,i,x(λ˜1, . . . , λ˜j−1, t, λ˜j+1, . . . , λ˜n) is increasing on Γj(λ˜,D).
(3.30.3) If there exists a walk (i0, . . . , ip) in D of length p from i to x, then, for all λ˜ :=
(λ˜1, . . . , λ˜n) in the domain of SD,i,x with (λ˜i1 , . . . , λ˜ip−1) >c 0p−1, the function
t ↦→ SD,i,x(λ˜1, . . . , λ˜i−1, t, λ˜i+1, . . . , λ˜n) is strictly increasing on Γi(λ˜,D).
I conclude the discussion of Proposition 3.25 by interpreting (3.10) in light of Def-
inition CS. Suppose α ≥c 0n (in addition to λ ≥c 0n and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1). The
GKB centrality of vertex i ̸= x does not increase in response to isolating vertex x from
all other vertices in D (Result 3.25.1): ∆ i(D x,D) = −SD,i,x(λ) bx(α,λ,D) ≤ 0.
This is also true for any other vertex j ̸= x, from which it follows that the effect from
isolating vertex x cannot be positive for one vertex andnegative for another. TheGKB
centrality of vertex i decreases if, in addition to the foregoing assumptions, there
exists a walk (i0, . . . , ip) in D of length p from i to x such that (λi0 , . . . ,λip−1) >c 0p
and αx > 0 (Result 3.25.3). In this case, the decrease is proportional to the centrality
of vertex x, bx(α,λ,D), which is positive (Result 3.15.1 and αx > 0). The magnitude
of the change depends on how strongly vertex i is connected (in D) to vertex x,
as measured by the connection strength of (i, x) in D, SD,i,x(λ), which is positive
(Results 3.19.1 and 3.19.2). Specifically, the stronger vertex i is connected (in D)
to vertex x, the larger the magnitude of the change. Under certain (additional)
assumptions (see Results 3.23.2 and 3.30.3), SD,i,x(λ) and bx(α,λ,D) are strictly
increasing in λi on Γi(λ,D), in which case the magnitude of the decrease in the
GKB centrality of vertex i is increasing in λi on Γi(λ,D).
Next, I discuss the second case where α is as in Example 3.2 and λ as in Ex-
ample 3.5. The result is stated as Proposition 3.31.
Proposition 3.31 Suppose α is as in Example 3.2, that is, α(D) = A˙(D)1n and α(D x)
= A˙(D x)1n, λ is as in Example 3.5, that is, λ(D) = λ(D x) = λ¯1n for some λ¯ ∈ R,
and 1 /∈ σ(λ¯A˙(D)) ∪ σ(λ¯A˙(D x)). If λ¯ = 0, then
∆(D x,D) =
(
A˙(D x)− A˙(D))1n, (3.12)
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and if λ¯ ̸= 0, then
∆(D x,D) = 1
λ¯
(
ex − 1bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)b(ex, λ¯1n,D)
)
− bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
b(ex, λ¯1n,D). (3.13)
Specifically, if λ¯ = 0, then, for all i ∈ I(n),
∆ i(D x,D) =
{
−deg+D(x) if i = x,
− 1N+D (i)(x) if i ̸= x,
(3.14)
and if λ¯ ̸= 0, then, for all i ∈ I(n),
∆ i(D x,D) = −δi,x bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)
− (1− δi,x) bi(ex, λ¯1n,D)bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
(
1
λ¯
+ bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
))
. (3.15)
Let i ∈ I(n) \ {x}.
(3.31.1) If λ¯ ≥ 0 and ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, then ∆x(D x,D) ≤ 0 and ∆ i(D x,D) ≤ 0.
(3.31.2) If λ¯ ≥ 0, ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, and deg+D(x) > 0, then ∆x(D x,D) < 0.
(3.31.3) If λ¯ > 0, ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, and there exists a walk in D from i to x, then
∆ i(D x,D) < 0.
I discuss the effects of isolating vertex x in the context of Proposition 3.31. First,
consider the case λ¯ = 0. The centrality of vertex x falls to zero if deg+D(x) > 0.
The centrality of vertex i ̸= x decreases by 1 if vertex x is an out-neighbor of i
in D, otherwise it remains unchanged. The decrease by 1 corresponds to the loss
in vertex i’s out-degree by isolating vertex x. Second, consider the case λ¯ ̸= 0. The
centrality of vertex x changes by − bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D). This change is negative,
that is, the centrality decreases, if λ¯ > 0, ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, and deg+D(x) > 0 (Re-
sult 3.15.1). The corresponding change in the context of Proposition 3.25 is given
by αx − bx(α,λ,D). The difference arises from the fact that vertex x’s idiosyncrasy
is constant in the context of Proposition 3.25, whereas it drops to zero in the context
of Proposition 3.31. The change in vertex i’s centrality is given by
− 1
λ¯
bi(ex, λ¯1n,D)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
− bi(ex, λ¯1n,D)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)
. (3.16)
The first summand of (3.16) represents the change in response to a ceteris paribus
change (that is, the adjacency matrix is fixed at A˙(D  x)) in the profile of id-
iosyncracies from A˙(D)1n to A˙(D x)1n (see Proposition 3.24). This summand
is nonpositive if λ¯ > 0 and ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1 (Result 3.19.1), it is negative if λ¯ > 0,
ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, and there exists a walk in D from i to x (Result 3.19.2), and it is
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zero if λ¯ > 0, ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, and there does not exist a walk in D from i to x
(Result 3.19.3). The second summand of (3.16) represents the change in response
to a ceteris paribus change (that is, the idiosyncracies are fixed at A˙(D)1n) in the
adjacency matrix from A˙(D) to A˙(D x). This summand is nonpositive if λ¯ > 0
and ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1 (Result 3.19.1), it is negative if λ¯ > 0, ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, there
exists a walk in D from i to x, and deg+D(x) > 0 (Results 3.15.1 and 3.19.2), and
it is zero if λ¯ > 0, ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, and there does not exist a walk in D from i
to x (Results 3.15.1 and 3.19.3). Note that the second summand is similar to the
expression for ∆ i(D x,D) in (3.10). Thus, if the centrality of vertex i decreases in
the context of Proposition 3.31, then the magnitude of the decrease is larger than
that in the context of Proposition 3.25, provided that the values of α and λmatch
those of A˙(D)1n and λ¯1n, respectively, and λ¯ > 0 and ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1. The reason
for this is clear: the components of the GKB centrality are increasing in the digraph’s
arc set (Result 3.24.1) and they are increasing in the profile of vertex idiosyncrasies.
The change in vertex i’s centrality is proportional to the connection strength of (i, x)
in D:
∆ i(D x,D) = −SD,i,x(λ¯1n)
(
1
λ¯
+ bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
))
.
Vertex i’s centrality does not increase if λ¯ ≥ 0 and ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1 (Result 3.31.1),
and it decreases if λ¯ > 0, ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, and there exists a walk in D from i to x (Re-
sult 3.31.3). If there exists awalk inD from i to x and ρ(A˙(D))2 < ∑j∈N+D (x) deg
+
D(j),
then there exists a positive constant c(D, x) such that the magnitude of the de-
crease is increasing in λ¯ on the nonempty interval {λ˜ ∈ R++ | ρ(λ˜A˙(D)) < 1} ∩
(c(D, x),+∞) (Proposition 3.29 and Lemma 3.32).
Lemma 3.32 If ρ(A˙(D))2 < ∑j∈N+D (x) deg
+
D(j), then there exists a constant c(D, x) > 0
such that the function t ↦→ (1/t) + bx(A˙(D)1n, t1n,D) is strictly increasing on the non-
empty interval {λ˜ ∈ R++ | ρ(λ˜A˙(D)) < 1} ∩ (c(D, x),+∞).30
Sufficient conditions for ∆ i(D  x,D) to be of a particular sign are difficult
to obtain if λ¯ < 0. If λ¯ < 0, |λ¯|A˙(D)21n <c A˙(D)1n, and ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, then
bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) > 0 (Result 3.15.4). The sum (1/λ¯) + bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
) or
the connection strength of (i, x) in Dmay, however, be negative under the foregoing
conditions. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.33 Consider the digraph D of Example 3.20. Note that
A˙(D) =
0 1 01 0 1
0 1 0

with ρ(A˙(D)) =
√
2. Suppose α is as in Example 3.2, that is, α(D) = A˙(D)13
and, for all i ∈ I(3), α(D i) = A˙(D  i)13, and λ is as in Example 3.5, that
30. If ρ(A˙(D)) = 0, then {λ˜ ∈ R++ | ρ(λ˜A˙(D)) < 1} ∩ (c(D, x),+∞) = (c(D, x),+∞), and if
ρ(A˙(D)) > 0, then {λ˜ ∈ R++ | ρ(λ˜A˙(D)) < 1} ∩ (c(D, x),+∞) = (c(D, x), 1/ρ(A˙(D))).
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is, λ(D) = λ(D 1) = λ(D 2) = λ(D 3) = λ¯1n for some λ¯ ∈ R. Note that
{λ˜ ∈ R | ρ(λ˜A˙(D)) < 1} = (−1/√2, 1/√2) and {λ˜ ∈ R | |λ˜|A˙(D)21n <c A˙(D)1n}
= (−1/2,+∞). Suppose λ¯ = −1/3, which implies that b(A˙(D)13, λ¯13,D) >c 03
(Result 3.15.4). We find
(
I3 − λ¯A˙(D)
)−1
=
1
7
 8 −3 1−3 9 −3
1 −3 8

and
b
(
A˙(D)13, λ¯13,D
)
=
(
I3 − λ¯A˙(D)
)−1 A˙(D)13 = 17
 312
3
 .
Consequently, according to (3.13), if x = 1, then
∆(D 1,D)
=
1
λ¯
(
e1 − 1b1(e1, λ¯13,D)
b(e1, λ¯13,D)
)
− b1
(
A˙(D)13, λ¯13,D
)
b1(e1, λ¯13,D)
b(e1, λ¯13,D)
= −3
10
0
− 7
8
· 1
7
 8−3
1
− 3
8
· 1
7
 8−3
1
 = 1
28
−12−27
9
 ,
if x = 2, then
∆(D 2,D)
=
1
λ¯
(
e2 − 1b2(e2, λ¯13,D)b(e2, λ¯13,D)
)
− b2
(
A˙(D)13, λ¯13,D
)
b2(e2, λ¯13,D)
b(e2, λ¯13,D)
= −3
01
0
− 7
9
· 1
7
−39
−3
− 4
3
· 1
7
−39
−3
 = 1
28
−12−48
−12
 ,
and if x = 3, then
∆(D 3,D)
=
1
λ¯
(
e3 − 1b3(e3, λ¯13,D)b(e3, λ¯13,D)
)
− b3
(
A˙(D)13, λ¯13,D
)
b3(e3, λ¯13,D)
b(e3, λ¯13,D)
= −3
00
1
− 7
8
· 1
7
 1−3
8
− 3
8
· 1
7
 1−3
8
 = 1
28
 9−27
−12
 .
Note that, for all i ∈ I(3), (1/λ¯) + bi(A˙(D)13, λ¯13,D) is negative. Note also that
SD,2,1(λ¯1n), SD,1,2(λ¯1n), SD,3,2(λ¯1n), and SD,2,3(λ¯1n) are negative. 
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3.2.4.2 Effects from removing a vertex
This section analyzes the effects of a particular change in the digraph’s vertex set on
the GKB centrality: the removal of a single vertex. To this end, let x be an arbitrary
vertex in D, and let D⊖ x denote the digraph of order n− 1 that emerges from D by
removing vertex x (and thereby all arcs incident to vertex x), that is, D⊖ x is the sub-
digraph of Dwith vertex set I(n) \ {x} and arc set {(u, v) ∈ A(D) | 1{u,v}(x) = 0}.
Note that D ⊖ x is similar to but quite different from the digraph that emerges
from D by isolating vertex x from all other vertices in D, D x. Both D⊖ x and
D  x are subdigraphs of D that have the same arc set but different vertex sets.
Under certain conditions, this common feature implies that the two digraphs entail
equal changes in the components of the GKB centrality other than x. Note that
the GKB centrality b(α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x) has n− 1 components, whereas
the GKB centrality b(α(D),λ(D),D) has n components. In order to analyze the
effect from removing vertex x from D on the centrality of vertex i ̸= x, we need a
means to localize the ith component of the (column) vector b(α(D),λ(D),D) in
the (column) vector b(α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D ⊖ x). To this end, let the mapping
ıˆx : I(n) \ {x} → I(n− 1) be defined by
ıˆx(i) :=
{
i if i < x,
i− 1 if i > x,
that is, ıˆx is the unique order isomorphism from I(n) \ {x} to I(n− 1). For example,
if n = 5 and x = 3, then ıˆ3 : {1, 2, 4, 5} → {1, 2, 3, 4} is given by ıˆ3(1) = 1, ıˆ3(2) = 2,
ıˆ3(4) = 3, and ıˆ3(5) = 4. For any (column) vector v ∈ Rn, the mapping ıˆx enables
to localize the component in row i ̸= x of v in its subvector [v]−x, in particular,
[v]i =
[
[v]−x
]
ıˆx(i)
.
Finally, let A˙(D⊖ x) denote the adjacency matrix of D⊖ x with respect to ıˆx and
α(D⊖ x) (respectively, λ(D⊖ x)) the (column) vector or profile of vertex idio-
syncrasies (respectively, localness parameters) of D⊖ x with respect to ıˆx. Note
that A˙(D ⊖ x) is of order n − 1, whereas A˙(D x) is of order n. Note also that
A˙(D⊖ x) and A˙(D x) are related to each other by A˙(D⊖ x) = ETx A˙(D x)Ex,
where Ex := (e1, . . . , ex−1, ex+1, . . . , en).
Proposition 3.35 shows that the GKB centralities b(α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)
and b(α(D x),λ(D x),D x) are closely related if the mappings α and λ are
such that α(D⊖ x) = [α(D x)]−x and λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x or, equivalently,
for all i ∈ I(n) \ {x}, α(D⊖ x)(i) = α(D x)(i) and λ(D⊖ x)(i) = λ(D x)(i).
The equality α(D⊖ x) = [α(D x)]−x is true for the mappings α of Examples 3.1,
3.2, 3.3, and 3.4; it is not true for the mapping α of Example 3.34. The equality
λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x is true for the mappings λ of Examples 3.5, 3.6 (if, for
example, φ(E) is constant for all digraphs E), and 3.7.
Example 3.34 Suppose α satisfies, for all digraphs E, for all v ∈ V(E), α(E)(v) =
(1/order of E)deg+E (v). It follows that α(D⊖ x) = (1/(n− 1))A˙(D⊖ x)1n−1 and
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α(D x) = (1/n)A˙(D x)1n. Note that α(D⊖ x) ̸= [α(D x)]−x if D x is not
empty. 
Proposition 3.35 Suppose α(D⊖ x) = [α(D x)]−x and λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x.
(3.35.1) σ(diag(λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D⊖ x)) \ {0} = σ(diag(λ(D x))A˙(D x)) \ {0}.
(3.35.2) If 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D⊖ x)) ∪ σ(diag(λ(D))A˙(D)), then
b
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x) = [b(α(D x),λ(D x),D x)]−x
(3.17)
and
b
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)− [b(α(D),λ(D),D)]−x
=
[
b
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)− b(α(D),λ(D),D)]−x. (3.18)
It is important to note that Results 3.35.1 and 3.35.2 do not rest on Condi-
tions C-α and C-λ. Result 3.35.1 is relevant to Result 3.35.2 because it implies
that b(α(D x),λ,D x) exists and is unique if and only if b(α(D⊖ x),λ,D⊖ x)
exists and is unique. Provided that both equalities α(D⊖ x) = [α(D x)]−x and
λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x are true, all vertices other than x have the same GKB
centrality in D⊖ x and D x (see (3.17)): for all i ∈ I(n) \ {x},
bi
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)
= bıˆx(i)
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x).
Equation (3.18) is a direct consequence of (3.17) and states that the change in the
GKB centrality in response to removing vertex x is identical to the change in response
to isolating vertex x for all vertices other than vertex x: for all i ∈ I(n) \ {x},
bıˆx(i)
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)− bi(α(D),λ(D),D)
= bi
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)− bi(α(D),λ(D),D).
The rest of this section is concernedwith the two cases discussed in Section 3.2.4.1.
Proposition 3.36 considers the case where α and λ are constant (Conditions C-α
and C-λ) and Proposition 3.37 the case where α is as in Example 3.2 and λ as in
Example 3.5. Proposition 3.36 (respectively, Proposition 3.37) is closely related to
Proposition 3.25 (respectively, Proposition 3.31) by means of Proposition 3.35. The
interpretation of the change in the GKB centrality is therefore the same as in the
context of Propositions 3.25 and 3.31, in particular with regard to the connection
strength as a gauge for the magnitude of the change.
Proposition 3.36 Suppose Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied and α(D⊖ x) =
[α(D x)]−x and λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x. If 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D⊖ x)) ∪
σ(diag(λ(D))A˙(D)), then, for all i ∈ I(n) \ {x},
bıˆx(i)
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)− bi(α(D),λ(D),D)
= − bi
(
ex,λ(D),D
)
bx
(
ex,λ(D),D
) bx(α(D),λ(D),D)
= −SD,i,x
(
λ(D)
)
bx
(
α(D),λ(D),D
)
.
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Proposition 3.37 Suppose α is as in Example 3.2, that is, α(D) = A˙(D)1n and α(D⊖ x)
= A˙(D⊖ x)1n−1, λ is as in Example 3.5, that is, λ(D) = λ¯1n andλ(D⊖ x) = λ¯1n−1 for
some λ¯ ∈ R, and 1 /∈ σ(λ¯A˙(D⊖ x))∪ σ(λ¯A˙(D)). If λ¯ = 0, then, for all i ∈ I(n) \ {x},
bıˆx(i)
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)− bi(α(D),λ(D),D) = deg+D⊖x(ıˆx(i))−deg+D(i),
and if λ¯ ̸= 0, then, for all i ∈ I(n) \ {x},
bıˆx(i)
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)− bi(α(D),λ(D),D)
= − bi(ex, λ¯1n,D)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
(
1
λ¯
+ bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
))
= −SD,i,x
(
λ(D)
)( 1
λ¯
+ bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
))
.
3.2.5 Measures of the degree of idiosyncrasy
This section introduces different notions of the degree of idiosyncrasy that measure
the extent to which the GKB centrality is a local or global characteristic.
Suppose the GKB centrality in D with profile of vertex idiosyncrasies α >c 0n
and profile of localness parameters λ, b(α,λ,D), exists and is unique and positive.
Recall that, for all i ∈ I(n),
bi
(
α,λ,D
)
= αi + λi ∑
j∈N+D (i)
bj
(
α,λ,D
)
.
Thus, the strength of the association between vertex i’s centrality and the centralities
of its out-neighbors increases with the magnitude of λi. The centralities of vertex i’s
out-neighbors depend on their own idiosyncracies and localness parameters and the
centralities of their out-neighbors, and so forth, possibly ad infinitum. The recursive
nature of this dependence mirrors vertex i’s position within the digraph D, with
the dependence being stronger, the larger the magnitude of λi. If λi is close to
zero, then bi(α,λ,D) is close to αi. In this case, the degree to which bi(α,λ,D) is
determined by αi is high. As a result, bi(α,λ,D) represents a local characteristic
of vertex i. In contrast, if λi is large in magnitude, then vertex i’s centrality may
be strongly affected by its position. If vertex i is isolated, then bi(α,λ,D) = αi. If
λi > 0 and vertex i’s out-degree is high, then only a small portion of bi(α,λ,D)may
be accounted for by αi, so that the degree to which bi(α,λ,D) is determined by αi is
low. As a result, bi(α,λ,D) represents a global (in the sense that the position within
the digraph is taken into account) characteristic of vertex i.
The following definition introduces three different notions of degree of idiosyn-
crasy: a measure of the extent to which the GKB centrality of a single vertex is a
local or global characteristic and two aggregate measures.
Definition DI The degree of idiosyncrasy of vertex i (in D) is defined by
VDI(i, α,λ,D) :=
αi
bi(α,λ,D)
.
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The average degree of idiosyncrasy (in D) is defined by
ADI(α,λ,D) :=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
VDI(i, α,λ,D).
The total degree of idiosyncrasy (in D) is defined by
TDI(α,λ,D) :=
‖α‖
‖b(α,λ,D)‖ .
where ‖·‖ is any norm on Rn.31
As intended, a vertex’s degree of idiosyncrasy is high if its centrality is largely
determined by its idiosyncrasy. Other interesting properties of all three degrees of
idiosyncrasy are listed in the following result.
Proposition 3.38 Suppose ‖·‖ is monotonic in the positive orthant.32
(3.38.1) If λ ≥c 0n, then all three degrees of idiosyncrasy lie in the interval (0, 1]. If λ ≤c
0n, then the reciprocal of all three degrees of idiosyncrasy lie in the interval (0, 1].
(3.38.2) Suppose Condition I-α-λ is satisfied and the localness parameters vary contin-
uously. Let (i, j) ∈ I(n)2 with i ̸= j. If [λ]−i ≥c 0n−1 and N+D (i) ̸=
∅, then λi ↦→ VDI(i, α,λ,D) and λi ↦→ ADI(α,λ,D) are strictly decreas-
ing and λi ↦→ TDI(α,λ,D) is decreasing on Γi(λ,D). If [λ]−j ≥c 0n−1,
N+D (j) ̸= ∅, and there exists a walk (i0, . . . , ip) in D of length p from i to j
such that (λi0 , . . . ,λip−1) >c 0p, then λj ↦→ VDI(i, α,λ,D) is strictly decreas-
ing on Γj(λ,D).
Under the conditions stated in Result 3.38.2, if ‖·‖ is the p-norm (1 ≤ p < ∞),
then λi ↦→ TDI(α,λ,D) is strictly decreasing on Γi(λ,D), and if ‖·‖ is the maximum
norm, then λi ↦→ TDI(α,λ,D) is decreasing (but not necessarily strictly decreasing)
on Γi(λ,D).
3.3 Key player analysis
The key player analysis is divided into two parts. Section 3.3.1 describes the network
game for which two key player problems are defined; it is a static, noncooperative
game of complete information, where the players take their decisions simultaneously
and independently of one another. Section 3.3.2 defines the two key player problems
and discusses their solutions for two specific cases.
31. Note that ‖b(α,λ,D)‖ > 0 because b(α,λ,D) >c 0n.
32. A norm ‖·‖ on Rn is called monotonic if, for all v,w ∈ Rn, |v| ≤c |w| implies that ‖v‖ ≤ ‖w‖
(Bauer, Stoer, and Witzgall 1961, p. 257), where |v| denotes the vector the components of which are
the absolute values of the components of v. A norm ‖·‖ on Rn is called monotonic in the positive orthant
(in Rn) if, for all v,w ∈ Rn+, v ≤c w implies that ‖v‖ ≤ ‖w‖ (p. 259). The p-norm (1 ≤ p < ∞) and the
maximum norm are both monotonic and monotonic in the positive orthant.
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3.3.1 The network game
There are n > 1 players. The set of all players is identified with the set I(n) =
{1, . . . , n}, which is abbreviated as I . The players have a common action space R+.
The action of player i ∈ I is denoted by yi. The set of all possible action profiles
(column vectors) (y1, . . . , yn) is equal to Rn+. A player’s utility (or payoff) depends
not only on his own action but may also depend on the actions of other players.
This dependence is made explicit by a nonempty digraph D on I , which is common
knowledge. The digraph D encodes information about the identities of the players
who directly affect a player’s utility through their actions. For a particular player i,
the set of all players who directly affect his utility is given by his out-neighborhood
(inD),N+D (i). Note that, for all i ∈ I , i /∈ N+D (i), becauseD has no self-loops, which
is a consequence of the definition of a digraph. The assumption of a digraph implies
that a player is not necessarily an out-neighbor of his out-neighbors, that is, for
all i ∈ I , j ∈ N+D (i) does not necessarily imply that i ∈ N+D (j). The dependence of
a player’s utility on his out-neighbors’ actions is therefore potentially unidirectional.
The players’ utility (or payoff) functions {ui : Rn+ → R}i∈I are given by
ui(y1, . . . , yn) := αiyi − 12y
2
i + λiyi ∑
j∈N+D (i)
yj =
(
αi + λi ∑
j∈I
a˙i,j(D)yj
)
yi − 12y
2
i ,
where αi ≥ 0 and λi can be of any sign.33 As in Section 3.2, αi and λi are the short
forms of αi(D) and λi(D), which are defined by αi(D) := α(D)(i) and λi(D) :=
λ(D)(i), where α and λ are two mappings that assign to every digraph E (of any
order) the functions α(E) : V(E)→ R+ and λ(E) : V(E)→ R. The utility that play-
er i ascribes to the action profile (y1, . . . , yn) consists of two components: the private
component and the social component. The private component is given by the sum of
the private benefit, αiyi, and the private cost, −(1/2)y2i , with the marginal private
benefit equal to αi. The social component is given by λiyi ∑j∈N+D (i) yj and represents
player i’s social benefit (if λi > 0) or social cost (if λi < 0) from playing action yi.
Player i’s utility function is symmetric in his out-neighbors’ actions.34 It exhibits
local strategic complements (respectively, substitutes) if λi > 0 (respectively, λi < 0)
because
∂2ui(y1, . . . , yn)
∂yi∂yj
=
{
λi if j ∈ N+D (i),
0 if j /∈ N+D (i);
it exhibits positive (respectively, negative) local externalities if λi > 0 (respectively,
λi < 0).35 The profiles (column vectors) α and λ are defined as in Section 3.2, and,
like their components, they may depend on D. If this dependence is material to a
33. Recall that a˙i,j(D) denotes the component in row i and column j of the adjacency matrix of D (with
respect to the identity mapping on I), A˙(D).
34. That is, for all permutationspi of I with fixed points I \N+D (i), ui(ypi(1), . . . , ypi(n)) = ui(y1, . . . , yn).
35. In accordance with the terminology introduced by Galeotti et al. (2010, pp. 226–27), player i’s utility
function is said to exhibit positive (respectively, negative) local externalities if for all (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn+
and for all (y˜1, . . . , y˜n) ∈ Rn+ with y˜i = yi and {j ∈ N+D (i) | y˜j ≥ yj} = N+D (i), ui(y˜1, . . . , y˜n) ≥
ui(y1, . . . , yn) (respectively, ui(y˜1, . . . , y˜n) ≤ ui(y1, . . . , yn)).
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result, the two profiles are written as α(D) and λ(D). The present network game
is denoted by Γ(α,λ,D). The players of Γ(α,λ,D) are called ex ante homogeneous
with respect to α, or α-homogeneous for short, if α = α¯1n for some α¯ ∈ R+; they are
called ex ante homogeneous with respect to λ, or λ-homogeneous for short, if λ = λ¯1n for
some λ¯ ∈ R. The network game of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006)
corresponds to Γ(α, λ¯1n,D) with α >c 0n and λ¯ ∈ R++.
Sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique and interior Nash equilibrium,
or NE for short, of Γ(α,λ,D) are stated in Propositions 3.39 and 3.40, where the
former result considers the case λ− = 0n, that is, λ ≥c 0n, and the latter the case
λ− ̸= 0n.36
Proposition 3.39 The game Γ(α,λ,D) has a unique and interior NE y⋆ ∈ Rn++, which
is given by
y⋆ = b(α,λ,D), (3.19)
if three conditions are satisfied: (3.39.1) λ− = 0n, (3.39.2) ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, and
(3.39.3) 0n <c α.
Proposition 3.40 The game Γ(α,λ,D) has a unique and interior NE y⋆ ∈ Rn++, which
is given by (3.19), if four conditions are satisfied: (3.40.1) λ− ̸= 0n; (3.40.2) Condi-
tion C-ρ; (3.40.3) diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1α <c α; and (3.40.4) for
all nonempty and proper subsets J of I , 1 /∈ σ([diag(λ)A˙(D)]J ,J ) and [α]I\J +
[diag(λ)A˙(D)]I\J ,J (I|J | − [diag(λ)A˙(D)]J ,J )−1[α]J >c 0|I\J |.
The unique and interior NE of Γ(α,λ,D), provided it exists, is given by the
GKB centrality in D with profile of vertex idiosyncrasies α and profile of localness
parameters λ, b(α,λ,D). This characterization of the NE is of the same kind as
that of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006). It goes without saying that
all comparative statics results of Section 3.2.4 apply to the unique and interior NE
of Γ(α,λ,D). Note that equilibrium welfare in Γ(α,λ,D), defined as the sum of the
players’ utilities at the NE b(α,λ,D) of Γ(α,λ,D), is equal to (1/2)‖b(α,λ,D)‖22.
I briefly discuss Proposition 3.40. The game Γ(α,λ,D) has a unique interior NE
if Conditions 3.40.1, 3.40.2, and 3.40.3 are satisfied.37 Conditions 3.40.2 and 3.40.3
imply that α >c 0n (see the discussion of Result 3.14.2 in Section 3.2.3) and rule out
that the profile 0n is a boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D).38 These two conditions entail
a lower bound for the negative components of λ (see again the discussion of Re-
sult 3.14.2 in Section 3.2.3). Condition 3.40.4 rules out that a situation where some
players play zero and the remaining players play a positive action is a boundary
NE of Γ(α,λ,D), provided that Conditions 3.40.1, 3.40.2, and 3.40.3 are satisfied.
For the purpose of discussing Condition 3.40.4, suppose λ = λ¯1n for some λ¯ < 0,
which implies that λ− ̸= 0n (Condition 3.40.1), Conditions 3.40.2, 3.40.3, and 3.40.4
36. Recall that λ− denotes the componentwise negative part of λ.
37. Note the distinction between a unique interior NE and a unique and interior NE of Γ(α,λ,D).
38. A boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D) is a NE of Γ(α,λ,D) that involves actions at the topological boundary
of R+, {0}.
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are satisfied, and J is a nonempty and proper subset of I . Condition 3.40.3 reduces
to (In − |λ¯|A˙(D))α >c 0n, which implies that(
I|J | − |λ¯|[A˙(D)]J ,J
)
[α]J >c |λ¯|[A˙(D)]J ,I\J [α]I\J . (3.20)
Condition 3.40.4 implies that
|λ¯|[A˙(D)]I\J ,J
(
I|J | − λ¯[A˙(D)]J ,J
)−1
[α]J <c [α]I\J , (3.21)
where (I|J | − λ¯[A˙(D)]J ,J )−1[α]J >c 0|J | according to (3.20) and Conditions
3.40.2 and 3.40.3.39 Note that the vector on the left-hand side of inequality (3.21) is
strictly increasing in the magnitude of λ¯ on some interval of the negative real line
for which Conditions 3.40.2 and 3.40.3 are satisfied. It follows that Condition 3.40.4
entails a lower bound for λ¯ (in terms of A˙(D) and α).
The remainder of this section discusses briefly three special cases of the network
game Γ(α,λ,D), thereby highlighting its nexus with existing games or models in
the literature on the economics of social interactions. The first case (Example 3.41)
shows that the so-called local-aggregate game (Calvó-Armengol and Zenou 2004;
Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou 2006) is a special case of Γ(α,λ,D). The
second case (Example 3.42) establishes a relation between the so-called local-average
game (Patacchini and Zenou 2012) and Γ(α,λ,D). The third case (Example 3.43) is
motivated by the work of Mas and Moretti (2009), who study the productivity of
cashiers in a national supermarket chain. They find strong evidence of productivity
spillovers and substantial heterogeneity in howworkers respond to peers; specifically,
the spillover effect is positive and large for some workers, and it is small or even
negative for others (see, in particular, Figure 3).
Example 3.41 (Local-aggregate game) Suppose α >c 0n and λ = λ¯1n for some
λ¯ ∈ R++ (Example 3.5), that is, the localness parameters are positive and homoge-
neous across players. It follows from (3.19) that the system of best reply functions
at the unique and interior NE (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) of Γ(α,λ,D) is given by
∀i ∈ I y⋆i = αi + λ¯ ∑
j∈N+D (i)
y⋆j . (3.22)
39. The proof of (I|J | − λ¯[A˙(D)]J ,J )−1[α]J >c 0|J | is as follows. First, note that ρ(|λ¯|A˙(D)) < 1
(Condition 3.40.2). Second, note that ρ(|λ¯|[A˙(D)]J ,J ) ≤ ρ(|λ¯|A˙(D)) because |λ¯|A˙(D) is nonnegative
and |λ¯|[A˙(D)]J ,J is a principal submatrix of |λ¯|A˙(D) (see, for example, Berman and Plemmons 1994,
Corollary 1.6 on p. 28). It follows that ρ(|λ¯|[A˙(D)]J ,J ) < 1. We find(
I|J | − λ¯[A˙(D)]J ,J
)−1
[α]J =
(
I|J | − λ¯2[A˙(D)]2J ,J
)−1(I|J | − |λ¯|[A˙(D)]J ,J )[α]J
≥c
(
I|J | − |λ¯|[A˙(D)]J ,J
)
[α]J
>c |λ¯|[A˙(D)]J ,I\J [α]I\J
>c 0|J |,
where the equality follows from Proposition 3.12, the first inequality from I|J | − λ¯2[A˙(D)]2J ,J being
a nonsingular M-matrix (Proposition 3.12) whose inverse is bounded below by In (Lemma B.6), the
second inequality from (3.20), and the last inequality form [α]I\J >c 0|J | (Conditions 3.40.2 and 3.40.3).
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The system (3.22) is representative of the local-aggregate game of Calvó-Armengol
and Zenou (2004) and Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006), which is a
game with local strategic complements because λ¯ > 0. Statistical models based
on (3.22) have been used to estimate network effects in crime (Liu et al. 2012;
Lindquist and Zenou 2014). 
Example 3.42 (Local-average game) Suppose, for all i ∈ I , deg+D(i) > 0, αi > 0,
and λi = φ¯/deg+D(i), where φ¯ ∈ R++ (Example 3.6). It follows from (3.19) that the
system of best reply functions at the unique and interiorNE (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) of Γ(α,λ,D)
is given by
∀i ∈ I y⋆i = αi + φ¯
∑j∈N+D (i) y
⋆
j
deg+D(i)
. (3.23)
The system (3.23) has the same structure as the system of best reply functions at
the unique and interior NE (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) of the local-average game of Patacchini and
Zenou (2012), in which the players’ utility functions are given by
ui(y1, . . . , yn) := αiyi − 12y
2
i − φ¯
(
yi −
∑j∈N+D (i) yj
deg+D(i)
)2
and the system of best reply functions at the NE by
∀i ∈ I y⋆i =
αi
1+ φ¯
+
φ¯
1+ φ¯
∑j∈N+D (i) y
⋆
j
deg+D(i)
. (3.24)
Provided that the functional dependence of the intercept and slope parameters, that
is, αi/(1+ φ¯) and φ¯/(1+ φ¯), is ignored in the translation of (3.24) to a statistical
model (as, for example, in Patacchini andZenou 2012), the resulting statisticalmodel
is observationally equivalent to the statistical model that corresponds to (3.23). 
Example 3.43 (Mas and Moretti 2009) Suppose, for all i ∈ I , deg+D(i) > 0, αi > 0,
and λi = φi/deg+D(i), where φi ∈ R (Example 3.6). It follows from (3.19) that the
system of best reply functions at the unique and interiorNE (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) of Γ(α,λ,D)
is given by
∀i ∈ I y⋆i = αi + φi
∑j∈N+D (i) y
⋆
j
deg+D(i)
.
This system is the network analogue of the alternative model suggested by Mas
and Moretti (2009) to analyse coworker productivity spillovers, where a worker’s
productivity is assumed to depend on the contemporaneous rather than the perma-
nent productivity of coworkers (pp. 120–21). The negative spillover effects found
by Mas and Moretti (2009) correspond to negative values of φi. The network game
proposed in this section constitutes therefore a microeconomic foundation of the
network analogue of Mas and Moretti’s (2009) alternative model. Their empirical
findings speak in particular for a network game where the localness parameters are
potentially heterogeneous across player in terms of both magnitude and sign. 
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3.3.2 Two key player problems
Suppose the game Γ(α,λ,D) has a unique NE that is given by b(α,λ,D) in what
follows. A key player problem is defined relative to a central planner’s objective
function. In the context of the present game, there are two alternatives: aggregate
equilibrium action or equilibrium welfare. The following analysis is confined to a
variant of the former alternative, namely, weighted aggregate equilibrium action,
Υ(ω,D) :=
〈
ω, b
(
α(D),λ(D),D
)〉
=
n
∑
i=1
ωi bi
(
α(D),λ(D),D
)
,
where ω := (ω1, . . . ,ωn) ∈ [0, 1]n is a (column) vector of weights, referred to as
profile of weights. Note that ω need not necessarily satisfy 〈1n,ω〉 = 1. Unweighted
aggregate equilibrium action corresponds to the profile of weights 1n. The focus is
on the following two key player problems:
KPP-I Find the player whose isolation from all other players of the game Γ(α,λ,D)
(by cutting all his or her arcs to all other players) results in the maximal
decrease in weighted aggregate equilibrium action.
KPP-R Find the player whose removal from the game Γ(α,λ,D) (and thereby from
the digraph D) results in the maximal decrease in weighted aggregate
equilibrium action.
A key player problemwith a profile of weights for which all components are positive
is called a global key player problem (in Γ(α,λ,D)), and a key player problem with a
profile of weights for which at least one component is zero is called a local key player
problem (in Γ(α,λ,D)). The notion of a local key player problem embodies the idea
that the planner attaches importance only to the players residing in a particular
subdigraph K of D. In this case, only the components of the profile of weights with
indices in the vertex set of K, V(K), receive positive weights, for example, weight 1
in case of equal weights, and all other components receive weight 0.
The distinction between the two types of key player problems is subtle but
important in two respects: First, KPP-I and KPP-R are generally different in that
they do not necessarily identify the same player(s) as the key player(s).40 Second,
the two key player problems involve different changes in the topology of the network.
KPP-I entails the isolation of a player, whereas KPP-R entails the removal of a player.
This difference is relevant in practice because only one type of change in the topology
of the network may be feasible or appropriate for a given phenomenon. Consider,
for example, a network of criminals where action represents an illegal act or some
measure thereof. Suppose a convicted offender is sentenced to several years in prison
and thereby physically removed from his network. Often, the imprisonment aims
at cutting off all communication channels between the offender and the members of
his (former) network. It goes without saying that this constitutes a major challenge
for correctional institutions. If it is impossible for the convicted offender to commit
40. See Example 3.54 in Section 3.3.2.3 for an illustration.
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the illegal act behind bars, which is, for example, the case for armed robbery, then
the notion of the key player defined in the formulation of KPP-R is more appropriate
than the notion in the formulation of KPP-I. Suppose the sentence or probation
conditions of a convicted offender involve association, location, or even residence
restrictions. The offender is thereby isolated from the rest of his network, but he
may still be able to commit the illegal act. In this case, the notion of the key player
of KPP-I is more appropriate than that of KPP-R.
A key assumption for the subsequent analysis is that the players adjust only
their actions in response to the planner’s alteration of the digraph by which they
are connected but do not form new arcs or sever existing arcs themselves. This is a
reasonable assumption in the short term. In the medium to long term, the players
may adjust their connections, and they may also anticipate the planner’s key player
policy and take this into account in their decisions. The players’ utility parameters,
{(αi(D),λi(D)}i∈I , may change according to the mappings α and λ.
3.3.2.1 The KPP-I
Suppose, for all x ∈ I , Γ(α(D x),λ(D x),D x) has a unique NE that is given
by b(α(D x),λ(D x),D x). The planner’s objective is to maximally reduce
weighted aggregate equilibrium action by isolating exactly one player from all other
players of the game Γ(α,λ,D). Formally, the planner solves
KP-I(ω, α,λ,D) := argmin
x∈{y∈I|∆ΥI(y,ω,D)<0}
{
x ↦→ ∆ΥI(x,ω,D)},
where ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) denotes the change in weighted aggregate equilibrium action
caused by isolating player x:
∆ΥI(x,ω,D) := Υ(ω,D x)− Υ(ω,D).
Aplayer inKP-I(ω, α,λ,D) is called a key player of KPP-I in Γ(α(D),λ(D),D). Prop-
osition 3.24, equation (3.7) in particular, forms the basis for solving a specific KPP-I.
Compact, interpretable expressions of ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) are available under certain
assumptions. The focus of the remainder of this section is on the two cases discussed
in Section 3.2.4.1. The first case assumes that α and λ are constant (Conditions C-α
and C-λ). The corresponding result is stated as Proposition 3.44 and is based on
Proposition 3.25. The second case assumes that α is as in Example 3.2 and λ as in Ex-
ample 3.5, that is, the players of Γ(α,λ,D) are λ-homogeneous. The corresponding
result is stated as Proposition 3.48 and is based on Proposition 3.31.
Proposition 3.44 If Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied and ρ(diag(|λ|)A˙(D)) < 1,
then, for all x ∈ I , bx(ex,λ,D) ̸= 0 and
∆ΥI(x,ω,D) = ωxαx − bx(α,λ,D)bx(ex,λ,D) 〈ω, b(ex,λ,D)〉.
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By isolating player x, his action changes from bx(α,λ,D) to αx, his marginal
private benefit.41 The magnitude of the difference between ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) and αx −
bx(α,λ,D) is a measure of the extent to which a social multiplier is at work (via the
social components of the players’ utility functions). If λ− ̸= 0n, then ∆ΥI(x,ω,D)
may be negative, zero, or positive (see Example 3.52 in Section 3.3.2.3). If λ− = 0n,
that is, λ ≥c 0n, then ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) is nonpositive. This and other properties of
∆ΥI(x,ω,D) are stated in Proposition 3.45.
Proposition 3.45 Suppose Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied, α >c 0n, λ ≥c 0n, and
ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1. For all x ∈ I ,
∆ΥI(x,ω,D) = −ωx
(
bx(α,λ,D)− αx
)− bx(α,λ,D) ∑
j∈I\{x}
ωjSD,j,x(λ) ≤ 0,
(3.25)
where SD,j,x(λ) is the connection strength of (j, x) in D at λ (Definition CS). Let x ∈
I , and let (∗) denote the following condition: There exists a player i ∈ I \ {x} for
whom ωi > 0 and there exists a walk (i0, . . . , ip) in D of length p from i to x such that
(λi0 , . . . ,λip−1) >c 0p.
(3.45.1) If ωx > 0, λx > 0, and N+D (x) ̸= ∅, then ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) < 0.
(3.45.2) If Condition (∗) is satisfied, then ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) < 0.
(3.45.3) If Conditions I-α-λ and (∗) are satisfied, then ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) is strictly decreasing
in αx on R++.
(3.45.4) If Conditions I-α-λ and (∗) are satisfied and there exists a walk (k0, . . . , kq) in
D of length q from x to i such that (λk0 , . . . ,λkq−1) >c 0q, then ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) is
strictly decreasing in αi on R++.
(3.45.5) If Conditions I-α-λ and (∗) are satisfied andN+D (x) ̸= ∅, then ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) is
strictly decreasing in λx on Γx(λ,D).
(3.45.6) If Conditions I-α-λ and (∗) are satisfied, then ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) is strictly decreasing
in λi on Γi(λ,D).
If ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) < 0 for some x ∈ I , then KP-I(ω, α,λ,D) ̸= ∅ but not necessar-
ily |KP-I(ω, α,λ,D)| = 1. Sufficient conditions for ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) < 0 are given in
Proposition 3.45 (Results 3.45.1 and 3.45.2). As regards the case ω = 1n, if Condi-
tions C-α and C-λ are satisfied, α >c 0n, λ >c 0n, and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, then
there exists an x ∈ I with∆ΥI(x, 1n,D) < 0 becauseD is not empty. Equation (3.25)
shows that the stronger the players of Γ(α(D),λ(D),D) are connected in D in terms
of connection strength, the larger is the decrease in weighted aggregate equilibrium
action.
41. If player i is isolated, then, for all action profiles (y1, . . . , yn), his utility satisfies ui(y1, . . . , yn) =
αiyi − (1/2)y2i , from which it follows that his best reply is given by his marginal private benefit, αi .
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A special case of Proposition 3.44, namely, where the players of Γ(α,λ,D) are
both α-homogeneous and λ-homogeneous, is stated in Corollary 3.46. To this end,
note that if λ = λ¯1n for some λ¯ ∈ R with 1 /∈ σ(λ¯A˙(D)), then
〈ω, b(ex,λ,D)〉 = bx(ω, λ¯1n,DT), (3.26)
where DT denotes the transpose of D with A˙(DT) = A˙(D)T.
Corollary 3.46 If α is as in Example 3.1 with α¯ ∈ R++, λ is as in Example 3.5 with
λ¯ ∈ R, and ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, then, for all x ∈ I , bx(ex, λ¯1n,D) ̸= 0 and
∆ΥI(x,ω,D) = α¯
(
ωx − bx(1n, λ¯1n,D) bx(ω, λ¯1n,D
T)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
)
.
As regards the second case where α is as in Example 3.2 and λ as in Example 3.5,
it is important to note that b(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) is the unique but not necessarily
interior NE of the game Γ(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) if λ¯ ≥ 0 and ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1 (Propos-
ition 3.47). Under the foregoing conditions, if a player’s out-degree is zero, then he
plays action zero, and a positive action otherwise.
Proposition 3.47 The game Γ(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) has a unique NE y⋆ ∈ Rn+, which is
given by y⋆ = b(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D), if two conditions are satisfied: (3.47.1) λ¯ ≥ 0 and
(3.47.2) ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1. The action profile b(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) satisfies, for all i ∈ I , if
deg+D(i) = 0, then bi(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) = 0, and bi(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) > 0 otherwise.
Note that Proposition 3.47 is true for any game Γ(A˙(D x)1n, λ¯1n,D x).
Proposition 3.48 Suppose α is as in Example 3.2, λ is as in Example 3.5 with λ¯ ≥ 0, and
ρ(λ¯A˙(D)). For all x ∈ I , if λ¯ = 0, then
∆ΥI(x,ω,D) = −
(
ωxdeg+D(x) + ∑
i∈N−D (x)
ωi
)
,
and if λ¯ > 0, then
∆ΥI(x,ω,D) =
1
λ¯
(
ωx − bx(ω, λ¯1n,D
T)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
)
− bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) bx(ω, λ¯1n,D
T)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
.
Within the framework of Proposition 3.48, if λ¯ > 0, then
∆ΥI(x,ω,D) = −ωx
(
bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D)− 0
)
−
(
1
λ¯
+ bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D)
)
∑
j∈I\{x}
ωjSD,j,x(λ¯1n),
which is less than the corresponding expression given in Proposition 3.45 if ωx > 0
or there exists a player i ∈ I \ {x} for whom ωi > 0 and there exists a walk in D
from i to x, provided that the values of the profiles α and λ in Proposition 3.45 agree
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with A˙(D)1n and λ¯1n, respectively. The reason for this is that the marginal private
benefit of the player being isolated remains unchanged within the framework of
Proposition 3.45, whereas it falls to zero within the framework of Proposition 3.48,
which results in a decrease of his action from bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) to 0. This de-
crease can be decomposed into two components: a change from bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D)
to deg+D(x) and a change from deg+D(x) to 0. Both changes cause other connected
players to reduce their actions. The former change results in a decline of weighted
aggregate equilibrium action by bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D)∑j∈I\{x} ωjSD,j,x(λ¯1n) and the
latter by (1/λ¯)∑j∈I\{x} ωjSD,j,x(λ¯1n).
3.3.2.2 The KPP-R
Suppose, for all x ∈ I , Γ(α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x) has a unique NE that is given
by b(α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x). The planner’s objective is to maximally reduce
weighted aggregate equilibrium action by removing exactly one player from the
game Γ(α,λ,D). Formally, the planner solves
KP-R(ω, α,λ,D) := argmin
x∈{y∈I|∆ΥR(y,ω,D)<0}
{
x ↦→ ∆ΥR(x,ω,D)},
where ∆ΥR(x,ω,D) denotes the change in weighted aggregate equilibrium action
caused by removing player x:42
∆ΥR(x,ω,D) := Υ([ω]−x,D⊖ x)− Υ(ω,D).
A player in KP-R(ω, α,λ,D) is called a key player of KPP-R in Γ(α(D),λ(D),D).
Propositions 3.24 and 3.35 form the basis for solving a specific KPP-R. Expres-
sions of ∆ΥR(x,ω,D) for the two cases discussed in Section 3.3.2.1 are given in
Propositions 3.49 and 3.51.
Proposition 3.49 If Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied, for all x ∈ I , α(D⊖ x) =
[α(D x)]−x and λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x, and ρ(diag(|λ(D)|)A˙(D)) < 1, then,
for all x ∈ I , ∆ΥR(x,ω,D) = ∆ΥI(x,ω,D)−ωxαx.
By removing player x from the game, his action changes from bx(α,λ,D) to 0.
The magnitude of the difference between ∆ΥR(x,ω,D) and − bx(α,λ,D) is a mea-
sure of the extent to which a social multiplier is at work. If λ− ̸= 0n, then
∆ΥR(x,ω,D)may be negative, zero, or positive (see Example 3.53 in Section 3.3.2.3).
If λ− = 0n, then ∆ΥR(x,ω,D) is nonpositive. Results 3.45.2 to 3.45.6 are true also
for ∆ΥR(x,ω,D) because
∆ΥR(x,ω,D) = −ωx bx(α,λ,D)− bx(α,λ,D) ∑
j∈I\{x}
ωjSD,j,x(λ)
42. In the terminology of graph theory, the additive inverse of ∆ΥR(x,ω,D) is a vitality index
(Koschützki et al. 2005, Definition 3.6.1).
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if Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied, λ ≥c 0n, for all x ∈ I , α(D⊖ x) =
[α(D x)]−x and λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x, and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1. The condi-
tion of Result 3.45.1 can be weakened to ωx > 0.
Proposition 3.49 shows that KPP-I and KPP-R are closely related under the stated
conditions. The difference between ∆ΥR(x,ω,D) and ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) is due to the
facts that player x’s action decreases from bx(α,λ,D) to αx if he is being isolated and
from bx(α,λ,D) to 0 if he is being removed from the game and the effects on all other
players are the same in both cases (Proposition 3.35). Moreover, Proposition 3.49
implies that the two key player problems have the same key player(s) if the players
of Γ(α,λ,D) are α-homogeneous but not necessarily λ-homogeneous. This result is
stated in Corollary 3.50.
Corollary 3.50 If the players of Γ(α,λ,D) are α-homogeneous, Condition C-λ is satis-
fied, for all x ∈ I , λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x, and ρ(diag(|λ(D)|)A˙(D)) < 1, then
KP-I(ω, α,λ,D) = KP-R(ω, α,λ,D).
Proposition 3.51 shows that α-homogeneity is not a necessary condition for
KPP-I and KPP-R to have the same key player(s).
Proposition 3.51 If α is as in Example 3.2, λ is as in Example 3.5 with λ¯ ≥ 0, and
ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, then, for all x ∈ I , ∆ΥR(x,ω,D) = ∆ΥI(x,ω,D).
3.3.2.3 Examples
Examples 3.52 and 3.53 show that ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) and ∆ΥR(x,ω,D) can be negative,
zero, or positive for some player x if λ− ̸= 0n. Example 3.54 shows that KPP-I
and KPP-R are generally different in that they do not necessarily identify the same
player(s) as the key player(s). Example 3.55 shows that a key player of KPP-I is
not necessarily the player with the largest difference between action and marginal
private benefit and a key player of KPP-R is not necessarily the player with the
highest action. Example 3.56 shows that a key player problem may identify several
players as key players. Example 3.57 shows that a local key player problem can
be different from the corresponding global key player problem in that the two
problems identify different key players.
Example 3.52 Suppose D = ({1, 2, . . . , 7}, {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 1), (3, 2),
(3, 4), (4, 3), (4, 5), (4, 6), (4, 7), (5, 4), (5, 6), (6, 4), (6, 5), (7, 4)}). See Figure 3.4 for
an illustration of D. In addition, suppose α(D) = α(D 7) = 17 and λ(D) =
λ(D 7) = (1/3)(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,−c), where c ∈ {8/28, 9/28, 10/28}. Straightfor-
ward but tedious calculations show that
∆ΥI(7, 17,D) =
56c− 18
2c+ 9
.
If follows that ∆ΥI(7, 17,D) < 0 if c = 8/28, ∆ΥI(7, 17,D) = 0 if c = 9/28, and
∆ΥI(7, 17,D) > 0 if c = 10/28. 
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Figure 3.4. A symmetric digraph of order 7 and size 16 (Examples 3.52, 3.54,
and 3.55)
Example 3.53 Consider the digraph D of Example 3.21. Suppose α(D) = 14,
λ(D) = (1/6)(−2,−c, 6,−3), α(D⊖ 3) = 13, and λ(D⊖ 3) = (1/6)(−2,−c,−3),
where c ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Straightforward but tedious calculations show that
∆ΥR(3, 14,D) =
2c− 6
15
.
If follows that ∆ΥR(3, 14,D) < 0 if c = 2, ∆ΥR(3, 14,D) = 0 if c = 3, and
∆ΥR(3, 14,D) > 0 if c = 4. 
Example 3.54 Consider the digraph D of Example 3.52. Suppose Conditions C-α
and C-λ are satisfied, α(D) = (5, 5, 6, 5, 5, 5, 5) and λ(D) = (1/12)17, and for
all x ∈ I , α(D⊖ x) = [α(D x)]−x and λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x. Straightfor-
ward calculations show that KP-I(17, α,λ,D) = {4} and KP-R(17, α,λ,D) = {3}
(see Table 3.1), that is, the key player of the unweighted global KPP-I in Γ(α,λ,D)
is player 4, and the key player of the unweighted global KPP-R in Γ(α,λ,D) is
player 3. By isolating player 4, his action changes from b4(α,λ,D) = 7.12 to α4 = 5.
This decrease by 2.12 is the largest among all players, which results in a decline in
unweighted aggregate equilibrium action by 4.72. By removing player 3 from the
game, his action changes from b3(α,λ,D) = 7.62 to 0. This decrease is the largest
among all players and results in a decline in unweighted aggregate equilibrium
action by 9.82. 
Example 3.55 Consider Example 3.54 with α(D) = (2, 2, 3, 4, 2, 2, 1) and λ(D) =
(1/10)(2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2). Straightforward calculations show that KP-I(17, α,λ,D) =
KP-R(17, α,λ,D) = {4} (see Table 3.2), that is, player 4 is the key player of both
unweighted global KPP-I and KPP-R in Γ(α,λ,D). Note that player 4 is not the
player with the largest difference between action and marginal private benefit or
the player with the highest action, who, in both cases, is player 3. 
Example 3.56 Suppose D = ({1, 2, . . . , 7}, {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 3),
(5, 4), (5, 6), (6, 4), (6, 5), (7, 4)}). See Figure 3.5 for an illustration of D. In addition,
suppose Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied, α(D) = (2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1), λ(D) =
(1/3)17, and for all x ∈ I , α(D⊖ x) = [α(D x)]−x and λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x.
Straightforward calculations yield KP-I(17, α,λ,D) = {4} and KP-R(17, α,λ,D) =
{1, 2, 5, 6} (see Table 3.3), that is, the key player of the unweighted global KPP-I
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Table 3.1. Unweighted global key player problems (Example 3.54)
x αx bx(α,λ,D) bx(α,λ,D)− αx ∆ΥI(x, 17,D) ∆ΥR(x, 17,D)
1 5 6.15 1.15 −2.33 −7.33
2 5 6.15 1.15 −2.33 −7.33
3 6⋆ 7.62⋆ 1.62 −3.82 −9.82⋆
4 5 7.12 2.12⋆ −4.72⋆ −9.72
5 5 6.10 1.10 −2.32 −7.32
6 5 6.10 1.10 −2.32 −7.32
7 5 5.59 0.59 −1.20 −6.20
Notes: All real numbers in decimal notation are rounded to two decimal places.
Numbers with a star indicate a column minimum or maximum.
Table 3.2. Unweighted global key player problems (Example 3.55)
x αx bx(α,λ,D) bx(α,λ,D)− αx ∆ΥI(x, 17,D) ∆ΥR(x, 17,D)
1 2 3.92 1.92 −4.09 −6.09
2 2 3.92 1.92 −4.09 −6.09
3 3 5.68⋆ 2.68⋆ −6.56 −9.56
4 4⋆ 5.56 1.56 −7.30⋆ −11.30⋆
5 2 3.89 1.89 −3.53 −5.53
6 2 3.89 1.89 −3.53 −5.53
7 1 2.11 1.11 −1.53 −2.53
Notes: All real numbers in decimal notation are rounded to two decimal places.
Numbers with a star indicate a column minimum or maximum.
Table 3.3. Unweighted global key player problems (Example 3.56)
x αx bx(α,λ,D) bx(α,λ,D)− αx ∆ΥI(x, 17,D) ∆ΥR(x, 17,D)
1 2⋆ 3.75⋆ 1.75⋆ −3.00 −5.00⋆
2 2⋆ 3.75⋆ 1.75⋆ −3.00 −5.00⋆
3 1 1.50 0.50 −3.17 −4.17
4 1 1.50 0.50 −3.50⋆ −4.50
5 2⋆ 3.75⋆ 1.75⋆ −3.00 −5.00⋆
6 2⋆ 3.75⋆ 1.75⋆ −3.00 −5.00⋆
7 1 1.50 0.50 −0.50 −1.50
Notes: All real numbers in decimal notation are rounded to two decimal places.
Numbers with a star indicate a column minimum or maximum.
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Figure 3.5. An asymmetric digraph of order 7 and size 11 (Examples 3.56)
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Figure 3.6. An asymmetric digraph of order 7 and size 14 (Example 3.57)
in Γ(α,λ,D) is player 4, who is different from any of the key players of the un-
weighted global KPP-R in Γ(α,λ,D), players 1, 2, 5, and 6. 
Example 3.57 Suppose D = ({1, 2, . . . , 7}, {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 1), (3, 2),
(3, 4), (4, 3), (4, 7), (5, 4), (5, 6), (6, 4), (6, 7), (7, 6)}). See Figure 3.6 for an illustration
of D. Suppose ω = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1). Let K denote the subdigraph of D induced
by the subset of players J := {i ∈ I | ωi > 0} = {4, 5, 6, 7}, that is, K := D〈J 〉.
Suppose Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied, α(D) = (2, 2, 3, 2, 2, 2, 1), λ(D) =
(1/3)17, for all x ∈ I , α(D⊖ x) = [α(D x)]−x and λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x,
α(K) = [α(D)]J = (2, 2, 2, 1), λ(K) = [λ(D)]J = (1/3)14, and for all x ∈ I(4),
α(K⊖ x) = [α(K x)]−x and λ(K⊖ x) = [λ(K x)]−x. Straightforward calcu-
lations show that KP-R(ω, α,λ,D) = {4} and 3 + KP-R(14, α,λ,K) = {6} (see
Table 3.4), that is, the key player of the local KPP-R in Γ(α,λ,D), player 4, is dif-
ferent from the key player of the unweighted global KPP-R in Γ([α]J , [λ]J ,K),
player 6.43 The key player of the unweighted global KPP-R in Γ(α,λ,D) is player 3,
who is also the player with the highest action in Γ(α,λ,D) (b3(α,λ,D) = 10.74). If
there were no arcs between players 3 and 4, then player 4 would play action 2.74
(b4−3([α]J , [λ]J ,K) = 2.74). Because player 4’s utility function exhibits strategic
complements (λ4 > 0), his action in Γ(α,λ,D), b4(α,λ,D) = 6.47, is higher than his
action in Γ([α]J , [λ]J ,K), b4−3([α]J , [λ]J ,K) = 2.74. The difference 6.47− 2.74 =
3.73 represents the effect of the actions of players 1, 2, and 3 on player 4’s action
in Γ(α,λ,D). This effect is taken into account in the local KPP-R in Γ(α,λ,D) but is
completely ignored in the unweighted global KPP-R in Γ([α]J , [λ]J ,K); as a result,
the key player of the local KPP-R in Γ(α,λ,D) is different from the key player of
the unweighted global KPP-R in Γ([α]J , [λ]J ,K). 
43. The set 3+KP-R(14, α,λ,K) is equal to {3+ i | i ∈ KP-R(14, α,λ,K)}.
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Table 3.4. Global and local key player problems (Example 3.57)
Global key player problems in Γ(α,λ,D) with ω = 17
x αx bx(α,λ,D) ∆ΥI(x, 17,D) ∆ΥR(x, 17,D)
1 2 8.37 −18.85 −20.85
2 2 8.37 −18.85 −20.85
3 3⋆ 10.74⋆ −25.79⋆ −28.79⋆
4 2 6.47 −17.15 −19.15
5 2 5.84 −3.84 −5.84
6 2 5.05 −7.99 −9.99
7 1 2.68 −5.86 −6.86
Local key player problems in Γ(α,λ,D) with ω = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1)
x αx bx(α,λ,D) ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) ∆ΥR(x,ω,D)
4 2⋆ 6.47⋆ −10.68⋆ −12.68⋆
5 2⋆ 5.84 −3.84 −5.84
6 2⋆ 5.05 −7.32 −9.32
7 1 2.68 −4.79 −5.79
Global key player problems in Γ([α]J , [λ]J ,K) with ω = 14a
x αx bx−3([α]J , [λ]J ,K) ∆Υ
I(x− 3, 14,K) ∆ΥR(x− 3, 14,K)
4 2⋆ 2.74 −3.36 −5.36
5 2⋆ 4.13⋆ −2.13 −4.13
6 2⋆ 3.65 −4.63⋆ −6.63⋆
7 1 2.22 −3.52 −4.52
Notes: All real numbers in decimal notation are rounded to two decimal places.
Numbers with a star indicate a column minimum or maximum. a K = D〈J 〉 with
J = {4, 5, 6, 7}.
3.4 Concluding remarks
The present work contributes to the literature on key player analysis by introducing
the concept of the local key player in the context of a network game where the
players are heterogeneous with respect to the marginal private benefit from taking
an action and with respect to the network effects exerted on own behavior by the
actions of connected players, of which the magnitude and sign can vary across
players. The qualifier local refers thereby to the social planner’s objective to reduce
aggregate activity of only those players who reside in a certain local area or part of
the network.
The proposed network game or, more precisely, its translation to a statistical
model nests several prominent models used in the literature on the economics of
social interactions to estimate peer or network effects, such as the local-aggregate
model (Calvó-Armengol and Zenou 2004; Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou
2006), the local-average model (Patacchini and Zenou 2012), and a network version
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of a model discussed in Mas and Moretti (2009) to estimate the extent to which the
productivity of a worker depends on the productivity of co-workers in the same
team. Recent research combined the local-aggregate and local-average models into
a hybrid model to test which of the two is more adequate to describe a certain
phenomenon (Liu, Patacchini, and Zenou 2014; Lindquist, Sauermann, and Zenou
2016). A translation of the proposed network game to an identifiable statistical
model enables to test at the individual level to which extent network effects are driven
by the aggregate or average action of an individual’s neighbors. As a first step,
future research needs to discuss suitable estimators of the parameters of such a
statistical model.
Empirical work on key players in social networks is relatively scarce (see Zenou
2016 for a survey). The proposed refinement of the key player concept may con-
tribute to the growth of this literature because it widens the field of application by
adding a local flavor. An example is the design of compensation plans for employees
according to their contribution to overall team productivity in a team organization
where the teams form a universe of interconnected islands; specifically, the team
member who would reduce team productivity most if he or she gave notice receives
the highest salary. The local flavor may be an important feature when implementing
key player based policies in the real world in the context of crime. It enables in
particular the design of a key player based policing policy to fight crime locally in
all police areas (or other geographical areas of political importance or interest) of a
jurisdiction, thereby taking into account that criminal networks spread across area
boundaries. Needless to say, the design of such a key player based policing policy is
only possible if relevant data is available. Lindquist and Zenou (2014) demonstrate
with their analysis of co-offending networks in Sweden that a policing policy based
on the global key player concept is in fact implementable. They identify the key
offender in each weakly connected component. They show that a key player based
policing policy outperforms other reasonable policing policies such as targeting the
most active criminals or targeting criminals who have the highest betweenness or
eigenvector centrality in the network. Provided that their data can be complemented
with spatial data on crime, for example, the average coordinate of the geographical
locations of all crimes attributed to a criminal over a certain period of time, the
implementation of a policing policy based on the local key player concept seems
realistic.

Appendix A
Basic Concepts in Graph Theory
This appendix reviews basic concepts of the theory of digraphs (for a comprehensive
introduction see, for example, Bang-Jensen and Gutin 2009).
Basic terminology
A directed graph (or digraph for short) D consists of a nonempty, finite set of elements
called vertices and a finite set of ordered pairs of distinct vertices called arcs. The
set of vertices of D is called the vertex set of D and is denoted by V(D). The set
of arcs of D is called the arc set of D and is denoted by A(D). It follows that D is
represented by the pair (V(D),A(D)).
The order of D is the cardinality of V(D). The size of D is the cardinality ofA(D).
The digraph D is called empty if A(D) = ∅.
Suppose D is of order at least two and not empty. An arc (u, v) in D is directed
from u to v, where u and v are called the tail and the head of (u, v), respectively. The
definition of a digraph implies that D contains no multiple arcs, that is, pairs of arcs
with the same head and the same tail, and no self-loops, that is, arcs whose head
and tail are equal. Two vertices u and v in D are called adjacent in D if the arc (u, v)
or the arc (v, u) is in D.
Symmetric and transitive digraph
The transpose of D, denoted by DT, is defined as (V(D), {(u, v) | (v, u) ∈ A(D)}).
The digraph D is called symmetric if for all distinct vertices u and v in D, (u, v)
is an arc in D if and only if (v, u) is an arc in D, that is, DT = D.
The digraph D is called transitive if for all pairs ((u, v), (v,w)) of arcs in D with
u ̸= w, the arc (u,w) is also in D (see, for example, Bang-Jensen and Gutin 2009,
Section 2.3).
Walk and path
Let x and y be two (not necessarily distinct) vertices in D, and let p be a positive
integer. A walk in D of length p from x to y is a finite sequence (v0, v1, . . . , vp)
in V(D) of length p + 1 such that v0 = x, vp = y, and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , p},
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(vk−1, vk) ∈ A(D). The inverse of the walk (v0, v1, . . . , vp) in D is the finite sequence
(vp, vp−1, . . . , v0), which may or may not be a walk in D. A walk in D is called path
if it contains no repeated vertices.
Weakly and strongly connected component
A digraph K is called subdigraph of D if V(K) ⊂ V(D), A(K) ⊂ A(D), and A(K) ⊂
V(K)2. IfK is a subdigraph ofD, thenD is called a superdigraph ofK. A subdigraphK
of D is called complete if for all pairs (u, v) of distinct vertices in K, both arcs (u, v)
and (v, u) are in K. The subdigraph of D induced by L ⊂ V(D), denoted by D〈L〉, is
the unique subdigraph of D such that V(D〈L〉) = L and every arc in D with both
head and tail in L is in D〈L〉. A subdigraph K of D is called strongly connected if
|V(K)| = 1 or else for all pairs (u, v) of distinct vertices in K, there exists a walk in K
from u to v and a walk in K from v to u. A strongly connected component of D is a
maximal induced subdigraph of D that is strongly connected. A complete component
of D is a strongly connected component that is complete. The complete biorientation
of D, denoted by CB(D), is the unique digraph obtained from D by adding the
arc (v, u) to D if (u, v) but not (v, u) is in D. A subdigraph K of D is called a weakly
connected component of D if CB(K) is a strongly connected component of CB(D).
Distance and diameter
The distance between two vertices u and v in D, denoted by distD(u, v), is defined
as follows: it is zero if u = v, else it is the length (that is, the number of arcs) of a
shortest path in D from u to v if such a path exists and +∞ otherwise. The diameter
of D, denoted by diam(D), is defined asmax{distD(u, v) | (u, v) ∈ V(D)2}.
Neighborhoods
Let u be a vertex in D, and let r be a positive integer. The in-neighborhood of u (in D)
is the set N−D (u) := {v ∈ V(D) | (v, u) ∈ A(D)}, and the out-neighborhood of u
(in D) is the set N+D (u) := {v ∈ V(D) | (u, v) ∈ A(D)}. The vertices of N−D (u)
andN+D (u) are called in-neighbors and out-neighbors of u (in D), respectively. The in-
degree of u (inD) is defined by deg−D(u) := |N−D (u)| and the out-degree of u (inD) by
deg+D(u) := |N+D (u)|. The vertex u is called isolated (in D) ifN−D (u) = N+D (u) = ∅.
The out-neighborhood of order r of u (in D), denoted byN+D,r(u), is defined recursively
by
N+D,1(u) := N+D (u),
∀r > 1 N+D,r(u) :=
⋃
v∈N+D,r−1(u)
N+D (v).
The vertices of the set ⋃r∈Z++\{1}N+D,r(u) are called higher-order out-neighbors of u
(in D). The in-neighborhood of order r of u (in D), which is denoted by N−D,r(u), and
the higher-order in-neighbors of u (in D) are defined analogously.
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Adjacency matrix
A digraph D of order N > 1 can be represented by a square matrix of order N. This
can be seen as follows. Let h : V(D)→ {1, . . . ,N} be a bijection. By means of h, the
vertex set V(D) can be identified with the set {1, . . . ,N} and the arc setA(D)with a
subset of {1, . . . ,N}2, namely, Ah(D) := {(h(u), h(v)) | (u, v) ∈ A(D)}. It follows
that h is a digraph isomorphism from (V(D),A(D)) to ({1, . . . ,N},Ah(D)), that is,
h is an arc-preserving bijection. The adjacency matrix of D with respect to h, denoted
by A˙h(D), is the square matrix of order N with the component in row i and column j
equal to one if (i, j) ∈ Ah(D) and zero else. Note that A˙h(D) is different fromON ,
the zero matrix of order N, if D is not empty. Also note that all components on the
main diagonal of A˙h(D) vanish because D has no self-loops. If V(D) ⊂ R and h is
the unique order isomorphism, then A˙h(D) is written as A˙(D).1
1. An order isomorphism is an order-preserving bijection. For example, if V(D) = {1, 3, 4, 7, 8}, then
h : V(D)→ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is given by h(1) = 1, h(3) = 2, h(4) = 3, h(7) = 4, and h(8) = 5.

Appendix B
Basic Results in Matrix Analysis
This appendix contains a collection of basic results in matrix analysis referenced
either in the text or in the proofs of the main results. Lemma B.2, Result B.3.1 of
Lemma B.3, Lemma B.5, Result B.6.1 of Lemma B.6, and Lemmata B.7, B.8, and B.9
are well known in the literature. Let n ∈ Z++ \ {1}.
Lemma B.1 Let x, y ∈ Rn, and let A ∈ M(n,R).
(B.1.1) If x ≤c y andOn ≤c A, then Ax ≤c Ay.
(B.1.2) If x <c y and In ≤c A, then Ax <c Ay.
Proof Let x, y ∈ Rn, and let A ∈ M(n,R). Let z := x− y.
Proof of Result B.1.1 Suppose z ≤c 0n andOn ≤c A. We find Ax = Ay+ Az ≤c
Ay because z ≤c 0n andOn ≤c A imply that Az ≤c 0n. 
Proof of Result B.1.2 Suppose z <c 0n and In ≤c A. We find Ax = Ay+ Az <c
Ay because z <c 0n and In ≤c A imply that Az <c 0n. 
Lemma B.2 Let A ∈ M(n,R) with A ̸= On. The Neumann series ∑∞k=0 Ak converges
(strongly) if and only if ρ(A) < 1. If ∑∞k=0 Ak converges (strongly), then In − A is
nonsingular with inverse ∑∞k=0 Ak.
Proof See, for example, Meyer (2000, pp. 618–19) or Frommer (1990, Satz A.2.2).
Lemma B.3 Let c ∈ R \ {0}, and let A ∈ M(n,R) with A ̸= On.
(B.3.1) The matrix In − cA is nonsingular if and only if 1 /∈ σ(cA).
(B.3.2) If |c|ρ(A) < 1, then, for all p ∈ Z++, the Neumann series∑∞k=0 cpkApk converges
(strongly) and In − cpAp is nonsingular with inverse ∑∞k=0 cpkApk.
Proof Let c ∈ R \ {0}, and let A ∈ M(n,R) with A ̸= On.
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Proof of Result B.3.1 First, note that In− cA is nonsingular if and only if (1/c)In−
A is nonsingular because In − cA = c((1/c)In − A). Second, note that, by the
definition of σ(A), (1/c)In − A is nonsingular if and only if (1/c) /∈ σ(A). Finally,
note that (1/c) /∈ σ(A) is equivalent to 1 /∈ σ(cA). 
Proof of Result B.3.2 Suppose |c|ρ(A) < 1. Let p ∈ Z++. First, note that
|c|ρ(A) < 1 is equivalent to (|c|ρ(A))p < 1. Second, note that, for all a ∈ R,
ρ(aA) = |a|ρ(A) because σ(aA) = aσ(A). Third, note that ρ(Ap) = ρ(A)p,
which is a consequence of the spectral mapping theorem (see, for example, Kubrusly
2011, Theorem 6.19 and Corollary 6.20). Using the preceding results, we find
ρ(cpAp) = |cp|ρ(Ap) = |c|pρ(A)p = (|c|ρ(A))p, which implies that (|c|ρ(A))p < 1
is equivalent to ρ(cpAp) < 1. Finally, note that, according to Lemma B.2, the Neu-
mann series ∑∞k=0 cpkApk converges (strongly) and In − cpAp is nonsingular with
inverse ∑∞k=0 cpkApk. 
Lemma B.4 Let (c1, c2) ∈ R2, and let A ∈ M(n,R). Suppose 1 /∈ σ(c2A). The two
matrices In − c1A and (In − c2A)−1 commute.
Proof Let (c1, c2) ∈ R2, and let A ∈ M(n,R). Suppose 1 /∈ σ(c2A). The statement
is trivial if c2 = 0. Suppose c2 ̸= 0 in what follows. Premultiplying (respectively,
postmultiplying) both sides of the identity In = (In − c2A) + c2A by (In − c2A)−1
gives (In − c2A)−1 = In + c2(In − c2A)−1A (respectively, (In − c2A)−1 = In +
c2A(In − c2A)−1), from which it follows that (In − c2A)−1A = A(In − c2A)−1. Us-
ing this result, we find (In − c1A)(In − c2A)−1 = (In − c2A)−1 − c1A(In − c2A)−1
= (In − c2A)−1 − c1(In − c2A)−1A = (In − c2A)−1(In − c1A), that is, In − c1A
and (In − c2A)−1 commute. 
Lemma B.5 (Perron 1907; Frobenius 1912) Let A ∈ M(n,R) be nonnegative.
(B.5.1) The matrix A has a nonnegative real eigenvalue that is equal to its spectral radius,
that is, ρ(A) ∈ σ(A).
(B.5.2) To the eigenvalue ρ(A) of A there corresponds a nonnegative eigenvector, that is,
there exists an x ∈ Rn+ \ {0n} with Ax = ρ(A)x.
Proof See, for example, Varga (2000, Theorem 2.20). 
Lemma B.6 Let c ∈ R+, and let A ∈ M(n,R) be nonnegative.
(B.6.1) The matrix In − cA is nonsingular with a nonnegative inverse if and only if
cρ(A) < 1.
(B.6.2) If cρ(A) < 1, then In ≤c (In − cA)−1.
(B.6.3) If c > 0, cρ(A) < 1, and A is irreducible, thenOn <c (In − cA)−1.
Proof Let c ∈ R+, and let A ∈ M(n,R) be nonnegative. Results B.6.1 and B.6.2
are trivial if c = 0. Suppose c > 0 in what follows.
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Proof of Result B.6.1 First, note that In − cA is nonsingular with nonnegative in-
verse if and only if (1/c)In − A is nonsingular with nonnegative inverse because
c > 0 and In− cA = c((1/c)In−A). Second, note that (1/c)In−A is anM-matrix if
and only if (1/c) ≥ ρ(A) (for the definition of M-matrices see, for example, Berman
and Plemmons 1994, Definition 1.2 on p. 133). Third, note that (1/c)In − A is sin-
gular if 1/c = ρ(A). Indeed, if 1/c = ρ(A), then (1/c) ∈ σ(A) (Lemma B.5). Thus,
(1/c)In − A is a nonsingular M-matrix if and only if (1/c) > ρ(A). Fourth, note
that (1/c)In − A is nonsingular with nonnegative inverse if and only if (1/c)In − A
is a nonsingular M-matrix (see, for example, Theorem 2.3 on pp. 134–38, in particu-
lar Condition N38). The foregoing results imply that In − cA is nonsingular with
nonnegative inverse if and only if 1/c > ρ(A) or, equivalently, cρ(A) < 1. 
Proof of Result B.6.2 Suppose cρ(A) < 1. Note that In − cA is nonsingular with
nonnegative inverse (Result B.6.1). Postmultiplying both sides of In = (In − cA) +
cA by (In − cA)−1 gives (In − cA)−1 = In + cA(In − cA)−1, which implies that
In ≤c (In − cA)−1 because c > 0 and both A and (In − cA)−1 are nonnegative. 
Proof of Result B.6.3 Suppose cρ(A) < 1 and A is irreducible. Note that In − cA
is nonsingular with nonnegative inverse (Result B.6.1). For all (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , n}2,
there exists an mi,j ∈ Z++ such that [Ami,j ]i,j > 0 because A is nonnegative and
irreducible (see, for example, Berman and Plemmons 1994, Theorem 2.1 on p. 29).
Let m := max{mi,j | (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , n}2}. According to the proof of Result B.6.2,
(In − cA)−1 = In + cA(In − cA)−1, from which
(In − cA)−1 =
m
∑
k=0
ckAk + cm+1Am+1(In − cA)−1
follows by recursive substitution. We find, for all (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , n}2,
[(In − cA)−1]i,j =
m
∑
k=0
ck[Ak]i,j + c
m+1[Am+1(In − cA)−1]i,j ≥ cmi,j [Ami,j ]i,j > 0
because c > 0 and both A and (In − cA)−1 are nonnegative. 
Lemma B.7 For any sub-multiplicative matrix norm ‖·‖ on M(n,C) and for any
A ∈ M(n,C), ρ(A) ≤ ‖A‖.
Proof The proof follows the lines in Meyer (2000, Example 7.1.4). Let ‖·‖ be a
sub-multiplicative matrix norm onM(n,C), and let A ∈ M(n,C). I show that
∀λ ∈ σ(A) |λ| ≤ ‖A‖, (B.1)
from which ρ(A) ≤ ‖A‖ follows. Let λ ∈ σ(A) with associated eigenvector v ∈ Cn.
By the definition of an eigenvector, v ̸= 0n. Let B ∈ M(n,C)with [B],1 = v and for
all j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}, [B],j = 0n. We find λB = AB and |λ|‖B‖ = ‖λB‖ = ‖AB‖ ≤
‖A‖‖B‖, which is equivalent to |λ| ≤ ‖A‖ because ‖B‖ > 0 (v ̸= 0n implies that
B ̸= On). 
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Lemma B.8 If A ∈ M(n,R) is nonnegative and row-normalized, then ρ(A) = 1.
Proof Let A ∈ M(n,R) be nonnegative and row-normalized, where A ∈ M(n,C)
by the canonical embedding R ↪→ C. Recall that the maximum absolute row sum
norm ‖·‖∞ on M(n,C) is sub-multiplicative. First, I show that ρ(A) ≤ 1. We
find ‖A‖∞ = max{∑nj=1|[A]ij| | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} = 1 because A is nonnegative and
row-normalized. Lemma B.7 implies that ρ(A) ≤ 1. Second, I show that ρ(A) ≥ 1.
We find A1n = 11n because A is row-normalized, that is, 1 is an eigenvalue of A
with corresponding eigenvector 1n. It follows that ρ(A) ≥ 1. 
Lemma B.9 For all A ∈ M(n,R), ρ(−A) = ρ(A).
Proof Let A ∈ M(n,R). According to the Gelfand–Beurling formula (see, for
example, Kubrusly 2011, Proposition 6.21), for any consistent matrix norm ‖·‖ on
M(n,R), ρ(A) = limk→∞‖Ak‖1/k, from which it follows that ρ(−A) = ρ(A). 
Appendix C
Tables
Table C.1. Non-isomorphic digraphs D of order n ∈ {3, 4} with geometric multi-
plicity g.m.(1, A¯(D)) > 1
Digraph D |A(D)|a |[D]|b Eig(1, A¯(D))c g.m.(1, A¯(D))d
|I0(D)|e g.m.(1, A¯(D))− |I0(D)|
n = 3
1
2
3
0 1 e1, e2, 13 3
3 0
1
2
3
1 6 e3, 13 2
1 1
1
2
3
2 3 e3, 13 2
1 1
1
2
3
2 3 e1 − e3, 13 2
0 2
n = 4
1
23
4
0 1 e1, e2, e3, 14 4
4 0
1
23
4
1 12 e3, e4, 14 3
2 1
a The size of D, that is, the number of arcs of D. b The cardinality of the isomorphism class
[D] of D. c A basis for Eig(1, A¯(D)), the eigenspace of A¯(D) associated with the eigenvalue 1.
The standard basis for Rn is given by e1, . . . , en. The common “dimension” of the standard
basis vectors is entirely omitted in this notion and must be inferred from the context. d The
geometric multiplicity of the eigenvalue 1 of A¯(D), that is, the dimension of Eig(1, A¯(D)).
e The number of isolated vertices (players) of D.
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Table C.1. Non-isomorphic digraphs D of order n ∈ {3, 4} with geometric multi-
plicity g.m.(1, A¯(D)) > 1 (continued)
Digraph D |A(D)| |[D]| Eig(1, A¯(D)) g.m.(1, A¯(D))
|I0(D)| g.m.(1, A¯(D))− |I0(D)|
1
23
4
2 6 e3, e4, 14 3
2 1
1
23
4
2 24 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
2 12 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
2 12 e1 − e3, e4, 14 3
1 2
1
23
4
2 24 e1 + e2, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
3 24 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
3 24 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
3 8 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
3 24 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
3 12 e1 + e2, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
3 24 2e1 + e2, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
3 24 2e1 + e2, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
3 12 e3 − e4, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
3 4 e1 − e3, e3 − e4, 14 3
0 3
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Table C.1. Non-isomorphic digraphs D of order n ∈ {3, 4} with geometric multi-
plicity g.m.(1, A¯(D)) > 1 (continued)
Digraph D |A(D)| |[D]| Eig(1, A¯(D)) g.m.(1, A¯(D))
|I0(D)| g.m.(1, A¯(D))− |I0(D)|
1
23
4
4 12 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
4 24 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
4 12 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
4 12 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
4 3 e1 + e2, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
4 12 3e1 + 2e2 + e3, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
4 24 2e1 + 2e2 + e3, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
4 12 e3 − e4, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
4 6 e1 − e3, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
4 16 e1 + e2 − 2e4, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
4 24 2e1 + e2 − 2e4, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
5 24 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
5 12 e1 + e2 − 2e4, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
5 24 e1 + 2e2 − 3e4, 14 2
0 2
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Table C.1. Non-isomorphic digraphs D of order n ∈ {3, 4} with geometric multi-
plicity g.m.(1, A¯(D)) > 1 (continued)
Digraph D |A(D)| |[D]| Eig(1, A¯(D)) g.m.(1, A¯(D))
|I0(D)| g.m.(1, A¯(D))− |I0(D)|
1
23
4
5 12 e1 − e3, 14 2
0 2
1
23
4
6 4 e4, 14 2
1 1
1
23
4
6 6 e1 − e3, 14 2
0 2
Appendix D
Proofs of Chapter 1 Results
Proof of Lemma 1.1
See, for example, Amann and Escher (2005, Theorem 5.7 on p. 274, Corollary 1.2 on
p. 302, and Theorem 1.8 on p. 306). 
Example 1.3
Let the function d : R2++ → R be defined by d(x, y) := (log(x/y))2. It is straight-
forward to show that d is a semimetric on R++.
Let (x, y) ∈ R2++. We find
∂d(x, y)
∂x
=
2
x
log
(
x
y
)
,
which implies that
∂d(x, y)
∂x

< 0 if and only if x < y,
= 0 if and only if x = y,
> 0 if and only if x > y.
It follows that the function x ↦→ d(x, y) is strictly decreasing on (0, y) and strictly
increasing on (y,+∞).
Let (x,∆x) ∈ R2++ with ∆x < x, and let x0 :=
√
(x−∆x)(x+∆x). Note that
log((x−∆x)/(x+∆x)) < 0 because 0 < (x−∆x)/(x+∆x) < 1. We find
d(x−∆x, y)− d(x+∆x, y) = 2 log
(
x0
y
)
log
(
x−∆x
x+∆x
)
,
which implies that
d(x−∆x, y)− d(x+∆x, y)

< 0 if and only if y < x0,
= 0 if and only if y = x0,
> 0 if and only if y > x0.
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It follows that the function y ↦→ d(x − ∆x, y)− d(x + ∆x, y) is negative on (0, x0)
and positive on (x0,+∞). 
Proof of Corollary 1.7
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be defined
as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose G is complete.
By definition, if the players of Γ are strongly ex ante homogeneous, then they
are weakly ex ante homogeneous.
Suppose the players of Γ are weakly ex ante homogeneous, that is, α = A¯(G)α.
Since G is complete, we have A¯(G) = (1/(n− 1))(1n1Tn − In). We find
α = A¯(G)α ⇔ α = 1n1
T
n − In
n− 1 α
⇔ (n− 1)α = 〈1n, α〉1n − α
⇔ α = 〈1n, α〉
n
1n.
It follows that the players of Γ are strongly ex ante homogeneous. 
Proof of Proposition 1.8
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be defined
as in Section 1.3.2. Note that 1n ∈ Eig(1, A¯(G)), so that g.m.(1, A¯(G)) ≥ 1.
Proof of Result 1.8.1 Suppose the players of Γ are weakly and not strongly ex ante
homogeneous. It follows that α = A¯(G)α and α /∈ span{1n}. We conclude that
span{1n} ( span{1n, α} ⊂ Eig(1, A¯(G)) and g.m.(1, A¯(G)) > 1. 
Proof of Result 1.8.2 Suppose G is strongly connected. It follows that sl(G) is
strongly connected. Since sl(G) is strongly connected, A¯(G) is irreducible (see,
for example, Berman and Plemmons 1994, Theorem 2.7 on p. 30). Since A¯(G)
is nonnegative and irreducible, ρ(A¯(G)) is a simple eigenvalue of A¯(G) (see, for
example, Varga 2000, Theorem 2.7), that is, the eigenvalue ρ(A¯(G)) has algebraic
multiplicity one. Since A¯(G) is nonnegative and row-normalized, ρ(A¯(G)) = 1
(Lemma B.8). The geometric multiplicity of an eigenvalue does not exceed its
algebraic multiplicity (see, for example, Horn and Johnson 2012, Theorem 1.4.10).
It follows that ρ(A¯(G))must have geometric multiplicity one, that is, the dimension
of the eigenspace of A¯(G) associated with the eigenvalue 1 is equal to 1. Finally, we
find Eig(1, A¯(G)) = span{1n} because 1n ∈ Eig(1, A¯(G)) and g.m.(1, A¯(G)) = 1.
Proof of Result 1.8.3 Suppose player x ∈ I is isolated in G. We have A¯(G)ex = ex,
from which span{1n, ex} ⊂ Eig(1, A¯(G)) and g.m.(1, A¯(G)) > 1 follow. 
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Proof of Corollary 1.9
The statement follows from Result 1.8.2. 
Example 1.12
Consider the setup of Example 1.12. Let Ppi be the permutation matrix of pi, that is,
Ppi = (e2, e3, . . . , en−1, en, e1)T = (en, e1, e2, . . . , en−2, en−1). We have A¯(G) = Ppi .
First, I show that Γ cannot have a NE that lies in the interior of Rn+. Suppose, for
the sake of contradiction, Γ has an interior NE y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) ∈ Rn++. It follows
that the players’ best reply functions at y⋆ satisfy
∀i ∈ I y⋆i =
1
γ
αi + y⋆pi(i) ⇔ y⋆ =
1
γ
α+ Ppiy⋆.
The NE y⋆ is therefore given by (In − Ppi)y⋆ = (1/γ)α, where In − Ppi is singular
because 1n ∈ ker(In−Ppi). Consequently, αmust lie in the column space of In−Ppi ,
that is, there exists a c := (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Rn such that (In − Ppi)c = α. We find 0 <
∑i∈I αi = 〈1n, α〉 = 〈1n, (In − Ppi)c〉 = 〈1n, c〉 − 〈1n,Ppic〉 = ∑i∈I ci −∑i∈I ci = 0,
a contradiction.
Second, I show that Γ cannot have a NE that does not lie in the interior of Rn+.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, Γ has a NE y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) ∈ Rn+ with
{i ∈ I | y⋆i = 0} ̸= ∅. Let k ∈ I with y⋆k = 0. Note that
∂uk(y⋆)
∂yk
= αk + γy⋆pi(k).
Since y⋆k = 0, we must have ∂uk(y⋆)/∂yk ≤ 0 or, equivalently, y⋆pi(k) ≤ −αk/γ. It
follows that y⋆
pi(k) < 0 because αk > 0 and γ > 0, a contradiction to y⋆pi(k) ∈ R+. 
Proof of Proposition 1.13
Let Γ := (I ,G,R, {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a NALA game, and let α be defined as in
Section 1.3.2. Suppose Conditions 1.13.1 to 1.13.4 are satisfied. In what follows, the
component in row i and column j of A¯(G), a¯i,j(G), is abbreviated to a¯i,j.
First, note that f (R) = R because f (R) is an interval (Lemma 1.1) and
f is strictly increasing (Assumption F) and not bounded below and
above (Condition 1.13.4). Second, note that Condition 1.13.3 is equivalent to
1 /∈ σ(γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G)).
Let Y⋆ ⊂ Rn denote the set of all NEs in pure strategies of Γ. I show that
|Y⋆| = 1. To this end, let y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) ∈ Rn. Note that y⋆ ∈ Y⋆ if and only if
∀i ∈ I ∂ui(y
⋆)
∂yi
= 0 (D.1)
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and
∀i ∈ I ∂
2ui(y⋆)
∂yi
2 < 0. (D.2)
Let i ∈ I . For all y := (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn, we have
∂ui(y)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (yi)− γ
(
f (yi)− ∑
j∈I
a¯i,j f (yj)
))
∂ f (yi)
and
∂2ui(y)
∂yi
2 =
(
αi − β f (yi)− γ
(
f (yi)− ∑
j∈I
a¯i,j f (yj)
))
∂2 f (yi)
− (β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i))∂ f (yi)2.
Since ∂ f > 0 (Assumption F), the preceding two results imply that
0 =
∂ui(y⋆)
∂yi
⇔ 0 = αi − β f (y⋆i )− γ
(
f (y⋆i )− ∑
j∈I
a¯i,j f (y⋆j )
)
(D.3)
⇔ f (y⋆i ) =
αi
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ ∑j∈I
a¯i,j f (y⋆j ) (D.4)
and
0 >
∂2ui(y⋆)
∂yi
2
⇔ 0 >
(
αi − β f (y⋆i )− γ
(
f (y⋆i )− ∑
j∈I
a¯i,j f (y⋆j )
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (D.3)
∂2 f (y⋆i )
− (β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i))∂ f (y⋆i )2
⇔ 0 < β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i).
Using (D.4), we find
(D.1) ⇔ f (y⋆) = 1
β+ γ
α+
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G) f (y⋆)
⇔
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆) =
1
β+ γ
α. (D.5)
Condition 1.13.3 implies that the system of linear equations(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
z⋆ =
1
β+ γ
α (D.6)
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has a unique solution z⋆ := (z⋆1 , . . . , z⋆n) ∈ Rn (Lemma B.3), which is given by
z⋆ =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
α. (D.7)
It is clear from a comparison of the system of equations (D.5) and the system of
linear equations (D.6) that y⋆ is a solution to the system of equations z⋆ = f (y⋆).
This system has a unique solution y⋆ ∈ Rn because f is bijective (Lemma 1.1) and
f (R)n = Rn. In summary, the system of equations (D.1) has a unique solution
y⋆, which is given by (1.7). Finally, note that, for all i ∈ I , β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i) > 0,
because β > 0 (Condition 1.13.1) and β+ γ > 0 (Condition 1.13.2). The preceding
arguments demonstrate that there exists a unique y⋆ ∈ Rn that satisfies both (D.1)
and (D.2). To sum up, I have shown that y⋆ as given by (1.7) lies in Y⋆ and that
|Y⋆| = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 1.14
Let Γ := (I ,G, [0, υ¯], {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a NALA game, let α be defined as in Sec-
tion 1.3.2, and let αmin and αmax be defined as in Section 1.3.3. Suppose Conditions
1.14.1 to 1.14.4 are satisfied. In what follows, the component in row i and column j
of A¯(G), a¯i,j(G), is abbreviated to a¯i,j.
First, note that f ([0, υ¯]) = [ f (0), f (υ¯)] and int( f ([0, υ¯])n) = ( f (0), f (υ¯))n be-
cause f ([0, υ¯]) is an interval (Lemma 1.1) and f is strictly increasing (Assump-
tion F). Second, note that ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 (Lemma B.8). Third, note that Conditions
1.14.1 and 1.14.2 imply that β+ γ > 0 and 0 ≤ γ/(β+ γ) < 1. Fourth, note that
Condition 1.14.3 is equivalent to β f (0)1n <c α and Condition 1.14.4 is equivalent to
α <c β f (υ¯)1n.
Let Y⋆ ⊂ (0, υ¯)n denote the set of all interior NEs in pure strategies of Γ. I show
that |Y⋆| = 1. To this end, let y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) ∈ [0, υ¯]n. Note that y⋆ ∈ Y⋆ if and
only if
y⋆ ∈ (0, υ¯)n, (D.8)
∀i ∈ I ∂ui(y
⋆)
∂yi
= 0, (D.9)
and
∀i ∈ I ∂
2ui(y⋆)
∂yi
2 < 0. (D.10)
Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.13, we find
(D.9) ⇔
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆) =
1
β+ γ
α (D.11)
and
(D.10) ⇔ ∀i ∈ I β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i) > 0.
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The matrix In − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G) is nonsingular with a nonnegative inverse that is
bounded below by In because 0 ≤ γ/(β+ γ) < 1 and ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 (Lemma B.6).
It follows that the system (D.6) has a unique solution z⋆ := (z⋆1 , . . . , z⋆n) ∈ Rn,
which is given by (D.7). The two inequalities In ≤c (In − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G))−1 and
β f (0)1n <c α imply that f (0)1n <c z⋆. Indeed,
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
α >c
β f (0)
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
1n = f (0)1n,
where the inequality is according to Lemma B.1 and the equality follows from the
fact that (
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
1n =
β+ γ
β
1n. (D.12)
Similarly, In ≤c (In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G))−1 and α <c β f (υ¯)1n imply that z⋆ <c
f (υ¯)1n. It follows from f (0)1n <c z⋆ and z⋆ <c f (υ¯)1n that z⋆ ∈ ( f (0), f (υ¯))n.
It is clear from a comparison of the right system of equations of (D.11) and the
system of linear equations (D.6) that y⋆ is a solution to the system of equations
z⋆ = f (y⋆). This system has a unique solution y⋆ ∈ (0, υ¯)n because f is bijective
(Lemma 1.1) and z⋆ ∈ ( f (0), f (υ¯))n. In summary, the system of equations (D.9)
has a unique solution y⋆, which is given by (1.7). Finally, note that, for all i ∈ I ,
β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i) > 0, because β > 0 (Condition 1.14.1) and β+ γ > 0 (Conditions
1.14.1 and 1.14.2). The preceding arguments demonstrate that there exists a unique
y⋆ ∈ [0, υ¯]n that satisfies (D.8), (D.9), and (D.10). To sum up, I have shown that y⋆
as given by (1.7) lies in Y⋆ and that |Y⋆| = 1.
In the remainder of the proof, I show that Γ has no boundary NEs. Table D.1
gives an overview of all possible types of boundary NEs of Γ. For example, a
boundary NE of type B-3 is characterized by the fact that some players play zero
and the remaining players play an action in the interior of the action space. Let
y˜⋆ := (y˜⋆1 , . . . , y˜
⋆
n) ∈ [0, υ¯]n.
Table D.1. Possible types of boundary Nash equilibria of Γ (Propositions 1.14
and 1.15)
Actions and set of actions
Type 0 (0, υ¯) υ¯
B-1 ×
B-2 ×
B-3 × ×
B-4 × ×
B-5 × ×
B-6 × × ×
First, 0n (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-1 in Table D.1) cannot
be a boundary NE of Γ. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, 0n is a boundary
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NE of Γ. Then we must have
∀i ∈ I ∂ui(0n)
∂yi
≤ 0. (D.13)
Let i ∈ I . We find
∂ui(0n)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− ∑
j∈I
a¯i,j f (0)
))
∂ f (0)
=
(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0)
> 0
because∑j∈I a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (0) > 0 (Assumption F), and αi > β f (0) (Condition 1.14.3).
The preceding inequality contradicts (D.13). Consequently, 0n cannot be a boundary
NE of Γ.
Second, I show that υ¯1n (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-2 in
Table D.1) cannot be a boundary NE of Γ. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
υ¯1n is a boundary NE of Γ. Then we must have
∀i ∈ I ∂ui(υ¯1n)
∂yi
≥ 0. (D.14)
Let i ∈ I . We find
∂ui(υ¯1n)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (υ¯)− γ
(
f (υ¯)− ∑
j∈I
a¯i,j f (υ¯)
))
∂ f (υ¯)
=
(
αi − β f (υ¯)
)
∂ f (υ¯)
< 0
because∑j∈I a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (υ¯) > 0 (Assumption F), and αi < β f (υ¯) (Condition 1.14.4).
The preceding inequality contradicts (D.14). Consequently, υ¯1n cannot be a bound-
ary NE of Γ.
Third, I show that a situation where some players play zero and the remaining
players play an action in the interior of the action space (this is referred to as a
boundary NE of type B-3 in Table D.1) cannot be a boundary NE of Γ. Suppose, for
the sake of contradiction, y˜⋆ is a boundary NE of Γ of type B-3. Specifically, suppose
there exists a J ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n such that (i) for all i ∈ I \ J , y˜⋆i = 0, and
(ii) for all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i ∈ (0, υ¯). Then we must have
∀i ∈ I \ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≤ 0. (D.15)
Let i ∈ I \ J . Since γ ≥ 0 (Condition 1.14.2), A¯(G) is nonnegative, and f is strictly
increasing (Assumption F), we have
γ ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
) ≤ 0. (D.16)
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Using (D.16), we find
∂ui(y˜⋆)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− ∑
j∈I\J
a¯i,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (0)
=
{(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (0)− γ∑j∈J a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) > 0,
≥ (αi − β f (0))∂ f (0)
> 0
because ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (0) > 0 (Assumption F), and αi > β f (0)
(Condition 1.14.3). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.15). Consequently, y˜⋆
cannot be a boundary NE of Γ of type B-3.
Fourth, I show that a situation where some players play zero and the remaining
players play the maximum possible action (this is referred to as a boundary NE
of type B-4 in Table D.1) cannot be a boundary NE of Γ. Suppose, for the sake of
contradiction, y˜⋆ is a boundary NE of Γ of type B-4. Specifically, suppose there
exists a J ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n such that (i) for all i ∈ I \ J , y˜⋆i = 0, and (ii) for
all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i = υ¯. Then we must have
∀i ∈ I \ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≤ 0 (D.17)
and
∀i ∈ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≥ 0. (D.18)
Let i ∈ I \ J and k ∈ J . Since γ ≥ 0 (Condition 1.14.2), A¯(G) is nonnegative, and
f is strictly increasing (Assumption F), we have
γ ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)) ≤ 0 (D.19)
and
γ ∑
j∈I\J
a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (0)) ≥ 0. (D.20)
Using (D.19), we find
∂ui(y˜⋆)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− ∑
j∈I\J
a¯i,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j f (υ¯)
))
∂ f (0)
=
{(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (0)− γ∑j∈J a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)))∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) > 0,
≥ (αi − β f (0))∂ f (0)
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> 0
because ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (0) > 0 (Assumption F), and αi > β f (0)
(Condition 1.14.3). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.17). Using (D.20), we
find
∂uk(y˜⋆)
∂yk
=
(
αk − β f (υ¯)− γ
(
f (υ¯)− ∑
j∈I\J
a¯k,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯k,j f (υ¯)
))
∂ f (υ¯)
=
{(
αk − β f (υ¯)
)
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) = 0,(
αk − β f (υ¯)− γ∑j∈I\J a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (0)))∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) > 0,
≤ (αk − β f (υ¯))∂ f (υ¯)
< 0
because ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (υ¯) > 0 (Assumption F), and αk < β f (υ¯)
(Condition 1.14.4). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.18). Consequently, y˜⋆
cannot be a boundary NE of Γ of type B-4.
Fifth, I show that a situation where some players play an action in the interior of
the action space and the remaining players play the maximum possible action (this
is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-5 in Table D.1) cannot be a boundary NE
of Γ. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, y˜⋆ is a boundary NE of Γ of type B-5.
Specifically, suppose there exists a J ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n such that (i) for
all i ∈ I \ J , y˜⋆i ∈ (0, υ¯), and (ii) for all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i = υ¯. Then we must have
∀i ∈ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≥ 0. (D.21)
Let i ∈ J . Since γ ≥ 0 (Condition 1.14.2), A¯(G) is nonnegative, and f is strictly
increasing (Assumption F), we have
γ ∑
j∈I\J
a¯i,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (y˜⋆j )
) ≥ 0. (D.22)
Using (D.22), we find
∂ui(y˜⋆)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (υ¯)− γ
(
f (υ¯)− ∑
j∈I\J
a¯i,j f (y˜⋆j )− ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j f (υ¯)
))
∂ f (υ¯)
=
{(
αi − β f (υ¯)
)
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (υ¯)− γ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (i) > 0,
≤ (αi − β f (υ¯))∂ f (υ¯)
< 0
because ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (υ¯) > 0 (Assumption F), and αi < β f (υ¯)
(Condition 1.14.4). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.21). Consequently, y˜⋆
cannot be a boundary NE of Γ of type B-5.
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Sixth, I show that a situation where some players play zero, some players play
an action in the interior of the action space, and the remaining players play the
maximum possible action (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-6 in
Table D.1) cannot be a boundary NE of Γ. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
y˜⋆ is a boundary NE of Γ of type B-6. Specifically, suppose there exist J ⊂ I
and K ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n, 0 < |K| < n, and K ∩ I = ∅ such that (i) for
all i ∈ I \ (J ∪ K), y˜⋆i = 0, (ii) for all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i ∈ (0, υ¯), and (iii) for all i ∈ K,
y˜⋆i = υ¯. Then we must have
∀i ∈ I \ (J ∪K) ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≤ 0 (D.23)
and
∀i ∈ K ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≥ 0. (D.24)
Let i ∈ I \ (J ∪K) and k ∈ K. Since γ ≥ 0 (Condition 1.14.2), A¯(G) is nonnegative,
and f is strictly increasing (Assumption F), we have
γ ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
)
+ γ ∑
j∈K
a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)) ≤ 0 (D.25)
and
γ ∑
j∈I\(J ∪K)
a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (0))+ γ ∑
j∈J
a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (y˜⋆j )
) ≥ 0. (D.26)
Using (D.25), we find
∂ui(y˜⋆)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− ∑
j∈I\(J ∪K)
a¯i,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j f (y˜⋆j )
− ∑
j∈K
a¯i,j f (υ¯)
))
∂ f (0)
=

(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (0)− γ∑j∈J a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
)
− γ∑j∈K a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)))∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) > 0,
≥ (αi − β f (0))∂ f (0)
> 0
because ∑j∈I\(J ∪K) a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j + ∑j∈K a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (0) > 0 (Assumption F),
and αi > β f (0) (Condition 1.14.3). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.23).
Using (D.26), we find
∂uk(y˜⋆)
∂yk
=
(
αk − β f (υ¯)− γ
(
f (υ¯)− ∑
j∈I\(J ∪K)
a¯k,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯k,j f (y˜⋆j )
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− ∑
j∈K
a¯k,j f (υ¯)
))
∂ f (υ¯)
=

(
αk − β f (υ¯)
)
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) = 0,(
αk − β f (υ¯)− γ∑j∈I\(J ∪K) a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (0))
− γ∑j∈J a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) > 0,
≤ (αk − β f (υ¯))∂ f (υ¯)
< 0
because ∑j∈I\(J ∪K) a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j + ∑j∈K a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (υ¯) > 0 (Assumption F),
and αk < β f (υ¯) (Condition 1.14.4). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.24).
Consequently, y˜⋆ cannot be a boundary NE of Γ of type B-6. 
Proof of Proposition 1.15
Let Γ := (I ,G, [0, υ¯], {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a NALA game, let α be defined as in Sec-
tion 1.3.2, and let αmin and αmax be defined as in Section 1.3.3. Suppose Conditions
1.15.1 to 1.15.4 are satisfied. In what follows, the component in row i and column j
of A¯(G), a¯i,j(G), is abbreviated to a¯i,j.
First, note that f ([0, υ¯]) = [ f (0), f (υ¯)] and int( f ([0, υ¯])n) = ( f (0), f (υ¯))n be-
cause f ([0, υ¯]) is an interval (Lemma 1.1) and f is strictly increasing (Assumption F).
Second, note that ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 (Lemma B.8) and ρ(A¯(G)2) = ρ(A¯(G))2, which
is a consequence of the spectral mapping theorem (see, for example, Kubrusly 2011,
Theorem 6.19 and Corollary 6.20). Third, note that Conditions 1.15.1 and 1.15.2
imply that β + γ > 0 and −1 < γ/(β + γ) < 0. Fourth, note that Condi-
tion 1.15.3 is equivalent to β f (0)1n + γ( f (0)− f (υ¯))1n <c α, where β f (0)1n <c
β f (0)1n+ γ( f (0)− f (υ¯)) because γ < 0 (Condition 1.15.2) and f is strictly increas-
ing (Assumption F), fromwhich it follows that Condition 1.15.3 is stronger thanCon-
dition 1.14.3, so that, β f (0)1n <c α. Fifth, note that Condition 1.15.4 is equivalent to
α <c β f (υ¯)1n + γ( f (υ¯)− f (0))1n, where β f (υ¯)1n + γ( f (υ¯)− f (0))1n <c β f (υ¯)1n
because γ < 0 (Condition 1.15.2) and f is strictly increasing (Assumption F), from
which it follows that Condition 1.15.4 is stronger than Condition 1.14.4, so that,
α <c β f (υ¯). Sixth, note that Conditions 1.15.1 to 1.15.4 imply that (Lemma 1.19)
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (0)1n <c
(
In +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α <c
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (υ¯)1n. (D.27)
Let Y⋆ ⊂ (0, υ¯)n denote the set of all interior NEs in pure strategies of Γ. I show
that |Y⋆| = 1. To this end, let y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) ∈ [0, υ¯]n. Note that y⋆ ∈ Y⋆ if and
only if
y⋆ ∈ (0, υ¯)n, (D.28)
∀i ∈ I ∂ui(y
⋆)
∂yi
= 0, (D.29)
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and
∀i ∈ I ∂
2ui(y⋆)
∂yi
2 < 0. (D.30)
Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.13, we find
(D.29) ⇔
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆) =
1
β+ γ
α (D.31)
and
(D.30) ⇔ ∀i ∈ I β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i) > 0.
The matrix In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G) is nonsingular because |γ/(β + γ)| < 1 and
ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 (Lemma B.3). It follows that the system of linear equations (D.6) has
a unique solution z⋆ := (z⋆1 , . . . , z⋆n) ∈ Rn, which is given by (D.7). Next, I show
that z⋆ ∈ ( f (0), f (υ¯))n. To this end, I derive an alternative representation of z⋆.
Note that(
In +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
= In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2, (D.32)
where In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2 is nonsingular with a nonnegative inverse that is
bounded below by In because 0 < γ2/(β + γ)2ρ(A¯(G)2) = γ2/(β + γ)2 < 1
(Lemma B.6). It follows that(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
=
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1(
In +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
, (D.33)
which leads to the following alternative representation of z⋆:
z⋆ =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1(
In +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α. (D.34)
The inequality In ≤c (In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2)−1 and the left inequality of (D.27)
imply that z⋆ ∈ ( f (0),+∞)n. Indeed,
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1(
In +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α
>c
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (0)1n = f (0)1n,
where the inequality is according to Lemma B.1 and the equality follows from the
fact that (
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1
1n =
(β+ γ)2
β(β+ 2γ)
1n. (D.35)
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Similarly, the inequality In ≤c (In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2)−1 and the right inequal-
ity of (D.27) imply that z⋆ ∈ (−∞, f (υ¯))n. Combining z⋆ ∈ (−∞, f (υ¯))n and
z⋆ ∈ ( f (0),+∞)n gives z⋆ ∈ ( f (0), f (υ¯))n. It is clear from a comparison of the
right system of equations of (D.31) and the system of linear equations (D.6) that
y⋆ is a solution to the system of equations z⋆ = f (y⋆). This system has a unique
solution y⋆ ∈ (0, υ¯)n because f is bijective (Lemma 1.1) and z⋆ ∈ ( f (0), f (υ¯))n.
In summary, the system of equations (D.29) has a unique solution y⋆, which is
given by (1.7). Finally, note that, for all i ∈ I , β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i) > 0, because β > 0
(Condition 1.15.1) and β+ γ > 0 (Conditions 1.15.1 and 1.15.2). The preceding
arguments demonstrate that there exists a unique y⋆ ∈ [0, υ¯]n that satisfies (D.28),
(D.29), and (D.30). To sum up, I have shown that y⋆ as given by (1.7) lies in Y⋆
and that |Y⋆| = 1.
In the remainder of the proof, I show that Γ has no boundaryNEs. TableD.1 gives
an overview of all possible types of boundary NEs of Γ. Let y˜⋆ := (y˜⋆1 , . . . , y˜⋆n) ∈
[0, υ¯]n.
First, 0n (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-1 in Table D.1) cannot
be a boundary NE of Γ. See the proof of Proposition 1.14 for the precise argument.
Second, υ¯1n (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-2 in Table D.1) cannot
be a boundary NE of Γ. See the proof of Proposition 1.14 for the precise argument.
Third, I show that a situation where some players play zero and the remaining
players play an action in the interior of the action space (this is referred to as a
boundary NE of type B-3 in Table D.1) cannot be a boundary NE of Γ. Suppose, for
the sake of contradiction, y˜⋆ is a boundary NE of Γ of type B-3. Specifically, suppose
there exists a J ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n such that (i) for all i ∈ I \ J , y˜⋆i = 0, and
(ii) for all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i ∈ (0, υ¯). Then we must have
∀i ∈ I \ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≤ 0. (D.36)
Let i ∈ I \ J . Since γ < 0 (Condition 1.15.2), A¯(G) is nonnegative, and f is strictly
increasing (Assumption F), we have
γ ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
) ≤ γ( f (0)− f (υ¯)). (D.37)
Using (D.37), we find
∂ui(y˜⋆)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− ∑
j∈I\J
a¯i,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (0)
=
{(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (0)− γ∑j∈J a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) > 0,
≥
{(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)))∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) > 0,
> 0
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because ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (0) > 0 (Assumption F), αi > β f (0) (As-
sumption F and Conditions 1.15.2 and 1.15.3), and αi > β f (0) + γ( f (0)− f (υ¯))
(Condition 1.15.3). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.36). Consequently, y˜⋆
cannot be a boundary NE of Γ of type B-3.
Fourth, I show that a situation where some players play zero and the remaining
players play the maximum possible action (this is referred to as a boundary NE
of type B-4 in Table D.1) cannot be a boundary NE of Γ. Suppose, for the sake of
contradiction, y˜⋆ is a boundary NE of Γ of type B-4. Specifically, suppose there
exists a J ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n such that (i) for all i ∈ I \ J , y˜⋆i = 0, and (ii) for
all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i = υ¯. Then we must have
∀i ∈ I \ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≤ 0 (D.38)
and
∀i ∈ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≥ 0. (D.39)
Let i ∈ I \ J and k ∈ J . Since γ < 0 (Condition 1.15.2), A¯(G) is nonnegative, and
f is strictly increasing (Assumption F), we have
γ ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)) ≤ γ( f (0)− f (υ¯)) (D.40)
and
γ ∑
j∈I\J
a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (0)) ≥ γ( f (υ¯)− f (0)). (D.41)
Using (D.40), we find
∂ui(y˜⋆)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− ∑
j∈I\J
a¯i,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j f (υ¯)
))
∂ f (0)
=
{(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (0)− γ∑j∈J a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)))∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) > 0,
≥
{(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)))∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) > 0,
> 0
because ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (0) > 0 (Assumption F), αi > β f (0) (As-
sumption F and Conditions 1.15.2 and 1.15.3), and αi > β f (0) + γ( f (0)− f (υ¯))
(Condition 1.15.3). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.38). Using (D.41), we
find
∂uk(y˜⋆)
∂yk
=
(
αk − β f (υ¯)− γ
(
f (υ¯)− ∑
j∈I\J
a¯k,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯k,j f (υ¯)
))
∂ f (υ¯)
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=
{(
αk − β f (υ¯)
)
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) = 0,(
αk − β f (υ¯)− γ∑j∈I\J a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (0)))∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) > 0,
≤
{(
αk − β f (υ¯)
)
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) = 0,(
αi − β f (υ¯)− γ
(
f (υ¯)− f (0)))∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) > 0,
< 0
because ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (υ¯) > 0 (Assumption F), αk < β f (υ¯) (As-
sumption F and Conditions 1.15.2 and 1.15.4), and αk < β f (υ¯) + γ( f (υ¯)− f (0))
(Condition 1.15.4). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.39). Consequently, y˜⋆
cannot be a boundary NE of Γ of type B-4.
Fifth, I show that a situation where some players play an action in the interior of
the action space and the remaining players play the maximum possible action (this
is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-5 in Table D.1) cannot be a boundary NE
of Γ. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, y˜⋆ is a boundary NE of Γ of type B-5.
Specifically, suppose there exists a J ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n such that (i) for
all i ∈ I \ J , y˜⋆i ∈ (0, υ¯), and (ii) for all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i = υ¯. Then we must have
∀i ∈ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≥ 0. (D.42)
Let i ∈ J . Since γ < 0 (Condition 1.15.2), A¯(G) is nonnegative, and f is strictly
increasing (Assumption F), we have
γ ∑
j∈I\J
a¯i,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (y˜⋆j )
) ≥ γ( f (υ¯)− f (0)). (D.43)
Using (D.43), we find
∂ui(y˜⋆)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (υ¯)− γ
(
f (υ¯)− ∑
j∈I\J
a¯i,j f (y˜⋆j )− ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j f (υ¯)
))
∂ f (υ¯)
=
{(
αi − β f (υ¯)
)
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (υ¯)− γ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (i) > 0,
≤
{(
αi − β f (υ¯)
)
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (υ¯)− γ
(
f (υ¯)− f (0)))∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (i) > 0,
< 0
because ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (υ¯) > 0 (Assumption F), αi < β f (υ¯) (As-
sumption F and Conditions 1.15.2 and 1.15.4), and αi < β f (υ¯) + γ( f (υ¯)− f (0))
(Condition 1.15.4). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.42). Consequently, y˜⋆
cannot be a boundary NE of Γ of type B-5.
Sixth, I show that a situation where some players play zero, some players play
an action in the interior of the action space, and the remaining players play the
maximum possible action (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-6 in
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Table D.1) cannot be a boundary NE of Γ. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
y˜⋆ is a boundary NE of Γ of type B-6. Specifically, suppose there exist J ⊂ I
and K ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n, 0 < |K| < n, and K ∩ I = ∅ such that (i) for
all i ∈ I \ (J ∪ K), y˜⋆i = 0, (ii) for all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i ∈ (0, υ¯), and (iii) for all i ∈ K,
y˜⋆i = υ¯. Then we must have
∀i ∈ I \ (J ∪K) ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≤ 0 (D.44)
and
∀i ∈ K ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≥ 0. (D.45)
Let i ∈ I \ (J ∪K) and k ∈ K. Since γ < 0 (Condition 1.15.2), A¯(G) is nonnegative,
and f is strictly increasing (Assumption F), we have
γ ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
)
+ γ ∑
j∈K
a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)) ≤ γ( f (0)− f (υ¯)) (D.46)
and
γ ∑
j∈I\(J ∪K)
a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (0))+ γ ∑
j∈J
a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (y˜⋆j )
) ≥ γ( f (υ¯)− f (0)).
(D.47)
Using (D.46), we find
∂ui(y˜⋆)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− ∑
j∈I\(J ∪K)
a¯i,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j f (y˜⋆j )
− ∑
j∈K
a¯i,j f (υ¯)
))
∂ f (0)
=

(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (0)− γ∑j∈J a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
)
− γ∑j∈K a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)))∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) > 0,
≥
{(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− f (υ¯)))∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) > 0,
> 0
because ∑j∈I\(J ∪K) a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j + ∑j∈K a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (0) > 0 (Assumption F),
αi > β f (0) (Assumption F and Conditions 1.15.2 and 1.15.3), and αi > β f (0) +
γ( f (0)− f (υ¯)) (Condition 1.15.3). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.44).
Using (D.47), we find
∂uk(y˜⋆)
∂yk
=
(
αk − β f (υ¯)− γ
(
f (υ¯)− ∑
j∈I\(J ∪K)
a¯k,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯k,j f (y˜⋆j )
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− ∑
j∈K
a¯k,j f (υ¯)
))
∂ f (υ¯)
=

(
αk − β f (υ¯)
)
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) = 0,(
αk − β f (υ¯)− γ∑j∈I\(J ∪K) a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (0))
− γ∑j∈J a¯k,j
(
f (υ¯)− f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) > 0,
≤
{(
αk − β f (υ¯)
)
∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) = 0,(
αk − β f (υ¯)− γ
(
f (υ¯)− f (0)))∂ f (υ¯) if deg+G (k) > 0,
< 0
because ∑j∈I\(J ∪K) a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j + ∑j∈K a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (υ¯) > 0 (Assumption F),
αk < β f (υ¯) (Assumption F and Conditions 1.15.2 and 1.15.4), and αk < β f (υ¯) +
γ( f (υ¯)− f (0)) (Condition 1.15.4). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.45).
Consequently, y˜⋆ cannot be a boundary NE of Γ of type B-6. 
Proof of Proposition 1.16
Let Γ := (I ,G,R+, {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a NALA game, let α be defined as in Sec-
tion 1.3.2, and let αmin be defined as in Section 1.3.3. Suppose Conditions 1.16.1
to 1.16.4 are satisfied. In what follows, the component in row i and column j of
A¯(G), a¯i,j(G), is abbreviated to a¯i,j.
First, note that f (R+) = [ f (0),+∞) and int( f (R+)n) = ( f (0),+∞)n because
f (R+) is an interval (Lemma 1.1) and f is strictly increasing (Assumption F) and
not bounded above (Condition 1.16.4). Second, note that ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 (LemmaB.8).
Third, note that Conditions 1.16.1 and 1.16.2 imply that β + γ > 0 and 0 ≤
γ/(β+ γ) < 1. Fourth, note that Condition 1.16.3 is equivalent to β f (0)1n <c α.
Let Y⋆ ⊂ Rn++ denote the set of all interior NEs in pure strategies of Γ. I show
that |Y⋆| = 1. To this end, let y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) ∈ Rn+. Note that y⋆ ∈ Y⋆ if and
only if
y⋆ ∈ Rn++, (D.48)
∀i ∈ I ∂ui(y
⋆)
∂yi
= 0, (D.49)
and
∀i ∈ I ∂
2ui(y⋆)
∂yi
2 < 0. (D.50)
Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.13, we find
(D.49) ⇔
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆) =
1
β+ γ
α (D.51)
and
(D.50) ⇔ ∀i ∈ I β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i) > 0.
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The matrix In − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G) is nonsingular with a nonnegative inverse that is
bounded below by In because 0 ≤ γ/(β+ γ) < 1 and ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 (Lemma B.6).
It follows that the system of linear equations (D.6) has a unique solution z⋆ ∈ Rn,
which is given by (D.7). Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.14, the two
inequalities In ≤c (In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G))−1 and β f (0)1n <c α imply that z⋆ ∈
( f (0),+∞)n. It is clear from a comparison of the right system of equations of (D.51)
and the system of linear equations (D.6) that y⋆ is a solution to the system of
equations z⋆ = f (y⋆). This system has a unique solution y⋆ ∈ Rn++ because f
is bijective (Lemma 1.1) and z⋆ ∈ ( f (0),+∞)n. In summary, the system of equa-
tions (D.49) has a unique solution y⋆, which is given by (1.7). Finally, note that, for
all i ∈ I , β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i) > 0, because β > 0 (Condition 1.16.1) and β+ γ > 0
(Conditions 1.16.1 and 1.16.2). The preceding arguments demonstrate that there
exists a unique y⋆ ∈ Rn+ that satisfies (D.48), (D.49), and (D.50). To sum up, I have
shown that y⋆ as given by (1.7) lies in Y⋆ and that |Y⋆| = 1.
In the remainder of the proof, I show that Γ has no boundary NEs. Table D.2
gives an overview of all possible types of boundary NEs of Γ. For example, a
boundary NE of type B-2 is characterized by the fact that some players play zero
and the remaining players play a positive action.
Table D.2. Possible types of boundary Nash equilibria of Γ (Propositions 1.16
and 1.17)
Action and set of actions
Type 0 R++
B-1 ×
B-2 × ×
First, 0n (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-1 in Table D.2) cannot
be a boundary NE of Γ. See the proof of Proposition 1.14 for the precise argument.
Second, I show that a situation where some players play zero and the remaining
players play a positive action (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-2 in
Table D.2) cannot be a boundary NE of Γ. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
y˜⋆ := (y˜⋆1 , . . . , y˜
⋆
n) ∈ Rn+ is a boundary NE of Γ of type B-2. Specifically, suppose
there exists a J ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n such that (i) for all i ∈ I \ J , y˜⋆i = 0, and
(ii) for all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i ∈ R++. Then we must have
∀i ∈ I \ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≤ 0. (D.52)
Let i ∈ I \ J . Since γ ≥ 0 (Condition 1.16.2), A¯(G) is nonnegative, and f is strictly
increasing (Assumption F), we have
γ ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
) ≤ 0. (D.53)
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Using (D.53), we find
∂ui(y˜⋆)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− ∑
j∈I\J
a¯i,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (0)
=
{(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (0)− γ∑j∈J a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) > 0,
≥ (αi − β f (0))∂ f (0)
> 0
because ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j + ∑j∈J a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (0) > 0 (Assumption F), and αi > β f (0)
(Condition 1.16.3). The preceding inequality contradicts (D.52). Consequently, y˜⋆
cannot be a boundary NE of Γ of type B-2. 
Proof of Proposition 1.17
Let Γ := (I ,G,R+, {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a NALA game, let α be defined as in Sec-
tion 1.3.2, and let αmin and αmax be defined as in Section 1.3.3. Suppose Conditions
1.17.1 to 1.17.6 are satisfied. In what follows, the component in row i and column j
of A¯(G), a¯i,j(G), is abbreviated to a¯i,j.
First, note that f (R+) = [ f (0),+∞) and int( f (R+)n) = ( f (0),+∞)n because
f (R+) is an interval (Lemma 1.1) and f is strictly increasing (Assumption F) and not
bounded above (Condition 1.17.6). Second, note that ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 (Lemma B.8).
Third, note that ρ(A¯(G)2) = ρ(A¯(G))2, which is a consequence of the spectral
mapping theorem (see, for example, Kubrusly 2011, Theorem 6.19 and Corollary 6.20).
Fourth, note that Conditions 1.17.1 and 1.17.2 imply that β + γ > 0 and −1 <
γ/(β+ γ) < 0. Fifth, note that Conditions 1.17.1 to 1.17.4 imply that
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (0)1n <c
(
In +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α. (D.54)
Indeed, for all i ∈ I+0 (G),
β f (0) < αmin ⇒ β f (0) < αi ⇔ β(β+ 2γ)β+ γ f (0) < αi +
γ
β+ γ ∑j∈I
a¯i,jαj,
and for all i ∈ I \ I+0 (G),
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (0) < αmin +
γ
β+ γ
αmax ≤ αi + γβ+ γ ∑j∈I
a¯i,jαj,
where the first inequality is according to Condition 1.17.4.
Let Y⋆ ⊂ Rn++ denote the set of all interior NEs in pure strategies of Γ. I show
that |Y⋆| = 1. To this end, let y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n) ∈ Rn+. Note that y⋆ ∈ Y⋆ if and
only if
y⋆ ∈ Rn++, (D.55)
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∀i ∈ I ∂ui(y
⋆)
∂yi
= 0, (D.56)
and
∀i ∈ I ∂
2ui(y⋆)
∂yi
2 < 0. (D.57)
Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.13, we find
(D.56) ⇔
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆) =
1
β+ γ
α (D.58)
and
(D.57) ⇔ ∀i ∈ I β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i) > 0.
The matrix In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G) is nonsingular because |γ/(β + γ)| < 1 and
ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 (Lemma B.3). It follows that the system of linear equations (D.6)
has a unique solution z⋆ ∈ Rn, which is given by (D.7). Next, I show that z⋆ ∈
( f (0),+∞)n. The matrix In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2 is nonsingular with a nonnega-
tive inverse that is bounded below by In because 0 < γ2/(β+ γ)2ρ(A¯(G)2) < 1
(Lemma B.6). It follows that z⋆ has the representation (D.34). The equality (D.35)
and the two inequalities In ≤c (In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2)−1 and (D.54) imply that
z⋆ ∈ ( f (0),+∞)n. It is clear from a comparison of the right system of equations
of (D.58) and the system of linear equations (D.6) that y⋆ is a solution to the system
of equations z⋆ = f (y⋆). This system has a unique solution y⋆ ∈ Rn++ because f
is bijective (Lemma 1.1) and z⋆ ∈ ( f (0),+∞)n. In summary, the system of equa-
tions (D.56) has a unique solution y⋆, which is given by (1.7). Finally, note that, for
all i ∈ I , β+ γ 1I\I+0 (G)(i) > 0, because β > 0 (Condition 1.17.1) and β+ γ > 0
(Conditions 1.17.1 and 1.17.2). The preceding arguments demonstrate that there
exists a unique y⋆ ∈ Rn+ that satisfies (D.55), (D.56), and (D.57). To sum up, I have
shown that y⋆ as given by (1.7) lies in Y⋆ and that |Y⋆| = 1.
In the remainder of the proof, I show that Γ has no boundary NEs. Table D.2
gives an overview of all possible types of boundary NEs of Γ.
First, 0n (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-1 in Table D.2) cannot
be a boundary NE of Γ. See the proof of Proposition 1.14 for the precise argument.
Second, I show that a situation where some players play zero and the remaining
players play a positive action (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-2 in
Table D.2) cannot be a boundary NE of Γ. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
y˜⋆ := (y˜⋆1 , . . . , y˜
⋆
n) ∈ Rn+ is a boundary NE of Γ of type B-2. Specifically, suppose
there exists a J ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n such that (i) for all i ∈ I \ J , y˜⋆i = 0, and
(ii) for all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i ∈ R++. Then we must have
∀i ∈ I \ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≤ 0 (D.59)
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and
∀i ∈ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
= 0. (D.60)
In the rest of the proof, I show that, for all i ∈ I \ J , ∂ui(y˜⋆)/∂yi > 0. To this
end, I establish an upper bound for { f (y˜⋆i ) | i ∈ J }. Simple algebra shows that the
system of equations (D.60) is equivalent to(
I|J | −
γ
β+ γ
[A¯(G)]J ,J
)
[ f (y˜⋆)]J =
1
β+ γ
[α]J +
γ
β+ γ
f (0)[A¯(G)]J ,I\J 1|I\J |
because ∂ f > 0 (Assumption F). Note that ρ([A¯(G)]J ,J ) ≤ ρ(A¯(G)) (see, for
example, Berman and Plemmons 1994, Corollary 1.6 on p. 28). It follows that for
all p ∈ {1, 2}, the matrix I|J | − γp/(β + γ)p[A¯(G)]pJ ,J is nonsingular because
|γ/(β+ γ)| < 1 and ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 (Lemma B.3). We find
[ f (y˜⋆)]J =
1
β+ γ
(
I|J | −
γ
β+ γ
[A¯(G)]J ,J
)−1
×
(
[α]J + γ f (0)[A¯(G)]J ,I\J 1|I\J |
)
=
1
β+ γ
(
I|J | −
γ2
(β+ γ)2
[A¯(G)]2J ,J
)−1(
I|J | +
γ
β+ γ
[A¯(G)]J ,J
)
×
(
[α]J + γ f (0)[A¯(G)]J ,I\J 1|I\J |
)
. (D.61)
Condition 1.17.3 implies that
[α]J + γ f (0)[A¯(G)]J ,I\J 1|I\J | >c (β+ γ) f (0)1|J | − γ f (0)[A¯(G)]J ,J 1|J |,
which, together with Conditions 1.17.1 and 1.17.2, in turn implies that(
I|J | +
γ
β+ γ
[A¯(G)]J ,J
)(
[α]J + γ f (0)[A¯(G)]J ,I\J 1|I\J |
)
<c
(
αmax − β f (0)
)
1|J | + (β+ γ) f (0)
(
I|J | −
γ2
(β+ γ)2
[A¯(G)]2J ,J
)
1|J |.
(D.62)
Let
c :=
(
I|J | −
γ2
(β+ γ)2
[A¯(G)]2J ,J
)−1
1|J |, (D.63)
and let cmax denote the largest component of c. I show that
1|J | ≤c c ≤c
(β+ γ)2
β(β+ 2γ)
1|J |, (D.64)
where (β+ γ)2/(β(β+ 2γ)) > 1. First, I establish the lower bound. The inverse of
I|J | − γ2/(β+ γ)2[A¯(G)]2J ,J is nonnegative and bounded below by I|J | because
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0 < γ2/(β+ γ)2ρ([A¯(G)]2J ,J ) < 1 (Lemma B.6). It follows that 1|J | ≤c c. Second,
I establish the upper bound. We find
(D.63) ⇔ c = 1|J | +
γ2
(β+ γ)2
[A¯(G)]2J ,J c
⇒ c ≤c 1|J | +
γ2
(β+ γ)2
cmax[A¯(G)]
2
J ,J 1|J |
⇒ c ≤c
(
1+
γ2
(β+ γ)2
cmax
)
1|J |
⇔ cmax ≤ 1+ γ
2
(β+ γ)2
cmax
⇔ cmax ≤ (β+ γ)
2
β(β+ 2γ)
⇔ c ≤c (β+ γ)
2
β(β+ 2γ)
1|J |.
This concludes the proof of (D.64). Next, I establish that
∀i ∈ J f (y˜⋆i ) ≤
β+ γ
β(β+ 2γ)
(
αmax − β f (0)
)
+ f (0). (D.65)
We find
[ f (y˜⋆)]J =
1
β+ γ
(
I|J | −
γ2
(β+ γ)2
[A¯(G)]2J ,J
)−1
×
(
I|J | +
γ
β+ γ
[A¯(G)]J ,J
)(
[α]J + γ f (0)[A¯(G)]J ,I\J 1|I\J |
)
<c
αmax − β f (0)
β+ γ
(
I|J | −
γ2
(β+ γ)2
[A¯(G)]2J ,J
)−1
1|J | + f (0)1|J |
≤c β+ γ
β(β+ 2γ)
(
αmax − β f (0)
)
1|J | + f (0)1|J |.
The equality is according to (D.61). The first inequality follows from the two
inequalities (D.62) and I|J | ≤c (I|J | − γ2/(β + γ)2[A¯(G)]2J ,J )−1 (Lemma B.1).
The second inequality follows from (D.63) and (D.64). This concludes the proof
of (D.65). Finally, I show that, for all i ∈ I \ J , ∂ui(y˜⋆)/∂yi > 0. Let i ∈ I \ J . We
find
∂ui(y˜⋆)
∂yi
=
(
αi − β f (0)− γ
(
f (0)− ∑
j∈I\J
a¯i,j f (0)− ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (0)
=
{(
αi − β f (0)
)
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) = 0,(
αi − β f (0)− γ∑j∈J a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
))
∂ f (0) if deg+G (i) > 0,
> 0
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because ∑j∈I\J a¯i,j +∑j∈J a¯i,j = 1, ∂ f (0) > 0 (Assumption F), αi > β f (0) (Condi-
tion 1.17.3), and
−γ ∑
j∈J
a¯i,j
(
f (0)− f (y˜⋆j )
) ≥ γ(β+ γ)
β(β+ 2γ)
(
αmax − β f (0)
)
> β f (0)− αmin,
where the first inequality follows from (D.65) and the second from Condition 1.17.5.
This concludes the proof that y˜⋆ cannot be a boundary NE of Γ of type B-2. 
Example 1.18: Proof of (1.11)
Consider the setup of Example 1.18. The NALA game Γ has a unique and interior
NE y⋆ (Proposition 1.14), which is given by (1.7). We find
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G) =
(n− 1)β+ nγ
(n− 1)(β+ γ) In −
γ
(n− 1)(β+ γ)1n1
T
n.
Note that (n− 1)β+ nγ ̸= 0. Also note that γ1n1Tn has rank 1 because γ ̸= 0. It
follows that the matrix In − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G) is nonsingular. Its inverse is given by
Sherman and Morrison’s (1949) formula (see, for example, Bartlett 1951, p. 107),
which yields(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
=
β+ γ
(n− 1)β+ nγ
(
(n− 1)In + γ
β
1n1Tn
)
.
Using (1.7) and the preceding result, we find
y⋆ =
n
(n− 1)β+ nγ
(
γ
β
〈1n, α〉
n
1n +
(
1− 1
n
)
α
)
.
For an alternative proof of (1.11) see the proof of Proposition 1.50. 
Proof of Lemma 1.19
Let Γ := (I ,G, [0, υ¯], {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a NALA game, let α be defined as in Sec-
tion 1.3.2, and let α∧ := αmin and α∨ := αmax be defined as in Section 1.3.3. Suppose
Conditions 1.15.1 to 1.15.4 are satisfied. Note that β+ γ > 0.
The proof of (1.17) proceeds in two steps. First, I show that(
α∧ +
γ
β+ γ
α∨
)
1n ≤c α+ γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)α ≤c
(
α∨ +
γ
β+ γ
α∧
)
1n. (D.66)
Second, I show that
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (0) < α∧ +
γ
β+ γ
α∨ ≤ α∨ + γ
β+ γ
α∧ <
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (υ¯). (D.67)
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As regards the proof of (D.66), note that, for all i ∈ I , γα∨ ≤ γαi ≤ γα∧,
because γ < 0. Using this result, we find
∀i ∈ I+0 (G) α∧ +
γ
β+ γ
α∨ ≤ αi + γβ+ γαi ≤ α∨ +
γ
β+ γ
α∧ (D.68)
and
∀i ∈ I \ I+0 (G) α∧ +
γ
β+ γ
α∨ ≤ αi + γβ+ γ
∑j∈N+G (i) αj
deg+G (i)
≤ α∨ + γ
β+ γ
α∧.
(D.69)
Combining (D.68) and (D.69), we find
∀i ∈ I α∧ + γ
β+ γ
α∨ ≤ [α]i +
γ
β+ γ
[A¯(G)α]i ≤ α∨ +
γ
β+ γ
α∧
⇔
(
α∧ +
γ
β+ γ
α∨
)
1n ≤c α+ γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)α ≤c
(
α∨ +
γ
β+ γ
α∧
)
1n.
As regards the proof of (D.67), note that Conditions 1.15.3 and 1.15.4 imply that
α∨ − α∧ < β f (υ¯) + γ
(
f (υ¯)− f (0))− β f (0)− γ( f (0)− f (υ¯))
= (β+ 2γ)
(
f (υ¯)− f (0)). (D.70)
We find
(β+ γ)α∧ + γα∨ = (β+ 2γ)α∧ + γ(α∨ − α∧)
> (β+ 2γ)α∧ + γ(β+ 2γ)
(
f (υ¯)− f (0))
= (β+ 2γ)
(
α∧ + γ
(
f (υ¯)− f (0)))
> β(β+ 2γ) f (0),
where the first inequality is according to (D.70) and the second inequality is accord-
ing to Condition 1.15.3, and
(β+ γ)α∨ + γα∧ = (β+ 2γ)α∨ − γ(α∨ − α∧)
< (β+ 2γ)α∨ − γ(β+ 2γ)
(
f (υ¯)− f (0))
= (β+ 2γ)
(
α∨ − γ
(
f (υ¯)− f (0)))
< β(β+ 2γ) f (υ¯),
where the first inequality is according to (D.70) and the second inequality is accord-
ing to Condition 1.15.4. Combining the preceding two results, we find
β(β+ 2γ) f (0) < (β+ γ)α∧ + γα∨ ≤ (β+ γ)α∨ + γα∧ < β(β+ 2γ) f (υ¯),
which is equivalent to (D.67). This concludes the proof of (1.17).
Finally, I show that {α¯ ∈ Rn | α¯ satisfies (1.17)} is a convex set. Let {α¯1, α¯2} ⊂
{α¯ ∈ Rn | α¯ satisfies (1.17)}. Let θ ∈ (0, 1). We find
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (0)1n = θ
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (0)1n + (1− θ) β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (0)1n
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<c θ
(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α¯1 + (1− θ)
(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
α¯2
=
(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)(
θα¯1 + (1− θ)α¯2
)
and similarly(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)(
θα¯1 + (1− θ)α¯2
)
<c
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
f (υ¯)1n.
Thus, (θα¯1 + (1− θ)α¯2) ∈ {α¯ ∈ Rn | α¯ satisfies (1.17)}. 
Example 1.21: Proofs of (1.20), (1.21), and (1.24)
Consider the setup of Example 1.21. In what follows, I write α∧ for αmin,Ik and α∨
for αmax,Ik .
First, I show that ∑j∈Ik αj = (d+ 1)(α∧ + α∨)/2. We find
∑
j∈Ik
αj =
d+1
∑
j=1
(
α∧ +
α∨ − α∧
d
(j− 1)
)
= (d+ 1)α∧ +
α∨ − α∧
d
(
(d+ 1)(d+ 2)
2
− (d+ 1)
)
= (d+ 1)
α∧ + α∨
2
.
Second, I show that (1.20) and (1.21) are true. Using the preceding result, we
find
∀i ∈ Ik
∑j∈N+G (i) αj
deg+G (i)
=
1
d ∑j∈Ik\{i}
αj =
d+ 1
d
α∧ + α∨
2
− 1
d
αi (D.71)
and
∀i ∈ Ik αi > |γ|β+ γ
∑j∈N+G (i) αj
deg+G (i)
⇔ ∀i ∈ Ik αi > |γ|β+ γ
d+ 1
d
α∧ + α∨
2
− |γ|
β+ γ
1
d
αi
⇔ ∀i ∈ Ik 2
(
(β+ γ)d+ |γ|)αi > |γ|(d+ 1)(α∧ + α∨)
⇔ 2((β+ γ)d+ |γ|)α∧ > |γ|(d+ 1)(α∧ + α∨)
⇔ 2((β+ γ)d− |γ|d)α∧ > |γ|(d+ 1)(α∨ − α∧)
⇔ α∨ − α∧ < β+ 2γ|γ|
2d
d+ 1
α∧
⇔ α∨
α∧
< 1+
β+ 2γ
|γ|
2d
d+ 1
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because β > 0, −β/2 < γ < 0, d > 0, and α∧ > 0.
Third, I show that (1.24) is true. Using (D.71), we find
∀i ∈ Ik αi < |γ|β+ γ
∑j∈N+G (i) αj
deg+G (i)
+
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
υ¯
⇔ ∀i ∈ Ik αi + |γ|β+ γ
1
d
αi <
|γ|
β+ γ
d+ 1
d
α∧ + α∨
2
+
β(β+ 2γ)
β+ γ
υ¯
⇔ ∀i ∈ Ik 2
(
(β+ γ)d+ |γ|)αi < |γ|(d+ 1)(α∧ + α∨) + 2β(β+ 2γ)dυ¯
⇔ 2((β+ γ)d+ |γ|)α∨ < |γ|(d+ 1)(α∧ + α∨) + 2β(β+ 2γ)dυ¯
⇔ 2((β+ γ)d− |γ|d)α∨ < |γ|(d+ 1)(α∧ − α∨) + 2β(β+ 2γ)dυ¯
⇔ α∨ − α∧ < β+ 2γ|γ|
2d
d+ 1
(βυ¯− α∨). 
Proof of Lemma 1.22
Let Γ := (I ,G, [0, υ¯], {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a NALA game, and let α be defined as in
Section 1.3.2. Suppose Conditions 1.15.1 and 1.15.2 and the two inequalities (1.17)
are satisfied.
First, note that the matrix In − |γ|/(β + γ)A¯(G) is nonsingular with a non-
negative inverse that is bounded below by In because ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 and 0 <
|γ|/(β+ γ) < 1 (Lemma B.6). Second, note that(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
1n =
β+ γ
β+ 2γ
1n (D.72)
because A¯(G)1n = 1n implies that(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
1n =
β+ 2γ
β+ γ
1n.
Using (D.72), premultiplying (In − |γ|/(β+ γ)A¯(G))α and each occurrence of 1n
in (1.17) by the inverse of In − |γ|/(β+ γ)A¯(G) yields β f (0)1n <c α <c β f (υ¯)1n
(Lemma B.1). 
Proof of Proposition 1.23
Let Γ(G) := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be
defined as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2, so that β + γ > 0
and |γ/(β + γ)| < 1. In addition, suppose Γ(G) has a unique and interior NE
y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,G) = (y⋆1(α, β,γ, f ,G), . . . , y
⋆
n(α, β,γ, f ,G)), which is given by (1.7).
Let (i, j) ∈ I2, and let θ be αj, β, or γ. We find
∂y⋆i (α, β,γ, f ,G)
∂θ
=
∂ f−1
(
y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)
)
∂θ
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=
1
∂ f
(
f−1
(
y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)
)) ∂y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂θ
=
1
∂ f
(
y⋆i (α, β,γ, f ,G)
) ∂y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂θ
,
where ∂ f (y⋆i (α, β,γ, f ,G)) > 0 because ∂ f > 0 (Assumption F). It follows that the
partial derivatives of y⋆i (α, β,γ, f ,G) and y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G) with respect to θ have
the same sign.
Next, I compute the partial derivatives of y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G) with respect to α, β,
and γ. To this end, note that
y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G) =
1
β+ γ
α+
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G). (D.73)
First, I compute the partial derivative of y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G) with respect to α. Us-
ing (1.7), we find
J(β,γ,G) :=
∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂α
=
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
.
Second, I compute the partial derivative of y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G) with respect to β.
Using (D.73), we find
∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂β
= − 1
(β+ γ)2
(
α+ γA¯(G)y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
)
+
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂β
,
which implies that
∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂β
= − 1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
×
(
1
β+ γ
α+
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
)
= − 1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
= −J(β,γ,G)y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G).
Third, I compute the partial derivative of y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G) with respect to γ. Us-
ing (D.73), we find
∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂γ
= − 1
(β+ γ)2
α+
β
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
+
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂γ
,
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which implies that
∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂γ
=
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
×
(
β
β+ γ
A¯(G)y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)− 1β+ γα
)
=
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
× (A¯(G)y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)− y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G))
= J(β,γ,G)
(
A¯(G)− In
)
y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G).
Proof of Result 1.23.1 Suppose −β/2 < γ < 0. Note that In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2
is a nonsingular M-matrix with a nonnegative inverse that is bounded below by In
because A¯(G) is nonnegative and 0 < γ2/(β+ γ)2ρ(A¯(G)2) < 1 (Lemma B.6).
First, I establish a lower bound for J(β,γ,G). We find
J(β,γ,G) =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
≥c 1
β+ γ
In − |γ|
(β+ γ)2
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1
1n1Tn
=
1
β+ γ
In − |γ|
β(β+ 2γ)
1n1Tn.
The first equality is according to (1.25) and (D.33). The inequality follows from three
inequalities: β+ γ > 0, In ≤c (In− γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2)−1, and A¯(G) ≤c 1n1Tn. The
second equality follows from (D.35).
Second, I establish an upper bound for J(β,γ,G). We find
J(β,γ,G) =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
≤c 1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1
≤c β+ γ
β(β+ 2γ)
1n1Tn.
The first inequality follows from three inequalities: β+ γ > 0, On ≤c A¯(G), and
In ≤c (In − γ2/(β + γ)2 A¯(G)2)−1. The second inequality follows from the two
inequalities β+ γ > 0 and In ≤c (In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2)−1 and (D.35).
Third, I show that, for all i ∈ I , [J(β,γ,G)]i,i > 0. To this end, let i ∈ I , and
let Qi denote the square matrix of order n that results from A¯(G) by setting all
components in row i and column i to zero, that is,Qi := (In− eieTi )A¯(G)(In− eieTi ).
The definition of Qi implies that On ≤c Qi ≤c A¯(G), which in turn implies that
ρ(Qi) ≤ ρ(A¯(G)) (see, for example, Varga 2000, Theorem 2.21). It follows that
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In−γ/(β+γ)Qi and In−γ2/(β+γ)2Q2i are nonsingular because |γ/(β+γ)| < 1
and ρ(A¯(G)) = 1 (Lemma B.3). The Laplace expansion of det(In − γ/(β+ γ)Qi)
along the ith column of In − γ/(β+ γ)Qi yields
det
(
In − γ
β+ γ
Qi
)
=
n
∑
k=1
(−1)k+i det
([
In − γ
β+ γ
Qi
]
−k,−i
)[
In − γ
β+ γ
Qi
]
k,i
= (−1)i+i det
([
In − γ
β+ γ
Qi
]
−i,−i
)
= (−1)i+i det
([
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
]
−i,−i
)
=
[
adj
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)]
i,i
. (D.74)
The first equality is the Laplace expansion. The second equality follows from,
for all k ∈ I , [In − γ/(β + γ)Qi]k,i = δk,i. The third equality follows from the
definition of Qi. The last equality follows from the definition of the adjugate of
In − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G). We find
[(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1]
i,i
=
[
adj
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)]
i,i
det
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
=
det
(
In − γ
β+ γ
Qi
)
det
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
=
det
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
Q2i
)
det
(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
Qi
) det
(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
det
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)
> 0.
The first equality is clear. The second equality is according to (D.74). The third
equality follows from (D.32) and an analogous equality with Qi substituted for
A¯(G). The inequality follows from the fact that the determinant of a nonsingular
M-matrix is positive (see, for example, Plemmons 1977, Theorem 1, especially
Condition A1). 
Proof of Result 1.23.2 Evidently, if γ = 0, then J(β,γ,G) = (1/β)In. 
Proof of Result 1.23.3 Suppose γ > 0. Note that In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G) is a non-
singular M-matrix with a nonnegative inverse that is bounded below by In be-
cause A¯(G) is nonnegative and 0 < γ/(β+ γ)ρ(A¯(G)) < 1 (Lemma B.6). First,
I establish a lower bound for J(β,γ,G). The two inequalities β + γ > 0 and
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In ≤c (In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G))−1 imply that 1/(β + γ)In ≤c J(β,γ,G). Second,
I establish an upper bound for J(β,γ,G). The two inequalities β + γ > 0 and
In ≤c (In − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(G))−1 and (D.12) imply that J(β,γ,G) ≤c (1/β)1n1Tn. 
Proof of Result 1.23.4 First, note that sl(G) = G if G is strongly connected. Second,
note that G is strongly connected if and only if A˙(G) is irreducible (see, for example,
Berman and Plemmons 1994, Theorem 2.1 on p. 29). Third, note that A¯(G) is
irreducible if and only if A˙(G) is irreducible.
Suppose G is strongly connected and γ > 0. It follows that A¯(G) is irre-
ducible. Since 0 < γ/(β+ γ) < 1, ρ(A¯(G)) = 1, and A¯(G) is irreducible, we have
On <c (β+ γ)J(β,γ,G) (Lemma B.6), which in turn implies thatOn <c J(β,γ,G)
because β+ γ > 0. 
Proof of Result 1.23.5 Suppose γ > 0. Let (i, j) ∈ I2 with i ̸= j. Note that
∀p ∈ Z+
[
A˙
(
sl(G)
)p]
i,j > 0 ⇔
[
A¯(G)p
]
i,j > 0. (D.75)
There exists a walk in G from i to j if and only if there exists a walk in sl(G) from i
to j. There exists a walk in sl(G) from i to j if and only if there exists a p ∈ Z++
such that [A˙(sl(G))p]i,j > 0 (see, for example, Festinger 1949, pp. 154–55). Ac-
cording to (D.75), for all p ∈ Z++, [A˙(sl(G))p]i,j > 0 if and only if [A¯(G)p]i,j > 0.
Since 0 < γ/(β + γ) < 1 and ρ(A¯(G)) = 1, the definition of J(β,γ,G) implies
(Lemma B.2) that
J(β,γ,G) =
1
β+ γ
∞
∑
m=0
(
γ
β+ γ
)m
A¯(G)m,
which in turn implies that
[J(β,γ,G)]i,j =
1
β+ γ
∞
∑
m=0
(
γ
β+ γ
)m[
A¯(G)m
]
i,j. (D.76)
Note that all summands in (D.76) are nonnegative because β > 0, γ > 0, and
On ≤c A¯(G). Thus, [J(β,γ,G)]i,j > 0 if and only if there exists a p ∈ Z++ such
that [A¯(G)p]i,j > 0. 
Proof of Result 1.23.6 Suppose β > γ ≥ 0. Note that
∀k ∈ I [J(β,γ,G)]k,k ≥
1
β+ γ
(D.77)
according to Results 1.23.2 and 1.23.3. I show that
∀(i, j) ∈ I2 with i ̸= j [J(β,γ,G)]i,j <
1
β+ γ
.
Let (i, j) ∈ I2 with i ̸= j. According to (D.12), we have
J(β,γ,G)1n =
1
β
1n. (D.78)
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Using (D.78), we find
[J(β,γ,G)]i,i + [J(β,γ,G)]i,j +
n
∑
k=1,k/∈{i,j}
[J(β,γ,G)]i,k =
1
β
,
which implies that
[J(β,γ,G)]i,j =
1
β
− [J(β,γ,G)]i,i −
n
∑
k=1,k/∈{i,j}
[J(β,γ,G)]i,k
≤ 1
β
− 1
β+ γ
=
γ
β
1
β+ γ
<
1
β+ γ
,
where the first inequality follows from (D.77) and the fact that for all k ∈ I ,
[J(β,γ,G)]i,k ≥ 0 (Results 1.23.2 and 1.23.3), and the second inequality follows
from the assumption that β > γ. 
Proof of Corollary 1.26
Let (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game. Suppose β > 0 and γ >
−β/2, so that β + γ > 0 and |γ/(β + γ)| < 1. Let x ∈ I , and let jx(β,γ,G) be
defined as in (1.30).
Results 1.26.1 to 1.26.6 follow directly from Results 1.23.1 to 1.23.6. In the rest of
the proof, I show that Result 1.26.7 is true. Suppose deg+G (x) = 0. The definition of
J(β,γ,G) implies that
jx(β,γ,G) =
1
β+ γ
ex +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)jx(β,γ,G),
which in turn implies that
[jx(β,γ,G)]x =
1
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ
n
∑
j=1
[A¯(G)]x,j[jx(β,γ,G)]j
=
1
β+ γ
+
γ
β+ γ
[jx(β,γ,G)]x
because [A¯(G)]x,j = δj,x. It follows that [jx(β,γ,G)]x = 1/β > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1.27
Let Γ(G) := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, α be defined as in
Section 1.3.2, and (x, y) ∈ I2 \A(G)with x ̸= y. The digraph G (x, y) induces the
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generic NALA game Γ(G (x, y)) := (I ,G (x, y),Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ). Suppose
β > 0 and γ > −β/2, so that β+ γ > 0 and |γ/(β+ γ)| < 1. In addition, suppose
Γ(G) has a unique and interior NE y⋆(G), which is given by (1.7), and Γ(G (x, y))
has a unique and interior NE y⋆(G (x, y)), which is of the form (1.7).
First, I show that 1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 > 0. The inequality is trivial if
γ = 0. Suppose γ ̸= 0 in what follows. Note that γ/(β+ γ)ex∆(x, y,G)T is a matrix
with rank 1 because γ ̸= 0 and ∆(x, y,G) ̸= 0n. This fact and (1.29) imply that
In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G  (x, y)) is a rank-one-perturbation of In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G),
both matrices being nonsingular. Cauchy’s formula for the determinant of a rank-
one perturbation (see, for example, Horn and Johnson 2012, formula (0.8.5.11))
yields
1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 =
det
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯
(
G (x, y)
))
det
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
) . (D.79)
Both determinants in (D.79) are positive. To see this, consider two cases. First,
the case γ > 0. Both In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G) and In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G (x, y)) are
nonsingular M-matrices, which have positive determinants (see, for example, Plem-
mons 1977, Theorem 1, especially Condition A1). Second, the case −β/2 < γ < 0.
Using (D.32) and an analogous equality with A¯(G (x, y)) substituted for A¯(G)
gives
det
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
=
det
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)
det
(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
and
det
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯
(
G (x, y)
))
=
det
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯
(
G (x, y)
)2)
det
(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯
(
G (x, y)
)) ,
where the nonsingular M-matrices In − |γ|/(β+ γ)A¯(G), In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2,
In − |γ|/(β+ γ)A¯(G (x, y)), and In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G (x, y))2 have positive
determinants. This concludes the proof of 1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 > 0.
Second, I prove (1.31). Note that, according to (1.7),
f
(
y⋆(G)
)
=
1
β+ γ
α+
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G) f
(
y⋆(G)
) (D.80)
and
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))
=
1
β+ γ
α+
γ
β+ γ
A¯
(
G (x, y)
)
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))
. (D.81)
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If γ = 0, then f (y⋆(G (x, y)))− f (y⋆(G)) = 0n, which is a special case of (1.31).
Suppose γ ̸= 0 in what follows. Using (D.80) and (D.81), we find
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))− f (y⋆(G))
=
γ
β+ γ
A¯
(
G (x, y)
)
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))− γ
β+ γ
A¯(G) f
(
y⋆(G)
) (D.82)
=
γ
β+ γ
A¯
(
G (x, y)
)(
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))− f (y⋆(G)))
+
γ
β+ γ
(
A¯
(
G (x, y)
)− A¯(G)) f (y⋆(G)),
which implies that
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))− f (y⋆(G)) = γ
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯
(
G (x, y)
))−1
×
(
A¯
(
G (x, y)
)− A¯(G)) f (y⋆(G)). (D.83)
Using (1.29) and (D.83), we find
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))− f (y⋆(G))
=
γ
β+ γ
((
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
− γ
β+ γ
ex∆(x, y,G)T
)−1
× (ex∆(x, y,G)T) f (y⋆(G)). (D.84)
The inverse of (In−γ/(β+γ)A¯(G))−γ/(β+γ)ex∆(x, y,G)T is given by Sherman
and Morrison’s (1949) formula (see, for example, Bartlett 1951, p. 107):((
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
− γ
β+ γ
ex∆(x, y,G)T
)−1
=
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
+
γ
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1(
ex∆(x, y,G)T
)(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
1− γ
β+ γ
〈
∆(x, y,G),
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
ex
〉
=
(
In +
γjx(β,γ,G)∆(x, y,G)T
1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉
)(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
. (D.85)
Combining (D.84) and (D.85) gives
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))− f (y⋆(G))
=
γ
β+ γ
(
In +
γjx(β,γ,G)∆(x, y,G)T
1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉
)(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
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× (ex∆(x, y,G)T) f (y⋆(G))
= γ
(
In +
γjx(β,γ,G)∆(x, y,G)T
1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉
)(
jx(β,γ,G)∆(x, y,G)T
)
f
(
y⋆(G)
)
= γ
〈
∆(x, y,G), f
(
y⋆(G)
)〉(
In +
γjx(β,γ,G)∆(x, y,G)T
1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉
)
jx(β,γ,G)
=
γ
〈
∆(x, y,G), f
(
y⋆(G)
)〉
1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 jx(β,γ,G).
This concludes the proof of (1.31).
Third, I prove (1.32). Using (D.82), we find
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))− A¯(G (x, y)) f (y⋆(G (x, y)))
= f
(
y⋆(G)
)− A¯(G) f (y⋆(G))
+
γ
β+ γ
A¯
(
G (x, y)
)
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))
− A¯(G (x, y)) f (y⋆(G (x, y)))
+ A¯(G) f
(
y⋆(G)
)− γ
β+ γ
A¯(G) f
(
y⋆(G)
)
= f
(
y⋆(G)
)− A¯(G) f (y⋆(G))− d(α, β,γ, f ,G, x, y),
where
d(α, β,γ, f ,G, x, y) :=
β
β+ γ
A¯
(
G (x, y)
)
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))
− β
β+ γ
A¯(G) f
(
y⋆(G)
)
.
If γ = 0, then f (y⋆(G)) = f (y⋆(G (x, y))) = (1/β)α and jx(β,γ,G) = (1/β)ex
(Result 1.26.2), so that
d(α, β,γ, f ,G, x, y) =
(
A¯
(
G (x, y)
)− A¯(G)) 1
β
α
=
(
ex∆(x, y,G)T
) 1
β
α
= β〈∆(x, y,G), (1/β)α〉 1
β
ex
=
β
〈
∆(x, y,G), f
(
y⋆(G)
)〉
1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 jx(β,γ,G).
If γ ̸= 0, then
d(α, β,γ, f ,G, x, y) =
β
γ
(
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))− 1
β+ γ
α
)
− β
γ
(
f
(
y⋆(G)
)− 1
β+ γ
α
)
D Proofs of Chapter 1 Results 231
=
β
γ
(
f
(
y⋆
(
G (x, y)
))− f (y⋆(G)))
=
β
〈
∆(x, y,G), f
(
y⋆(G)
)〉
1− γ〈∆(x, y,G), jx(β,γ,G)〉 jx(β,γ,G),
where the first equality follows from (D.80) and (D.81) and the last equality is
according to (1.31). This concludes the proof of (1.32). 
Proofs of Propositions 1.29, 1.31, 1.33, 1.34, and 1.35
Let Γ(G) := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be
defined as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose Condition G is satisfied, β > 0, and γ > −β/2,
so that β+ γ > 0 and |γ/(β+ γ)| < 1. In addition, suppose Γ(G) has a unique and
interior NE y⋆ := (y⋆1 , . . . , y⋆n), which is given by (1.7). LetGκ be aweakly connected
component of G of order nκ > 1, and let Iκ := V(Gκ). Let h : Iκ → {1, . . . , nκ}
be the unique order isomorphism. The component Gκ induces the generic NALA
game Γ(Gκ) := (Iκ ,Gκ ,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈Iκ , f ). Let αmin,Iκ := min{αi | i ∈ Iκ} and
αmax,Iκ := max{αi | i ∈ Iκ}. Finally, let αIκ := (αh−1(1), . . . , αh−1(nκ)), and y⋆Iκ :=
(y⋆h−1(1), . . . , y
⋆
h−1(nκ)
).
Note that Inκ − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(Gκ) is nonsingular because |γ/(β+ γ)| < 1 and
ρ(A¯(Gκ)) = 1 (Lemma B.3).
Proof of Proposition 1.29
Let g be the unique order isomorphism from I \ Iκ to {nκ + 1, . . . , n}. Let pi be the
permutation of I defined by
pi(i) :=
{
h−1(i) if i ≤ nκ ,
g−1(i) if i > nκ .
Let Ppi denote the permutation matrix of pi. The matrix Ppi is nonsingular with
P−1pi = PTpi . We find
Ppiα =
(
αIκ
[α]I\Iκ
)
, (D.86)
Ppi f (y⋆) =
(
fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ )
[ f (y⋆)]I\Iκ
)
, (D.87)
and
Ppi A¯(G)P−1pi =
(
A¯(Gκ) 0nκ0
T
n−nκ
0n−nκ0Tnκ [A¯(G)]I\Iκ ,I\Iκ
)
, (D.88)
where Ppi A¯(G)P−1pi is block diagonal because Gκ is a weakly connected component
of G. According to (1.7), y⋆ satisfies
f (y⋆) =
1
β+ γ
α+
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G) f (y⋆). (D.89)
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Using (D.86) to (D.89), we find(
fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ )
[ f (y⋆)]I\Iκ
)
= Ppi f (y⋆)
=
1
β+ γ
Ppiα+
γ
β+ γ
Ppi A¯(G)P−1pi Ppi f (y⋆)
=
1
β+ γ
(
αIκ
[α]I\Iκ
)
+
γ
β+ γ
(
A¯(Gκ) 0nκ0
T
n−nκ
0n−nκ0Tnκ [A¯(G)]I\Iκ ,I\Iκ
)(
fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ )
[ f (y⋆)]I\Iκ
)
,
which implies that
fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ ) =
1
β+ γ
αIκ +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ) fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ ),
which in turn is equivalent to (1.36). It is straightforward to show that y⋆Iκ is theunique and interior NE of Γ(Gκ). 
Proof of Proposition 1.31
Proof of Result 1.31.1 Suppose −β/2 < γ < 0. First, note that
Inκ − γ2/(β + γ)2 A¯(Gκ)2 is a nonsingular M-matrix, which has a nonnegative
inverse that is bounded below by Inκ , because 0 < γ2/(β+ γ)2 < 1, ρ(A¯(Gκ)2) = 1,
andOn ≤c A¯(Gκ) (Lemma B.6). Second, note that(
Inκ −
γ2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(Gκ)
2
)−1
1nκ =
(β+ γ)2
β(β+ 2γ)
1nκ . (D.90)
Third, note that
fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ ) =
1
β+ γ
(
Inκ −
γ2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(Gκ)
2
)−1(
Inκ +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)
αIκ .
Analogous to the proof of (D.66), which holds true if β > 0 and −β < γ < 0, we
find
(β+ γ)αmin,Iκ + γαmax,Iκ
β+ γ
1nκ ≤c
(
Inκ +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)
αIκ
≤c (β+ γ)αmax,Iκ + γαmin,Iκ
β+ γ
1nκ . (D.91)
Using (D.90), premultiplying each vector in (D.91) by the inverse of
Inκ − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(Gκ)2 yields (Lemma B.1)
(β+ γ)
(β+ γ)αmin,Iκ + γαmax,Iκ
β(β+ 2γ)
1nκ
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≤c
(
Inκ −
γ2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(Gκ)
2
)−1(
Inκ +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)
αIκ
≤c (β+ γ) (β+ γ)αmax,Iκ + γαmin,Iκ
β(β+ 2γ)
1nκ ,
which is equivalent to (1.37) because
(β+ γ)αmin,Iκ + γαmax,Iκ
β+ 2γ
= αmin,Iκ −
|γ|
β+ 2γ
(αmax,Iκ − αmin,Iκ )
and
(β+ γ)αmax,Iκ + γαmin,Iκ
β+ 2γ
= αmax,Iκ +
|γ|
β+ 2γ
(αmax,Iκ − αmin,Iκ ).
Suppose Conditions 1.15.1 to 1.15.4 are satisfied. Using (D.67) and the three in-
equalities αmin ≤ αmin,Iκ ≤ αmax,Iκ ≤ αmax, we find
f (0) <
(β+ γ)αmin + γαmax
β(β+ 2γ)
≤ (β+ γ)αmin,Iκ + γαmax,Iκ
β(β+ 2γ)
and
f (υ¯) >
(β+ γ)αmax + γαmin
β(β+ 2γ)
≥ (β+ γ)αmax,Iκ + γαmin,Iκ
β(β+ 2γ)
.
It follows that f (0) < (1/β)(αmin,Iκ − |γ|/(β+ 2γ)(αmax,Iκ − αmin,Iκ )) and
(1/β)(αmax,Iκ + |γ|/(β+ 2γ)(αmax,Iκ − αmin,Iκ )) < f (υ¯). 
Proof of Result 1.31.2 Suppose γ = 0. According to (1.36), fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) = (1/β)αIκ .
Proof of Result 1.31.3 Suppose γ > 0. First, note that Inκ − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(Gκ) is a
nonsingular M-matrix, which has a nonnegative inverse that is bounded below
by Inκ , because 0 < γ/(β+ γ) < 1, ρ(A¯(Gκ)) = 1, andOn ≤c A¯(Gκ) (Lemma B.6).
Second, note that (
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)−1
1nκ =
β+ γ
β
1nκ . (D.92)
Third, note that
αmin,Iκ1nκ ≤c αIκ ≤c αmax,Iκ1nκ . (D.93)
Using (D.92), premultiplying each vector in (D.93) by the inverse of
Inκ − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(Gκ) yields (Lemma B.1)
αmin,Iκ
β+ γ
β
1nκ ≤c
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)−1
αIκ ≤c αmax,Iκ
β+ γ
β
1nκ ,
which is equivalent to (αmin,Iκ/β)1nκ ≤c fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) ≤c (αmax,Iκ/β)1nκ . 
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Proof of Proposition 1.33
Proof of Result 1.33.1 Suppose γ > 0. Note that Inκ − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(Gκ) is a non-
singular M-matrix, which has a nonnegative inverse that is bounded below by Inκ
(Lemma B.6). Premultiplying both sides of the inequality 0nκ ≤c (<c) αIκ by the
inverse of Inκ − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(Gκ) and dividing by β+ γ yields 0nκ ≤c (<c) fnκ (y⋆Iκ )(Lemma B.1 and (1.36)), which implies that 0nκ ≤c (<c) γ/(β+ γ)A¯(Gκ) fnκ (y⋆Iκ ),which in turn implies that
1
β+ γ
αIκ ≤c (<c)
1
β+ γ
αIκ +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ) fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ ) = fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ ). 
Proof of Result 1.33.2 Suppose γ ̸= 0. The system of equations (1.36) is equivalent
to fnκ (y⋆Iκ )− A¯(Gκ) fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) = (β/γ)((1/β)αIκ − fnκ (y⋆Iκ )), from which it followsthat sgn(γ) fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) ≤c (<c) sgn(γ)A¯(Gκ) fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) is both necessary and sufficientfor (1/β)αIκ ≤c (<c) fnκ (y⋆Iκ ). 
Proof of Proposition 1.34
Proof of Result 1.34.1 Suppose αIκ = α¯1nκ for some α¯ ∈ R. We find
f (y⋆Iκ ) =
1
β+ γ
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)−1
αIκ
=
α¯
β+ γ
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)−1
1nκ
=
α¯
β+ γ
β+ γ
β
1nκ
=
α¯
β
1nκ ,
where the first equality is according to (1.36) and the third equality is according
to (D.92). 
Proof of Result 1.34.2 Suppose y⋆Iκ = y¯1nκ for some y¯ ∈ int(Y). We find
αIκ = (β+ γ)
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)
f (y⋆Iκ )
= (β+ γ) f (y¯)
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)
1nκ
= (β+ γ) f (y¯)
(
1− γ
β+ γ
)
1nκ
= β f (y¯)1nκ ,
where the first equality follows from (1.36), the second equality is according to
f (y⋆Iκ ) = f (y¯1nκ ) = f (y¯)1nκ , and the third equality follows from A¯(Gκ)1nκ = 1nκ .
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Proof of Proposition 1.35
Proof of Result 1.35.1 Suppose αIκ = A¯(Gκ)αIκ . Note that(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)−1
= Inκ +
γ
β+ γ
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)−1
A¯(Gκ). (D.94)
Indeed, premultiplying both sides of
Inκ =
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)
+
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
by the inverse of Inκ − γ/(β+ γ)A¯(Gκ) gives (D.94). We find
fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ ) =
1
β+ γ
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)−1
αIκ
=
1
β+ γ
(
Inκ +
γ
β+ γ
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)−1
A¯(Gκ)
)
αIκ
=
1
β+ γ
αIκ +
γ
β+ γ
1
β+ γ
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)−1
αIκ
=
1
β+ γ
αIκ +
γ
β+ γ
fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ ), (D.95)
where the first and the last equality are according to (1.36), the second equality
is according to (D.94), and the third equality is according to the assumption that
αIκ = A¯(Gκ)αIκ . Finally, note that (D.95) is equivalent to fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) = (1/β)αIκ . 
Proof of Result 1.35.2 Suppose γ ̸= 0 and fnκ (y⋆Iκ ) = (1/β)αIκ . Using (1.36), wefind
fnκ (y
⋆
Iκ ) =
1
β+ γ
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)−1
αIκ
⇔ 1
β
(
Inκ −
γ
β+ γ
A¯(Gκ)
)
αIκ =
1
β+ γ
αIκ
⇔ γ
β(β+ γ)
αIκ =
γ
β(β+ γ)
A¯(Gκ)αIκ
⇔ αIκ = A¯(Gκ)αIκ . 
Proof of Lemma 1.37
Let G be a digraph on I . Let S(G) be defined as in (1.38).
Proof of Result 1.37.1 Suppose Condition G is satisfied, which implies that
I \ I+0 (G) ̸= ∅. Evidently, S(G) is symmetric and nonnegative definite.
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First, I show that S(G) ̸= On. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, S(G) = On,
that is, In − A¯(G) = A¯(G)T(In − A¯(G)). Let i ∈ I \ I+0 (G). We find
1 = [In − A¯(G)]i,i
=
[
A¯(G)T
(
In − A¯(G)
)]
i,i
= [A¯(G)]i,i[In − A¯(G)]i,i + ∑
j∈I\{i}
[A¯(G)]j,i[In − A¯(G)]j,i
= − ∑
j∈I\{i}
[A¯(G)]2j,i
≤ 0,
a contradiction.
Second, I show that ρ(S(G)) > 0. Note that σ(S(G)) ⊂ R+ because S(G) is
symmetric andnonnegative definite. It is therefore sufficient to show that σ(S(G)) ̸=
{0}. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, σ(S(G)) = {0}. The matrix S(G) is
diagonalizable because it is symmetric. It follows that there exists a nonsingular
matrix P of order n such that P−1S(G)P = On, from which S(G) = On follows, a
contradiction.
Third, I show that
ρ
(
S(G)
) ≤ 2max{1I\I+0 (G)(j) + deg−G (j)min{deg+G (i) ∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)}
∣∣∣∣∣ j ∈ I
}
.
To this end, I establish two auxiliary results:
‖In − A¯(G)‖∞ = 2 (D.96)
and
‖In − A¯(G)‖1 ≤ max
{
1I\I+0 (G)(j) +
deg−G (j)
min
{
deg+G (i)
∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)}
∣∣∣∣∣ j ∈ I
}
.
(D.97)
First, I prove (D.96). We have, according to (1.3),
∀(i, j) ∈ I2 [In − A¯(G)]i,j =

0 if i = j and deg+G (i) = 0,
1 if i = j and deg+G (i) > 0,
0 if i ̸= j and j /∈ N+G (i),
− 1
deg+G (i)
if i ̸= j and j ∈ N+G (i),
which implies that
∀i ∈ I
n
∑
j=1
∣∣[In − A¯(G)]i,j∣∣ =
{
0 if deg+G (i) = 0,
2 if deg+G (i) > 0.
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Since I \ I+0 (G) ̸= ∅, we find
‖In − A¯(G)‖∞ = max
{ n
∑
j=1
∣∣[In − A¯(G)]i,j∣∣ ∣∣∣ i ∈ I} = 2. (D.98)
Second, I prove (D.97). We have, for all j ∈ I ,
n
∑
i=1
∣∣[In − A¯(G)]i,j∣∣
=
∣∣1− [A¯(G)]j,j∣∣+ ∑
i∈I\{j}
[A¯(G)]i,j
=
∣∣1− 1I+0 (G)(j)∣∣+ ∑
i∈I+0 (G)\{j}
[A¯(G)]i,j + ∑
i∈I\(I+0 (G)∪{j})
[A¯(G)]i,j
=
∣∣1I\I+0 (G)(j)∣∣+ ∑
i∈I+0 (G)\{j}
δi,j + ∑
i∈I\(I+0 (G)∪{j})
1N+G (i)(j)
deg+G (i)
= 1I\I+0 (G)(j) + ∑
i∈I\I+0 (G)
1N−G (j)(i)
deg+G (i)
≤ 1I\I+0 (G)(j) +
1
min
{
deg+G (i)
∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)} ∑i∈I\I+0 (G) 1N−G (j)(i)
= 1I\I+0 (G)(j) +
∣∣N−G (j)∣∣
min
{
deg+G (i)
∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)}
= 1I\I+0 (G)(j) +
deg−G (j)
min
{
deg+G (i)
∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)} . (D.99)
The first equality is obvious. The second equality follows from (1.3), which implies
that [A¯(G)]j,j = 1I+0 (G)(j). The third equality is according to (1.3). The forth
equality follows from the fact that j /∈ N+G (j) and the fact that j ∈ N+G (i) if and
only if i ∈ N−G (j). The inequality is obvious. The fifth equality follows from the fact
that for all i ∈ I+0 (G), i /∈ N−G (j). The last equality is according to the definition of
deg−G (j). Using (D.99), we find
‖In − A¯(G)‖1 = max
{ n
∑
i=1
∣∣[In − A¯(G)]i,j∣∣ ∣∣∣ j ∈ I}
≤ max
{
1I\I+0 (G)(j) +
deg−G (j)
min
{
deg+G (i)
∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)}
∣∣∣∣∣ j ∈ I
}
.
Finally, we find
ρ(S) = ρ
((
In − A¯(G)
)T(In − A¯(G)))
≤ ∥∥(In − A¯(G))T(In − A¯(G))∥∥∞
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≤ ∥∥(In − A¯(G))T∥∥∞‖In − A¯(G)‖∞
= ‖In − A¯(G)‖1‖In − A¯(G)‖∞
≤ 2max
{
1I\I+0 (G)(j) +
deg−G (j)
min
{
deg+G (i)
∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)}
∣∣∣∣∣ j ∈ I
}
.
The first equality is trivial. The first inequality is according to Lemma B.7 be-
cause ‖·‖∞ is sub-multiplicative, which also justifies the second inequality. The
second equality is straightforward to see. The third inequality follows from (D.96)
and (D.97). 
Proof of Result 1.37.2 Suppose Condition G is not satisfied. It follows that A¯(G) =
In and S(G) = On. 
Proof of Proposition 1.38
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be defined
as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose Γ has a unique and interior social optimum y⋆S :=
(y⋆S,1, . . . , y
⋆
S,n). Let S(G) be defined as in (1.38). In what follows, the component in
row i and column j of A¯(G), a¯i,j(G), is abbreviated to a¯i,j.
It follows from the definition of a social optimum of Γ that y⋆S is the unique,
global, and interior maximum point of w : Yn → R. Since y⋆S is an interior global
maximum point of w, by Fermat’s theorem, y⋆S is a stationary point of w, that is, it
satisfies
∀i ∈ I ∂w(y
⋆
S)
∂yi
= 0. (D.100)
Let i ∈ I . For all y := (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Yn, we have
∂w(y)
∂yi
= αi∂ f (yi)− β f (yi)∂ f (yi)
− γ
(
f (yi)− ∑
j∈I
(
a¯j,i + a¯i,j
)
f (yj) + ∑
j∈I
∑
k∈I
a¯j,i a¯j,k f (yk)
)
∂ f (yi)
because
w(y) = ∑
j∈I
uj(y) = ∑
j∈I
αj f (yj)− β2 ∑j∈I
f (yj)2 − γ2 ∑j∈I
(
f (yj)− ∑
k∈I
a¯j,k f (yk)
)2
.
Since ∂ f > 0 (Assumption F), the preceding result about the partial derivative
implies that the system of equations (D.100) is equivalent to
∀i ∈ I β f (y⋆S,i) + γ
(
f (y⋆S,i)− ∑
j∈I
(a¯j,i + a¯i,j) f (y⋆S,j) + ∑
j∈I
∑
k∈I
a¯j,i a¯j,k f (y⋆S,k)
)
= αi,
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which in turn is equivalent to(
βIn + γS(G)
)
f (y⋆S) = α. (D.101)
The assumption that y⋆S is the unique and interior social optimum of Γ implies that
the matrix βIn + γS(G) is nonsingular. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, this
matrix is singular. It follows that there exists a c := (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Rn \ {0n} such
that (
βIn + γS(G)
)
c = 0n. (D.102)
Since y⋆S is an interior social optimum of Γ, f (y⋆S) lies in int( f (Y)n), from which
it follows that for all i ∈ I , there exists an open ball with radius ri > 0 and
center f (y⋆S,i) that is contained in int( f (Y)). For all i ∈ I , let
λi :=

1 if ci = 0,
ri
2|ci| if ci ̸= 0.
Let λ := min{λi | i ∈ I} > 0. The definition of λ implies that for all i ∈ I , the point
f (y⋆S,i) + λci lies in int( f (Y)), from which it follows that y⋆T,i := f−1( f (y⋆S,i) + λci)
lies in int(Y). Let y⋆T := (y⋆T,1, . . . , y⋆T,n). Note that f (y⋆T) = f (y⋆S) + λc. Evidently,
y⋆T ∈ int(Yn) and f (y⋆T) ∈ int( f (Y)n). Note that y⋆T ̸= y⋆S because λ > 0 and
c ̸= 0n. We find
w(y⋆T) = 〈α, f (y⋆T)〉 −
1
2
〈
f (y⋆T),
(
βIn + γS(G)
)
f (y⋆T)
〉
= 〈α, f (y⋆S) + λc〉 −
1
2
〈
f (y⋆S) + λc,
(
βIn + γS(G)
)(
f (y⋆S) + λc
)〉
= 〈α, f (y⋆S)〉+ λ〈α, c〉 −
1
2
〈
f (y⋆S),
(
βIn + γS(G)
)
f (y⋆S)
〉
− λ〈 f (y⋆S), (βIn + γS(G))c〉− 12λ2〈c, (βIn + γS(G))c〉
= 〈α, f (y⋆S)〉 −
1
2
〈
f (y⋆S),
(
βIn + γS(G)
)
f (y⋆S)
〉
= w(y⋆S),
where 〈α, c〉 = 0 according to (D.101) and (D.102) and 〈 f (y⋆S), (βIn+γS(G))c〉 = 0
and 〈c, (βIn + γS(G))c〉 = 0 according to (D.102). Since y⋆S is the unique, global,
and interior maximum point of w, w(y⋆T) = w(y⋆S) implies that y⋆T = y⋆S, which
contradicts y⋆T ̸= y⋆S. This concludes the proof of (1.39). 
Proof of Proposition 1.39
Let Γ := (I ,G,R, {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a NALA game, and let α be defined as in
Section 1.3.2. Suppose Conditions 1.39.1, 1.39.2, and 1.39.3 are satisfied. Let S(G)
be defined as in (1.38).
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First, note that f (R) = R because f (R) is an interval (Lemma 1.1) and f is
strictly increasing (Assumption F) and not bounded below and above (Condi-
tion 1.39.3). Second, note that f (R) is convex. Third, note that f (R) is open, so that
int( f (R)) = f (R). It follows that f (R)n is convex and open.
LetM⋆ ⊂ Rn denote the set of all global maximum points of w. I show that
|M⋆| = 1. Let the function w˜ : f (R)n → R be defined by w˜ := w ◦ ( f−1, . . . , f−1),
that is, for all z ∈ f (R)n,
w˜(z) = 〈α, z〉 − 1
2
〈
z,
(
βIn + γS(G)
)
z
〉
.
I show that w˜ has a unique global maximum point. The function w˜ is twice
continuously differentiable on f (R)n, its Hessian (matrix) satisfies
∀z ∈ f (R)n (Hess w˜)(z) = −(βIn + γS(G)).
Since (Hess w˜)(z) does not depend on z ∈ f (R)n, I write Hess w˜ for (Hess w˜)(z)
in what follows. The symmetric matrix βIn + γS(G) is positive definite (and there-
fore nonsingular) because β > 0 (Condition 1.39.1) and γρ(S(G)) > −β (Con-
dition 1.39.2). Indeed, min σ(βIn + γS(G)) > 0 (see the proof of Lemma 1.43
for details). It follows that w˜ is strictly concave on f (R)n. Since w˜ is strictly con-
cave, it has at most a global maximum point, and a local maximum point of w˜ is a
global maximum point. It is therefore enough to show that w˜ has a local maximum
point. Since w˜ is strictly concave and differentiable, it has a local maximum point
at z ∈ f (R)n if and only if (grad w˜)(z) = 0n. We find
∀z ∈ f (R)n (grad w˜)(z) = α+ (Hess w˜)z.
SinceHess w˜ is nonsingular, there exists a unique z⋆ := (z⋆1 , . . . , z⋆n) ∈ Rn (sic) such
that (grad w˜)(z⋆) = 0n; in particular,
z⋆ =
(−(Hess w˜))−1α = (βIn + γS(G))−1α = Q(β,γ,G)α, (D.103)
where Q(β,γ,G) is defined as in (1.41). We have z⋆ ∈ f (R)n because f (R)n = Rn.
This concludes the proof that z⋆ is the unique global maximum point of w˜.
Since f is bijective (Lemma 1.1), there exists a unique y⋆S := (y⋆S,1, . . . , y⋆S,n) ∈ Rn
such that z⋆ = f (y⋆S); in particular, for all i ∈ I , y⋆S,i := f−1(z⋆i ).
The vector y⋆S is the unique global maximum point of w. This can be seen as
follows. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a yˆ ∈ Rn with
yˆ ̸= y⋆S and w(yˆ) ≥ w(y⋆S). Let zˆ := f (yˆ). Since f is injective (Lemma 1.1), yˆ ̸= y⋆S
implies that zˆ = f (yˆ) ̸= f (y⋆S) = z⋆. Since z⋆ is the unique global maximum point
of w˜, zˆ ̸= z⋆ implies that w˜(zˆ) < w˜(z⋆). We find
w˜(zˆ) = w˜
(
f (yˆ)
)
= w(yˆ) ≥ w(y⋆S) = w˜
(
f (y⋆S)
)
= w˜(z⋆),
a contradiction to w˜(zˆ) < w˜(z⋆). This concludes the proof that y⋆S is the unique
global maximum point of w. It follows that Γ has a unique and interior social
optimum, which is given by (1.39). 
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Proof of Proposition 1.40
Let Γ := (I ,G,R+, {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a NALA game, and let α be defined as
in Section 1.3.2 and α¯I := (1/n)∑i∈I αi. Suppose Conditions 1.40.1 to 1.40.4 are
satisfied. Let S(G) be defined as in (1.38).
First, note that f (R+) = [ f (0),+∞) because f (R+) is an interval (Lemma 1.1)
and f is strictly increasing (Assumption F) and not bounded
above (Condition 1.40.4). Second, note that f (R+) is convex. Third, note that
int( f (R+)) = ( f (0),+∞).
LetM⋆ ⊂ Rn+ denote the set of all global maximum points of w. I show that
|M⋆| = 1. Let the function w˜ : f (R+)n → R be defined by w˜ := w ◦ ( f−1, . . . , f−1).
I show that w˜ has a unique, global, and interior maximum point. The function w˜ is
twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave on f (R+)n (Conditions 1.40.1
and 1.40.2). It is therefore enough to show that w˜ has a local maximum point in
the interior of f (R+)n. The function z ↦→ w˜(z) with domain Rn (sic) has a unique
global maximum point z⋆ := (z⋆1 , . . . , z⋆n) ∈ Rn, which is given by (D.103). I show
that z⋆ ∈ int( f (R+)n) = ( f (0),+∞)n. To this end, let
∀i ∈ I ai :=
(
βIn + γS(G)
)−1ei. (D.104)
We find
z⋆ − f (0)1n =
(
βIn + γS(G)
)−1
α− f (0)1n
=
(
βIn + γS(G)
)−1(
α¯I1n +
n
∑
i=1
(αi − α¯I )ei
)
− f (0)1n
=
1
β
(
α¯I − β f (0)
)
1n +
n
∑
i=1
(αi − α¯I )
(
βIn + γS(G)
)−1ei
=
1
β
(
α¯I − β f (0)
)
1n +
n
∑
i=1
(αi − α¯I )ai
=
1
β
(
α¯I − β f (0)
)
1n +
n
∑
i=1
|αi − α¯I | 1(−∞,0)(αi − α¯I )(−1)ai
+
n
∑
i=1
|αi − α¯I | 1(0,+∞)(αi − α¯I )ai
≥c 1
β
(
α¯I − β f (0)
)
1n
+
n
∑
i=1
|αi − α¯I | 1(−∞,0)(αi − α¯I )
(
− 1
βs(β,γ,G)
1n
)
+
n
∑
i=1
|αi − α¯I | 1(0,+∞)(αi − α¯I )
(
− 1
βs(β,γ,G)
1n
)
=
1
β
(
α¯I − β f (0)− 1s(β,γ,G)
n
∑
i=1
|αi − α¯I |
)
1n
>c 0n.
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The first equality is according to (D.103). The second equality follows from the
identity α = α¯I1n +∑ni=1(αi − α¯I )ei. The third equality follows from Result 1.43.5.
The forth equality is according to (D.104). The fifth and the sixth equality are
obvious. The first inequality follows from Results 1.43.1 to 1.43.4, which together
imply that for all i ∈ I , −(1/(βs(β,γ,G)))1n ≤c ai ≤c (1/(βs(β,γ,G)))1n. The
second inequality follows from Conditions 1.40.1 and 1.40.3. This concludes the
proof that z⋆ ∈ int( f (R+)n) and the proof that z⋆ is the unique global maximum
point of w˜. Finally, since f is bijective (Lemma 1.1), there exists a unique y⋆S :=
(y⋆S,1, . . . , y
⋆
S,n) ∈ int(Rn+) such that z⋆ = f (y⋆S); in particular, for all i ∈ I , y⋆S,i :=
f−1(z⋆i ). The vector y⋆S is the unique, global, and interior maximum point of w. It
follows that Γ has a unique and interior social optimum, which is given by (1.39).
Proof of Proposition 1.41
Let Γ := (I ,G, [0, υ¯], {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a NALA game, and let α be defined as in
Section 1.3.2 and α¯I := (1/n)∑i∈I αi. Suppose Conditions 1.41.1, 1.41.2, and 1.41.3
are satisfied. Let S(G) be defined as in (1.38).
First, note that f ([0, υ¯]) = [ f (0), f (υ¯)] (Lemma 1.1). Second, note that f ([0, υ¯])
is convex. Third, note that int( f ([0, υ¯])) = ( f (0), f (υ¯)).
LetM⋆ ⊂ [0, υ¯]n denote the set of all global maximum points of w. I show that
|M⋆| = 1. Let the function w˜ : f ([0, υ¯])n → R be defined by w˜ := w ◦ ( f−1, . . . , f−1).
I show that w˜ has a unique, global, and interior maximum point. The function w˜
is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave on f ([0, υ¯])n (Conditions
1.41.1 and 1.41.2). It is therefore enough to show that w˜ has a localmaximumpoint in
the interior of f ([0, υ¯])n. The function z ↦→ w˜(z)with domainRn (sic) has a unique
global maximum point z⋆ := (z⋆1 , . . . , z⋆n) ∈ Rn, which is given by (D.103). I show
that z⋆ ∈ int( f ([0, υ¯])n) = ( f (0), f (υ¯))n. According to the proof of Proposition 1.40,
we have
z⋆ − f (0)1n ≥c 1
β
(
α¯I − β f (0)− 1s(β,γ,G)
n
∑
i=1
|αi − α¯I |
)
1n >c 0n,
where the second inequality follows from Conditions 1.41.1 and 1.41.3. Let {ai}i∈I
be defined as in (D.104). We find
z⋆ − f (υ¯)1n = 1
β
(
α¯I − β f (υ¯)
)
1n +
n
∑
i=1
|αi − α¯I | 1(−∞,0)(αi − α¯I )(−1)ai
+
n
∑
i=1
|αi − α¯I | 1(0,+∞)(αi − α¯I )ai
≤c 1
β
(
α¯I − β f (υ¯)
)
1n +
n
∑
i=1
|αi − α¯I | 1(−∞,0)(αi − α¯I )
(
1
βs(β,γ,G)
1n
)
+
n
∑
i=1
|αi − α¯I | 1(0,+∞)(αi − α¯I )
(
1
βs(β,γ,G)
1n
)
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=
1
β
(
α¯I − β f (υ¯) + 1s(β,γ,G)
n
∑
i=1
|αi − α¯I |
)
1n
<c 0n,
where the second inequality follows from Conditions 1.41.1 and 1.41.3. This con-
cludes the proof that z⋆ ∈ ( f (0), f (υ¯))n and the proof that z⋆ is the unique global
maximum point of w˜. Finally, since f is bijective (Lemma 1.1), there exists a unique
y⋆S := (y
⋆
S,1, . . . , y
⋆
S,n) ∈ (0, υ¯)n such that z⋆ = f (y⋆S); in particular, for all i ∈ I ,
y⋆S,i := f
−1(z⋆i ). The vector y⋆S is the unique, global, and interior maximum point
of w. It follows that Γ has a unique and interior social optimum, which is given
by (1.39). 
Proof of Lemma 1.43
Let G be a digraph on I . Let S(G) be defined as in (1.38). Note that σ(S(G)) ⊂ R+
because S(G) is symmetric and nonnegative definite. Suppose β ∈ R++ and γ ∈ R
are such that γρ(S(G)) > −β.
Before proving Results 1.43.1 to 1.43.5, I establish the following two auxiliary
results:
min σ
(
S(G)
)
= 0. (D.105)
and
σ
(
βIn + γS(G)
)
= β+ γσ
(
S(G)
)
:=
{
β+ γµ
∣∣ µ ∈ σ(S(G))}. (D.106)
First, I prove (D.105). Note thatmin σ(S(G)) ≥ 0 because σ(S(G)) ⊂ R+. Also note
that 0 ∈ σ(S(G)) because A¯(G)1n = 1n implies that S(G)1n = 0n = 01n. Combin-
ing the preceding two results, we findmin σ(S(G)) = 0. Second, I prove (D.106).
The equality is trivial if γ = 0. Suppose γ ̸= 0 in what follows. I show that
σ(βIn + γS(G)) ⊂ β + γσ(S(G)) and β + γσ(S(G)) ⊂ σ(βIn + γS(G)). Let
(λ, v) be an eigenpair of βIn + γS(G). We have (βIn + γS(G))v = λv, which
is equivalent to S(G)v = (1/γ)(λ − β)v, which implies that (1/γ)(λ − β) ∈
σ(S(G)), which in turn implies that λ = β + γ(1/γ)(λ − β) ∈ β + γσ(S(G)).
This proves that σ(βIn + γS(G)) ⊂ β+ γσ(S(G)). Let λ ∈ β+ γσ(S(G)). We have
λ = β + γµ for some µ ∈ σ(S(G)) with corresponding eigenvector w. We find
(βIn + γS(G))w = βw+ γS(G)w = βw+ γµw = (β+ γµ)w, which implies that
λ = β+ γµ ∈ σ(βIn + γS(G)). This proves that β+ γσ(S(G)) ⊂ σ(βIn + γS(G)).
The two auxiliary results (D.105) and (D.106) allow us to conclude that the
symmetric matrix βIn + γS(G) is positive definite and therefore nonsingular. In-
deed, if γ < 0, thenmin σ(βIn + γS(G)) = β+ γmax σ(S(G)) = β+ γρ(S(G)) >
β− β = 0, and if γ ≥ 0, thenmin σ(βIn+γS(G)) = β+γmin σ(S(G)) = β+γ0 =
β > 0.
Let Q(β,γ,G) be defined as in (1.41).
Proof of Result 1.43.1 The matrix Q(β,γ,G) is symmetric and positive definite
because its inverse, βIn + γS(G), is symmetric and positive definite. 
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Proof of Result 1.43.2 Note that max σ(Q(β,γ,G)) = ρ(Q(β,γ,G)) because
Q(β,γ,G) is symmetric and positive definite. Using (D.105) and (D.106), we find
max σ
(
Q(β,γ,G)
)
= max
{
1
λ
∣∣∣∣ λ ∈ σ(βIn + γS(G))}
=
1
min σ
(
βIn + γS(G)
)
=

1
β− |γ|ρ(S(G)) if γ < 0,
1
β
if γ ≥ 0.

Proof of Result 1.43.3 Let i ∈ I . According to the Rayleigh quotient theorem (see,
for example, Horn and Johnson 2012, Theorem 4.2.2),
min σ
(
Q(β,γ,G)
) ≤ 〈ei,Q(β,γ,G)ei〉 ≤ max σ(Q(β,γ,G)),
where 〈ei,Q(β,γ,G)ei〉 = [Q(β,γ,G)]i,i. 
Proof of Result 1.43.4 Let (i, j) ∈ I2 with i ̸= j. We have
0 <
〈
ei − sgn
(
[Q(β,γ,G)]i,j
)
ej,Q(β,γ,G)
(
ei − sgn
(
[Q(β,γ,G)]i,j
)
ej
)〉
= 〈ei,Q(β,γ,G)ei〉 − sgn
(
[Q(β,γ,G)]i,j
)〈
ej,Q(β,γ,G)ei
〉
− sgn([Q(β,γ,G)]i,j)〈ei,Q(β,γ,G)ej〉
+ sgn
(
[Q(β,γ,G)]i,j
)2〈ej,Q(β,γ,G)ej〉
= [Q(β,γ,G)]i,i − 2|[Q(β,γ,G)]i,j|+ [Q(β,γ,G)]j,j. (D.107)
The inequality follows from the positive definiteness ofQ(β,γ,G). The first equality
is straightforward to show. The second equality follows from the symmetry of
Q(β,γ,G). Finally, we find
|[Q(β,γ,G)]i,j| <
[Q(β,γ,G)]i,i + [Q(β,γ,G)]j,j
2
≤ max{[Q(β,γ,G)]k,k | k ∈ I}
≤ max σ(Q(β,γ,G)).
The first inequality is according to (D.107). The second inequality is obvious. The
last inequality is according to Result 1.43.3. 
Proof of Result 1.43.5 We have(
βIn + γS(G)
)
1n = β1n (D.108)
because A¯(G)1n = 1n. Premultiplying both sides of (D.108) by Q(β,γ,G) gives
1n = βQ(β,γ,G)1n. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.44
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be defined
as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose β > 0. In addition, suppose Γ has a unique and interior
social optimum y⋆S, which is given by (1.39).
Result 1.44.1 follows from (1.39). Result 1.44.2 follows from (1.39) and Re-
sult 1.43.5. Result 1.44.3 follows from (1.39) and the fact that A¯(G)1n = 1n. Re-
sult 1.44.4 follows from (1.39), the identity
(
βIn + γS(G)
)−1
=
1
β
(
In +
γ
β
S(G)
)−1
=
1
β
(
In − γ
β
(
In +
γ
β
S(G)
)−1
S(G)
)
,
and the fact that S(G)α = (In − A¯(G))T(α− A¯(G)α) = 0n if α = A¯(G)α. 
Proof of Lemma 1.45
Let G be a digraph on I . Suppose Condition G is satisfied. Definition A implies
that
∀(i, j) ∈ I2 [A¯(G)T]i,j =

δi,j if deg+G (j) = 0,
1N−G (i)(j)
deg+G (j)
if deg+G (j) > 0,
(D.109)
and
∀(i, j) ∈ I2 [A¯(G)T A¯(G)]i,j
=

δi,j 1I+0 (G)(j) if N
−
G (i) ∩N−G (j) = ∅,
δi,j 1I+0 (G)(j) + ∑
k∈N−G (i)∩N−G (j)
1
deg+G (k)
2 if N−G (i) ∩N−G (j) ̸= ∅.
(D.110)
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
A¯(G)T A¯(G) = A¯(G)T. (D.111)
According to Condition G, there exists a ˆ ∈ I such thatN+G ( ˆ) ̸= ∅ or, equivalently,
deg+G ( ˆ) > 0. Choose ıˆ ∈ N+G ( ˆ). Because G has no self-loops, which implies that
ˆ /∈ N+G ( ˆ) and ˆ /∈ N−G ( ˆ), wemust have ıˆ ̸= ˆ. Using (D.109), (D.110), and (D.111),
we find [
A¯(G)T A¯(G)
]
ˆ, ˆ =
[
A¯(G)T
]
ˆ, ˆ =
1N−G ( ˆ)( ˆ)
deg+G ( ˆ)
= 0,
which implies thatN−G ( ˆ) = ∅must be true. Using this result and (D.109), (D.110),
and (D.111), we find
0 =
[
A¯(G)T A¯(G)
]
ıˆ, ˆ =
[
A¯(G)T
]
ıˆ, ˆ =
1N−G (ıˆ)( ˆ)
deg+G ( ˆ)
,
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which implies that ˆ /∈ N−G (ıˆ) and therefore ıˆ /∈ N+G ( ˆ)must be true. This contradicts
our choice of ıˆ. Consequently, (D.111) cannot be true. 
Proof of Proposition 1.46
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be defined
as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2. In addition, suppose Γ has a
unique and interior NE y⋆N , which is given by (1.7), and a unique and interior social
optimum y⋆S, which is given by (1.39).
First, note that y⋆N = y⋆S if and only if f (y⋆N) = f (y⋆S) because f is bijective
(Lemma 1.1). Second, note that
(1.7) ⇔ α =
(
βIn + γ
(
In − A¯(G)
))
f (y⋆N) (D.112)
⇔ 1
β
α− f (y⋆N) =
γ
β
(
f (y⋆N)− A¯(G) f (y⋆N)
) (D.113)
and
(1.39) ⇔ α = (βIn + γS(G)) f (y⋆S). (D.114)
We find
0n =
(
βIn + γ
(
In − A¯(G)
))
f (y⋆N)−
(
βIn + γS(G)
)
f (y⋆S)
=
(
βIn + γS(G) + γA¯(G)
T
(
In − A¯(G)
))
f (y⋆N)−
(
βIn + γS(G)
)
f (y⋆S)
=
(
βIn + γS(G)
)(
f (y⋆N)− f (y⋆S)
)
+ γA¯(G)T
(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆N)
=
(
βIn + γS(G)
)(
f (y⋆N)− f (y⋆S)
)− βA¯(G)T( f (y⋆N)− 1βα
)
. (D.115)
The first equality is according to (D.112) and (D.114). The last equality is according
to (D.113). Using (D.115), we find
f (y⋆N)− f (y⋆S) = β
(
βIn + γS(G)
)−1 A¯(G)T( f (y⋆N)− 1βα
)
.
We conclude that y⋆N = y⋆S if and only if A¯(G)
T( f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α) = 0n or, equiva-
lently, f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α ∈ ker(A¯(G)T). 
Proof of Corollary 1.47
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be defined
as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2. In addition, suppose Γ has a
unique and interior NE y⋆N , which is given by (1.7), and a unique and interior social
optimum y⋆S, which is given by (1.39). Note that 0n ∈ ker(A¯(G)T).
First, I show that each of the Conditions 1.47.1, 1.47.2, and 1.47.3 is sufficient
for f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α ∈ ker(A¯(G)T). If γ = 0, then f (y⋆N) = (1/β)α (Result 1.31.2
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and Remark 1.36), which implies that f (y⋆N) − (1/β)α = 0n ∈ ker(A¯(G)T). If
α = A¯(G)α, then f (y⋆N) = (1/β)α (Result 1.35.1 and Remark 1.36), which implies
that f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α = 0n ∈ ker(A¯(G)T). Evidently, f (y⋆N) ̸= (1/β)α and f (y⋆N)−
(1/β)α ∈ ker(A¯(G)T) is sufficient for f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α ∈ ker(A¯(G)T).
Second, I show that at least one of the Conditions 1.47.1, 1.47.2, or 1.47.3 is neces-
sary for f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α ∈ ker(A¯(G)T). Suppose f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α ∈ ker(A¯(G)T) is
true. I consider two cases. First, suppose f (y⋆N) = (1/β)α. I show by contraposition
that either γ = 0 or both γ ̸= 0 and α = A¯(G)α must be true if f (y⋆N) = (1/β)α.
We have
¬
(
γ = 0 ∨ (γ ̸= 0 ∧ α = A¯(G)α)) ⇔ γ ̸= 0 ∧ (γ = 0 ∨ α ̸= A¯(G)α)
⇔ γ ̸= 0 ∧ α ̸= A¯(G)α
⇒ γ ̸= 0 ∧ (γ = 0 ∨ f (y⋆N) ̸= (1/β)α)
⇔ γ ̸= 0 ∧ f (y⋆N) ̸= (1/β)α
⇒ f (y⋆N) ̸= (1/β)α,
where the first implication follows from Result 1.35.2 and Remark 1.36. Second,
suppose f (y⋆N) ̸= (1/β)α. Evidently, f (y⋆N)− (1/β)α ∈ ker(A¯(G)T) and f (y⋆N) ̸=
(1/β)α. 
Example 1.48
Suppose G is complete. Let the polynomial function p : C → C be defined by
p(λ) := det(λIn − A¯(G)). Note that σ(A¯(G)) = {λ ∈ C | p(λ) = 0}. Since G is
complete, we have
∀λ ∈ C p(λ) = det
(
λIn − 1n− 1
(
1n1Tn − In
))
=
1
(n− 1)n det
((
1+ (n− 1)λ)In − 1n1Tn).
We find 1/(1− n) ∈ σ(A¯(G)) because
p
(
1
1− n
)
=
1
(1− n)n det
(
1n1Tn
)
= 0.
If λ ∈ C \ {1/(1− n)}, then
p(λ) =
(
1+ (n− 1)λ
n− 1
)n
det
(
In − 11+ (n− 1)λ1n1
T
n
)
=
(
1+ (n− 1)λ
n− 1
)n(
1− 1
1+ (n− 1)λ 〈1n, 1n〉
)
=
(
1+ (n− 1)λ
n− 1
)n (n− 1)(λ− 1)
1+ (n− 1)λ ,
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where the second equality follows from the matrix determinant lemma (see,
for example, Harville 1997, Corollary 18.1.3). We conclude that σ(A¯(G)) =
{1/(1− n), 1}. 
Proof of Proposition 1.50
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be defined
as in Section 1.3.2. SupposeG is complete, the players of Γ are ex ante heterogeneous,
β > 0, and γ > −β/2. In addition, suppose Γ has a unique and interior NE y⋆N ,
which is given by (1.7), and a unique and interior social optimum y⋆S, which is given
by (1.39).
Since G is complete, we have
A¯(G) =
1n1Tn − In
n− 1 , (D.116)
which implies that
S(G) =
n
(n− 1)2
(
nIn − 1n1Tn
)
. (D.117)
First, I derive an expression for f (y⋆N). Using (1.7) and (D.116), we find
f (y⋆N) =
1
β+ γ
α+
γ
β+ γ
1n1Tn − In
n− 1 f (y
⋆
N),
which is equivalent to(
1+
γ
β+ γ
1
n− 1
)
f (y⋆N) =
1
β+ γ
α+
γ
β+ γ
〈
1n, f (y⋆N)
〉
n− 1 1n. (D.118)
Using (D.118), we find
〈1n, f (y⋆N)〉 =
1
β
〈1n, α〉. (D.119)
Combining (D.118) and (D.119) gives
f (y⋆N) =
1
n(β+ γ)− β
(
γ
β
〈1n, α〉1n + (n− 1)α
)
(D.120)
=
n
n(β+ γ)− β
(
γ
β
〈1n, α〉
n
1n +
(
1− 1
n
)
α
)
. (D.121)
Second, I derive an expression for f (y⋆S). Using (1.39) and (D.117), we find
β f (y⋆S) +
nγ
(n− 1)2
(
nIn − 1n1Tn
)
f (y⋆S) = α,
which is equivalent to(
β+
n2γ
(n− 1)2
)
f (y⋆S) = α+
nγ
(n− 1)2 〈1n, f (y
⋆
S)〉1n. (D.122)
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Using (D.122), we find
〈1n, f (y⋆S)〉 =
1
β
〈1n, α〉. (D.123)
Combining (D.122) and (D.123) gives
f (y⋆S) =
1
(n− 1)2β+ n2γ
(
n
γ
β
〈1n, α〉1n + (n− 1)2α
)
(D.124)
=
n2
(n− 1)2β+ n2γ
(
γ
β
〈1n, α〉
n
1n +
(
1− 1
n
)2
α
)
. (D.125)
Third, I prove Results 1.50.1 and 1.50.2. According to (D.119) and (D.123),
〈1n, f (y⋆N)〉 = 〈1n, f (y⋆S)〉 = (1/β)〈1n, α〉. Using (D.120) and (D.124), we find
f (y⋆N)− f (y⋆S) =
(n− 1)nγ(
n(β+ γ)− β)((n− 1)2β+ n2γ)
(
α− 〈1n, α〉
n
1n
)
. (D.126)
Since n > 1, γ ̸= 0, and α ̸= (1/n)〈1n, α〉1n (because the players of Γ are ex ante
heterogeneous), we have f (y⋆N) ̸= f (y⋆S), which is equivalent to y⋆N ̸= y⋆S because
f is bijective (Lemma 1.1).
Fourth, I prove Results 1.50.3, 1.50.4, and 1.50.5, thereby making the dependence
of y⋆N,i and y⋆S,i on n explicit. According to (D.126),
∀i ∈ I ∀n > 1 f (y⋆N,i(n))− f (y⋆S,i(n)) = r(n)(αi − ∑nk=1 αkn
)
,
where
r(n) :=
(n− 1)nγ(
n(β+ γ)− β)((n− 1)2β+ n2γ) ∈ O(1) as n→ ∞
because γ > −β/2. Consequently, if ∑nk=1 αk ∈ O(n) as n→ ∞, then, for all i ∈ I ,
f (y⋆N,i(n))− f (y⋆S,i(n)) ∈ O(1) as n→ ∞. If f−1 is Lipschitz continuous, then there
exists a constant L ≥ 0 such that
∀i ∈ I ∀n > 1 ∣∣y⋆N,i(n)− y⋆S,i(n)∣∣ ≤ L∣∣ f (y⋆N,i(n))− f (y⋆S,i(n))∣∣.
Consequently, if f−1 is Lipschitz continuous and ∑nk=1 αk ∈ O(n) as n→ ∞, then,
for all i ∈ I , y⋆N,i(n)− y⋆S,i(n) ∈ O(1) as n→ ∞. According to (D.121) and (D.125),
if there exists an α¯ ∈ R such that (1/n)∑nk=1 αk − α¯ ∈ O(1) as n → ∞, then, for
all i ∈ I , f (y⋆N,i(n))− ci ∈ O(1) as n → ∞ and f (y⋆S,i(n))− ci ∈ O(1) as n → ∞,
where
∀i ∈ I ci := 1β+ γ
(
γ
β
α¯+ αi
)
.
Thus, since f−1 is continuous (Lemma 1.1), if there exists an α¯ ∈ R such that
(1/n)∑nk=1 αk − α¯ ∈ O(1) as n → ∞, then, for all i ∈ I , y⋆N,i(n)− f−1(ci) ∈ O(1)
as n → ∞ and y⋆S,i(n) − f−1(ci) ∈ O(1) as n → ∞, which in turn implies that
y⋆N,i(n)− y⋆S,i(n) ∈ O(1) as n→ ∞. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.51
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be defined
as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose Condition G is satisfied, β > 0, and γ > −β/2, so that
β+ γ > 0 and |γ/(β+ γ)| < 1. In addition, suppose Γ has a unique and interior
social optimum y⋆S, which is given by (1.39). Let
αS := (αS,1, . . . , αS,n) := α+ γA¯(G)
T
(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆S) (D.127)
and
N(G) := max
{
1I+0 (G)(j) +
deg−G (j)
min
{
deg+G (i)
∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)}
∣∣∣∣∣ j ∈ I
}
.
First, I show that y⋆S can be decentralized as the unique and interior NE of the
generic NALA game (I ,G,Y , {(αS,i, β,γ)}i∈I , f ). To this end, note that the matrix
In − γ/(β + γ)A¯(G) is nonsingular because |γ/(β + γ)| < 1 and ρ(A¯(G)) = 1
(Lemma B.3). Using (1.39), we find
f (y⋆S) =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)− γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)T
(
In − A¯(G)
))−1
α,
which is equivalent to(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆S) =
1
β+ γ
(
α+ γA¯(G)T
(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆S)
)
,
which in turn is equivalent to
f (y⋆S) =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
αS. (D.128)
Second, I show that αS = (In − γA¯(G)T(In − A¯(G))J(β,γ,G))−1α if (1.47) is
true. Suppose (1.47) is true. We have
αS = α+ γA¯(G)
T
(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆S) = α+ γA¯(G)
T
(
In − A¯(G)
)
J(β,γ,G)αS,
where the first equality is according to (D.127) and the second equality is according
to (D.128) and the definition of J(β,γ,G) in (1.25). Using the preceding result, we
find (
In − γA¯(G)T
(
In − A¯(G)
)
J(β,γ,G)
)
αS = α,
where In − γA¯(G)T(In − A¯(G))J(β,γ,G) is nonsingular (Lemma B.3).
Third, I show that
− β
2+ 2N(G)
< γ <
β
2N(G)
(D.129)
is sufficient for (1.47). To this end, I establish two auxiliary results:
‖A¯(G)‖1 ≤ N(G) (D.130)
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and
‖J(β,γ,G)‖∞ ≤

1
β+ 2γ
if γ < 0,
1
β
if γ ≥ 0.
(D.131)
First, I prove (D.130). Similar to the proof of (D.99), we find, for all j ∈ I ,
n
∑
i=1
∣∣[A¯(G)]i,j∣∣ = ∑
i∈I+0 (G)
δi,j + ∑
i∈I\I+0 (G)
1N+G (i)(j)
deg+G (i)
= 1I+0 (G)(j) + ∑
i∈I\I+0 (G)
1N−G (j)(i)
deg+G (i)
≤ 1I+0 (G)(j) +
1
min
{
deg+G (i)
∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)} ∑i∈I\I+0 (G) 1N−G (j)(i)
= 1I+0 (G)(j) +
deg−G (j)
min
{
deg+G (i)
∣∣ i ∈ I \ I+0 (G)} .
The preceding result implies that
‖A¯(G)‖1 = max
{ n
∑
i=1
∣∣[A¯(G)]i,j∣∣ ∣∣∣ j ∈ I} ≤ N(G).
This concludes the proof of (D.130). Second, I prove (D.131). First, consider the
case γ < 0. I show that ‖J(β,γ,G)‖∞ ≤ 1/(β+ 2γ). To this end, note that
J(β,γ,G) =
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1(
In − |γ|
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)
. (D.132)
The matrix In − γ2/(β+ γ)2 A¯(G)2 has a nonnegative inverse because it is a non-
singular M-matrix. This fact together with (D.35) implies that∥∥∥∥∥
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1∥∥∥∥∥
∞
=
(β+ γ)2
β(β+ 2γ)
. (D.133)
We have
∀i ∈ I
n
∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣[In − |γ|β+ γ A¯(G)
]
i,j
∣∣∣∣ =

β+ 2γ
β+ γ
if deg+G (i) = 0,
β
β+ γ
if deg+G (i) > 0.
Condition G and the preceding result imply that∥∥∥∥In − |γ|β+ γ A¯(G)
∥∥∥∥
∞
=
β
β+ γ
. (D.134)
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Using (D.132), we find
‖J(β,γ,G)‖∞ ≤c
1
β+ γ
∥∥∥∥∥
(
In − γ
2
(β+ γ)2
A¯(G)2
)−1∥∥∥∥∥
∞
∥∥∥∥(In − |γ|β+ γ A¯(G)
)∥∥∥∥
∞
=
1
β+ γ
(β+ γ)2
β(β+ 2γ)
β
β+ γ
=
1
β+ 2γ
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that ‖·‖∞ is sub-multiplicative and the
first equality is according to (D.133) and (D.134). Second, consider the case γ ≥ 0.
According to Results 1.23.2 and 1.23.3, for all (i, j) ∈ I2, [J(β,γ,G)]i,j ≥ 0. This
result and (D.12) imply that for all i ∈ I , ∑nj=1|[J(β,γ,G)]i,j| = 1/β, from which
‖J(β,γ,G)‖∞ = 1/β follows. This concludes the proof of (D.131). Using the two
auxiliary results, I show that (D.129) is sufficient for (1.47). First, consider the case
γ < 0. We find
ρ
(
γA¯(G)T
(
In − A¯(G)
)
J(β,γ,G)
)
≤ ∥∥γA¯(G)T(In − A¯(G))J(β,γ,G)∥∥∞
≤ −γ‖A¯(G)‖1‖In − A¯(G)‖∞‖J(β,γ,G)‖∞
≤ −2γN(G)
β+ 2γ
.
The first inequality is according to Lemma B.7 because ‖·‖∞ is sub-multiplicative.
The second inequality is obvious. The third inequality follows from (D.98), (D.130),
and (D.131). We have
−2γN(G)
β+ 2γ
< 1 ⇔ − β
2+ 2N(G)
< γ.
Second, consider the case γ ≥ 0. We find
ρ
(
γA¯(G)T
(
In − A¯(G)
)
J(β,γ,G)
)
≤ 2γN(G)
β
.
We have
2γN(G)
β
< 1 ⇔ γ < β
2N(G)
.
This concludes the proof that (D.129) is sufficient for (1.47). 
Proof of Proposition 1.52
Let τ ∈ int(nY) be a target for aggregate equilibrium action. Consider the generic
NALA game Γτ := (I ,G,Y , {(β f (τ/n), β, 0)}i∈I , f ), where β > 0.
The generic NALA game Γτ has a unique and interior NE y⋆, which is given
by y⋆ = (τ/n)1n. Consequently, 〈1n, y⋆〉 = τ. We conclude that τ is attainable
by {(β f (τ/n), β, 0)}i∈I . It follows that int(nY) ⊂ T ⋆(Y). Moreover, T ⋆(Y) ⊂
int(nY) according to the definition of T ⋆(Y). 
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Proof of Proposition 1.53
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be de-
fined as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2, so that β + γ > 0
and |γ/(β + γ)| < 1. In addition, suppose Γ has a unique and interior NE
y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,G) := (y⋆1(α, β,γ, f ,G), . . . , y
⋆
n(α, β,γ, f ,G)), which is given by (1.7).
Hereinafter, some or all of the arguments of y⋆(α, β,γ, f ,G) and of its components
may be omitted.
First, note that, for all i ∈ I , y⋆i = y⋆i (α, β,γ, f ,G) = f−1(y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)).
Consequently,
〈1n, y⋆〉 =
n
∑
i=1
y⋆i =
n
∑
i=1
f−1
(
y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)
)
.
Second, note that, according to Lemma 1.1,
∀i ∈ I ∂ f−1( f (y⋆i )) = 1∂ f ( f−1( f (y⋆i ))) = 1∂ f (y⋆i ) > 0.
Let
w( f , y⋆) :=
(
1
∂ f (y⋆1)
, . . . ,
1
∂ f (y⋆n)
)
∈ Rn++. (D.135)
First, I prove (1.48). Let j ∈ I . We find
∂〈1n, y⋆〉
∂αj
=
n
∑
i=1
∂ f−1
(
y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)
)
∂αj
=
n
∑
i=1
∂ f−1
(
y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)
)∂y⋆i (α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂αj
=
n
∑
i=1
∂ f−1
(
f (y⋆i )
)[∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂α
]
i,j
=
n
∑
i=1
[w( f , y⋆)]i[J(β,γ,G)]i,j
=
n
∑
i=1
[
J(β,γ,G)T
]
j,i[w( f , y
⋆)]i
=
[
J(β,γ,G)Tw( f , y⋆)
]
j,
where the fourth equality is according to (1.25) and (D.135).
Second, I prove (1.49). We find
∂〈1n, y⋆〉
∂β
=
n
∑
i=1
∂ f−1
(
f (y⋆i )
)[∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂β
]
i
=
n
∑
i=1
[w( f , y⋆)]i[−J(β,γ,G) f (y⋆)]i
254 D Proofs of Chapter 1 Results
= −〈w( f , y⋆), J(β,γ,G) f (y⋆)〉,
where the second equality is according to (1.26) and (D.135).
Third, I prove (1.50). We find
∂〈1n, y⋆〉
∂γ
=
n
∑
i=1
∂ f−1
(
f (y⋆i )
)[∂y⋆(α, β,γ, idY ,G)
∂γ
]
i
=
n
∑
i=1
[w( f , y⋆)]i
[
J(β,γ,G)
(
A¯(G)− In
)
f (y⋆)
]
i
=
〈
w( f , y⋆), J(β,γ,G)
(
A¯(G)− In
)
f (y⋆)
〉
,
where the second equality is according to (1.27) and (D.135).
Results 1.53.1, 1.53.2, and 1.53.3 are straightforward to show giving consideration
to J(β,γ,G) = (1/β)In if γ = 0 (Result 1.23.2) 1/(β+ γ)In ≤c J(β,γ,G) if γ > 0
(Result 1.23.3). 
Proof of Proposition 1.55
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be de-
fined as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2, so that β+ γ > 0 and
|γ/(β+ γ)| < 1. In addition, suppose Γ has a unique and interior NE y⋆, which is
given by (1.7).
I begin with establishing four auxiliary results. First, note that (1.7) is equivalent
to
(β+ γ) f (y⋆) = α+ γA¯(G) f (y⋆). (D.136)
Second, note that A¯(G) and J(β,γ,G) commute, that is,
A¯(G)J(β,γ,G) = J(β,γ,G)A¯(G). (D.137)
Indeed, we have(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
= In +
γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
= In +
γ
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
A¯(G),
which implies that
(β+ γ)J(β,γ,G) = In + γA¯(G)J(β,γ,G) = In + γJ(β,γ,G)A¯(G), (D.138)
from which (D.137) follows. Third, note that
∂J(β,γ,G)
∂β
= −J(β,γ,G)2. (D.139)
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Indeed, we have
∂J(β,γ,G)
∂β
=
∂
∂β
(
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1)
= − 1
(β+ γ)2
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
− 1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
×
(
∂
∂β
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
))(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
= − 1
β+ γ
J(β,γ,G)− γ
β+ γ
J(β,γ,G)A¯(G)J(β,γ,G)
= − 1
β+ γ
(
In + γJ(β,γ,G)A¯(G)
)
J(β,γ,G)
= − 1
β+ γ
(β+ γ)J(β,γ,G)J(β,γ,G)
= −J(β,γ,G)2,
where the fifth equality is according to (D.138). Fourth, note that
∂J(β,γ,G)
∂γ
= −(In − A¯(G))J(β,γ,G)2. (D.140)
Indeed, we have
∂J(β,γ,G)
∂γ
=
∂
∂γ
(
1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1)
= − 1
(β+ γ)2
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
− 1
β+ γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
×
(
∂
∂γ
(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
))(
In − γ
β+ γ
A¯(G)
)−1
= − 1
β+ γ
J(β,γ,G) +
β
β+ γ
J(β,γ,G)A¯(G)J(β,γ,G)
= − 1
β+ γ
(
In − βJ(β,γ,G)A¯(G)
)
J(β,γ,G)
= − 1
β+ γ
(
(β+ γ)J(β,γ,G)− (β+ γ)J(β,γ,G)A¯(G))J(β,γ,G)
= −(J(β,γ,G)− A¯(G)J(β,γ,G))J(β,γ,G)
= −(In − A¯(G))J(β,γ,G)2,
where the fifth equality is according to (D.138) and the sixth equality is according
to (D.137).
Next, I prove (1.51). We have
w(y⋆) = 〈α, f (y⋆)〉 − β
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉
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− γ
2
〈 f (y⋆)− A¯(G) f (y⋆), f (y⋆)− A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
=
1
2
〈 f (y⋆), α〉+ 1
2
〈 f (y⋆),γA¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
+
1
2
〈α, f (y⋆)〉+ 1
2
〈γA¯(G) f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉
− β+ γ
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 − γ
2
〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
=
1
2
〈 f (y⋆), α+ γA¯(G) f (y⋆)〉+ 1
2
〈α+ γA¯(G) f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉
− β+ γ
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 − γ
2
〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
=
β+ γ
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 − γ
2
〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉 (D.141)
=
β+ γ
2
‖ f (y⋆)‖22 −
γ
2
‖A¯(G) f (y⋆)‖22.
The first equality is according to (1.4) and the fourth equality follows from (D.136).
In order to prove (1.52), (1.53), and (1.54), I compute the partial derivatives
of 〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 and 〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉 with respect to α, β, and γ. The
partial derivatives of 〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 and 〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉with respect to α
are given by
∂〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉
∂α
= 2αT J(β,γ,G)T J(β,γ,G) (D.142)
and
∂〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
∂α
= 2αT J(β,γ,G)T A¯(G)T A¯(G)J(β,γ,G). (D.143)
The partial derivative of 〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 with respect to β is given by
∂〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉
∂β
=
〈
∂ f (y⋆)
∂β
, f (y⋆)
〉
+
〈
f (y⋆),
∂ f (y⋆)
∂β
〉
= 2
〈
f (y⋆),
∂ f (y⋆)
∂β
〉
= 2
〈
f (y⋆),
∂J(β,γ,G)
∂β
α
〉
= 2
〈
f (y⋆),−J(β,γ,G)2α
〉
= −2〈 f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G) f (y⋆)〉, (D.144)
where the fourth equality is according to (D.139). The partial derivativewith respect
to β of 〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉 is given by
∂〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
∂β
=
〈
∂A¯(G) f (y⋆)
∂β
, A¯(G) f (y⋆)
〉
+
〈
A¯(G) f (y⋆),
∂A¯(G) f (y⋆)
∂β
〉
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= 2
〈
A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G)
∂J(β,γ,G)
∂β
α
〉
= −2
〈
A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G)J(β,γ,G)2α
〉
= −2〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G)J(β,γ,G) f (y⋆)〉
= −2〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉, (D.145)
where the third equality is according to (D.139) and the fifth equality is according
to (D.137). The partial derivative of 〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 with respect to γ is given by
∂〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉
∂γ
= 2
〈
f (y⋆),
∂J(β,γ,G)
∂γ
α
〉
= 2
〈
f (y⋆),−(In − A¯(G))J(β,γ,G)2α〉
= −2〈 f (y⋆), (In − A¯(G))J(β,γ,G) f (y⋆)〉, (D.146)
where the second equality is according to (D.140). The partial derivative with
respect to γ of 〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉 is given by
∂〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
∂γ
= 2
〈
A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G)
∂J(β,γ,G)
∂γ
α
〉
= −2
〈
A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G)
(
In − A¯(G)
)
J(β,γ,G)2α
〉
= −2〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G)(In − A¯(G))J(β,γ,G) f (y⋆)〉
= −2〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), (In − A¯(G))J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉, (D.147)
where the second equality is according to (D.140) and the fourth equality is accord-
ing to (D.137). Next, I prove (1.52), (1.53), and (1.54). First, we find
∂w(y⋆)
∂α
=
β+ γ
2
∂〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉
∂α
− γ
2
∂〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
∂α
= (β+ γ)αT J(β,γ,G)T J(β,γ,G)
− γαT J(β,γ,G)T A¯(G)T A¯(G)J(β,γ,G)
= αT J(β,γ,G)T
(
(β+ γ)In − γA¯(G)T A¯(G)
)
J(β,γ,G),
where the second equality follows from (D.142) and (D.143). Second, we find
∂w(y⋆)
∂β
=
1
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉+ β+ γ
2
∂〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉
∂β
− γ
2
∂〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
∂β
=
1
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 − 〈 f (y⋆), (β+ γ)J(β,γ,G) f (y⋆)〉
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+ γ〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
=
1
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 − 〈 f (y⋆), (In + γJ(β,γ,G)A¯(G)) f (y⋆)〉
+ γ〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
= −1
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 − γ〈 f (y⋆)− A¯(G) f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
= −1
2
‖ f (y⋆)‖22 − γ
〈(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)
〉
,
where the second equality follows from (D.144) and (D.145) and the third equality
follows from (D.138). Third, we find
∂w(y⋆)
∂γ
=
1
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 − 1
2
〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
+
β+ γ
2
∂〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉
∂γ
− γ
2
∂〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
∂γ
=
1
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 − 1
2
〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
− (β+ γ)〈 f (y⋆), (In − A¯(G))J(β,γ,G) f (y⋆)〉
+ γ
〈
A¯(G) f (y⋆),
(
In − A¯(G)
)
J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)
〉
=
1
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 − 1
2
〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
− 〈 f (y⋆), (β+ γ)J(β,γ,G) f (y⋆)〉
+ (β+ γ)〈 f (y⋆), A¯(G)J(β,γ,G) f (y⋆)〉
+ γ〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
− 〈A¯(G) f (y⋆),γA¯(G)J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
=
1
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 − 1
2
〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
− 〈 f (y⋆), (In + γJ(β,γ,G)A¯(G)) f (y⋆〉
+ (β+ γ)〈 f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
+ γ〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
− 〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), ((β+ γ)J(β,γ,G)− In)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
= −1
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉+ 1
2
〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
+ β〈 f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
− β〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉 (D.148)
= −1
2
‖ f (y⋆)‖22 +
1
2
‖A¯(G) f (y⋆)‖22
+ β
〈(
In − A¯(G)
)
f (y⋆), J(β,γ,G)A¯(G) f (y⋆)
〉
,
where the second equality follows from (D.146) and (D.147) and the forth equality
follows from (D.137) and (D.138).
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Finally, I prove Results 1.55.1 to 1.55.3. First, I prove Results 1.55.1 and 1.55.2. If
γ = 0, then J(β,γ,G) = (1/β)In (Result 1.23.2) and y⋆ = (1/β)α (Result 1.31.2 and
Remark 1.36), so that ∂w(y⋆)/∂α = (1/β)αT according to (1.52) and ∂w(y⋆)/∂β =
−1/(2β2)‖α‖22 according to (1.53). If α ̸= 0n, γ > 0, and 0n ≤c f (y⋆) ≤c (1/β)α,
then ∂w(y⋆)/∂β < 0 according to (1.53) because α ̸= 0n is equivalent to f (y⋆) ̸= 0n
and f (y⋆) ≤c (1/β)α is equivalent to A¯(G) f (y⋆) ≤c f (y⋆) if γ > 0 (Result 1.33.2
and Remark 1.36). Second, I prove Result 1.55.3. We have
∂w(y⋆)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
= −1
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉+ 1
2
〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
+ 〈 f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉 − 〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
= −1
2
〈 f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉+ 1
2
〈 f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
+
1
2
〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), f (y⋆)〉 − 1
2
〈A¯(G) f (y⋆), A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
= −1
2
〈 f (y⋆)− A¯(G) f (y⋆), f (y⋆)− A¯(G) f (y⋆)〉
= −1
2
∥∥(In − A¯(G)) f (y⋆)∥∥22
= − 1
2β2
‖A¯(G)α− α‖22,
where the first equality follows from (D.148) because J(β,γ,G) = (1/β)In if γ = 0
(Result 1.23.2) and the last equality follows from the fact that y⋆ = (1/β)α if γ = 0
(Result 1.31.2 and Remark 1.36). 
Example 1.56: Proofs of (1.55) and (1.56)
Consider the setup of Example 1.56. If γ = 0, then ∂w(y⋆)/∂α = (1/β)αT (Re-
sult 1.55.1), which is equivalent to (1.55). Suppose γ ̸= 0 in what follows. We have
A¯(G) = 1neT1 . (D.149)
The inverse of the matrix In − (γ/(β+ γ))1neT1 is given by Sherman andMorrison’s
(1949) formula (see, for example, Bartlett 1951, p. 107) because (γ/(β+ γ))1neT1
has rank 1:
(
In − γ
β+ γ
1neT1
)−1
= In +
γ
β+ γ
1neT1
1− γ
β+ γ
〈1n, e1〉
= In +
γ
β
1neT1 . (D.150)
Using (1.52), (D.149), and (D.150), straightforward algebra yields
∂w(y⋆)
∂α
=
1
β+ γ
αT +
γ
β(β+ γ)
〈α, 1n − ne1〉eT1 +
γ
β(β+ γ)
〈α, e1〉1Tn
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=
1
β+ γ
αT +
γ
β(β+ γ)
(
∑
i∈I
αi − nα1
)
eT1 +
α1γ
β(β+ γ)
1Tn,
which is equivalent to (1.55). If α1 = α¯ + ∆α and α2 = · · · = αn = α¯ for some
(α¯,∆α) ∈ R++ ×R with α¯+∆α > 0 and β = 1, then
∂w(y⋆)
∂α1
= α¯− (n− 2)γ− 1
1+ γ
∆α,
from which (1.56) follows, provided that (n− 2)γ− 1 > 0. 
Example 1.57: Proofs of (1.57) and (1.58)
Consider the setup of Example 1.57. Using (D.149) and (D.150), we find
y⋆ =
1
β+ γ
α+
α1γ
β(β+ γ)
1n, A¯(G)y⋆ =
α1
β
1n,
and
J(β,γ,G)A¯(G)y⋆ =
α1
β2
1n,
from which
‖y⋆‖22 =
nα21γ
2
β2(β+ γ)2
+
2α1γ
β(β+ γ)2 ∑i∈I
αi +
1
(β+ γ)2 ∑i∈I
α2i (D.151)
and
R(α, β,γ, f ,G) =
α1
β2(β+ γ)
(
∑
i∈I
αi − nα1
)
(D.152)
follow. Using (1.53), (D.151), and (D.152), straightforward algebra yields (1.57).
If α1 = 1+∆α for some ∆α ∈ (−1,+∞) and α2 = · · · = αn = 1, then
∂w(y⋆)
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=1
=
(n− 2)(2+ γ)γ− 1
2(1+ γ)2
(∆α)2 −∆α− n
2
,
from which (1.58) follows. If n = 10, α1 = 1+∆α with ∆α ∈ (−1,+∞), α2 = · · · =
αn = 1, and γ = 5/6, then
∂w(y⋆)
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=1
=
322
121
(∆α)2 −∆α− 5.
The zero set of the polynomial (322/121)(∆α)2 −∆α− 5 is {−55/46, 11/7}, with
{−55/46, 11/7} ∩ (−1,+∞) = {11/7}. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.58
Let Γ := (I ,G,Y , {(αi, β,γ)}i∈I , f ) be a generic NALA game, and let α be defined
as in Section 1.3.2. Suppose β > 0 and γ > −β/2with γ ̸= 0, so that β+ γ > 0 and
0 < |γ/(β+ γ)| < 1. In addition, suppose Γ has a unique and interior NE y⋆(γ),
which is given by (1.7). We find
w
(
y⋆(γ)
)− w(y⋆(0))
=
β+ γ
2
〈
f
(
y⋆(γ)
)
, f
(
y⋆(γ)
)〉
− γ
2
〈
A¯(G) f
(
y⋆(γ)
)
, A¯(G) f
(
y⋆(γ)
)〉− 1
2β
〈α, α〉
=
β+ γ
2
〈
f
(
y⋆(γ)
)
, f
(
y⋆(γ)
)〉
− 1
2γ
〈
(β+ γ) f
(
y⋆(γ)
)− α, (β+ γ) f (y⋆(γ))− α〉− 1
2β
〈α, α〉
= − β(β+ γ)
2γ
〈
f
(
y⋆(γ)
)
, f
(
y⋆(γ)
)〉
+
β+ γ
2γ
〈
f
(
y⋆(γ)
)
, α
〉
+
β+ γ
2γ
〈
α, f
(
y⋆(γ)
)〉− β+ γ
2βγ
〈α, α〉
= − β(β+ γ)
2γ
〈
f
(
y⋆(γ)
)
, f
(
y⋆(γ)
)− 1
β
α
〉
+
β+ γ
2γ
〈
α, f
(
y⋆(γ)
)− 1
β
α
〉
= − β(β+ γ)
2γ
〈
f
(
y⋆(γ)
)− 1
β
α, f
(
y⋆(γ)
)− 1
β
α
〉
= − β(β+ γ)
2γ
∥∥∥∥ f (y⋆(γ))− 1βα
∥∥∥∥2
2
.
The first equality is according to (1.51). The second equality follows from (D.136).
The remaining equalities are straightforward to show. 
Proof of Corollary 1.59
The statement follows from Proposition 1.58. 
Proof of Proposition 1.64
Note that γ > 0 by assumption. Let D ∈ D, and let i ∈ I . If deg+D(i) = 0, then
u⋆i (D) = α(χ,D)(i) f
(
y⋆i (D)
)− β
2
f
(
y⋆i (D)
)2
=
α(χ,D)(i)2
2β
because f (y⋆i (D)) = α(χ,D)(i)/β. If deg+D(i) > 0, then
u⋆i (D) = α(χ,D)(i) f
(
y⋆i (D)
)− β
2
f
(
y⋆i (D)
)2
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− γ
2
(
f
(
y⋆i (D)
)− ∑
j∈I
a¯i,j(D) f
(
y⋆j (D)
))2
= α(χ,D)(i) f
(
y⋆i (D)
)− β
2
f
(
y⋆i (D)
)2 − 1
2γ
(
α(χ,D)(i)− β f (y⋆i (D)))2
=
α(χ,D)(i)2
2β
− β+ γ
2βγ
(
α(χ,D)(i)− β f (y⋆i (D)))2,
where the second equality follows from the first-order condition (see (D.4)),
f
(
y⋆i (D)
)
=
1
β+ γ
α(χ,D)(i) +
γ
β+ γ ∑j∈I
a¯i,j(D) f
(
y⋆j (D)
)
.
If the mapping α(χ, ·) : D → RI is constant, then
α(χ,D)(i) = α(χ,Di)(i) = α(χ, (I ,∅))(i),
which implies that
u⋆i (Di)− u⋆i (D) =
β+ γ
2βγ
(
α(χ,D)(i)− β f (y⋆i (D)))2 ≥ 0
because f (y⋆i (Di)) = α(χ,Di)(i)/β and γ > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1.65
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.13. 
Proof of Proposition 1.66
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.16. 
Proof of Proposition 1.67
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.14. 
Proof of Proposition 1.69
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.13. 
Proof of Proposition 1.70
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.16. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.71
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.14. 
Proof of Lemma 1.74
Let H and K be real symmetric matrices of the same order. Suppose H is positive
definite andK is positive semidefinite but not positive definite. Since H is symmetric
and positive definite, it has a unique positive definite square root H1/2, which is
symmetric. We have
σ(HK) = σ
(
H1/2H1/2K
)
= σ
(
H1/2KH1/2
) ⊂ R.
For the second equality see, for example, Horn and Johnson (2012, Theorem 1.3.22).
The set inclusion follows from the fact that symmetric matrices have real spectra.
Finally, the inequalitymin σ(HK) ≥ 0 follows from Johnson (1977, Lemma 1). In
particular, the inertia of HK and K are the same because H is positive definite,
where the negative index of inertia of K, that is, the number of negative eigenvalues
of K, is zero because K is positive semidefinite, from which it follows that HK has
no negative eigenvalues, so thatmin σ(HK) ≥ 0. 
Proofs of Lemmata 1.76, 1.77, and 1.78
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G). Consider the setup of Section 1.4.2.2. The
matrix A¯ is block diagonal with R blocks. For all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, let A¯r denote
the rth block of A¯ (that is, A¯r is the row-normalized adjacency matrix of sl(Gr)
with respect to the unique order isomorphism h : Ir → {1, . . . , nr}), which is, by
assumption, of order nr > 1. The matrix q(A¯) is block diagonal. Let r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}.
The rth block of q(A¯) is equal to q(A¯r), that is, A¯r − Inr . The matrix q(A¯r) has rank
at least one. To see this, suppose, for the sake of contradiction, the rank of q(A¯r) is
zero. It follows that q(A¯r) = Onr or, equivalently, A¯r = Inr . Note that A¯r = Inr if
and only if all players in Gr are isolated. As Gr is a weakly connected component
of G and all players in Gr are isolated, we must have nr = 1, which contradicts the
assumption that nr > 1. This concludes the proof that the rank of q(A¯r) is at least
one. The matrix q(A¯r) has rank at most nr − 1 because q(A¯r)1nr = 0nr .
Proof of Lemma 1.76
Proof of Result 1.76.1 For all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, q(A¯r) has rank at most nr − 1. As the
rank of a block diagonal matrix is equal to the sum of the ranks of its blocks, q(A¯)
has rank at most ∑Rr=1(nr − 1) = n− R. 
Proof of Result 1.76.2 This property is obvious. 
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Proof of Result 1.76.3 We have
q(A¯)ι =

q(A¯1)1n1 0n1 · · · 0n1
0n2 q(A¯2)1n2 · · · 0n2... ... . . . ...
0nR 0nR · · · q(A¯R)1nR
 = 0n0TR,
from which q(A¯)ιη = 0n follows. 
Proof of Result 1.76.4 Premultiplying (respectively, postmultiplying) both sides
of the identity
In = In − γ0q(A¯) + γ0q(A¯)
by (In − γ0q(A¯))−1 gives (In − γ0q(A¯))−1 = In + γ0(In − γ0q(A¯))−1q(A¯) (respec-
tively, (In − γ0q(A¯))−1 = In + γ0q(A¯)(In − γ0q(A¯))−1. Therefore,(
In − γ0q(A¯)
)−1 − In = γ0(In − γ0q(A¯))−1q(A¯) = γ0q(A¯)(In − γ0q(A¯))−1,
from which it follows that q(A¯) and (In − γ0q(A¯))−1 commute. 
Proof of Lemma 1.77
For all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, let sr denote the nullity of q(A¯r), that is, the rank of q(A¯r) is
equal to nr− sr, where 0 < sr < nr because 0 < nr− sr < nr. It follows that the rank
of q(A¯) is equal to ∑Rr=1(nr − sr) = n− S, where S := ∑Rr=1 sr. Let r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}.
The matrix q(A¯r)q(A¯r)T is symmetric and positive semidefinite but not positive
definite with rank nr − sr. (The notation introduced hereinafter is based on the
assumption that sr > 1 and nr − sr > 1. All results are, however, true if sr = 1 or
nr − sr = 1, with the obvious changes in notation.) Consequently, there exists a
spectral decomposition of q(A¯r)q(A¯r)T that is given by
q(A¯r)q(A¯r)
T = (Ur : Vr)
(
Λr 0nr−sr0Tsr
0sr0
T
nr−sr Osr
)
(Ur : Vr)
T = UrΛrUTr ,
where (Ur : Vr) is an orthogonal matrix of order nr and Λr is a positive definite
diagonal matrix of order nr − sr. The nr × (nr − sr) matrix Ur and the nr × sr
matrix Vr satisfyUTr Ur = Inr−sr , VTr Vr = Isr ,UTr Vr = 0nr−sr0Tsr , andUrUTr +VrVTr =
Inr . Let the (nr − sr)× nr matrix Qr be defined by
Qr := Λ−1/2r UTr q(A¯r),
where Λ−1/2r denotes the inverse of the unique principal square root Λ1/2r of Λr.
Note that Qr1nr = 0nr−sr , QrQTr = Inr−sr , which implies that Qr has full row rank,
QTrQr = q(A¯r)
TUrΛ−1r UTr q(A¯r), and q(A¯r)QTrQrq(A¯r)T = q(A¯r)q(A¯r)T.
First, I show that
q(A¯r)QTrQr = q(A¯r), (D.153)
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from which it follows that Qr A¯rQTrQr = Qr A¯r. We have
q(A¯r)QTrQr = UrΛrU
T
r UrΛ
−1
r U
T
r q(A¯r) = UrU
T
r q(A¯r),
where UrUTr = Ur(UTr Ur)−1UTr is the idempotent matrix that represents the projec-
tion mapping fromRnr to the column space ofUr with respect to the standard basis
forRnr . First, note that the columns of q(A¯r)q(A¯r)T lie in the column space ofUr be-
cause UrUTr q(A¯r)q(A¯r)T = q(A¯r)q(A¯r)T. Second, note that q(A¯r) and q(A¯r)q(A¯r)T
have the same column space (see, for example, Puntanen, Styan, and Isotalo 2011,
Theorem 1). It follows that the columns of q(A¯r) lie in the column space of Ur, that
is, UrUTr q(A¯r) = q(A¯r). This concludes the proof of (D.153).
Second, I show that Qr(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1 = Qr(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1QTrQr. We
find
Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1QTrQr = Qr(Inr + γ0(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1q(A¯r))QTrQr
= Qr + γ0Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1q(A¯r)
= Qr
(
Inr + γ0
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1q(A¯r))
= Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1,
where the first and the forth equality follow from(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1
= Inr + γ0
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1q(A¯r) (D.154)
and the second equality follows from QrQTr = Inr−sr and (D.153).
Third, I show that the matrix Inr−sr − γ0Qrq(A¯r)QTr is nonsingular with inverse
Qr(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1QTr . We find(
Inr−sr − γ0Qrq(A¯r)QTr
)
Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1QTr
= Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1QTr − γ0Qrq(A¯r)QTrQr(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1QTr
= Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1QTr − γ0Qrq(A¯r)(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1QTr
= Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1QTr
= QrQTr
= Inr−sr ,
where the second equality follows from (D.153), and
Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1QTr (Inr−sr − γ0Qrq(A¯r)QTr )
= Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1QTr − γ0Qr(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1QTrQrq(A¯r)QTr
= Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1QTr
− γ0Qr
(
Inr + γ0
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1q(A¯r))QTrQrq(A¯r)QTr
= Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1QTr
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− γ0Qrq(A¯r)QTr − γ20Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1q(A¯r)QTrQrq(A¯r)QTr
= Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1QTr
− γ0Qrq(A¯r)QTr − γ20Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1q(A¯r)q(A¯r)QTr
= Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1(Inr − γ0(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))q(A¯r)− γ20q(A¯r)q(A¯r))QTr
= QrQTr
= Inr−sr ,
where the second equality follows from (D.154) and the forth equality from (D.153).
Combining the two results Qr(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1 = Qr(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1QTrQr
and Qr(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1QTr = (Inr−sr − γ0Qrq(A¯r)QTr )−1 gives
Qr
(
Inr − γ0q(A¯r)
)−1
=
(
Inr−sr − γ0Qrq(A¯r)QTr
)−1Qr.
To sum up, for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, the (nr − sr)× nr matrix Qr has the following
properties:
(1) Qr has full row rank;
(2) QrQTr = Inr−sr ;
(3) q(A¯r)q(A¯r)T = q(A¯r)QTrQrq(A¯r)T;
(4) Qr1nr = 0nr−sr ;
(5) Qr A¯r = Qr A¯rQTrQr; and
(6) Qr(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1 = (Inr−sr − γ0Qrq(A¯r)QTr )−1Qr.
Finally, define the (n− S)× nmatrix Qℓ by
Qℓ :=

Q1 0n1−s10Tn2 · · · 0n1−s10TnR
0n2−s20Tn1 Q2 · · · 0n2−s20TnR... ... . . . ...
0nR−sR0Tn1 0nR−sR0
T
n2 · · · QR
 .
It is straightforward to show that Results 1.77.1 to 1.77.7 follow from the definition
of Qℓ and Results 1 to 6. 
Proof of Lemma 1.78
Let c ̸= 0. Let P(c) be the block diagonal matrix of order n that has the same block
structure as A¯, where for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, the rth block of P(c) is denoted by Pr(c)
and satisfies
Pr(c) = c
(
Inr −
1
nr
1nr1
T
nr
)
.
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Let r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}. The matrix Pr(1) is idempotent and symmetric. As Pr(1) is
idempotent, its spectrum is a subset of {0, 1} and its rank is equal to its trace, which
is equal to nr − 1. It follows that Pr(1) is positive semidefinite but not positive
definite. As Pr(1) is idempotent with rank nr − 1, the algebraic multiplicity of the
eigenvalue 1 is nr − 1 and that of the eigenvalue 0 is 1. Note that Pr(c) = cPr(1),
from which it follows that the matrix Pr(c) has the following properties: (i) it is
symmetric; (ii) it is positive (respectively, negative) semidefinite but not positive
(respectively, negative) definite if c > 0 (respectively, c < 0); (iii) its rank is equal
to nr − 1; and (iv) its spectrum is equal to {0, c}, where the algebraic multiplicity of
the eigenvalue c is nr − 1 and that of the eigenvalue 0 is 1. (The notation introduced
hereinafter is based on the assumption that nr − 1 > 1. All results are, however,
true if nr − 1 = 1, with the obvious changes in notation.) Consequently, there exists
a spectral decomposition of Pr(c) that is given by
Pr(c) = (Ur : vr)
(
cInr−1 0nr−1
0Tnr−1 0
)
(Ur : vr)
T = cUrUTr ,
where (Ur : vr) is an orthogonal matrix of order nr. The nr × (nr − 1) matrix Ur
and the nr × 1 vector vr (the normalized eigenvector of Pr corresponding to the
eigenvalue 0) satisfyUTr Ur = Inr−1, vr = (1/
√
nr)1nr , vTr vr = 1,UTr vr = 0nr−1, and
UrUTr + vrvTr = Inr . Let the (nr − 1)× nr matrix Qr be defined by
Qr :=
√
cUTr .
Note that Qr1nr = 0nr−1 and QrQTr = cInr−1, which implies that Qr has full row
rank. Also note that
q(A¯r)QTrQr = cq(A¯r), (D.155)
from which it follows that Qr A¯rQTrQr = cQr A¯r. Indeed, UrUTr + vrvTr = Inr and
q(A¯r)1nr = 0nr imply that
q(A¯r)QTrQr = cq(A¯r)
(
Inr − vrvTr
)
= cq(A¯r)
(
Inr −
1
nr
1nr1
T
nr
)
= cq(A¯r).
Analogous to the proof of Result 6 of Qr in the proof of Lemma 1.77, (D.154)
and (D.155) imply that Qr(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1 = (Inr−1 − (γ0/c)Qrq(A¯r)QTr )−1Qr.
To sum up, for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,R}, the (nr − 1) × nr matrix Qr has the following
properties:
(1) Qr has full row rank;
(2) QrQTr = cInr−1;
(3) QTrQr = c(Inr − (1/nr)1nr1Tnr );
(4) Qr1nr = 0nr−1;
(5) cQr A¯r = Qr A¯rQTrQr; and
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(6) Qr(Inr − γ0q(A¯r))−1 = (Inr−1 − (γ0/c)Qrq(A¯r)QTr )−1Qr.
Finally, define the (n− R)× nmatrix Qg by
Qg :=

Q1 0n1−10
T
n2 · · · 0n1−10TnR
0n2−10
T
n1 Q2 · · · 0n2−10TnR... ... . . . ...
0nR−10
T
n1 0nR−10
T
n2 · · · QR
 .
It is straightforward to show that Results 1.78.1 to 1.78.7 follow from the definition
of Qg and Results 1 to 6. 
Proof of Proposition 1.79
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). Let (θ1, θ2) be a pair of parame-
ter points inΘ2. Suppose Xφ1+ C¯Xψ1 ∈ ker(q(A¯)), that is, q(A¯)(Xφ1+ C¯Xψ1) =
0n. Note that (
In − γ1q(A¯)
)−1
= In + γ1
(
In − γ1q(A¯)
)−1q(A¯).
Using this result, we find
E
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = (In − γ1q(A¯))−1(Xφ1 + C¯Xψ1)
= Xφ1 + C¯Xψ1 + γ1
(
In − γ1q(A¯)
)−1q(A¯)(Xφ1 + C¯Xψ1)
= Xφ1 + C¯Xψ1.
Suppose
E
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = E( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F) (D.156)
is true. We find that (D.156) is equivalent to
Xφ1 + C¯Xψ1 =
(
In − γ2q(A¯)
)−1
(Xφ2 + C¯Xψ2),
which is equivalent to(
In − γ2q(A¯)
)
(Xφ1 + C¯Xψ1) = Xφ2 + C¯Xψ2,
which in turn is equivalent to
X(φ1 −φ2) + C¯X(ψ1 −ψ2) = 0n.
It follows that γ is not identified by P(Θ) through the mean. Finally, note that q(A¯)
is singular because 1 ∈ σ(A¯). 
Proof of Proposition 1.79'
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.79. 
D Proofs of Chapter 1 Results 269
Proof of Corollary 1.80
The first statement of the corollary follows immediately from Proposition 1.79. The
second statement follows from the first by noting that ker(q(A¯(G))) is a vector space
over R containing 1n, from which it follows that for all c ∈ R and for all v ∈ Rn,
v ∈ ker(q(A¯(G))) if and only if (v− c1n) ∈ ker(q(A¯(G))). 
Proof of Corollary 1.80'
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Corollary 1.80. 
Proof of Corollary 1.81
The statement of the corollary follows immediately from Proposition 1.79. 
Proof of Corollary 1.82
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). Suppose A¯ = C¯, ψ = ζφ, and
for all subparameter points ζ0 in ζ(Θ), −1 /∈ σ(ζ0 A¯). Let θ1 be a parameter point
in Θ. First, note that In + ζ1 A¯ is nonsingular because −1 /∈ σ(ζ1 A¯). Second, note
that q(A¯) and In + ζ1 A¯ commute. Using the preceding two results, the statement
of the corollary follows from Proposition 1.79 because
q(A¯)(Xφ1 + C¯Xψ1) = 0n ⇔ q(A¯)(In + ζ1 A¯)Xφ1 = 0n
⇔ (In + ζ1 A¯)q(A¯)Xφ1 = 0n
⇔ q(A¯)Xφ1 = 0n. 
Proof of Lemma 1.83
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). Results 1.83.1 and 1.83.2
follow directly from the definitions of A¯ and C¯. As to the proof of Result 1.83.3,
suppose A¯ = C¯. Recall that C¯ has only zeros on its main diagonal. The equality of
A¯ and C¯ implies that A¯ has only zeros on its main diagonal, which is equivalent to
I+0 (G) = ∅. The definitions of A¯ and C¯ and the assumption that the formermatrix is
equal to the latter imply that 0n = (A¯− C¯)1n = A¯1n− A¯(H)1n+diag(ι+0 (H))1n =
1n − 1n + ι+0 (H) = ι+0 (H), where ι+0 (H) = 0n if and only if I+0 (H) = ∅. 
Proof of Proposition 1.84
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). Let (θ1, θ2) be a pair of
parameter points in Θ2. Note that, for all (v1, v2) ∈ Rn ×Rn,(
In − γ1q(A¯)
)−1v1 = (In − γ2q(A¯))−1v2
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⇔ (In − γ2q(A¯))v1 = (In − γ1q(A¯))v2,
because In − γ1q(A¯) and (In − γ2q(A¯))−1 commute (Lemma B.4).
Proof of Result 1.84.1 Suppose A¯ ̸= C¯, I+0 (H) ̸= ∅, the kernel condition (1.75)
is not satisfied, and the matrix (1.76) has full column rank. We must show that
(γ1,φ1,ψ1) = (γ2,φ2,ψ2) is necessary for
E
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = E( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.157)
Suppose (D.157) is true. We find that (D.157) is equivalent to(
In − γ1q(A¯)
)−1(Xφ1 + C¯Xψ1) = (In − γ2q(A¯))−1(Xφ2 + C¯Xψ2),
which is equivalent to(
In − γ2q(A¯)
)(
Xφ1 + C¯Xψ1
)
=
(
In − γ1q(A¯)
)(
Xφ2 + C¯Xψ2
)
,
which in turn is equivalent to
0n = X
(
(1+ γ2)φ1 − (1+ γ1)φ2
)
+ A¯X
(
γ1φ2 − γ2φ1
)
+ C¯X
(
(1+ γ2)ψ1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2
)
+ A¯C¯X
(
γ1ψ2 − γ2ψ1
)
,
which in turn is equivalent to
0n = 1n
(
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2
)
+ ι+0 (H)
(
(1+ γ1)ψ2 − (1+ γ2)ψ1
)
+ A¯ι+0 (H)
(
γ2ψ1 − γ1ψ2
)
+ X2
(
(1+ γ2)φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)φ2,−1
)
+ A¯X2
(
γ1φ2,−1 − γ2φ1,−1
)
+ C¯X2
(
(1+ γ2)ψ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2,−1
)
+ A¯C¯X2
(
γ1ψ2,−1 − γ2ψ1,−1
)
because X = (1n : X2) (Assumption P-X), A¯1n = 1n, C¯1n = 1n − ι+0 (H), and
A¯C¯1n = 1n − A¯ι+0 (H). We have
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2 = 0 (D.158)
(1+ γ1)ψ2 − (1+ γ2)ψ1 = 0 (D.159)
γ2ψ1 − γ1ψ2 = 0 (D.160)
(1+ γ2)φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)φ2,−1 = 0K−1 (D.161)
γ1φ2,−1 − γ2φ1,−1 = 0K−1 (D.162)
(1+ γ2)ψ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2,−1 = 0K−1 (D.163)
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γ1ψ2,−1 − γ2ψ1,−1 = 0K−1 (D.164)
because matrix (1.76) has full column rank. The system of equations (D.158)
to (D.164) has a unique solution. Adding equations (D.159) and (D.160) gives
ψ1 = ψ2. This equality together with equation (D.158) gives φ1 = φ2. Adding
equations (D.161) and (D.162) gives φ1,−1 = φ2,−1. Adding equations (D.163)
and (D.164) gives ψ1,−1 = ψ2,−1. Using the equalities φ1 = φ2, φ1,−1 = φ2,−1,
ψ1 = ψ2, and ψ1,−1 = ψ2,−1, equations (D.159) and (D.160) are equivalent to
(γ1− γ2)ψ1 = 0, equations (D.161) and (D.162) are equivalent to (γ1− γ2)φ1,−1 =
0K−1, and equations (D.163) and (D.164) are equivalent to (γ1 − γ2)ψ1,−1 = 0K−1.
We must have ψ1 ̸= 0, φ1,−1 ̸= 0K−1, or ψ1,−1 ̸= 0K−1 because the kernel condi-
tion (1.75) is not satisfied (Corollary 1.80). It follows that γ1 = γ2. To sum up,
I have established that (γ1, φ1,φ1,−1,ψ1,ψ1,−1) = (γ2, φ2,φ2,−1,ψ2,ψ2,−1).
The proof that In, A¯, C¯, A¯C¯ are linearly independent if γ, φ, and ψ are identified
through the mean by P(Θ) is omitted. 
Proof of Result 1.84.2 Suppose A¯ ̸= C¯, I+0 (H) = ∅, the kernel condition (1.75)
is not satisfied, and the matrix (1.77) has full column rank. We must show that
(γ1,φ1,−1,ψ1,−1) = (γ2,φ2,−1,ψ2,−1) is necessary for
E
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = E( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.165)
Suppose (D.165) is true. We find that (D.165) is equivalent to
0n = 1n
(
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2
)
+ X2
(
(1+ γ2)φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)φ2,−1
)
+ A¯X2
(
γ1φ2,−1 − γ2φ1,−1
)
+ C¯X2
(
(1+ γ2)ψ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2,−1
)
+ A¯C¯X2
(
γ1ψ2,−1 − γ2ψ1,−1
)
.
We have
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2 = 0
(1+ γ2)φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)φ2,−1 = 0K−1 (D.166)
γ1φ2,−1 − γ2φ1,−1 = 0K−1 (D.167)
(1+ γ2)ψ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2,−1 = 0K−1 (D.168)
γ1ψ2,−1 − γ2ψ1,−1 = 0K−1 (D.169)
because matrix (1.77) has full column rank. The system of equations (D.166)
to (D.169) has a unique solution. Adding equations (D.166) and (D.167) gives
φ1,−1 = φ2,−1. Adding equations (D.168) and (D.169) gives ψ1,−1 = ψ2,−1. Using
the equalities φ1,−1 = φ2,−1 and ψ1,−1 = ψ2,−1, equations (D.166) and (D.167)
are equivalent to (γ1 − γ2)φ1,−1 = 0K−1 and equations (D.168) and (D.169) are
equivalent to (γ1 − γ2)ψ1,−1 = 0K−1. We must have φ1,−1 ̸= 0K−1 or ψ1,−1 ̸= 0K−1
because the kernel condition (1.75) is not satisfied (Corollary 1.80). It follows that
γ1 = γ2. To sum up, I have established that (γ1,φ1,−1,ψ1,−1) = (γ2,φ2,−1,ψ2,−1).
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The proof that In, A¯, C¯, A¯C¯ are linearly independent if γ, φ−1, and ψ−1 are
identified through the mean by P(Θ) is omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 1.84'
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.84. 
Proof of Proposition 1.86
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). Suppose A¯ = C¯, the kernel
condition (1.75) is not satisfied, γφ−1 + (1+ γ)ψ−1 ̸= 0K−1, and the matrix (1.78)
has full column rank. Let (θ1, θ2) be a pair of parameter points in Θ2. Note that
I+0 (H) = ∅ because A¯ = C¯ (Result 1.83.3). Wemust show that (γ1,φ1,−1,ψ1,−1) =
(γ2,φ2,−1,ψ2,−1) is necessary for
E
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = E( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.170)
Suppose (D.170) is true. We find that (D.170) is equivalent to
0n = 1n
(
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2
)
+ X2
(
(1+ γ2)φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)φ2,−1
)
+ A¯X2
(
γ1φ2,−1 + (1+ γ2)ψ1,−1 − γ2φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2,−1
)
+ A¯2X2
(
γ1ψ2,−1 − γ2ψ1,−1
)
.
We have
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2 = 0
(1+ γ2)φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)φ2,−1 = 0K−1 (D.171)
γ1φ2,−1 + (1+ γ2)ψ1,−1 − γ2φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2,−1 = 0K−1 (D.172)
γ1ψ2,−1 − γ2ψ1,−1 = 0K−1 (D.173)
because matrix (1.78) has full column rank. The system of equations (D.171),
(D.172), and (D.173) has a unique solution because γφ−1 + (1+ γ)ψ−1 ̸= 0K−1
implies that γ1φ1,−1 + (1+ γ1)ψ1,−1 ̸= 0K−1 and γ2φ2,−1 + (1+ γ2)ψ2,−1 ̸= 0K−1.
To show this, I consider two cases:
(1) Suppose γ1 = 0. The inequality γ1φ1,−1 + (1+ γ1)ψ1,−1 ̸= 0K−1 is equivalent
toψ1,−1 ̸= 0K−1. Using this result, equation (D.173) implies that γ2 = 0. Using
γ1 = γ2 = 0, equation (D.171) gives φ1,−1 = φ2,−1 and equation (D.172) gives
ψ1,−1 = ψ2,−1.
(2) Suppose γ1 ̸= 0. We must have γ2 ̸= 0. Indeed, if γ2 = 0, then ψ2,−1 ̸= 0K−1
according to the inequality γ2φ2,−1 + (1+ γ2)ψ2,−1 ̸= 0K−1 and ψ2,−1 = 0K−1
according to equation (D.173), a contradiction. Multiplying both sides of
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equation (D.172) by 1+ γ1 gives γ1(1+ γ1)φ2,−1 + (1+ γ1)(1+ γ2)ψ1,−1 −
(1+ γ1)γ2φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)2ψ2,−1 = 0K−1, which is equivalent to
(γ1 − γ2)
(
γ1φ1,−1 + (1+ γ1)ψ1,−1
)
= 0K−1 (D.174)
because γ1(1+ γ2)φ1,−1 = γ1(1+ γ1)φ2,−1 according to equation (D.171) and
ψ2,−1 = (γ2/γ1)ψ1,−1 according to equation (D.173). Equation (D.174) and
the inequality γ1φ1,−1 + (1+ γ1)ψ1,−1 ̸= 0K−1 imply that γ1 = γ2. Using
this result, equation (D.173) gives ψ1,−1 = ψ2,−1. Adding equations (D.171),
(D.172), and (D.173) givesφ1,−1−φ2,−1 = ψ2,−1−ψ1,−1, fromwhichφ1,−1 =
φ2,−1 follows because ψ1,−1 = ψ2,−1.
To sum up, I have established that (γ1,φ1,−1,ψ1,−1) = (γ2,φ2,−1,ψ2,−1). Finally,
note that the system of equations (D.171), (D.172), and (D.173) has infinitely many
solutions without the restrictions γ1φ1,−1 + (1+ γ1)ψ1,−1 ̸= 0K−1 and γ2φ2,−1 +
(1+ γ2)ψ2,−1 ̸= 0K−1, for example, for all (c1, c2, p) ∈ γ(Θ)2 ×RK−1 with c1 ̸= 0,(
γ1,γ2,φ1,−1,φ2,−1,ψ1,−1,ψ2,−1
)
=
(
0, c2, p, (1+ c2)p, 0K−1,−c2p
)
and (
γ1,γ2,φ1,−1,φ2,−1,ψ1,−1,ψ2,−1
)
=
(
c1, c2,−1+ c1c1 p,−
1+ c2
c1
p, p,
c2
c1
p
)
are solutions.
The proof that In, A¯, A¯2 are linearly independent if γ,φ−1, andψ−1 are identified
through the mean by P(Θ) is omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 1.86'
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.86. 
Proof of Lemma 1.87
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G). Suppose (x, y, z) is an intransitive triple in G.
It follows that deg+G (x) > 0, deg+G (y) > 0, [A¯]x,x = 0, [A¯]x,y = 1/deg+G (x) > 0,
[A¯]y,z = 1/deg
+
G (y) > 0, and [A¯]x,z = 0. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, In,
A¯, A¯2 are linearly dependent. There exists a triple (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0) such that
c0In + c1 A¯+ c2 A¯2 = On. (D.175)
Note that c2 ̸= 0. In order to prove this, suppose, for the sake of contradiction,
c2 = 0. It follows from (D.175) and [A¯]x,x = 0 that c0 + c2[A¯2]x,x = 0, from
which c0 = 0 follows because c2 = 0. It follows from (D.175) and c0 = c2 = 0 that
c1 A¯ = On, which implies that c1 = 0 because A¯ is nonnegative anddifferent fromOn.
Consequently, (c0, c1, c2) = (0, 0, 0), which contradicts (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0). This
concludes the proof that c2 ̸= 0. Wefind [A¯2]x,z = ∑nk=1[A¯]x,k[A¯]k,z ≥ [A¯]x,y[A¯]y,z >
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0 because A¯ is nonnegative, [A¯]x,y > 0, and [A¯]y,z > 0. It follows from (D.175) and
[A¯]x,z = 0 that c2[A¯2]x,z = 0, which is equivalent to [A¯2]x,z = 0 because c2 ̸= 0,
which contradicts [A¯2]x,z > 0. This concludes the proof that In, A¯, A¯2 are linearly
independent. 
Proof of Proposition 1.89
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). Suppose the kernel condi-
tion (1.75) is not satisfied, G = H, 0n ̸= ι+0 (G) ∈ c-sp(diag(ι+0 (G))X2), γφ−1 +
(1+ γ)ψ−1 ̸= 0K−1, and the matrix (1.79) has full column rank. Let (θ1, θ2) be
a pair of parameter points in Θ2. Note that A¯X2 − C¯X2 = diag(ι+0 (G))X2. Note
also that ι+0 (G) ∈ c-sp(diag(ι+0 (G))X2) if and only if there exists a λ ∈ RK−1 such
that diag(ι+0 (G))X2λ = ι+0 (G). It follows that ι+0 (G) = A¯X2λ− C¯X2λ for some
λ ∈ RK−1 \ {0K−1}, where λ ̸= 0K−1 because ι+0 (G) ̸= 0n. We must show that
(γ1,φ1,ψ1) = (γ2,φ2,ψ2) is necessary for
E
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = E( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.176)
Suppose (D.176) is true. We find that (D.176) is equivalent to
0n = 1n
(
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2
)
+ ι+0 (G)
(
(1+ γ1)ψ2 − (1+ γ2)ψ1
)
+ A¯ι+0 (G)
(
γ2ψ1 − γ1ψ2
)
+ X2
(
(1+ γ2)φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)φ2,−1
)
+ A¯X2
(
γ1φ2,−1 − γ2φ1,−1
)
+ C¯X2
(
(1+ γ2)ψ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2,−1
)
+ A¯C¯X2
(
γ1ψ2,−1 − γ2ψ1,−1
)
,
which in turn is equivalent to
0n = 1n
(
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2
)
+ X2
(
(1+ γ2)φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)φ2,−1
)
+ A¯X2
(
γ1φ2,−1 − γ2φ1,−1 + (1+ γ1)ψ2λ− (1+ γ2)ψ1λ
)
+ C¯X2
(
(1+ γ2)ψ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2λ+ (1+ γ2)ψ1λ
)
+ A¯2X2
(
γ2ψ1λ− γ1ψ2λ
)
+ A¯C¯X2
(
γ1ψ2,−1 − γ2ψ1,−1 − γ2ψ1λ+ γ1ψ2λ
)
because ι+0 (G) = A¯X2λ− C¯X2λ. We have
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2 = 0 (D.177)
(1+ γ2)φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)φ2,−1 = 0K−1 (D.178)
γ1φ2,−1 − γ2φ1,−1 + (1+ γ1)ψ2λ− (1+ γ2)ψ1λ = 0K−1 (D.179)
(1+ γ2)ψ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2λ+ (1+ γ2)ψ1λ = 0K−1 (D.180)
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γ2ψ1λ− γ1ψ2λ = 0K−1 (D.181)
γ1ψ2,−1 − γ2ψ1,−1 − γ2ψ1λ+ γ1ψ2λ = 0K−1 (D.182)
because matrix (1.79) has full column rank. Adding equations (D.179) and (D.180)
gives
γ1φ2,−1 + (1+ γ2)ψ1,−1 − γ2φ1,−1 − (1+ γ1)ψ2,−1 = 0K−1, (D.183)
and adding equations (D.181) and (D.182) gives
γ1ψ2,−1 − γ2ψ1,−1 = 0K−1. (D.184)
The system of equations (D.178), (D.183), and (D.184) has a unique solution, that
is, (γ1,φ1,−1,ψ1,−1) = (γ2,φ2,−1,ψ2,−1), because it is equivalent to the system of
equations (D.171), (D.172), and (D.173) (see the proof of Proposition 1.86). Note
that the system of equations (D.178), (D.183), and (D.184) has infinitely many
solutions without the restrictions γ1φ1,−1 + (1+ γ1)ψ1,−1 ̸= 0K−1 and γ2φ2,−1 +
(1+ γ2)ψ2,−1 ̸= 0K−1 (see the proof of Proposition 1.86). Equation (D.180), λ ̸=
0K−1, γ1 = γ2, 1 + γ1 > 0 (Assumption P-γ), and ψ1,−1 = ψ2,−1 imply that
ψ1 = ψ2. This result and (D.177) imply that φ1 = φ2. To sum up, I have established
that (γ1, φ1,φ1,−1,ψ1,ψ1,−1) = (γ2, φ2,φ2,−1,ψ2,ψ2,−1).
The proof that In, A¯, C¯, A¯2, A¯C¯ are linearly independent if γ, φ, and ψ are
identified through the mean by P(Θ) is omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 1.89'
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.89. 
Proof of Proposition 1.90
Inwhat follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). Suppose γ is identified byP(Θ).
Let (θ1, θ2) be a pair of parameter points in Θ2.
Proof of Result 1.90.1 Suppose I+0 (H) ̸= ∅ and the matrix (1n : ι+0 (H) : X2 : C¯X2)
has full column rank. We must show that (φ1,ψ1) = (φ2,ψ2) is necessary for
E
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = E( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.185)
Suppose (D.185) is true. Note that γ1 = γ2 because γ is identified by P(Θ). We
find that (D.185) is equivalent to(
In − γ1q(A¯)
)−1(Xφ1 + C¯Xψ1) = (In − γ2q(A¯))−1(Xφ2 + C¯Xψ2),
which is equivalent to
X
(
φ1 −φ2
)
+ C¯X
(
ψ1 −ψ2
)
= 0n
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because γ1 = γ2, which in turn is equivalent to
0n = 1n
(
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2
)
+ ι+0 (H)
(
ψ2 − ψ1
)
+ X2
(
φ1,−1 −φ2,−1
)
+ C¯X2
(
ψ1,−1 −ψ2,−1
)
because X = (1n : X2) (Assumption P-X) and C¯1n = 1n − ι+0 (H). We have
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2 = 0 (D.186)
ψ2 − ψ1 = 0 (D.187)
φ1,−1 −φ2,−1 = 0K−1 (D.188)
ψ1,−1 −ψ2,−1 = 0K−1 (D.189)
because the matrix (1n : ι+0 (H) : X2 : C¯X2) has full column rank. The system of
equations (D.186) to (D.189) has a unique solution, that is, (φ1,φ1,−1,ψ1,ψ1,−1) =
(φ2,φ2,−1,ψ2,ψ2,−1). 
Proof of Result 1.90.2 Suppose I+0 (H) = ∅ and the matrix (1n : X2 : C¯X2) has full
column rank. We must show that (φ1,−1,ψ1,−1) = (φ2,−1,ψ2,−1) is necessary for
E
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = E( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.190)
Suppose (D.190) is true. Note that γ1 = γ2 because γ is identified by P(Θ). We
find that (D.190) is equivalent to
1n
(
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2
)
+ X2
(
φ1,−1 −φ2,−1
)
+ C¯X2
(
ψ1,−1 −ψ2,−1
)
= 0n
because γ1 = γ2, X = (1n : X2) (Assumption P-X), and C¯1n = 1n. We have
φ1 + ψ1 − φ2 − ψ2 = 0
φ1,−1 −φ2,−1 = 0K−1 (D.191)
ψ1,−1 −ψ2,−1 = 0K−1 (D.192)
because the matrix (1n : X2 : C¯X2) has full column rank. The system of equations
(D.191) and (D.192) has a unique solution, that is, (φ1,−1,ψ1,−1) = (φ2,−1,ψ2,−1).
Proof of Proposition 1.90'
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.90. 
Proof of Proposition 1.91
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G). Suppose In, A¯ + A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly in-
dependent. Let (θ1, θ2) be a pair of parameter points in Θ20. We must show that
(γ1, ς1) = (γ2, ς2) is necessary for
var
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = var( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.193)
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Suppose (D.193) is true. Using Lemma B.4, we find that (D.193) is equivalent to
ς21
(
In − γ2q(A¯)
)(
In − γ2q(A¯)T
)
= ς22
(
In − γ1q(A¯)
)(
In − γ1q(A¯)T
)
,
which in turn is equivalent to
On =
(
(1+ γ2)2ς21 − (1+ γ1)2ς22
)
In
+
(
γ1(1+ γ1)ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ς21
)(
A¯+ A¯T
)
+
(
γ22ς
2
1 − γ21ς22
)
A¯A¯T.
We have
(1+ γ2)2ς21 − (1+ γ1)2ς22 = 0 (D.194)
γ1(1+ γ1)ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ς21 = 0 (D.195)
γ22ς
2
1 − γ21ς22 = 0 (D.196)
because In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly independent. The system of equations (D.194),
(D.195), and (D.196) has a unique solution. Adding equations (D.195) and (D.196)
gives
γ1ς
2
2 − γ2ς21 = 0. (D.197)
Adding equations (D.194), (D.195), and (D.197) gives ς21 = ς22, which is equivalent
to ς1 = ς2 because ς1 > 0 and ς2 > 0. This equality together with equation (D.197)
gives (γ1 − γ2)ς21 = 0, from which γ1 = γ2 follows because ς1 > 0. To sum up,
I have established that (γ1, ς1) = (γ2, ς2).
The proof that In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly independent if γ and ς are identified
through the variance by P(Θ0) is omitted. 
Proof of Lemma 1.92
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G). Note that, for all i ∈ I ,
[A¯+ A¯T]i,i =
{
2 if deg+G (i) = 0,
0 if deg+G (i) > 0,
and
[A¯A¯T]i,i =

1 if deg+G (i) = 0,
1
deg+G (i)
if deg+G (i) > 0,
and
[A¯T A¯]i,i =

1{0}
(
deg+G (i)
) if deg−G (i) = 0,
1{0}
(
deg+G (i)
)
+ ∑
j∈N−G (i)
1
deg+G (j)
2 if deg
−
G (i) > 0.
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The statement of the lemma is equivalent to the following equivalence: In, A¯+ A¯T,
A¯A¯T are linearly dependent if and only if In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯T A¯ are linearly dependent.
I prove only one implication, namely, In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly dependent if In,
A¯+ A¯T, A¯T A¯ are linearly dependent; the proof of the converse is similar. Suppose In,
A¯+ A¯T, A¯T A¯ are linearly dependent. I show that A¯ is normal, that is, A¯T A¯ = A¯A¯T,
from which it follows that In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly dependent. There exists a
triple (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0) such that
c0In + c1
(
A¯+ A¯T
)
+ c2 A¯T A¯ = On. (D.198)
There exists an i ∈ I with deg−G (i) > 0 because G is not empty. Let a := [A¯T A¯]i,i.
Note that a > 0 because deg−G (i) > 0 is equivalent toN−G (i) ̸= ∅, which implies that
there exists a j ∈ N−G (i) with deg+G (j) > 0. We must have deg+G (i) > 0. To see this,
suppose, for the sake of contradiction, deg+G (i) = 0. It follows from (D.198) that
c0[In]i,i + c1[A¯+ A¯
T]i,i + c2[A¯
T A¯]i,i = 0, which is equivalent to c0 + 2c1 + ac2 = 0,
and c01Tn1n + c11Tn(A¯+ A¯T)1n + c21Tn A¯T A¯1n = 0, which is equivalent to c0 + 2c1 +
c2 = 0. The two equalities c0 + 2c1 + ac2 = 0 and c0 + 2c1 + c2 = 0 imply that
ac2 = c2, which is equivalent to c2 = 0 because a > 0. It follows from c0 + 2c1 = 0
that c0 = 0 if and only if c1 = 0. I show that c0 ̸= 0, that is, c1 ̸= 0. Suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, c0 = 0, which implies that c1 = 0. Consequently,
(c0, c1, c2) = (0, 0, 0), which contradicts (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0). This concludes the
proof that c0 ̸= 0. It follows from (D.198) and c2 = 0 that c0In + c1(A¯+ A¯T) = On,
which is equivalent to A¯+ A¯T = 2In because c0 + 2c1 = 0 and c0 ̸= 0 and c1 ̸= 0,
which in turn is equivalent to A¯ = In because A¯ is nonnegative, which contradicts
the assumption that G is not empty. This concludes the proof that deg+G (i) > 0. It
follows from c0[In]i,i + c1[A¯+ A¯T]i,i + c2[A¯T A¯]i,i = 0 and deg+G (i) > 0 that
−c2 = a−1c0. (D.199)
It follows from (D.199) and a−1 > 0 that c0 = 0 if and only if c2 = 0. I show that
c0 ̸= 0, that is, c2 ̸= 0. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, c0 = 0, which implies
that c2 = 0. It follows from (D.198) that c1(A¯ + A¯T) = On, which implies that
c1 = 0 because A¯ is nonnegative and different fromOn. Consequently, (c0, c1, c2) =
(0, 0, 0), which contradicts (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0). This concludes the proof that
c0 ̸= 0. Let
c3 :=
c21 − c0c2
c22
=
c21 + a
−1c20
c22
> 0 and N := A¯+ c1
c2
In.
Note that (D.198) is equivalent to NNT = c3In. I show that N is nonsingular
and normal. First, I show that N is nonsingular. We have det(N) ̸= 0 because
0 ̸= cn3 = det(c3In) = det(NNT) = det(N)2. Second, I show that N is normal. We
have
NTN = N−1(NNT)N = N−1(c3In)N = c3In = NNT,
that is, N is normal. Finally, we find
On = NTN − NNT
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=
(
A¯+
c1
c2
In
)T(
A¯+
c1
c2
In
)
−
(
A¯+
c1
c2
In
)(
A¯+
c1
c2
In
)T
= A¯T A¯− A¯A¯T,
that is, A¯ is normal. 
Proof of Proposition 1.95
In what follows, I write I⋆ for I⋆(G) and A¯ for A¯(G). Note that, for all (i, j) ∈ I2,
[A¯+ A¯T]i,j =

2δi,j if deg+G (i) = 0 and deg+G (j) = 0,
δi,j +
1N+G (i)(j)
deg+G (i)
if deg+G (i) > 0 and deg+G (j) = 0,
δi,j +
1N+G (j)(i)
deg+G (j)
if deg+G (i) = 0 and deg+G (j) > 0,
1N+G (i)(j)
deg+G (i)
+
1N+G (j)(i)
deg+G (j)
if deg+G (i) > 0 and deg+G (j) > 0,
and
[A¯A¯T]i,j =

δi,j if deg+G (i) = 0 and deg+G (j) = 0,
1N+G (i)(j)
deg+G (i)
if deg+G (i) > 0 and deg+G (j) = 0,
1N+G (j)(i)
deg+G (j)
if deg+G (i) = 0 and deg+G (j) > 0,∣∣N+G (i) ∩N+G (j)∣∣
deg+G (i)deg
+
G (j)
if deg+G (i) > 0 and deg+G (j) > 0,
and
[A¯T A¯]i,j =

δi,j 1{0}
(
deg+G (i)
) if N−G (i) ∩N−G (j) = ∅,
δi,j 1{0}
(
deg+G (i)
)
+ ∑
k∈N−G (i)∩N−G (j)
1
deg+G (k)
2 if N−G (i) ∩N−G (j) ̸= ∅.
Let n⋆ := |I⋆|. Note that n⋆ > 1 and G〈I⋆〉 is not empty because G is not empty.
Assume without loss of generality that I⋆ = {1, . . . , n⋆}. It follows that A¯ is block
diagonal if n⋆ < n, specifically,
A¯ =

(
[A¯]I⋆ ,I⋆ 0
0 1
)
if n⋆ = n− 1,(
[A¯]I⋆ ,I⋆ 0n⋆0Tn−n⋆
0n−n⋆0Tn⋆ In−n⋆
)
if n⋆ < n− 1.
(D.200)
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First, I prove that if G〈I⋆〉 is an NRD(n⋆, d, (d − 1)/2, 0) for some positive
integer d, then In, A¯ + A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly dependent. Suppose G〈I⋆〉 is an
NRD(n⋆, d, (d− 1)/2, 0) for some positive integer d, which implies that G〈I⋆〉 is
d-regular (see Jørgensen 2015, Corollary 11). The adjacency matrix of G〈I⋆〉 with
respect to the identity mapping idI⋆ , A˙(G〈I⋆〉), satisfies (see Proposition 1)
A˙(G〈I⋆〉)A˙(G〈I⋆〉)T = dIn⋆ + d− 12
(
A˙(G〈I⋆〉) + A˙(G〈I⋆〉)T). (D.201)
Note that the adjacency matrix of G with respect to the identity mapping idI , A˙(G),
satisfies [A˙(G)]I⋆ ,I⋆ = A˙(G〈I⋆〉). Note also that [A¯]I⋆ ,I⋆ = (1/d)[A˙(G)]I⋆ ,I⋆
because G〈I⋆〉 is d-regular. It follows from (D.201) and A˙(G〈I⋆〉) = d[A¯]I⋆ ,I⋆ that
dIn⋆ +
d(d− 1)
2
(
[A¯]I⋆ ,I⋆ + [A¯]
T
I⋆ ,I⋆
)− d2[A¯]I⋆ ,I⋆ [A¯]TI⋆ ,I⋆ = On⋆ . (D.202)
This shows that In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly dependent if n⋆ = n, that is, [A¯]I⋆ ,I⋆ =
A¯. If n⋆ < n, then (D.200), (D.202), and d+ (d(d− 1)/2)(1+ 1)− d2 = 0 in case
n⋆ = n − 1 or dIn−n⋆ + (d(d − 1)/2)(In−n⋆ + In−n⋆) − d2In−n⋆ = On−n⋆ in case
n⋆ < n− 1 imply that
dIn +
d(d− 1)
2
(
A¯+ A¯T
)− d2 A¯A¯T = On,
that is, In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly dependent.
Second, I prove that if In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly dependent, then there exists
a positive integer d—to economize on notation, I reuse the symbol d introduced in
the preceding proof—such that
A˙(G〈I⋆〉)A˙(G〈I⋆〉)T = dIn⋆ + d− 12
(
A˙(G〈I⋆〉) + A˙(G〈I⋆〉)T), (D.203)
that is,G〈I⋆〉 is anNRD(n⋆, d, (d− 1)/2, 0) (see Proposition 1). Suppose In, A¯+ A¯T,
A¯A¯T are linearly dependent. There exists a triple (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0) such that
c0In + c1
(
A¯+ A¯T
)
+ c2 A¯A¯T = On. (D.204)
There exists an x ∈ I⋆ with deg+G (x) > 0 because G is not empty.
First, I show that c0 ̸= 0 and c2 ̸= 0. It follows from (D.204) that c0[In]x,x +
c1[A¯+ A¯T]x,x + c2[A¯A¯
T]x,x = 0, which is equivalent to
c0deg+G (x) + c2 = 0. (D.205)
It follows from (D.205) anddeg+G (x) > 0 that c0 = 0 if and only if c2 = 0. I show that
c0 ̸= 0, that is, c2 ̸= 0. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, c0 = 0, which implies
that c2 = 0. It follows from (D.204) that c1(A¯ + A¯T) = On, which implies that
c1 = 0 because A¯ is nonnegative and different fromOn. Consequently, (c0, c1, c2) =
(0, 0, 0), which contradicts (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0). This concludes the proof that
c0 ̸= 0 and c2 ̸= 0.
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Second, I show that A¯ is normal, that is, A¯A¯T = A¯T A¯. Let
c3 :=
c21 − c0c2
c22
=
c21 + c
2
0deg
+
G (x)
c22
> 0 and N := A¯+ c1
c2
In.
Note that (D.204) is equivalent to NNT = c3In. I show that N is nonsingular
and normal. First, I show that N is nonsingular. We have det(N) ̸= 0 because
0 < cn3 = det(c3In) = det(NN
T) = det(N)2. Second, I show that N is normal. We
have
NTN = N−1(NNT)N = N−1(c3In)N = c3In = NNT,
that is, N is normal. Finally, we find
On = NTN − NNT
=
(
A¯+
c1
c2
In
)T(
A¯+
c1
c2
In
)
−
(
A¯+
c1
c2
In
)(
A¯+
c1
c2
In
)T
= A¯T A¯− A¯A¯T,
that is, A¯ is normal.
Third, I show that, for all i ∈ I⋆, deg+G (i) > 0. Suppose, for the sake of contradic-
tion, there exists a z ∈ I⋆ with deg+G (z) = 0. There exists a y ∈ I⋆ with z ∈ N+G (y)
because deg+G (z) = 0 and z lies in some weakly connected component of G〈I⋆〉 of
order at least 2. Note that y ̸= z and deg+G (y) > 0 because z ∈ N+G (y). It follows
from (D.204) that
c0deg+G (y) + c2 = 0. (D.206)
We have
c0[In]y,z + c1[A¯+ A¯
T]y,z + c2[A¯A¯
T]y,z = 0
⇔ c1
1N+G (y)(z)
deg+G (y)
+ c2
1N+G (y)(z)
deg+G (y)
= 0
⇔ c1 + c2 = 0. (D.207)
Since A¯ is normal, (D.204) is equivalent to c0In+ c1(A¯+ A¯T)+ c2 A¯T A¯ = On, which
implies that c01Tn1n + c11Tn(A¯+ A¯T)1n + c21Tn A¯T A¯1n = 0, which is equivalent to
c0 + 2c1 + c2 = 0. (D.208)
It follows from (D.207) and (D.208) that c0 = c2. This equality, c0 ̸= 0, and (D.206)
give deg+G (y) = −1, which contradicts deg+G (y) > 0. This concludes the proof that
for all i ∈ I⋆, deg+G (i) > 0.
Fourth, I show that, for all i ∈ I⋆, deg−G (i) > 0. Suppose, for the sake of
contradiction, there exists a y ∈ I⋆ with deg−G (y) = 0, that is, N−G (y) = ∅. Since
A¯ is normal and deg+G (y) > 0, (D.204) implies that c0[In]y,y + c1[A¯ + A¯T]y,y +
c2[A¯T A¯]y,y = 0, which is equivalent to c0 = 0, a contradiction to c0 ̸= 0. This
concludes the proof that for all i ∈ I⋆, deg−G (i) > 0.
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Fifth, I show that there exists a positive integer d such that for all i ∈ I⋆,
deg−G (i) = deg
+
G (i) = d, that is, G〈I⋆〉 is d-regular. Let (y, z) ∈ (I⋆)2 with y ̸= z.
It follows from (D.204) that c0deg+G (y) + c2 = 0 and c0deg+G (z) + c2 = 0 because
deg+G (y) > 0 and deg+G (z) > 0. The inequality c0 ̸= 0 and the two equalities
c0deg+G (y) + c2 = 0 and c0deg+G (z) + c2 = 0 imply that deg+G (y) = deg+G (z). Let
d := deg+G (y) > 0. Since A¯ is normal, we find, for all i ∈ I⋆,
deg−G (i)
d2
=
∣∣N−G (i)∣∣
d2
= ∑
k∈N−G (i)
1
deg+G (k)
2 = [A¯
T A¯]i,i = [A¯A¯
T]i,i =
∣∣N+G (i)∣∣
deg+G (i)
2 =
d
d2
,
that is, deg−G (i) = d. This concludes the proof that G〈I⋆〉 is d-regular.
Sixth, I show that (D.203) is true. It follows from [A¯]I⋆ ,I⋆ = (1/d)A˙(G〈I⋆〉)
and (D.204) that
c0In⋆ +
c1
d
(
A˙(G〈I⋆〉) + A˙(G〈I⋆〉)T)+ c2
d2
A˙(G〈I⋆〉)A˙(G〈I⋆〉)T = On⋆ ,
which is equivalent to (D.203) because c2 ̸= 0, c0d+ c2 = 0, and (D.208) imply that
− c0d
2
c2
= d and − c1d
c2
=
d− 1
2
. 
Proof of Corollary 1.96
Results 1.96.1 and 1.96.2 follow from Proposition 1.95. 
Proof of Proposition 1.97
In what follows, I write I⋆ for I⋆(G) and A¯ for A¯(G). Suppose G is symmetric,
which implies that G〈I⋆〉 is symmetric. Note that every weakly connected compo-
nent of G〈I⋆〉 is of order at least 2.
First, I prove that In, A¯, A¯2 are linearly dependent if In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly
dependent. Suppose In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly dependent. It follows that G〈I⋆〉
is an NRD(|I⋆|, d, (d− 1)/2, 0) for some positive integer d (Proposition 1.95) and
A¯ satisfies (see the proof of Proposition 1.95)
dIn +
d(d− 1)
2
(
A¯+ A¯T
)− d2 A¯A¯T = On. (D.209)
Note that A¯ is symmetric, that is, A¯ = A¯T, becauseG〈I⋆〉 is symmetric and d-regular.
It follows from (D.209) and A¯ = A¯T that dIn + d(d− 1)A¯− d2 A¯2 = On, that is, In,
A¯, A¯2 are linearly dependent.
Second, I prove that In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly dependent if In, A¯, A¯2 are
linearly dependent. Suppose In, A¯, A¯2 are linearly dependent.
First, I show that every weakly connected component of G〈I⋆〉 is transitive.
There do not exist intransitive triples in G〈I⋆〉 because In, A¯, A¯2 are linearly depen-
dent (Lemma 1.87). It follows that G〈I⋆〉 is transitive, which in turn implies that
all of its weakly connected components are transitive.
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Second, I show that all weakly connected components of G〈I⋆〉 are complete.
All weakly connected components of G〈I⋆〉 are strongly connected because G〈I⋆〉
is symmetric. Note that a strongly connected digraph D is transitive if and only if
D is complete (see Bang-Jensen and Gutin 2009, p. 37). It follows that all weakly
connected components of G〈I⋆〉 are complete.
Third, I show that In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly dependent. All complete com-
ponents of G〈I⋆〉must be of the same order, denoted by m, because In, A¯, A¯2 are
linearly dependent (see Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009, Section 2.4.1.3). It
follows that G〈I⋆〉 is anNRD(|I⋆|,m− 1, (m− 2)/2, 0), from which it follows that
In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly dependent (Proposition 1.95). 
Proof of Corollary 1.98
The statement of the corollary follows from Propositions 1.95 and 1.97. 
Proof of Corollary 1.99
The statement of the corollary follows from Propositions 1.86, 1.91, and 1.97. 
Proof of Proposition 1.100
In what follows, I write C¯ for C¯(H). Suppose In, C¯+ C¯T, C¯C¯T are linearly indepen-
dent and γ is identified by P(Θ). Let (θ1, θ2) be a pair of parameter points in Θ2.
We must show that (ζ1, ς1) = (ζ2, ς2) is necessary for
var
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = var( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.210)
Suppose (D.210) is true. Note that γ1 = γ2 because γ is identified by P(Θ). We
find that (D.210) is equivalent to
ς21
(
In + ζ1C¯
)(
In + ζ1C¯T
)
= ς22
(
In + ζ2C¯
)(
In + ζ2C¯T
)
because γ1 = γ2, which in turn is equivalent to(
ς21 − ς22
)
In +
(
ζ1ς
2
1 − ζ2ς22
)(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+
(
ζ21ς
2
1 − ζ22ς22
)
C¯C¯T = On.
We have
ς21 − ς22 = 0 (D.211)
ζ1ς
2
1 − ζ2ς22 = 0 (D.212)
ζ21ς
2
1 − ζ22ς22 = 0 (D.213)
because In, C¯+ C¯T, C¯C¯T are linearly independent. The system of equations (D.211),
(D.212), and (D.213) has a unique solution. Equation (D.211) gives ς21 = ς22, which
is equivalent to ς1 = ς2 because ς1 > 0 and ς2 > 0. This equality together with
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equation (D.212) gives (ζ1− ζ2)ς21 = 0, from which ζ1 = ζ2 follows because ς1 > 0.
To sum up, I have established that (ζ1, ς1) = (ζ2, ς2).
The proof that In, C¯+ C¯T, C¯C¯T are linearly independent if ζ and ς are identified
through the variance by P(Θ) is omitted. 
Proof of Lemma 1.101
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Lemma 1.92. 
Proof of Proposition 1.102
In what follows, I write C¯ for C¯(H). Note that, for all i ∈ I , [C¯+ C¯T]i,i = 0 and
[C¯C¯T]i,i =

0 if deg+H(i) = 0,
1
deg+H(i)
if deg+H(i) > 0.
I prove the contrapositive of the conditional statement of the proposition. Suppose
In, C¯+ C¯T, C¯C¯T are linearly dependent. I show that I+0 (H) = ∅. Suppose, for the
sake of contradiction, I+0 (H) ̸= ∅. There exists a triple (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0) such
that
c0In + c1
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+ c2C¯C¯T = On. (D.214)
There exist an x ∈ I with deg+H(x) > 0 (because H is not empty) and a y ∈ I
with deg+H(y) = 0 (because I+0 (H) ̸= ∅). It follows from (D.214) that c0[In]x,x +
c1[C¯ + C¯T]x,x + c2[C¯C¯
T]x,x = 0, which is equivalent to c0deg+H(x) + c2 = 0, and
c0[In]y,y + c1[C¯ + C¯
T]y,y + c2[C¯C¯
T]y,y = 0, which is equivalent to c0 = 0. The two
equalities c0deg+H(x) + c2 = 0 and c0 = 0 imply that c2 = 0. It follows from (D.214)
and c0 = c2 = 0 that c1(C¯ + C¯T) = On, which implies that c1 = 0 because C¯ is
nonnegative and different from On. Consequently, (c0, c1, c2) = (0, 0, 0), which
contradicts (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0). This concludes the proof that I+0 (H) = ∅. 
Proof of Proposition 1.103
The following proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.95. There are, however,
subtle differences that justify a detailed proof.
In what follows, I write C¯ for C¯(H). Note that, for all i ∈ I , [C¯+ C¯T]i,i = 0,
[C¯C¯T]i,i =

0 if deg+H(i) = 0,
1
deg+H(i)
if deg+H(i) > 0,
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and
[C¯TC¯]i,i =

0 if N−H (i) = ∅,
∑
k∈N−H (i)
1
deg+H(k)
2 if N−H (i) ̸= ∅.
First, I prove that if H is an NRD(n, d, (d− 1)/2, 0) for some positive integer d,
then In, C¯+ C¯T, C¯C¯T are linearly dependent. SupposeH is anNRD(n, d, (d− 1)/2, 0)
for some positive integer d, which implies that H is d-regular (see Jørgensen 2015,
Corollary 11). The adjacency matrix of H with respect to the identity mapping idI ,
A˙(H), satisfies (see Proposition 1)
A˙(H)A˙(H)T = dIn +
d− 1
2
(
A˙(H) + A˙(H)T
)
. (D.215)
Note that A˙(H) = dC¯ because H is d-regular. It follows from (D.215) and A˙(H) =
dC¯ that
dIn +
d(d− 1)
2
(
C¯+ C¯T
)− d2C¯C¯T = On. (D.216)
This concludes the proof that In, C¯+ C¯T, C¯C¯T are linearly dependent.
Second, I prove that if In, C¯+ C¯T, C¯C¯T are linearly dependent, then there exists
a positive integer d—to economize on notation, I reuse the symbol d introduced in
the preceding proof—such that
A˙(H)A˙(H)T = dIn +
d− 1
2
(
A˙(H) + A˙(H)T
)
, (D.217)
which is equivalent (see Proposition 1) to H being an
NRD(n, d, (d− 1)/2, 0). Suppose In, C¯ + C¯T, C¯C¯T are linearly dependent. There
exists a triple (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0) such that
c0In + c1
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+ c2C¯C¯T = On. (D.218)
Let x ∈ I . Note that deg+H(x) > 0 because I+0 (H) = ∅ (Proposition 1.102).
First, I show that c0 ̸= 0 and c2 ̸= 0. It follows from (D.218) that c0[In]x,x +
c1[C¯+ C¯T]x,x + c2[C¯C¯
T]x,x = 0, which is equivalent to
c0deg+H(x) + c2 = 0. (D.219)
It follows from (D.219) anddeg+H(x) > 0 that c0 = 0 if and only if c2 = 0. I show that
c0 ̸= 0, that is, c2 ̸= 0. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, c0 = 0, which implies
that c2 = 0. It follows from (D.218) that c1(C¯+ C¯T) = On, which implies that c1 = 0
because C¯ is nonnegative anddifferent fromOn. Consequently, (c0, c1, c2) = (0, 0, 0),
which contradicts (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0). This concludes the proof that c0 ̸= 0 and
c2 ̸= 0.
Second, I show that C¯ is normal, that is, C¯C¯T = C¯TC¯. Let
c3 :=
c21 − c0c2
c22
=
c21 + c
2
0deg
+
H(x)
c22
> 0 and N := C¯+ c1
c2
In.
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Note that (D.218) is equivalent to NNT = c3In. I show that N is nonsingular
and normal. First, I show that N is nonsingular. We have det(N) ̸= 0 because
0 < cn3 = det(c3In) = det(NN
T) = det(N)2. Second, I show that N is normal. We
have
NTN = N−1(NNT)N = N−1(c3In)N = c3In = NNT,
that is, N is normal. Finally, we find
On = NTN − NNT
=
(
C¯+
c1
c2
In
)T(
C¯+
c1
c2
In
)
−
(
C¯+
c1
c2
In
)(
C¯+
c1
c2
In
)T
= C¯TC¯− C¯C¯T,
that is, C¯ is normal.
Third, I show that, for all i ∈ I , deg+H(i) > 0, that is, I+0 (H) = ∅. Suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, there exists a y ∈ I with deg+H(y) = 0. It follows
from (D.218) that c0[In]y,y + c1[C¯ + C¯T]y,y + c2[C¯C¯T]y,y = 0, which is equivalent
to c0 = 0, a contradiction to c0 ̸= 0. This concludes the proof that for all i ∈ I ,
deg+H(i) > 0.
Fourth, I show that, for all i ∈ I , deg−H(i) > 0. Suppose, for the sake of contradic-
tion, there exists a y ∈ I with deg−H(y) = 0, that is, N−H (y) = ∅. Since C¯ is normal
and deg+H(y) > 0, (D.218) implies that c0[In]y,y + c1[C¯ + C¯T]y,y + c2[C¯TC¯]y,y = 0,
which is equivalent to c0 = 0, a contradiction to c0 ̸= 0. This concludes the proof
that for all i ∈ I , deg−H(i) > 0.
Fifth, I show that there exists a positive integer d such that for all i ∈ I , deg−H(i) =
deg+H(i) = d, that is, H is d-regular. Let (y, z) ∈ I2 with y ̸= z. It follows from
(D.218) that c0deg+H(y) + c2 = 0 and c0deg+H(z) + c2 = 0 because deg+H(y) > 0 and
deg+H(z) > 0. The inequality c0 ̸= 0 and the two equalities c0deg+H(y) + c2 = 0 and
c0deg+H(z) + c2 = 0 imply that deg+H(y) = deg+H(z). Let d := deg+H(y) > 0. Since
C¯ is normal, we find, for all i ∈ I ,
deg−H(i)
d2
=
∣∣N−H (i)∣∣
d2
= ∑
k∈N−H (i)
1
deg+H(k)
2 = [C¯
TC¯]i,i = [C¯C¯
T]i,i =
1
deg+H(i)
=
1
d
,
that is, deg−H(i) = d. This concludes the proof that H is d-regular.
Sixth, I show that (D.217) is true. Note that C¯1n = 1n because I+0 (H) = ∅.
Since C¯ is normal, (D.218) is equivalent to c0In + c1(C¯+ C¯T) + c2C¯TC¯ = On, which
implies that c01Tn1n + c11Tn(C¯+ C¯T)1n + c21TnC¯TC¯1n = 0, which is equivalent to
c0 + 2c1 + c2 = 0. (D.220)
It follows from (D.218) and C¯ = (1/d)A˙(H) that
c0In +
c1
d
(
A˙(H) + A˙(H)T
)
+
c2
d2
A˙(H)A˙(H)T = On,
which is equivalent to (D.217) because c2 ̸= 0, c0d+ c2 = 0, and (D.220) imply that
− c0d
2
c2
= d and − c1d
c2
=
d− 1
2
. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.104
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). Suppose A¯ ̸= C¯ and the nine
matrices of Proposition 1.104 are linearly independent. Let (θ1, θ2) be a pair of
parameter points in Θ2. We must show that (γ1, ζ1, ς1) = (γ2, ζ2, ς2) is necessary
for
var
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = var( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.221)
Suppose (D.221) is true. Using Lemma B.4, we find that (D.221) is equivalent to
ς21
(
In − γ2q(A¯)
)(
In + ζ1C¯
)(
In + ζ1C¯T
)(
In − γ2q(A¯)T
)
= ς22
(
In − γ1q(A¯)
)(
In + ζ2C¯
)(
In + ζ2C¯T
)(
In − γ1q(A¯)T
)
,
which in turn is equivalent to
On =
(
(1+ γ2)2ς21 − (1+ γ1)2ς22
)
In
+
(
γ1(1+ γ1)ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ς21
)(
A¯+ A¯T
)
+
(
γ22ς
2
1 − γ21ς22
)
A¯A¯T
+
(
(1+ γ2)2ζ1ς21 − (1+ γ1)2ζ2ς22
)(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+
(
(1+ γ2)2ζ21ς
2
1 − (1+ γ1)2ζ22ς22
)
C¯C¯T
+
(
γ1(1+ γ1)ζ2ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ζ1ς21
)(
A¯
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
A¯T
)
+
(
γ1(1+ γ1)ζ22ς
2
2 − γ2(1+ γ2)ζ21ς21
)(
A¯C¯C¯T + C¯C¯T A¯T
)
+
(
γ22ζ1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ2ς22
)
A¯
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
A¯T
+
(
γ22ζ
2
1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ22ς22
)
A¯C¯
(
A¯C¯
)T.
We have
(1+ γ2)2ς21 − (1+ γ1)2ς22 = 0 (D.222)
γ1(1+ γ1)ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ς21 = 0 (D.223)
γ22ς
2
1 − γ21ς22 = 0 (D.224)
(1+ γ2)2ζ1ς21 − (1+ γ1)2ζ2ς22 = 0 (D.225)
(1+ γ2)2ζ21ς
2
1 − (1+ γ1)2ζ22ς22 = 0 (D.226)
γ1(1+ γ1)ζ2ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ζ1ς21 = 0 (D.227)
γ1(1+ γ1)ζ22ς
2
2 − γ2(1+ γ2)ζ21ς21 = 0 (D.228)
γ22ζ1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ2ς22 = 0 (D.229)
γ22ζ
2
1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ22ς22 = 0 (D.230)
because the nine matrices of Proposition 1.104 are linearly independent. The system
of equations (D.222) to (D.230) has a unique solution. Adding equations (D.222)
and (D.223) gives
(1+ γ2)ς21 − (1+ γ1)ς22 = 0, (D.231)
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and adding equations (D.223) and (D.224) gives
γ1ς
2
2 − γ2ς21 = 0. (D.232)
Adding equations (D.231) and (D.232) gives ς21 = ς22, which is equivalent to ς1 = ς2
because ς1 > 0 and ς2 > 0. This equality together with equation (D.232) gives
(γ1 − γ2)ς21 = 0, from which γ1 = γ2 follows because ς1 > 0. If γ1 = 0, then
γ1 = γ2, ς1 = ς2, and equation (D.225) give (ζ1 − ζ2)ς21 = 0, from which ζ1 = ζ2
follows because ς1 > 0. If γ1 ̸= 0, then γ1 = γ2, ς1 = ς2, and equation (D.229)
give (ζ1 − ζ2)γ21ς21 = 0, from which ζ1 = ζ2 follows because ς1 > 0. To sum up,
I have established that (γ1, ζ1, ς1) = (γ2, ζ2, ς2). 
Proof of Proposition 1.105
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). Suppose A¯ = C¯, γζ ≥ 0, and
the six matrices of Proposition 1.105 are linearly independent. Let (θ1, θ2) be a pair
of parameter points inΘ2. We must show that (γ1, ζ1, ς1) = (γ2, ζ2, ς2) is necessary
for
var
(
f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = var( f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.233)
Suppose (D.233) is true. Using Lemma B.4, we find that (D.233) is equivalent to
ς21
(
In − γ2q(C¯)
)(
In + ζ1C¯
)(
In + ζ1C¯T
)(
In − γ2q(C¯)T
)
= ς22
(
In − γ1q(C¯)
)(
In + ζ2C¯
)(
In + ζ2C¯T
)(
In − γ1q(C¯)T
)
,
which in turn is equivalent to
On =
(
(1+ γ2)2ς21 − (1+ γ1)2ς22
)
In
+
(
(1+ γ1)
(
γ1 − (1+ γ1)ζ2
)
ς22 − (1+ γ2)
(
γ2 − (1+ γ2)ζ1
)
ς21
)(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+
((
γ2 − (1+ γ2)ζ1
)2
ς21 −
(
γ1 − (1+ γ1)ζ2
)2
ς22
)
C¯C¯T
+
(
γ1(1+ γ1)ζ2ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ζ1ς21
)(
C¯2 + C¯T2
)
+
(
γ2
(
γ2 − (1+ γ2)ζ1
)
ζ1ς
2
1 − γ1
(
γ1 − (1+ γ1)ζ2
)
ζ2ς
2
2
)
C¯
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
C¯T
+
(
γ22ζ
2
1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ22ς22
)
C¯2C¯T2.
We have
(1+ γ2)2ς21 − (1+ γ1)2ς22 = 0 (D.234)
(1+ γ1)
(
γ1 − (1+ γ1)ζ2
)
ς22 − (1+ γ2)
(
γ2 − (1+ γ2)ζ1
)
ς21 = 0 (D.235)(
γ2 − (1+ γ2)ζ1
)2
ς21 −
(
γ1 − (1+ γ1)ζ2
)2
ς22 = 0 (D.236)
γ1(1+ γ1)ζ2ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ζ1ς21 = 0 (D.237)
γ2
(
γ2 − (1+ γ2)ζ1
)
ζ1ς
2
1 − γ1
(
γ1 − (1+ γ1)ζ2
)
ζ2ς
2
2 = 0 (D.238)
γ22ζ
2
1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ22ς22 = 0 (D.239)
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because the sixmatrices of Proposition 1.105 are linearly independent. The system of
equations (D.234) to (D.239) has a unique solution because γ1ζ1 ≥ 0 and γ2ζ2 ≥ 0.
To show this, I consider two cases:
(1) Suppose γζ = 0, so that γ1ζ1 = γ2ζ2 = 0. I consider two cases:
(1.1) Suppose γ1 = 0. Equation (D.239) gives γ2ζ1 = 0 because ς1 > 0. We
must have γ2 = 0. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, γ2 ̸= 0, from
which ζ1 = ζ2 = 0 follows because γ2ζ1 = γ2ζ2 = 0. Adding equations
(D.235) and (D.236) gives γ2ς21 = 0. It follows that ς1 = 0, which
contradicts ς1 > 0. This concludes the proof that γ2 = 0. Equations
(D.234) and γ1 = γ2 = 0 give ς21 = ς22, which is equivalent to ς1 = ς2
because ς1 > 0 and ς2 > 0. This equality and equation (D.235) give
(ζ1 − ζ2)ς21 = 0, from which ζ1 = ζ2 follows because ς1 > 0.
(1.2) Suppose γ1 ̸= 0, from which ζ1 = 0 follows because γ1ζ1 = 0. Equa-
tion (D.239) gives γ1ζ2 = 0 because ς2 > 0. It follows that ζ2 = 0.
Adding equations (D.235) and (D.236) gives
γ1ς
2
2 − γ2ς21 = 0. (D.240)
Adding equations (D.234), (D.235), and (D.240) gives ς21 = ς22, which
is equivalent to ς1 = ς2 because ς1 > 0 and ς2 > 0. This equality and
equation (D.240) give (γ1 − γ2)ς21 = 0, from which γ1 = γ2 follows
because ς1 > 0.
(2) Suppose γζ > 0, so that γ1ζ1 > 0 and γ2ζ2 > 0. Using (D.235), we find
(1+ γ1)
(
γ1 − (1+ γ1)ζ2
)
ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ς21 + (1+ γ2)2ζ1ς21 = 0
⇒ (1+ γ1)ς22
(
γ1 − (1+ γ1)ζ2 − γ1 ζ2ζ1 + (1+ γ1)ζ1
)
= 0
⇔ γ1 − (1+ γ1)ζ2 − γ1 ζ2ζ1 + (1+ γ1)ζ1 = 0
⇔ (ζ1 − ζ2)
(
γ1 + (1+ γ1)ζ1
)
= 0
⇔ ζ1 − ζ2 = 0.
The implication follows from equations (D.234) and (D.237), where ζ1 ̸= 0
because γ1ζ1 > 0. The first equivalence follows from 1+ γ1 > 0 (Assump-
tion P-γ) and ς2 > 0. The second equivalence is obvious. The last equivalence
follows from γ1 + (1+ γ1)ζ1 ̸= 0, which is a consequence of γ1ζ1 > 0. Indeed,
if γ1 + (1 + γ1)ζ1 = 0, then γ1ζ1 = −(1+ γ1)ζ21 ≤ 0 because 1 + γ1 > 0,
which contradicts γ1ζ1 > 0. Using ζ1 = ζ2 and ζ1 ̸= 0, equation (D.237) gives
γ1(1+ γ1)ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ς21 = 0. (D.241)
Adding equations (D.234) and (D.241) gives (1+ γ1)ς22 = (1+ γ2)ς21. This
equality and equation (D.241) give (γ1 − γ2)(1+ γ1)ς22 = 0, from which γ1 =
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γ2 follows because 1+ γ1 > 0 and ς2 > 0. Equations (D.234) and γ1 = γ2
give (ς21 − ς22)(1+ γ1)2 = 0, from which ς1 = ς2 follows because 1+ γ1 > 0,
ς1 > 0, and ς2 > 0.
To sum up, I have established that (γ1, ζ1, ς1) = (γ2, ζ2, ς2). Finally, note that the
system of equations (D.234) to (D.239) has infinitely many solutions without the
restrictions γ1ζ1 ≥ 0 and γ2ζ2 ≥ 0, for example, for all (c, s) ∈ γ(Θ)×R++,(
γ1,γ2, ζ1, ζ2, ς1, ς2
)
=
(
0, c, 0,− c
1+ c
, s, (1+ c)s
)
is a solution. 
Proof of Proposition 1.106
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.84. 
Proof of Proposition 1.107
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.86. 
Proof of Lemma 1.108
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G). Let p > 1 be an integer.
First, I showby contraposition that A¯0, . . . , A¯p are linearly independent if q(A¯)A¯0,
. . . , q(A¯)A¯p−1 are linearly independent. Suppose A¯0, . . . , A¯p are linearly dependent,
that is, there exists a (p+ 1)-tuple (a1, . . . , ap+1) ̸= 0p+1 such that ∑p+1k=1 ak A¯k−1 =
On. Induction on p shows that
p+1
∑
k=1
ak A¯k−1 =
p
∑
k=1
(
p+1
∑
j=k+1
aj
)
(A¯− In)A¯k−1
if ∑p+1k=1 ak = 0. Note that ∑
p+1
k=1 ak A¯
k−1 = On and A¯1n = 1n imply that ∑p+1k=1 ak = 0.
For all k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, let bk := ∑p+1j=k+1 aj. Note that (a1, . . . , ap+1) ̸= 0p+1 implies
that (b1, . . . , bp) ̸= 0p because a1 = −∑p+1j=2 aj, ap+1 = bp, and for all k ∈ {2, . . . , p},
ak = bk−1 − bk. We find
On =
p+1
∑
k=1
ak A¯k−1 =
p
∑
k=1
(
p+1
∑
j=k+1
aj
)(
A¯− In
)
A¯k−1 =
p
∑
k=1
bkq(A¯)A¯k−1,
that is, q(A¯)A¯0, . . . , q(A¯)A¯p−1 are linearly dependent.
Second, I show that q(A¯)A¯0, . . . , q(A¯)A¯p−1 are linearly independent if A¯0, . . . , A¯p
are linearly independent. Suppose q(A¯)A¯0, . . . , q(A¯)A¯p−1 are linearly dependent,
that is, there exists a p-tuple (c1, . . . , cp) ̸= 0p such that ∑pk=1 ckq(A¯)A¯k−1 = On.
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Let d1 := −c1, dp+1 := cp, and for all k ∈ {2, . . . , p}, dk := ck−1 − ck. Note that
(c1, . . . , cp) ̸= 0p implies that (d1, . . . , dp+1) ̸= 0p+1 because c1 = −d1, cp = dp+1,
and for all k ∈ {2, . . . , p− 1}, ck = −∑kj=1 dj. We find
On =
p
∑
k=1
ck
(
A¯− In
)
A¯k−1 = −c1In +
p
∑
k=2
(ck−1 − ck)A¯k−1 + cp A¯p =
p+1
∑
k=1
dk A¯k−1,
that is, A¯0, . . . , A¯p are linearly dependent. 
Proof of Lemma 1.109
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G). Suppose G has a subdigraph of diameter (at
least) three. It follows that there exist four pairwise distinct vertices w, x, y, and z
in G such that P := (w, x, y, z) is a shortest path in G (of length 3) from w to z.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, In, A¯, A¯2, A¯3 are linearly dependent. There
exists a 4-tuple (c0, c1, c2, c3) ̸= (0, 0, 0, 0) such that
c0In + c1 A¯+ c2 A¯2 + c3 A¯3 = On. (D.242)
Note that c3 ̸= 0. To prove this, suppose, for the sake of contradiction, c3 = 0.
Note that (c0, c1, c2) ̸= (0, 0, 0) because (c0, c1, c2, c3) ̸= (0, 0, 0, 0) and c3 = 0. It
follows from (D.242) that c0In + c1 A¯+ c2 A¯2 = On, that is, In, A¯, A¯2 are linearly
dependent. Note that both (w, x, y) and (x, y, z) are intransitive triples in G because
P is a shortest path in G from w to z. Lemma 1.87 implies that In, A¯, A¯2 are linearly
independent, and we have reached a contradiction. This concludes the proof that
c3 ̸= 0. Note that [A¯]w,z = [A¯2]w,z = 0 and [A¯3]w,z > 0 because P is a shortest path
in G of length 3 from w to z. It follows from (D.242), w ̸= z, [A¯]w,z = [A¯2]w,z = 0,
and c3 ̸= 0 that [A¯3]w,z = 0, a contradiction to [A¯3]w,z > 0. This concludes the proof
that In, A¯, A¯2, A¯3 are linearly independent. 
Proof of Proposition 1.111
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.89. 
Proof of Proposition 1.112
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.90. 
Proof of Proposition 1.113
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.91. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.114
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G). I prove by contraposition that In, A¯+ A¯T, A¯A¯T
are linearly independent if q(A¯)q(A¯)T, q(A¯)(q(A¯) + q(A¯)T)q(A¯)T, q2(A¯)q2(A¯)T are
linearly independent. Suppose In, A¯ + A¯T, A¯A¯T are linearly dependent, that is,
there exists a triple (c1, c2, c3) ̸= 03 such that c1In+ c2(A¯+ A¯T) + c3 A¯A¯T = On. Let
T :=
1 2 10 1 1
0 0 1
 ,
and let (d1, d2, d3) := T(c1, c2, c3). Note that (d1, d2, d3) ̸= 03 because T is nonsin-
gular and (c1, c2, c3) ̸= 03. We have d1In + d2(q(A¯) + q(A¯)T) + d3q(A¯)q(A¯)T = On,
which implies that q(A¯)q(A¯)T, q(A¯)(q(A¯) + q(A¯)T)q(A¯)T, q2(A¯)q2(A¯)T are linearly
dependent. 
Proof of Proposition 1.115
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.100. 
Proof of Proposition 1.116
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). Suppose A¯ ̸= C¯ and the nine
matrices of Proposition 1.116 are linearly independent. Let (θ1, θ2) be a pair of
parameter points in Θ2. We must show that (γ1, ζ1, ς1) = (γ2, ζ2, ς2) is necessary
for
var
(
q(A¯) f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = var(q(A¯) f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.243)
Suppose (D.243) is true. Using Lemma B.4, we find that (D.243) is equivalent to
ς21
(
In − γ2q(A¯)
)
q(A¯)
(
In + ζ1C¯
)(
In + ζ1C¯T
)
q(A¯)T
(
In − γ2q(A¯)T
)
= ς22
(
In − γ1q(A¯)
)
q(A¯)
(
In + ζ2C¯
)(
In + ζ2C¯T
)
q(A¯)T
(
In − γ1q(A¯)T
)
,
which in turn is equivalent to
On =
(
ς21 − ς22
)
q(A¯)q(A¯)T
+
(
ζ1ς
2
1 − ζ2ς22
)
q(A¯)
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
q(A¯)T
+
(
ζ21ς
2
1 − ζ22ς22
)
q(A¯)C¯C¯Tq(A¯)T
+
(
γ1ς
2
2 − γ2ς21
)
q(A¯)
(
q(A¯) + q(A¯)T
)
q(A¯)T
+
(
γ1ζ2ς
2
2 − γ2ζ1ς21
)
q(A¯)
(
q(A¯)
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
q(A¯)T
)
q(A¯)T
+
(
γ1ζ
2
2ς
2
2 − γ2ζ21ς21
)
q(A¯)
(
q(A¯)C¯C¯T + C¯C¯Tq(A¯)T
)
q(A¯)T
+
(
γ22ς
2
1 − γ21ς22
)
q2(A¯)q2(A¯)T
+
(
γ22ζ1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ2ς22
)
q2(A¯)
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
q2(A¯)T
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+
(
γ22ζ
2
1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ22ς22
)
q2(A¯)C¯C¯Tq2(A¯)T.
We have
ς21 − ς22 = 0 (D.244)
ζ1ς
2
1 − ζ2ς22 = 0 (D.245)
ζ21ς
2
1 − ζ22ς22 = 0 (D.246)
γ1ς
2
2 − γ2ς21 = 0 (D.247)
γ1ζ2ς
2
2 − γ2ζ1ς21 = 0 (D.248)
γ1ζ
2
2ς
2
2 − γ2ζ21ς21 = 0 (D.249)
γ22ς
2
1 − γ21ς22 = 0 (D.250)
γ22ζ1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ2ς22 = 0 (D.251)
γ22ζ
2
1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ22ς22 = 0 (D.252)
because the nine matrices of Proposition 1.116 are linearly independent. The system
of equations (D.244) to (D.252) has a unique solution. Equation (D.244) gives
ς21 = ς
2
2, which is equivalent to ς1 = ς2 because ς1 > 0 and ς2 > 0. This result
and equation (D.245) give (ζ1 − ζ2)ς21 = 0, from which ζ1 = ζ2 follows because
ς1 > 0. Similarly, equation (D.247) gives γ1 = γ2. To sum up, I have established
that (γ1, ζ1, ς1) = (γ2, ζ2, ς2). 
Proof of Proposition 1.117
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). I prove by contraposition that
the nine matrices of Proposition 1.104 are linearly independent if the nine matrices
of Proposition 1.116 are linearly independent. Suppose the nine matrices of Prop-
osition 1.104 are linearly dependent, that is, there exists a 9-tuple (c1, . . . , c9) ̸= 09
such that
On = c1In + c2
(
A¯+ A¯T
)
+ c3 A¯A¯T + c4
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+ c5C¯C¯T
+ c6
(
A¯
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
A¯T
)
+ c7
(
A¯C¯C¯T + C¯C¯T A¯T
)
+ c8 A¯
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
A¯T + c9 A¯C¯C¯T A¯T.
Let
T :=

1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

,
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and let (d1, . . . , d9) := T(c1, . . . , c9). Note that (d1, . . . , d9) ̸= 09 because T is non-
singular and (c1, . . . , c9) ̸= 09. We have
On = d1In + d4
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+ d5C¯C¯T + d2
(
q(A¯) + q(A¯)T
)
+ d6
(
q(A¯)
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
q(A¯)T
)
+ d7
(
q(A¯)C¯C¯T + C¯C¯Tq(A¯)T
)
+ d3q(A¯)q(A¯)
T + d8q(A¯)
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
q(A¯)T + d9q(A¯)C¯C¯Tq(A¯)
T,
which implies that the nine matrices of Proposition 1.116 are linearly dependent.
Proof of Proposition 1.118
In what follows, I write A¯ for A¯(G) and C¯ for C¯(H). Suppose A¯ = C¯, γζ ≥ 0, and
the six matrices of Proposition 1.118 are linearly independent. Let (θ1, θ2) be a pair
of parameter points inΘ2. We must show that (γ1, ζ1, ς1) = (γ2, ζ2, ς2) is necessary
for
var
(
q(A¯) f
(
y(θ1)
) ∣∣ F) = var(q(A¯) f (y(θ2)) ∣∣ F). (D.253)
Suppose (D.253) is true. Using Lemma B.4, we find that (D.253) is equivalent to
ς21
(
In − γ2q(C¯)
)
q(C¯)
(
In + ζ1C¯
)(
In + ζ1C¯T
)
q(C¯)T
(
In − γ2q(C¯)T
)
= ς22
(
In − γ1q(C¯)
)
q(C¯)
(
In + ζ2C¯
)(
In + ζ2C¯T
)
q(C¯)T
(
In − γ1q(C¯)T
)
,
which in turn is equivalent to
On =
(
ς21 − ς22
)
q(C¯)q(C¯)T
+
(
ζ1ς
2
1 − ζ2ς22
)
q(C¯)
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
q(C¯)T
+
(
ζ21ς
2
1 − ζ22ς22
)
q(C¯)C¯C¯Tq(C¯)T
+
(
γ1ς
2
2 − γ2ς21
)
q(C¯)
(
q(C¯) + q(C¯)T
)
q(C¯)T
+
(
γ1ζ2ς
2
2 − γ2ζ1ς21
)
q(C¯)
(
q(C¯)
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
q(C¯)T
)
q(C¯)T
+
(
γ1ζ
2
2ς
2
2 − γ2ζ21ς21
)
q(C¯)
(
q(C¯)C¯C¯T + C¯C¯Tq(C¯)T
)
q(C¯)T
+
(
γ22ς
2
1 − γ21ς22
)
q2(C¯)q2(C¯)T
+
(
γ22ζ1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ2ς22
)
q2(C¯)
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
q2(C¯)T
+
(
γ22ζ
2
1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ22ς22
)
q2(C¯)C¯C¯Tq2(C¯)T,
which in turn is equivalent to
On =
(
(1+ γ2)2ς21 − (1+ γ1)2ς22
)
q(C¯)q(C¯)T
+
((
(1− γ22)ζ1 − γ2(1+ γ2)
)
ς21 −
(
(1− γ21)ζ2 − γ1(1+ γ1)
)
ς22
)
× q(C¯)(C¯+ C¯T)q(C¯)T
+
((
γ22(1+ 2ζ1) + ζ
2
1
)
ς21 −
(
γ21(1+ 2ζ2) + ζ
2
2
)
ς22
)
q(C¯)C¯C¯Tq(C¯)T
+
(
γ1(1+ γ1)ζ2ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ζ1ς21
)
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× q(C¯)(q(C¯)(C¯+ C¯T)+ (C¯+ C¯T)q(C¯)T)q(C¯)T
+
(
γ1(ζ2 − γ1)ζ2ς22 − γ2(ζ1 − γ2)ζ1ς21
)
× q(C¯)(q(C¯)C¯C¯T + C¯C¯Tq(C¯)T)q(C¯)T
+
(
γ22ζ
2
1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ22ς22
)
q2(C¯)C¯C¯Tq2(C¯)T
because
q2(C¯)q2(C¯)T = q(C¯)q(C¯)T − q(C¯)(C¯+ C¯T)q(C¯)T + q(C¯)C¯C¯Tq(C¯)T
and
q(C¯)
(
q(C¯) + q(C¯)T
)
q(C¯)T = q(C¯)
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
q(C¯)T − 2q(C¯)q(C¯)T
and
q2(C¯)
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
q2(C¯)T = q(C¯)
(
q(C¯)C¯C¯T + C¯C¯Tq(C¯)T
)
q(C¯)T
− q(C¯)(q(C¯)(C¯+ C¯T)+ (C¯+ C¯T)q(C¯)T)q(C¯)T
− q(C¯)(C¯+ C¯T)q(C¯)T + 2q(C¯)C¯C¯Tq(C¯)T.
We have
(1+ γ2)2ς21 − (1+ γ1)2ς22 = 0 (D.254)(
(1− γ22)ζ1 − γ2(1+ γ2)
)
ς21 −
(
(1− γ21)ζ2 − γ1(1+ γ1)
)
ς22 = 0 (D.255)(
γ22(1+ 2ζ1) + ζ
2
1
)
ς21 −
(
γ21(1+ 2ζ2) + ζ
2
2
)
ς22 = 0 (D.256)
γ1(1+ γ1)ζ2ς22 − γ2(1+ γ2)ζ1ς21 = 0 (D.257)
γ1(ζ2 − γ1)ζ2ς22 − γ2(ζ1 − γ2)ζ1ς21 = 0 (D.258)
γ22ζ
2
1ς
2
1 − γ21ζ22ς22 = 0 (D.259)
because the sixmatrices of Proposition 1.118 are linearly independent. The system of
equations (D.254) to (D.259) has a unique solution because γ1ζ1 ≥ 0 and γ2ζ2 ≥ 0.
To show this, I consider two cases:
(1) Suppose γζ = 0, so that γ1ζ1 = γ2ζ2 = 0. I consider two cases:
(1.1) Suppose γ1 = 0. Equation (D.259) gives γ2ζ1 = 0 because ς1 > 0. We
must have γ2 = 0. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, γ2 ̸= 0, from
which ζ1 = ζ2 = 0 follows because γ2ζ1 = γ2ζ2 = 0. Equation (D.256)
gives γ22ς21 = 0. It follows that ς1 = 0, which contradicts ς1 > 0. This
concludes the proof that γ2 = 0. Equations (D.254) and γ1 = γ2 = 0
give ς21 = ς22, which is equivalent to ς1 = ς2 because ς1 > 0 and ς2 > 0.
This equality, γ1 = γ2 = 0, and equation (D.255) give (ζ1 − ζ2)ς21 = 0,
from which ζ1 = ζ2 follows because ς1 > 0.
(1.2) Suppose γ1 ̸= 0, from which ζ1 = 0 follows because γ1ζ1 = 0. Equa-
tion (D.259) gives γ1ζ2 = 0 because ς2 > 0. It follows that ζ2 = 0.
Adding equations (D.254) and (D.255) gives
(1+ γ2)ς21 − (1+ γ1)ς22 = 0. (D.260)
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Adding equations (D.255), (D.256), and (D.260) gives ς21 = ς22, which
is equivalent to ς1 = ς2 because ς1 > 0 and ς2 > 0. This equality and
equation (D.260) give (γ1 − γ2)ς21 = 0, from which γ1 = γ2 follows
because ς1 > 0.
(2) Suppose γζ > 0, so that γ1ζ1 > 0 and γ2ζ2 > 0. I consider two cases:
(2.1) Suppose ζ1 = −1. Adding equations (D.257) and (D.258) gives
γ1(1+ ζ2)ζ2ς22 = γ2(1+ ζ1)ζ1ς
2
1, (D.261)
from which ζ2 = −1 follows because γ1 ̸= 0, ζ2 ̸= 0, and ς2 > 0.
Adding equations (D.256) and (D.259) gives ς21 = ς21, which is equivalent
to ς1 = ς2 because ς1 > 0 and ς2 > 0. Adding equations (D.258)
and (D.259) gives (γ1 − γ2)ς21 = 0, from which γ1 = γ2 follows because
ς1 > 0.
(2.2) Suppose ζ1 ̸= −1. It follows from equation (D.261) that ζ2 ̸= −1 be-
cause γ2 ̸= 0, ζ1 ̸= 0, and ς1 > 0. Adding equation (D.254), twice
equation (D.255), and equation (D.256) gives
(1+ ζ1)2ς21 = (1+ ζ2)
2ς22. (D.262)
Multiplying both sides of equation (D.261) by 1+ ζ2, then substituting
(1+ ζ1)2ς21 for (1+ ζ2)2ς22 (see equation (D.262)), and then dividing
both sides by ς21(1+ ζ1) gives
γ1(1+ ζ1)ζ2 = γ2ζ1(1+ ζ2). (D.263)
Using equations (D.257) and (D.263), equation (D.255) implies that
(1+ γ1)γ2ζ1 = γ1(1+ γ2)ζ2. (D.264)
Note that ζ1 + γ1(1 + ζ1) ̸= 0, which is a consequence of γ1ζ1 > 0.
Indeed, if ζ1 + γ1(1+ ζ1) = 0, then γ1ζ1 = −γ21/(1+ γ1) ≤ 0 because
1 + γ1 > 0 (Assumption P-γ), which contradicts γ1ζ1 > 0. Using
equations (D.257), (D.261), and (D.264), equation (D.255) implies that(
γ1 − γ2
)
(1+ γ1)
γ2
γ1
(
ζ1 + γ1(1+ ζ1)
)
= 0,
which in turn implies that γ1 = γ2 because γ1 ̸= 0, γ2 ̸= 0, 1+ γ1 > 0,
and ζ1 + γ1(1+ ζ1) ̸= 0. Equation (D.254) and γ1 = γ2 give ς21 = ς21,
which is equivalent to ς1 = ς2 because ς1 > 0 and ς2 > 0. Equa-
tion (D.257), γ1 = γ2, and ς1 = ς2 give (ζ1 − ζ2)γ1(1 + γ1)ς21 = 0,
which implies that ζ1 = ζ2 because γ1 ̸= 0, 1+ γ1 > 0, and ς1 > 0.
To sum up, I have established that (γ1, ζ1, ς1) = (γ2, ζ2, ς2). Finally, note that the
system of equations (D.254) to (D.259) has infinitely many solutions without the
restrictions γ1ζ1 ≥ 0 and γ2ζ2 ≥ 0, for example, for all (c, s) ∈ γ(Θ)×R++,(
γ1,γ2, ζ1, ζ2, ς1, ς2
)
=
(
0, c, 0,− c
1+ c
, s, (1+ c)s
)
is a solution. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.119
In what follows, I write C¯ for C¯(H). I prove by contraposition that the six matrices
of Proposition 1.105 are linearly independent if the six matrices of Proposition 1.118
are linearly independent. Suppose the six matrices of Proposition 1.105 are linearly
dependent, that is, there exists a 6-tuple (c1, . . . , c6) ̸= 06 such that
c1In + c2
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+ c3C¯C¯T + c4
(
C¯2 + C¯T2
)
+ c5C¯
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
C¯T + c6C¯2C¯T2 = On.
Let
T :=

1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 2 0 0
0 0 1 −2 2 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
 ,
and let (d1, . . . , d6) := T(c1, . . . , c6). Note that (d1, . . . , d6) ̸= 06 because T is non-
singular and (c1, . . . , c6) ̸= 06. We have
On = d1In + d2
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+ d3C¯C¯T + d4
(
q(C¯)
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
+
(
C¯+ C¯T
)
q(C¯)T
)
+ d5
(
q(C¯)C¯C¯T + C¯C¯Tq(C¯)T
)
+ d6q(C¯)C¯C¯Tq(C¯)
T,
which implies that the six matrices of Proposition 1.118 are linearly dependent. 
Proof of Proposition 1.120
The proof is omitted. 

Appendix E
Proofs of Chapter 2 Results
Proof of Proposition 2.1
The proof is omitted because it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.16 (with
f = idR+). 
Proof of Corollary 2.2
Note that
x⋆θ1 =
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯
according to Proposition 2.1, which is equivalent to
x⋆θ1 = diag(β¯+ γ¯)
−1α¯+ diag(β¯+ γ¯)−1 diag(γ¯)A¯(G)x⋆θ1 .
Using the preceding results, we find
x⋆i (θ1) = e
T
i x
⋆
θ1
=
α¯i
β¯i + γ¯i
+
γ¯i
β¯i + γ¯i
eTi A¯(G)
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯,
where {ek}nk=1 denotes the canonical basis of Rn with (column) basis vector ek :=
(δk,1, . . . , δk,n), where δk,l is Kronecker’s delta of k and l. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Note that the unique and interior (Bayesian) NE of Γ is given by (Proposition 2.1)
x⋆θ1 =
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯,
from which it follows that
∀i ∈ I x⋆i (θ1) = eTi
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯.
Recall that, for all i ∈ I , α¯i = α¯C + α¯Ii , β¯i = β¯C + β¯Ii , and γ¯i = γ¯C + γ¯Ii .
Results 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3 are proved with the use of matrix calculus and the
following fact.
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Fact E.1 (E.1.1) For all i ∈ I , [(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1]i,i > 0.
(E.1.2) For all (i, j) ∈ I2 with i ̸= j, [(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1]i,j ≥ 0.
Proof of Fact E.1 Note that(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1
=
(
In − diag(β¯+ γ¯)−1 diag(γ¯)A¯(G)
)−1 diag(β¯+ γ¯)−1
≥c diag(β¯+ γ¯)−1 (E.1)
because diag(β¯+ γ¯)−1 diag(γ¯)A¯(G) ≥c On and ρ(diag(β¯+ γ¯)−1 diag(γ¯)A¯(G)) <
1 imply that (In−diag(β¯+ γ¯)−1 diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1 ≥c In (LemmaB.6). Results E.1.1
and E.1.2 follow from (E.1). 
Let us now prove Results 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3. Let (i, j) ∈ I2.
Proof of Result 2.3.1 We find
∂x⋆i (θ1)
∂α¯Ij
= eTi
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1 ∂α¯
∂α¯Ij
= eTi
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1ej
=
[(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1]i,j.
It follows that ∂x⋆i (θ1)/∂α¯Ij ≥ 0 if i ̸= j (Result E.1.2) and ∂x⋆i (θ1)/∂α¯Ii > 0 (Re-
sult E.1.1). 
Proof of Result 2.3.2 We find
∂x⋆θ1
∂β¯Ij
=
∂
∂β¯Ij
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯
= −(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1
× ∂
∂β¯Ij
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G)) (diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
= x⋆θ1
= −(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1ejeTj x⋆θ1
= −x⋆j (θ1)
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1ej.
It follows that ∂x⋆i (θ1)/∂β¯Ij ≤ 0 if i ̸= j (Result E.1.2) and ∂x⋆i (θ1)/∂β¯Ii < 0 (Re-
sult E.1.1) because x⋆j (θ1) > 0. 
Proof of Result 2.3.3 We find
∂x⋆θ1
∂γ¯Ij
=
∂
∂γ¯Ij
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯
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= −(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1
× ∂
∂γ¯Ij
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G)) (diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
= x⋆θ1
= −(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1(ejeTj − ejeTj A¯(G))x⋆θ1
= −(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1ej eTj (In − A¯(G))x⋆θ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
= x⋆j (θ1)−
n
∑
k=1
a¯j,kx⋆k (θ1)
= −
(
x⋆j (θ1)−
n
∑
k=1
a¯j,kx⋆k (θ1)
)(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1ej.
It follows that ∂x⋆i (θ1)/∂γ¯Ij ≤ 0 (respectively, ∂x⋆i (θ1)/∂γ¯Ij ≥ 0) if i ̸= j and
x⋆j (θ1) ≥ ∑nk=1 a¯j,kx⋆k (θ1) (respectively, x⋆j (θ1) ≤ ∑nk=1 a¯j,kx⋆k (θ1)) because
[(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1]i,j ≥ 0 (Result E.1.2) and ∂x⋆i (θ1)/∂γ¯Ii < 0 (re-
spectively, ∂x⋆i (θ1)/∂γ¯Ii > 0) if x⋆i (θ1) > ∑nk=1 a¯i,kx⋆k (θ1) (respectively, x⋆i (θ1) <
∑nk=1 a¯i,kx
⋆
k (θ1)) because [(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1]i,i > 0 (Result E.1.1). 
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.3, Results 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3 are proved with
the use of matrix calculus. Let (i, j) ∈ I2.
Proof of Result 2.4.1 We find
∂x⋆i (θ1)
∂α¯C
= eTi
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1 ∂α¯
∂α¯C
= eTi
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−11n
≥ eTi diag(β¯+ γ¯)−11n
=
1
β¯i + γ¯i
> 0,
where the first inequality follows from (E.1) and the second from β¯i > 0 and
γ¯i ≥ 0. 
Proof of Result 2.4.2 We find
∂x⋆θ1
∂β¯C
=
∂
∂β¯C
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯
= −(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1
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× ∂
∂β¯C
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))︸ ︷︷ ︸
= In
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
= x⋆θ1
= −(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1x⋆θ1
≤c −diag(β¯+ γ¯)−1x⋆θ1
<c 0n,
where the first inequality follows from (E.1) and the second from β¯ >c 0n, γ¯ ≥c 0n,
and x⋆θ1 >c 0n. It follows that ∂x
⋆
i (θ1)/∂β¯
C < 0. 
Proof of Result 2.4.3 We find
∂x⋆θ1
∂γ¯C
=
∂
∂γ¯C
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯
= −(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1
× ∂
∂γ¯C
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G)) (diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1α¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
= x⋆θ1
= −(diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1(In − A¯(G))x⋆θ1 .
It follows that the sign of ∂x⋆i (θ1)/∂γ¯C depends on β¯, γ¯, and G. 
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Player i’s (pure) strategy, xi : Θ→ R+, is given by the values it assumes on the finite
type space Θ = {θ1, . . . , θT}. For a particular type θr ∈ Θ, that is, for a particular
value (or realization) θr of his signal si, player i chooses action xi(θr) in order to
maximize his conditional expected utility given the event {si = θr},
E
(
ui
(
idΩ, (x1 ◦ s1, . . . , xn ◦ sn)
) ∣∣ si = θr).
A strategy profile (x⋆1 , . . . , x⋆n) is an interior BNE of Γ(α, β,γ) if and only if it satisfies
three conditions: the interiority conditions, that is,
∀(i, r) ∈ I × {1, . . . , T} x⋆i (θr) > 0;
the first-order conditions, that is,
∀(i, r) ∈ I × {1, . . . , T} ∂E
(
ui
(
idΩ, (x⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x⋆n ◦ sn)
) ∣∣ si = θr)
∂x⋆i (θr)
= 0; (E.2)
and the second-order conditions, that is,
∀(i, r) ∈ I × {1, . . . , T} ∂
2E
(
ui
(
idΩ, (x⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x⋆n ◦ sn)
) ∣∣ si = θr)
∂x⋆i (θr)
2 < 0.
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Let (i, r) ∈ I × {1, . . . , T}. We find
E
(
ui
(
idΩ, (x⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x⋆n ◦ sn)
) ∣∣ si = θr)
= E(αi | si = θr)x⋆i (θr)−
1
2
E(βi | si = θr)x⋆i (θr)2
− 1
2
E
(
γix⋆i (θr)
2 − 2γix⋆i (θr)
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j(x⋆j ◦ sj) + γi
( n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j(x⋆j ◦ sj)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣ si = θr
)
= E(αi | si = θr)x⋆i (θr)−
1
2
E(βi | si = θr)x⋆i (θr)2
− 1
2
E(γi | si = θr)x⋆i (θr)2 +
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j E
(
γi(x⋆j ◦ sj)
∣∣ si = θr)x⋆i (θr)
− 1
2
E
(
γi
( n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j(x⋆j ◦ sj)
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣ si = θr
)
,
from which it follows that
∂E
(
ui
(
idΩ, (x⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x⋆n ◦ sn)
) ∣∣ si = θr)
∂x⋆i (θr)
= E(αi | si = θr)−
(
E(βi | si = θr) +E(γi | si = θr)
)
x⋆i (θr)
+
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j E
(
γi(x⋆j ◦ sj)
∣∣ si = θr)
= E(αi | si = θr)−E(βi + γi | si = θr)x⋆i (θr) (E.3)
+
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j E
(
γi(x⋆j ◦ sj)
∣∣ si = θr)
and
∂2E
(
ui
(
idΩ, (x⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x⋆n ◦ sn)
) ∣∣ si = θr)
∂x⋆i (θr)
2 = −E(βi + γi | si = θr) < 0,
where the inequality follows from βi > 0 and γi ≥ 0. Note that, for all (i, r) ∈
I × {1, . . . , T},
E
(
γi(x⋆j ◦ sj)
∣∣ si = θr) = E(1Ω γi(x⋆j ◦ sj) ∣∣ si = θr)
= E
( T
∑
q=1
1{sj=θq} γi(x
⋆
j ◦ sj)
∣∣∣∣ si = θr)
=
T
∑
q=1
E
(
1{sj=θq} γi(x
⋆
j ◦ sj)
∣∣ si = θr)
=
T
∑
q=1
E
(
1{sj=θq} 1{si=θr} γi(x
⋆
j ◦ sj)
)
P(si = θr)
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=
T
∑
q=1
E
(
1{sj=θq}∩{si=θr} γi(x
⋆
j ◦ sj)
)
P(si = θr)
=
T
∑
q=1
P(sj = θq, si = θr)
P(si = θr)
E
(
1{sj=θq}∩{si=θr} γi(x
⋆
j ◦ sj)
)
P(sj = θq, si = θr)
=
T
∑
q=1
P(sj = θq | si = θr)E
(
γi(x⋆j ◦ sj)
∣∣ sj = θq, si = θr)
=
T
∑
q=1
P(sj = θq | si = θr)E(γi | sj = θq, si = θr)x⋆j (θq),
where the first equality follows from
1Ω = 1⋃T
q=1 s
−1
j ({θq}) =
T
∑
q=1
1s−1j ({θq}) =
T
∑
q=1
1{sj=θq} .
Using (E.3) and the preceding result, the first-order conditions (E.2) are equivalent
to
∀(i, r) ∈ I × {1, . . . , T} E(αi | si = θr)−E(βi + γi | si = θr)x⋆i (θr)
+
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j
T
∑
q=1
P(sj = θq | si = θr)E(γi | sj = θq, si = θr)x⋆j (θq) = 0,
which are equivalent to
∀(i, r) ∈ I × {1, . . . , T} x⋆i (θr) =
E(αi | si = θr)
E(βi + γi | si = θr) +
1
E(βi + γi | si = θr)
×
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j
T
∑
q=1
P(sj = θq | si = θr)E(γi | sj = θq, si = θr)x⋆j (θq),
which are equivalent to
∀i ∈ I x⋆Θ,i = diag
(
β
µ
i + γ
µ
i
)−1
α
µ
i + diag
(
β
µ
i + γ
µ
i
)−1 n∑
j=1
a¯i,j(Πi,j ◦ Γi,j)x⋆Θ,j,
which are equivalent to
x⋆Θ = diag
(
βµ + γµ
)−1
αµ + diag
(
βµ + γµ
)−1((A¯(G)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π ◦ Γ)x⋆Θ,
which is equivalent to(
InT − diag
(
βµ + γµ
)−1((A¯(G)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π ◦ Γ))x⋆Θ = diag(βµ + γµ)−1αµ.
(E.4)
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In the remainder of the proof, we show that the system of equations (E.4) has a
unique solution. We proceed in two steps.
First, we establish that the matrix
InT − diag
(
βµ + γµ
)−1((A¯(G)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π ◦ Γ) (E.5)
is nonsingular. Let the square matrix N of order nT be defined by
N := diag
(
βµ + γµ
)−1((A¯(G)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π ◦ Γ).
We show that ρ(N) < 1. To this end, note that ρ(N) ≤ ‖N‖∞ (Lemma B.7). The
matrix N can be regarded as a block matrix with n2 square blocks of orders T, where
the block in block row i ∈ I and block column j ∈ I is equal to
a¯i,j diag
(
β
µ
i + γ
µ
i
)−1
(Πi,j ◦ Γi,j),
from which it follows that ‖N‖∞ is equal to
max
{ n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j
T
∑
q=1
[
diag
(
β
µ
i + γ
µ
i
)−1(
Πi,j ◦ Γi,j
)]
r,q
∣∣∣∣ (i, r) ∈ I × {1, . . . , T}}.
We find, for all (i, r) ∈ I × {1, . . . , T},
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j
T
∑
q=1
[
diag
(
β
µ
i + γ
µ
i
)−1(
Πi,j ◦ Γi,j
)]
r,q
=
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j
T
∑
q=1
[
diag
(
β
µ
i + γ
µ
i
)−1]
r,r
[
Πi,j ◦ Γi,j
]
r,q
=
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j
T
∑
q=1
1
E(βi + γi | si = θr)P(sj = θq | si = θr)E(γi | sj = θq, si = θr)
=
1
E(βi + γi | si = θr)
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j
T
∑
q=1
P(sj = θq | si = θr)E(γi | sj = θq, si = θr)
=
1
E(βi + γi | si = θr)
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j E(γi | si = θr)
=
E(γi | si = θr)
E(βi | si = θr) +E(γi | si = θr)
< 1,
where the second to last equality follows from
T
∑
q=1
P(sj = θq | si = θr)E(γi | sj = θq, si = θr)
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=
T
∑
q=1
P(sj = θq, si = θr)
P(si = θr)
E
(
1{sj=θq}∩{si=θr} γi
)
P(sj = θq, si = θr)
=
T
∑
q=1
E
(
1{sj=θq} 1{si=θr} γi
)
P(si = θr)
=
T
∑
q=1
E
(
1{sj=θq} γi
∣∣ si = θr)
= E
(( T
∑
q=1
1{sj=θq}
)
γi
∣∣∣∣ si = θr)
= E
(
1⋃T
q=1{sj=θq} γi
∣∣∣ si = θr)
= E(1Ω γi | si = θr)
= E(γi | si = θr)
and the inequality from βi > 0 and γi ≥ 0. This concludes the proof of ρ(N) < 1.
It follows that matrix (E.5) is nonsingular (Lemma B.3) and the system of equa-
tions (E.4) has a unique solution,
x⋆Θ =
(
InT − diag
(
βµ + γµ
)−1((A¯(G)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π ◦ Γ))−1 diag(βµ + γµ)−1αµ
(E.6)
=
(
diag
(
βµ + γµ
)− (A¯(G)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π ◦ Γ)−1αµ. (E.7)
Second, we establish that x⋆Θ >c 0nT . Note that matrix (E.5) is a nonsingular
M-matrix whose inverse is bounded below by InT because the matrix N is nonnega-
tive with ρ(N) < 1 (Lemma B.6). Note also that
diag
(
βµ + γµ
)−1
αµ >c 0nT .
The foregoing two results together with (E.6) imply that x⋆Θ >c 0nT (Lemma B.1).
This concludes the proof that the strategy profile (x⋆1 , . . . , x⋆n) given by (E.7) is
the unique interior BNE of Γ(α, β,γ).
Finally, note that Γ(α, β,γ) has no boundary BNEs. In order to prove this,
suppose, for the sake of contradiction, the strategy profile (x˜⋆1 , . . . , x˜⋆n) is a boundary
BNE of Γ(α, β,γ). There exists a pair (k, s) ∈ I × {1, . . . , T} such that x˜⋆k (θs) = 0
and
∂E
(
uk
(
idΩ, (x˜⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x˜⋆n ◦ sn)
) ∣∣ sk = θs)
∂x˜⋆k (θs)
≤ 0. (E.8)
Using (E.3), we find
∂E
(
uk
(
idΩ, (x˜⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x˜⋆n ◦ sn)
) ∣∣ sk = θs)
∂x˜⋆k (θs)
= E(αk | sk = θs)
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+
n
∑
j=1
a¯k,j E
(
γk(x˜⋆j ◦ sj)
∣∣ sk = θs) > 0
because αk > 0 and γk ≥ 0, which contradicts (E.8). Consequently, the strategy
profile (x˜⋆1 , . . . , x˜⋆n) cannot be a boundary BNE of Γ(α, β,γ). 
Proof of Proposition 2.6
The statement follows from the first-order conditions for the unique and interior
BNE strategy profile (x⋆1 , . . . , x⋆n) of Γ(α, β,γ). The first-order conditions (E.2) are
equivalent to (see (E.3))
∀(i, r) ∈ I × {1, . . . , T} E((βi + γi)(x⋆i ◦ si) ∣∣ si = θr)
= E(αi | si = θr) +
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j E
(
γi(x⋆j ◦ sj)
∣∣ si = θr). (E.9)
It follows that
∀i ∈ I
T
∑
r=1
P(si = θr)E
(
(βi + γi)(x⋆i ◦ si)
∣∣ si = θr)
=
T
∑
r=1
P(si = θr)E(αi | si = θr) +
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j
T
∑
r=1
P(si = θr)E
(
γi(x⋆j ◦ sj)
∣∣ si = θr),
which are equivalent to
∀i ∈ I E((βi + γi)(x⋆i ◦ si)) = E(αi) +E(γi n∑
j=1
a¯i,j(x⋆j ◦ sj)
)
, (E.10)
which in turn are equivalent to
E
diag(β+ γ)
x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

 = E(α) +E
diag(γ)A¯(G)
x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

. 
Proof of Proposition 2.7
We find
w⋆
(
Γ(α, β,γ)
)
=
n
∑
i=1
E
(
ui
(
idΩ, (x⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x⋆n ◦ sn)
))
=
n
∑
i=1
E
(
αi(x⋆i ◦ si)−
βi
2
(x⋆i ◦ si)2 −
γi
2
(
x⋆i ◦ si −
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j(x⋆j ◦ sj)
)2)
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=
n
∑
i=1
E
(
αi(x⋆i ◦ si)
)− 1
2
n
∑
i=1
E
(
(βi + γi)(x⋆i ◦ si)2
)
+
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j E
(
γi(x⋆i ◦ si)(x⋆j ◦ sj)
)
− 1
2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
k=1
a¯i,j a¯i,k E
(
γi(x⋆j ◦ sj)(x⋆k ◦ sk)
)
=
1
2
n
∑
i=1
E
(
(βi + γi)(x⋆i ◦ si)2
)− 1
2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
n
∑
k=1
a¯i,j a¯i,k E
(
γi(x⋆j ◦ sj)(x⋆k ◦ sk)
)
,
where the last equality follows from
∀i ∈ I E((βi + γi)(x⋆i ◦ si)2) = E(αi(x⋆i ◦ si))+ n∑
j=1
a¯i,j E
(
γi(x⋆i ◦ si)(x⋆j ◦ sj)
)
.
(E.11)
In order to prove (E.11), note that the first-order conditions (E.2) for the unique
and interior BNE strategy profile (x⋆1 , . . . , x⋆n) of Γ(α, β,γ) are equivalent to (E.9),
which imply that
∀i ∈ I
T
∑
r=1
P(si = θr)E
(
(βi + γi)(x⋆i ◦ si)2
∣∣ si = θr)
=
T
∑
r=1
P(si = θr)E
(
αi(x⋆i ◦ si)
∣∣ si = θr)
+
n
∑
j=1
a¯i,j
T
∑
r=1
P(si = θr)E
(
γi(x⋆i ◦ si)(x⋆j ◦ sj)
∣∣ si = θr). (E.12)
Finally, note that (E.11) and (E.12) are equivalent. 
Proof of Corollary 2.8
Let the (column) vectors β¯ and γ¯ be defined as in Section 2.3. We find
βµ = β¯⊗ 1T and γµ = γ¯⊗ 1T . (E.13)
Note that, for all (i, j) ∈ I2, Γi,j = γ¯i1T1TT . We find
Γ =

γ¯11T1TT . . . γ¯11T1
T
T . . . γ¯11T1
T
T... ... ...
γ¯i1T1TT . . . γ¯i1T1
T
T . . . γ¯i1T1
T
T... ... ...
γ¯n1T1TT . . . γ¯n1T1
T
T . . . γ¯n1T1
T
T

=
(
diag(γ¯)⊗ IT
)(
1n1Tn ⊗ 1T1TT
)
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=
(
diag(γ¯)1n1Tn
)⊗ 1T1TT ,
which implies that(
A¯(G)⊗ 1T1TT
) ◦Π ◦ Γ = Γ ◦ (A¯(G)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π
=
((
diag(γ¯)1n1Tn
)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦ (A¯(G)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π
=
((
diag(γ¯)A¯(G)
)⊗ 1T1TT) ◦Π. (E.14)
Using results (E.13) and (E.14), the statement of the corollary follows from Propos-
ition 2.5. 
Proof of Corollary 2.9
The statement follows from Corollary 2.8. 
Proof of Corollary 2.10
Suppose, for all i ∈ I , there exist β¯i ∈ R++ and γ¯i ∈ R+ such that βi(Ω) = {β¯i}
and γi(Ω) = {γ¯i}. Let the (column) vectors β¯ and γ¯ be defined as in Section 2.3.
Using Proposition 2.6, we find
E
diag(β+ γ)
x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

 = E(α) +E
diag(γ)A¯(G)
x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn


⇔ E
diag(β¯+ γ¯)
x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

 = E(α) +E
diag(γ¯)A¯(G)
x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn


⇔ diag(β¯+ γ¯)E

x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

 = E(α) + diag(γ¯)A¯(G)E

x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn


⇔ E(α) = (diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))E

x
⋆
1 ◦ s1...
x⋆n ◦ sn

. (E.15)
Note that diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G) is nonsingular. Indeed,
diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G) = diag(β¯+ γ¯)(In − diag(β¯+ γ¯)−1 diag(γ¯)A¯(G))
and
ρ
(
diag(β¯+ γ¯)−1 diag(γ¯)A¯(G)
) ≤ ∥∥diag(β¯+ γ¯)−1 diag(γ¯)∥∥∞︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 1
‖A¯(G)‖∞︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1
< 1,
from which the claim follows (Lemma B.3). We conclude that (E.15) is equivalent
to E((x⋆1 ◦ s1, . . . , x⋆n ◦ sn)) = (diag(β¯+ γ¯)− diag(γ¯)A¯(G))−1E(α). 
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Proof of Lemma 2.11
Suppose Assumption S-I is satisfied. Let i ∈ I . Note that, for all j ∈ N+G (i),
E(x⋆j ◦ sj | si) = E(x⋆j ◦ sj). Using this result and the first-order conditions for the
unique and interior BNE in pure strategies (x⋆1 , . . . , x⋆n) of Γ(α), we find
x⋆i ◦ si =
1
β¯i + γ¯i
(
E(αi | si) + γ¯i ∑
j∈I
a¯i,j E(x⋆j ◦ sj)
)
,
from which
x⋆i ◦ si −E(x⋆i ◦ si) =
E(αi | si)−E(αi)
β¯i + γ¯i
follows. We conclude that
var(x⋆i ◦ si) =
var
(
E(αi | si)
)
(β¯i + γ¯i)2
. 
Proof of Corollary 2.12
The statement follows from Proposition 2.7 and Lemma 2.11. 
Proof of Corollary 2.13
Suppose, for all i ∈ I , there exist α¯i ∈ R++ and γ¯i ∈ R+ such that αi(Ω) = {α¯i}
and γi(Ω) = {γ¯i}. Let the (column) vectors α¯ and γ¯ be defined as in Section 2.3.
We find
αµ = α¯⊗ 1T and γµ = γ¯⊗ 1T . (E.16)
Using results (E.14) and (E.16), the statement of the corollary follows from Propos-
ition 2.5. 
Proof of Corollary 2.14
The statement follows from Corollary 2.13. 
Proof of Corollary 2.15
The statement follows from Proposition 2.7. 
Proof of Corollary 2.16
The statement follows from Proposition 2.6. 
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Proof of Corollary 2.17
Suppose, for all i ∈ I , there exist α¯i ∈ R++ and β¯i ∈ R++ such that αi(Ω) = {α¯i}
and βi(Ω) = {β¯i}. Let the (column) vectors α¯ and β¯ be defined as in Section 2.3.
We find
αµ = α¯⊗ 1T and βµ = β¯⊗ 1T . (E.17)
Using results (E.17), the statement of the corollary follows from Proposition 2.5.
Proof of Corollary 2.18
The statement follows from Proposition 2.6. 
Proof of Corollary 2.19
The statement follows from Proposition 2.7. 

Appendix F
Proofs of Chapter 3 Results
Proof of Proposition 3.8
The statement follows from Lemma B.3. 
Proof of Lemma 3.9
Note that bounded linear operators of finite rank on a Banach space are compact and
compact linear operators on a Banach space are completely continuous. It follows
that square matrices represent completely continuous operators (with respect to
any norm). The statement then follows from Suzuki (1976). 
Proof of Proposition 3.10
Suppose Condition 3.8.1 is satisfied. Let k : V(D) → I(|V(D)|) be a bijection.
There exists a unique permutation pi of I(|V(D)|) such that h = pi ◦ k. Let Ppi :=
(epi(1), . . . , epi(|V(D)|))T, that is, Ppi is the permutation matrix of pi. First, note that
αk(D) = Ppiαh(D) and λk(D) = Ppiλh(D). Indeed, we find, for all i ∈ I(|V(D)|),
[αk(D)]i = (α(D) ◦ k−1)(i) = (α(D) ◦ h−1)(pi(i)) = [αh(D)]pi(i) = [Ppiαh(D)]i
because k−1 = h−1 ◦ pi. Second, note that A˙k(D) = Ppi A˙h(D)P−1pi . Indeed, we find,
for all (i, j) ∈ I(|V(D)|)2, [A˙k(D)]i,j = 1 if and only if (k−1(i), k−1(j)) ∈ A(D) if
and only if [A˙h(D)]pi(i),pi(j) = 1 if and only if [Ppi A˙h(D)P−1pi ]i,j = 1. Third, note that
σ(diag(λh(D))A˙h(D)) = σ(diag(λk(D))A˙k(D)) because diag(λh(D))A˙h(D) and
diag(λk(D))A˙k(D) are similar. Using the preceding results, we find
bk
(
αk(D),λk(D),D
)
=
(
I|V(D)| − diag
(
λk(D)
)
A˙k(D)
)−1
αk(D)
=
(
I|V(D)| − Ppi diag
(
λh(D)
)
P−1pi Ppi A˙h(D)P−1pi
)−1Ppiαh(D)
= Ppi
(
I|V(D)| − diag
(
λh(D)
)
A˙h(D)
)−1P−1pi Ppiαh(D)
= Ppibh
(
αh(D),λh(D),D
)
. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.11
Suppose Condition 3.8.1 is satisfied. Let E be a nonempty digraph of order |V(D)|
that is isomorphic toD bymeans of the digraph isomorphism f : V(D)→ V(E). Let
k : V(E)→ I(|V(D)|) be a bijection. Note that α(D) = α(E) ◦ f and λ(D) = λ(E) ◦
f . There exists a unique permutation pi of I(|V(D)|) such that h = pi ◦ k ◦ f . See Fig-
ure 3.1 for an illustration. Let Ppi denote the permutationmatrix of pi. First, note that
αk(E) = Ppiαh(D) and λk(E) = Ppiλh(D). Indeed, we find, for all i ∈ I(|V(D)|),
[αk(E)]i = (α(E) ◦ k−1)(i) = (α(D) ◦ f−1 ◦ f ◦ h−1 ◦ pi)(i) = (α(D) ◦ h−1)(pi(i)) =
[αh(D)]pi(i) = [Ppiαh(D)]i because k−1 = f ◦ h−1 ◦ pi. Second, note that A˙k(E) =
Ppi A˙h(D)P−1pi . Indeed, we find, for all (i, j) ∈ I(|V(D)|)2, [A˙k(E)]i,j = 1 if and only
if (k−1(i), k−1(j)) ∈ A(E) if and only if ( f−1(k−1(i)), f−1(k−1(j))) ∈ A(D) if and
only if [A˙h(D)]pi(i),pi(j) = 1 if and only if [Ppi A˙h(D)P−1pi ]i,j = 1. Third, note that
σ(diag(λh(D))A˙h(D)) = σ(diag(λk(E))A˙k(E)) because diag(λh(D))A˙h(D) and
diag(λk(E))A˙k(E) are similar. Using the preceding results, we find
bk
(
αk(E),λk(E), E
)
=
(
I|V(D)| − diag
(
λk(E)
)
A˙k(E)
)−1
αk(E)
=
(
I|V(D)| − Ppi diag
(
λh(D)
)
P−1pi Ppi A˙h(D)P−1pi
)−1Ppiαh(D)
= Ppi
(
I|V(D)| − diag
(
λh(D)
)
A˙h(D)
)−1
αh(D)
= Ppibh
(
αh(D),λh(D),D
)
. 
Proof of Proposition 3.12
Suppose ConditionC-ρ is satisfied. It follows that both In−diag(λ+)A˙(D) and In−
diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1 are nonsingular (Lemma B.2). It follows
also that In + diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1 is nonsingular (Lemmata
B.2 and B.9). The identity λ = λ+ − λ− implies that In − diag(λ)A˙(D) = In −
diag(λ+)A˙(D) + diag(λ−)A˙(D), which in turn implies that
In − diag(λ)A˙(D) =
(
In + diag(λ−)A˙(D)
(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1)
× (In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)). (F.1)
Note that In − diag(λ)A˙(D) is nonsingular because both factors on the right-hand
side of (F.1) are nonsingular. We have
In −
(
diag(λ−)A˙(D)
(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1)2
=
(
In − diag(λ−)A˙(D)
(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1)
×
(
In + diag(λ−)A˙(D)
(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1). (F.2)
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Note that In − (diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1)2 is nonsingular because
both factors on the right-hand side of (F.2) are nonsingular. Combining results
(F.1) and (F.2) shows that the inverse of In − diag(λ)A˙(D) is given by(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1(
In −
(
diag(λ−)A˙(D)
(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1)2)−1
×
(
In − diag(λ−)A˙(D)
(
In − diag(λ+)A˙(D)
)−1).
Note that, for all A ∈ M(n,R), ρ(A2) = ρ(A)2, which is a consequence of the
spectral mapping theorem (see, for example, Kubrusly 2011, Theorem 6.19 and Corol-
lary 6.20). It follows that ρ((diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1)2) < 1 (Con-
dition C-ρ), which implies that In − (diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1)2 is a
nonsingular M-matrix because In − diag(λ+)A˙(D) is a nonsingular M-matrix with
nonnegative inverse. Finally, note that In − diag(λ−)A˙(D)(In − diag(λ+)A˙(D))−1
is a nonsingular M-matrix. 
Proof of Corollary 3.13
Results 3.13.1 and 3.13.2 follow from Proposition 3.12. 
Proof of Proposition 3.14
Results 3.14.1 and 3.14.2 follow from Propositions 3.8 and 3.12 and Lemmata B.1
and B.6. 
Proof of Corollary 3.15
Results 3.15.1 to 3.15.4 follow from Proposition 3.14. As regards Results 3.15.1 and
3.15.2, note that if λ ≥c 0n, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, and α ≥c 0n, then b(α,λ,D) ≥c α
because (In − diag(λ)A˙(D))−1 ≥c In (Lemma B.6). 
Proof of Lemma 3.16
Let a ∈ Rn+, and let A ∈ M(n,R) be nonnegative. Assume that Aa <c a. It follows
that a ̸= 0n. Note that ρ(A) = ρ(AT) because A and AT are similar and, therefore,
have the same spectrum. Note also that ρ(AT) is an eigenvalue of AT to which
there corresponds a nonnegative (and nonzero) eigenvector v (Lemma B.5). The
foregoing two facts imply that ATv = ρ(A)v. Let z := a− Aa, where z >c 0n by
assumption. We find
zTv = aTv− aTATv = aTv− ρ(A)aTv = (1− ρ(A))aTv (F.3)
with zTv > 0 because z >c 0n, v ≥c 0n, and v ̸= 0n. It follows from a ≥c 0n,
v ≥c 0n, zTv > 0, and (F.3) that aTv > 0. We conclude that ρ(A) < 1 because
(1− ρ(A))aTv > 0 and aTv > 0. 
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Proof of Corollary 3.17
The statement follows from Lemma 3.16. 
Proof of Corollary 3.18
The statement follows from Lemma 3.16. 
Proof of Lemma 3.19
Suppose λ ≥c 0n and ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1. Let (i, j) ∈ I(n)2 with i ̸= j. Note that
[(In − diag(λ)A˙(D))−1]i,j = eTi (In − diag(λ)A˙(D))−1ej = bi(ej,λ,D).
Proof of Result 3.19.1 We have (In − diag(λ)A˙(D))−1 ≥c In (Lemma B.6), from
which it follows that bi(ei,λ,D) ≥ 1 and bi(ej,λ,D) ≥ 0. 
Proof of Result 3.19.2 Suppose there exists a walk (i0, . . . , ip) in D of length p ∈
Z++ from i to j such that (λi0 , . . . ,λip−1) >c 0p.
The proof of bi(ej,λ,D) > 0 is based on the following auxiliary result.
Fact F.1 For all q ∈ Z++, [(diag(λ)A˙(D))q]i,j > 0 if and only if there exists a walk
(i0, . . . , iq) in D of length q from i to j such that (λi0 , . . . ,λiq−1) >c 0q.
Proof of Fact F.1 The proof is by induction on q. Note that, for all q ∈ Z++,
[A˙(D)q]i,j > 0 if and only if there exists a walk in D of length q from i to j (see, for
example, Festinger 1949, pp. 154–55).
First, the base case:
(⇒) Assume that [diag(λ)A˙(D)]i,j > 0. We find λi > 0 and a˙i,j(D) > 0 because
[diag(λ)A˙(D)]i,j = λi a˙i,j(D), and (i, j) is a walk in D from i to j with the
required property.
(⇐) Assume that (i, j) is a walk in D and λi > 0. It follows that a˙i,j(D) > 0 and
[diag(λ)A˙(D)]i,j = λi a˙i,j(D) > 0.
Second, the inductive step: Let q ∈ Z++. Assume that the following statement is
true:
The inequality [(diag(λ)A˙(D))q]i,j > 0 is true if and only if there
exists a walk (i0, . . . , iq) in D of length q from i to j such that
(λi0 , . . . ,λiq−1) >c 0q.
(∗∗)
We need to show that statement (∗∗) is true for q+ 1.
(⇒) Assume that [(diag(λ)A˙(D))q+1]i,j > 0. We have
[(
diag(λ)A˙(D)
)q+1]
i,j =
n
∑
k=1
[(
diag(λ)A˙(D)
)q]
i,k
[
diag(λ)A˙(D)
]
k,j
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=
n
∑
k=1
λk a˙k,j(D)
[(
diag(λ)A˙(D)
)q]
i,k.
It follows from λ ≥c 0n (which together with A˙(D) ≥c On implies that
diag(λ)A˙(D) ≥c On) and [(diag(λ)A˙(D))q+1]i,j > 0 that there exists a k¯ ∈
I(n) such that λk¯ > 0, a˙k¯,j(D) > 0, and [(diag(λ)A˙(D))q]i,k¯ > 0. The third
inequality and statement (∗∗) imply that there exists a walk (i0, . . . , iq) in D
of length q from i to k¯ such that (λi0 , . . . ,λiq−1) >c 0q. It follows from λk¯ > 0
and a˙k¯,j(D) > 0 that (i0, . . . , iq, j) is a walk in D with the required property.
(⇐) Assume that there exists a walk (i0, . . . , iq, iq+1) in D of length q+ 1 from i
to j such that (λi0 , . . . ,λiq) >c 0q+1. Note that (i0, . . . , iq) is a walk in D of
length q from i to iq with (λi0 , . . . ,λiq−1) >c 0q. It follows from statement (∗∗)
that [(diag(λ)A˙(D))q]i,iq > 0. Note also that a˙iq ,j(D) > 0 because (iq, j) is an
arc in the walk (i0, . . . , iq, iq+1). We find[(
diag(λ)A˙(D)
)q+1]
i,j =
n
∑
k=1
λk a˙k,j(D)
[(
diag(λ)A˙(D)
)q]
i,k
≥ λiq a˙iq ,j(D)
[(
diag(λ)A˙(D)
)q]
i,iq
> 0,
where the first inequality follows from λ ≥c 0n and A˙(D) ≥c On and the
second from λiq > 0, a˙iq ,j(D) > 0, and [(diag(λ)A˙(D))q]i,iq > 0. 
We find
bi(ej,λ,D) =
[(
In − diag(λ)A˙(D)
)−1]
i,j
=
∞
∑
k=0
[(
diag(λ)A˙(D)
)k]
i,j
≥ [(diag(λ)A˙(D))p]i,j
> 0,
where the second equality follows fromLemma B.2, the first inequality from λ ≥c 0n
and A˙(D) ≥c On, and the second inequality from Fact F.1 and the assumption that
(i0, . . . , ip) is a walk in D of length p from i to j such that (λi0 , . . . ,λip−1) >c 0p. 
Proof of Result 3.19.3 Suppose λ ≥c 0n, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, and there does not
exist a walk in D from i to j. If λ ̸= 0n, then
bi(ej,λ,D) =
∞
∑
k=0
[(
diag(λ)A˙(D)
)k]
i,j = 0,
where the first equality follows from Lemma B.2 and the second from Fact F.1. If
λ = 0n, then bi(ej,λ,D) = δi,j = 0. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.22
Suppose Condition I-α-λ is satisfied and 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D)). Let (i, j) ∈ I(n)2.
We find
∂b(α,λ,D)
∂α
=
∂
(
In − diag(λ)A˙(D)
)−1
α
∂α
=
(
In − diag(λ)A˙(D)
)−1,
which implies that
∂ bi(α,λ,D)
∂αj
= eTi
(
In − diag(λ)A˙(D)
)−1ej = bi(ej,λ,D).
Results 3.22.1 and 3.22.2 follow from Lemma 3.19. 
Proof of Proposition 3.23
Suppose Condition I-α-λ is satisfied and 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D)). Let (i, j) ∈ I(n)2.
We find
∂ bi(α,λ,D)
∂λj
=
∂eTi b(α,λ,D)
∂λj
= −eTi
(
In − diag(λ)A˙(D)
)−1 ∂(In − diag(λ)A˙(D))
∂λj
× (In − diag(λ)A˙(D))−1α
= eTi
(
In − diag(λ)A˙(D)
)−1ejeTj A˙(D)b(α,λ,D)
= bi(ej,λ,D) ∑
k∈N+D (j)
bk(α,λ,D).
Results 3.23.1 and 3.23.2 follow from Result 3.15.1, in particular, b(α,λ,D) ≥c α if
α ≥c 0n and λ ∈ Rn+ is such that ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, and Lemma 3.19. 
Proof of Proposition 3.24
Assume that 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ(D))A˙(D)) ∪ σ(diag(λ(E))A˙(E)). According to Defin-
ition C and Proposition 3.8,
b
(
α(D),λ(D),D
)
= α(D) + diag
(
λ(D)
)
A˙(D)b
(
α(D),λ(D),D
)
and
b
(
α(E),λ(E), E
)
= α(E) + diag
(
λ(E)
)
A˙(E)b
(
α(E),λ(E), E
)
.
We find
b
(
α(E),λ(E), E
)− b(α(D),λ(D),D)
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= α(E)− α(D)
+ diag
(
λ(E)
)
A˙(E)b
(
α(E),λ(E), E
)− diag(λ(D))A˙(D)b(α(D),λ(D),D)
= α(E)− α(D)
+ diag
(
λ(E)
)
A˙(E)b
(
α(E),λ(E), E
)− diag(λ(D))A˙(D)b(α(E),λ(E), E)
+ diag
(
λ(D)
)
A˙(D)b
(
α(E),λ(E), E
)− diag(λ(D))A˙(D)b(α(D),λ(D),D)
= α(E)− α(D) + (diag(λ(E))A˙(E)− diag(λ(D))A˙(D))b(α(E),λ(E), E)
+ diag
(
λ(D)
)
A˙(D)
(
b
(
α(E),λ(E), E
)− b(α(D),λ(D),D)),
which implies that(
In − diag
(
λ(D)
)
A˙(D)
)(
b
(
α(E),λ(E), E
)− b(α(D),λ(D),D)) = α(E)−α(D)
+
(
diag
(
λ(E)
)
A˙(E)− diag(λ(D))A˙(D))b(α(E),λ(E), E),
which in turn implies that
b
(
α(E),λ(E), E
)− b(α(D),λ(D),D)
=
(
In − diag
(
λ(D)
)
A˙(D)
)−1(
α(E)− α(D))
+
(
In − diag
(
λ(D)
)
A˙(D)
)−1(diag(λ(E))A˙(E)− diag(λ(D))A˙(D))
× b(α(E),λ(E), E)
= b
(
α(E)− α(D),λ(D),D)
+ b
((
diag
(
λ(E)
)
A˙(E)− diag(λ(D))A˙(D))b(λ(E), α(E), E),λ(D),D).
This concludes the proof of (3.7).
Fact F.2 If E is a superdigraph of D and λ(E) ≥c λ(D) ≥c 0n, then
ρ
(
diag
(
λ(E)
)
A˙(E)
) ≥ ρ(diag(λ(D))A˙(D)).
Proof of Fact F.2 Suppose E is a superdigraph of D and λ(E) ≥c λ(D) ≥c 0n.
We have diag(λ(E))A˙(E) ≥c diag(λ(D))A˙(D) ≥c On, from which it follows that
ρ(diag(λ(E))A˙(E)) ≥ ρ(diag(λ(D))A˙(D)) (see, for example, Varga 2000, The-
orem 2.21). 
Results 3.24.1 and 3.24.2 follow from (3.7), Fact F.2, and Corollary 3.15. 
Proof of Proposition 3.25
Suppose Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied and 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D  x)) ∪
σ(diag(λ)A˙(D)). Let A := diag(λ)A˙(D) and Ax := diag(λ)A˙(D  x). Let the
function x̂ : I(n) \ {x} → I(n) be defined by
x̂(i) :=
{
x− 1 if i < x,
x if i > x.
The proof of (3.8) rests upon four auxiliary results, which are stated as Facts F.3
to F.6.
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Fact F.3 For all (i, j) ∈ I(n)2, [A adj(In − A)]i,j = [adj(In − A)]i,j − δi,j det(In − A)
= [adj(In − A)A]i,j.
Fact F.4 For all i ∈ I(n), [adj(In − Ax)]i,x = [adj(In − Ax)]x,i = δi,x det(In − Ax).
Fact F.5 For all (i, j) ∈ (I(n) \ {x})2, if j < x, then
det
(
[In − Ax]−j,−i
)
= (−1)x+x̂(i)−1 det([In − Ax]−{j,x},−{i,x}),
and if j > x, then
det
(
[In − Ax]−j,−i
)
= (−1)x+x̂(i) det([In − Ax]−{j,x},−{i,x}).
Fact F.6 For all i ∈ I(n), [adj(In − A)]i,x = [adj(In − Ax)]i,x + [adj(In − Ax)A]i,x.
Proof of Fact F.3 The statement follows from
(In − A) adj(In − A) = adj(In − A)(In − A) = det(In − A)In,
which implies that
A adj(In − A) = adj(In − A)A = adj(In − A)− det(In − A)In. 
Proof of Fact F.4 Let i ∈ I(n). I only prove [adj(In − Ax)]i,x = δi,x det(In − Ax).
The proof of [adj(In − Ax)]x,i = δi,x det(In − Ax) is analogous. First, consider the
case i ̸= x. Note that [adj(In − Ax)]i,x = (−1)i+x det([In − Ax]−x,−i), where the
x̂(i)th column of [In − Ax]−x,−i is equal to 0n−1. Consequently, det([In − Ax]−x,−i)
= 0, from which [adj(In − Ax)]i,x = 0 follows. Second, consider the case i = x. The
Laplace expansion of the determinant of In − Ax along the xth column yields
det(In − Ax) =
n
∑
j=1
(−1)j+x det([In − Ax]−j,−x)[In − Ax]j,x
= (−1)x+x det([In − Ax]−x,−x)
= [adj(In − Ax)]x,x
because, for all j ∈ I(n), [In − Ax]j,x = δj,x. 
Proof of Fact F.5 Let (i, j) ∈ (I(n) \ {x})2. The Laplace expansion of the determi-
nant of [In − Ax]−j,−i along the x̂(i)th column yields
det
(
[In − Ax]−j,−i
)
=
n−1
∑
k=1
(−1)k+x̂(i) det([[In − Ax]−j,−i]−k,−x̂(i))[[In − Ax]−j,−i]k,x̂(i).
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Note that
[
[In − Ax]−j,−i
]
−k,−x̂(i) =
{
[In − Ax]−{j,k},−{i,x} if k < j,
[In − Ax]−{j,k+1},−{i,x} if k ≥ j,
and
[
[In − Ax]−j,−i
]
k,x̂(i) =
[
[In − Ax]−j,
]
k,x =
[
[ex]−j
]
k =
{
δk,x−1 if j < x,
δk,x if j > x.
Using the preceding three results, if j < x, then
det
(
[In − Ax]−j,−i
)
= (−1)x+x̂(i)−1 det([In − Ax]−{j,x},−{i,x}),
and if j > x, then
det
(
[In − Ax]−j,−i
)
= (−1)x+x̂(i) det([In − Ax]−{j,x},−{i,x}). 
Proof of Fact F.6 Let i ∈ I(n). First, consider the case i = x. We find
[adj(In − A)]x,x = (−1)x+x det
(
[In − A]−x,−x
)
= (−1)x+x det([In − Ax]−x,−x)
= [adj(In − Ax)]x,x
and
[adj(In − Ax)A]x,x =
n
∑
j=1,j ̸=x
[adj(In − Ax)]x,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 (Fact F.4)
[A]j,x + [adj(In − Ax)]x,x [A]x,x︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 0,
(F.4)
which imply that [adj(In − A)]x,x = [adj(In − Ax)]x,x + [adj(In − Ax)A]x,x.
Second, consider the case i ̸= x. Note that [adj(In − Ax)]i,x = 0 (Fact F.4). Let
B(x, i) := [In − A]−x,−i. For all k ∈ I(n), let ak denote the kth column of A. Note
that [B(x, i)],x̂(i) = [ex − ax]−x because i ̸= x. Let C(x, i) and D(x, i) be the unique
square matrices of order n− 1 that satisfy
∀j ∈ I(n− 1) [C(x, i)],j = (1− δj,x̂(i))[B(x, i)],j + δj,x̂(i)[ex]−x,
∀j ∈ I(n− 1) [D(x, i)],j = (1− δj,x̂(i))[B(x, i)],j − δj,x̂(i)[ax]−x.
As an illustration, if i /∈ {1, x− 1, x+ 1, n}, then
B(x, i) = [(e1 − a1, . . . , ex−1 − ax−1, ex − ax, ex+1 − ax+1, . . . , en − an)]−x,,
C(x, i) = [(e1 − a1, . . . , ex−1 − ax−1, ex , ex+1 − ax+1, . . . , en − an)]−x,,
D(x, i) = [(e1 − a1, . . . , ex−1 − ax−1, − ax, ex+1 − ax+1, . . . , en − an)]−x,.
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We find
[adj(In − A)]i,x = (−1)i+x det
(
[In − A]−x,−i
)
= (−1)i+x det(B(x, i))
= (−1)i+x(det(C(x, i))+ det(D(x, i)))
= (−1)i+x det(D(x, i))
= (−1)i+x
n−1
∑
j=1
(−1)j+x̂(i) det([D(x, i)]−j,−x̂(i))[D(x, i)]j,x̂(i)
= (−1)i+x
x−1
∑
j=1
(−1)j+x̂(i) det([In − A]−{j,x},−{i,x})[−A]j,x
+ (−1)i+x
n−1
∑
j=x
(−1)j+x̂(i) det([In − A]−{j+1,x},−{i,x})[−A]j+1,x
=
x−1
∑
j=1
(−1)i+j(−1)x+x̂(i)−1 det([In − A]−{j,x},−{i,x})[A]j,x
+
n
∑
j=x+1
(−1)i+j(−1)x+x̂(i) det([In − A]−{j,x},−{i,x})[A]j,x
=
x−1
∑
j=1
(−1)i+j det([In − Ax]−j,−i)[A]j,x
+ (−1)i+x det([In − Ax]−x,−i)[A]x,x
+
n
∑
j=x+1
(−1)i+j det([In − Ax]−j,−i)[A]j,x
=
n
∑
j=1
(−1)i+j det([In − Ax]−j,−i)[A]j,x
=
n
∑
j=1
[adj(In − Ax)]i,j[A]j,x
= [adj(In − Ax)A]i,x. (F.5)
The first two equalities are obvious. The third equality follows from the fact that
det(B(x, i)) is a multilinear function of the columns of B(x, i). The fourth equality
follows from det(C(x, i)) = 0 (the x̂(i)th column of C(x, i) is equal to 0n−1). The
fifth equality is according to the Laplace expansion of the determinant of D(x, i)
along the x̂(i)th column. The sixth equality is according to
∀j ∈ I(x− 1) [D(x, i)]j,x̂(i) = [−A]j,x,
∀j ∈ I(n− 1) \ I(x− 1) [D(x, i)]j,x̂(i) = [−A]j+1,x,
and
∀j ∈ I(x− 1) [D(x, i)]−j,−x̂(i) = [In − A]−{j,x},−{i,x},
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∀j ∈ I(n− 1) \ I(x− 1) [D(x, i)]−j,−x̂(i) = [In − A]−{j+1,x},−{i,x}.
The seventh equality is obvious. The eighth equality follows from Fact F.5 and the
equality [A]x,x = 0. The last three equalities are obvious. 
We have
b(α,λ,D)− b(α,λ,D x) = b(diag(λ)(A˙(D)− A˙(D x))b(α,λ,D),λ,D x)
= (In − Ax)−1(A− Ax)(In − A)−1α
=
adj(In − Ax)(A− Ax) adj(In − A)α
det(In − A)det(In − Ax) , (F.6)
where the first equality is according to Proposition 3.24. We find, for all (i, j) ∈
I(n)2,
[adj(In − Ax)(A− Ax) adj(In − A)]i,j
=
n
∑
l=1
[adj(In − Ax)(A− Ax)]i,l [adj(In − A)]l,j
=
n
∑
l=1
n
∑
k=1
[adj(In − Ax)]i,k[A− Ax]k,l [adj(In − A)]l,j
=
n
∑
l=1
[adj(In − Ax)]i,x[A]x,l [adj(In − A)]l,j
+
n
∑
k=1
[adj(In − Ax)]i,k[A]k,x[adj(In − A)]x,j
= [adj(In − Ax)]i,x[A adj(In − A)]x,j + [adj(In − Ax)A]i,x[adj(In − A)]x,j
= [adj(In − Ax)]i,x
(
[adj(In − A)]x,j − δj,x det(In − A)
)
+ [adj(In − Ax)A]i,x[adj(In − A)]x,j
=
(
[adj(In − Ax)]i,x + [adj(In − Ax)A]i,x
)
[adj(In − A)]x,j
− δj,x det(In − A)[adj(In − Ax)]i,x
= [adj(In − A)]i,x[adj(In − A)]x,j − δi,xδj,x det(In − A)det(In − Ax). (F.7)
The first two equalities are obvious. The third equality follows from the fact that
∀(k, l) ∈ I(n)2 [A− Ax]k,l = [A]k,l 1{k,l}(x),
where [A]x,x = 0. The fourth equality is obvious. The fifth equality follows from
Fact F.3. The sixth equality is obvious. The last equality follows from Facts F.4
and F.6. Using (F.7), we find, for all i ∈ I(n),
[adj(In − Ax)(A− Ax) adj(In − A)α]i
=
n
∑
j=1
[adj(In − Ax)(A− Ax) adj(In − A)]i,j[α]j
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= [adj(In − A)]i,x
n
∑
j=1
[adj(In − A)]x,j[α]j
− δi,x det(In − A)det(In − Ax)
n
∑
j=1
δj,x[α]j
= [adj(In − A)]i,x[adj(In − A)α]x − δi,x det(In − A)det(In − Ax)[α]x. (F.8)
Note that
eTx(In − A)−1ex =
[adj(In − A)]x,x
det(In − A) =
det(In − Ax)
det(In − A) , (F.9)
where the last equality follows from the Laplace expansion of the determinant
of In − Ax along the xth column (see also the proof of Fact F.4):
det(In − Ax) =
n
∑
j=1
(−1)j+x det([In − Ax]−j,−x)[In − Ax]j,x
= (−1)x+x det([In − Ax]−x,−x)
= (−1)x+x det([In − A]−x,−x)
= [adj(In − A)]x,x. (F.10)
Finally, using (F.6), (F.8), and (F.9), we find, for all i ∈ I(n),
[b(α,λ,D)− b(α,λ,D x)]i
=
[adj(In − Ax)(A− Ax) adj(In − A)α]i
det(In − A)det(In − Ax)
=
[adj(In − A)]i,x[adj(In − A)α]x − δi,x det(In − A)det(In − Ax)[α]x
det(In − A)det(In − Ax)
=
[
adj(In − A)α
det(In − A)
]
x
det(In − A)
det(In − Ax)
[
adj(In − A)
det(In − A)
]
i,x
− δi,x[α]x
=
[
(In − A)−1α
]
x
1
eTx(In − A)−1ex
[
(In − A)−1
]
i,x − δi,x[α]x
=
[
(In − A)−1α
]
x
1[
(In − A)−1ex
]
x
[
(In − A)−1ex
]
i − [α]x[ex]i
= [b(α,λ,D)]x
1
[b(ex,λ,D)]x
[b(ex,λ,D)]i − [α]x[ex]i
=
bx(α,λ,D)
bx(ex,λ,D)
[b(ex,λ,D)]i − αx[ex]i,
which implies that
b(α,λ,D)− b(α,λ,D x) = bx(α,λ,D)
bx(ex,λ,D)
b(ex,λ,D)− αxex.
This concludes the proof of (3.8). Let i ∈ I(n) \ {x}.
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Proof of Result 3.25.1 Suppose λ ≥c 0n, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, and α ≥c 0n. We
find
∆x(D x,D) = αx − bx(α,λ,D) ≤ 0
because bx(α,λ,D) ≥ αx (Result 3.15.1) and
∆ i(D x,D) = − bi(ex,λ,D)bx(ex,λ,D) bx(α,λ,D) ≤ 0
because bx(ex,λ,D) ≥ 1 (Result 3.19.1), bi(ex,λ,D) ≥ 0 (Result 3.19.1), and
bx(α,λ,D) ≥ 0 (Result 3.15.1). 
Proof of Result 3.25.2 Suppose λx > 0, [λ]−x ≥c 0n−1, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, there
exists a k ∈ N+D (x) with αk > 0, and [α]−k ≥c 0n−1. We find
∆x(D x,D) = αx − bx(α,λ,D) = −λx ∑
j∈N+D (x)
bj(α,λ,D) ≤ −λx bk(α,λ,D) < 0,
where the first inequality follows from λx > 0 and b(α,λ,D) ≥c 0n (Result 3.15.1)
and the second from bk(α,λ,D) ≥ αk > 0 (Result 3.15.1). 
Proof of Result 3.25.3 Suppose λ ≥c 0n, there exists a walk (i0, . . . , ip) in D of
length p from i to x such that (λi0 , . . . ,λip−1) >c 0p, ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1, αx > 0,
and [α]−x ≥c 0n−1. We find
∆ i(D x,D) = − bi(ex,λ,D)bx(ex,λ,D) bx(α,λ,D) < 0
because bx(ex,λ,D) ≥ 1 (Result 3.19.1), bi(ex,λ,D) > 0 (Result 3.19.2), and
bx(α,λ,D) ≥ αx > 0 (Result 3.15.1). 
Proof of Lemma 3.26
Suppose Condition C-λ is satisfied and ρ(diag(|λ|)A˙(D)) < 1. First, note that
On ≤c |diag(λ)A˙(D)| = diag(|λ|)A˙(D), which implies that ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) ≤
ρ(diag(|λ|)A˙(D)) (see, for example, Varga 2000, Theorem 2.21). Second, note
that On ≤c |diag(λ)A˙(D  x)| ≤c diag(|λ|)A˙(D) because A˙(D  x) ≤c A˙(D),
which implies that ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D x)) ≤ ρ(diag(|λ|)A˙(D)) (Theorem 2.21). Let
B be equal to diag(λ)A˙(D) or diag(λ)A˙(D x). Note that ρ(B) < 1. I show that
1 /∈ σ(B). Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, 1 ∈ σ(B). It follows that ρ(B) ≥ 1,
which contradicts ρ(B) < 1. This concludes the proof of 1 /∈ σ(B). 
Proof of Proposition 3.27
Let i ∈ I(n) \ {x}, and let λ¯ ∈ Rn+ be such that both inequalities ρ(diag(λ¯)A˙(D)) <
1 and diag(λ¯)A˙(D)1n ≤c 1n are true. Note that In − diag(λ¯)A˙(D) is a nonsingular
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M-matrix whose inverse is bounded below by In because diag(λ¯)A˙(D) is non-
negative and ρ(diag(λ¯)A˙(D)) < 1 (Lemma B.6). Note also that all row sums of
In − diag(λ¯)A˙(D) are nonnegative because diag(λ¯)A˙(D)1n ≤c 1n. It follows that
(see, for example, Berman and Plemmons 1994, Lemma 3.14 on p. 254)
0 ≤ [(In − diag(λ¯)A˙(D))−1]i,x ≤ [(In − diag(λ¯)A˙(D))−1]x,x,
where [(In − diag(λ¯)A˙(D))−1]x,x ≥ 1. We conclude that
SD,i,x(λ¯) =
bi
(
ex, λ¯,D
)
bx
(
ex, λ¯,D
) = [(In − diag(λ¯)A˙(D))−1]i,x[(
In − diag(λ¯)A˙(D)
)−1]
x,x
∈ [0, 1]. 
Proof of Proposition 3.29
Let i ∈ I(n) \ {x}. Suppose there exists a walk in D from i to x. Let λ¯ ∈ R++ be
such that ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, and let C(λ¯) := (In − λ¯A˙(D))−1. Note that
SD,i,x(λ¯1n) =
bi(ex, λ¯1n,D)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
=
eTi
(
In − λ¯A˙(D)
)−1ex
eTx
(
In − λ¯A˙(D)
)−1eTx =
eTi C(λ¯)ex
eTxC(λ¯)ex
.
We find
∂
(
t ↦→ SD,i,x(t1n)
)
(λ¯)
=
eTi C(λ¯)
2exeTxC(λ¯)ex − eTi C(λ¯)exeTxC(λ¯)2ex
λ¯
(
eTxC(λ¯)ex
)2
=
1
λ¯[C(λ¯)]2x,x
n
∑
k=1
[C(λ¯)]k,x
(
[C(λ¯)]x,x[C(λ¯)]i,k − [C(λ¯)]i,x[C(λ¯)]x,k
)
=
1
λ¯[C(λ¯)]2x,x
n
∑
k=1
[C(λ¯)]k,x det
(
[C(λ¯)]x,x [C(λ¯)]x,k
[C(λ¯)]i,x [C(λ¯)]i,k
)
=
1
λ¯[C(λ¯)]2x,x
∑
k∈I(n)\{x}
[C(λ¯)]k,x det
(
[C(λ¯)]{x,i},{x,k}
)
=
1
λ¯[C(λ¯)]2x,x
[C(λ¯)]i,x det
(
[C(λ¯)]{x,i},{x,i}
)
+
1
λ¯[C(λ¯)]2x,x
∑
k∈I(n)\{x,i}
[C(λ¯)]k,x det
(
[C(λ¯)]{x,i},{x,k}
)
, (F.11)
where the first equality follows from
∂C(λ¯)
∂λ¯
= C(λ¯)A˙(D)C(λ¯)
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and
A˙(D)C(λ¯) = C(λ¯)A˙(D) =
1
λ¯
(
C(λ¯)− In
)
.
First, note thatC(λ¯) is an inverseM-matrix that is bounded belowby In (LemmaB.6).
It follows that [C(λ¯)]x,x ≥ 1 and, for all k ∈ I(n) \ {x}, [C(λ¯)]k,x ≥ 0. Second, note
that [C(λ¯)]i,x > 0 because λ¯ > 0,
[C(λ¯)]i,x = bi(ex, λ¯,D) =
∞
∑
k=0
λ¯kdkD,i→x,
and there exists a walk in D from i to x, that is, dkD,i→x > 0 for some k ∈ Z++.
Third, note that all principal minors of an inverse M-matrix are positive (see, for
example, Johnson 1982, Corollary 1). It follows that det([C(λ¯)]{x,i},{x,i}) > 0.
Fourth, note that all almost principal minors of an inverse M-matrix are nonneg-
ative (see, for example, Willoughby 1977, pp. 77–78). It follows that for all k ∈
I(n) \ {x, i}, det([C(λ¯)]{x,i},{x,k}) ≥ 0. The foregoing four facts and (F.11) imply
that ∂(t ↦→ SD,i,x(t1n))(λ¯) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3.30
Let (i, j) ∈ (I(n) \ {x})×I(n), λ¯ := (λ¯1, . . . , λ¯n) ∈ Rn+ with ρ(diag(λ¯)A˙(D)) < 1,
and C(λ¯) := (In − diag(λ¯)A˙(D))−1. Note that
SD,i,x(λ¯) =
bi(ex, λ¯,D)
bx(ex, λ¯,D)
=
eTi
(
In − diag(λ¯)A˙(D)
)−1ex
eTx
(
In − diag(λ¯)A˙(D)
)−1eTx =
eTi C(λ¯)ex
eTxC(λ¯)ex
.
We find
∂SD,i,x(λ¯)
∂λ¯j
=
eTi C(λ¯)eje
T
j A˙(D)C(λ¯)exe
T
xC(λ¯)ex − eTi C(λ¯)exeTxC(λ¯)ejeTj A˙(D)C(λ¯)ex(
eTxC(λ¯)ex
)2
=
[A˙(D)C(λ¯)]j,x
[C(λ¯)]2x,x
(
[C(λ¯)]x,x[C(λ¯)]i,j − [C(λ¯)]i,x[C(λ¯)]x,j
)
=
[A˙(D)C(λ¯)]j,x
[C(λ¯)]2x,x
det
(
[C(λ¯)]x,x [C(λ¯)]x,j
[C(λ¯)]i,x [C(λ¯)]i,j
)
=
[A˙(D)C(λ¯)]j,x
[C(λ¯)]2x,x
det
(
[C(λ¯)]{x,i},{x,j}
)
, (F.12)
where the first equality follows from
∂C(λ¯)
∂λ¯j
= C(λ¯)ejeTj A˙(D)C(λ¯).
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First, note thatC(λ¯) is an inverseM-matrix that is bounded belowby In (LemmaB.6).
It follows that [C(λ¯)]x,x ≥ 1 and [A˙(D)C(λ¯)]j,x ≥ 0. Second, note that if λ¯j > 0,
then
[A˙(D)C(λ¯)]j,x =
[C(λ¯)]j,x − δj,x
λ¯j
as diag(λ¯)A˙(D)C(λ¯) = C(λ¯)− In. Third, note that [C(λ¯)]j,x = bj(ex, λ¯,D) > 0 if
there exists awalk (i0, . . . , ip) inD of length p from j to x such that (λ¯i0 , . . . , λ¯ip−1) >c
0p (Lemma 3.19). Fourth, note that det([C(λ¯)]{x,i},{x,x}) = 0. Fifth, note that all
principal minors of an inverse M-matrix are positive (see, for example, Johnson
1982, Corollary 1). It follows that det([C(λ¯)]{x,i},{x,i}) > 0. Sixth, note that all
almost principal minors of an inverse M-matrix are nonnegative (see, for example,
Willoughby 1977, pp. 77–78). It follows that det([C(λ¯)]{x,i},{x,j}) ≥ 0 (if i ̸= j). The
foregoing six facts and (F.12) imply Results 3.30.1, 3.30.2, and 3.30.3. 
Proof of Proposition 3.31
Suppose α is as in Example 3.2, λ is as in Example 3.5, and 1 /∈ σ(λ¯A˙(D)) ∪
σ(λ¯A˙(D x)). Let A := λ¯A˙(D) and Ax := λ¯A˙(D x). First, consider the case
λ¯ = 0. We find
b
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)− b(A˙(D x)1n, λ¯1n,D x) = (A˙(D)− A˙(D x))1n.
Second, consider the case λ¯ ̸= 0. First, note that, for all i ∈ I(n),
[adj(In − Ax)(A− Ax)1n]i
=
n
∑
j=1
[adj(In − Ax)]i,j[(A− Ax)1n]j
=
n
∑
j=1,j ̸=x
[adj(In − Ax)]i,j[A]j,x + [adj(In − Ax)]i,x[A1n]x
=
n
∑
j=1
[adj(In − Ax)]i,j[A]j,x + [adj(In − Ax)]i,x[A1n]x
= [adj(In − Ax)A]i,x + [adj(In − Ax)]i,x[A1n]x
= [adj(In − A)]i,x + [adj(In − Ax)]i,x([A1n]x − 1)
= det(In − A)
[
(In − A)−1ex
]
i + det(In − Ax)([A1n]x − 1)[ex]i, (F.13)
where the second equality follows from
∀j ∈ I(n) [(A− Ax)1n]j =
{
[A1n]x if j = x,
[A]j,x if j ̸= x,
the third equality follows from [A˙(D)]x,x = 0, the fifth equality follows from Fact F.6,
and the sixth equality follows from Fact F.4 (see the proof of Proposition 3.25 for
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Facts F.4 and F.6). Second, note that
b
(
A˙(D)1n − A˙(D x)1n, λ¯1n,D x
)
=
1
λ¯
(In − Ax)−1(A− Ax)1n
=
1
λ¯
1
det(In − Ax) adj(In − Ax)(A− Ax)1n
=
1
λ¯
det(In − A)
det(In − Ax) (In − A)
−1ex +
1
λ¯
([A1n]x − 1)ex
=
1
λ¯
1
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
b(ex, λ¯1n,D) + deg+D(x)ex −
1
λ¯
ex, (F.14)
where the third equality follows from (F.13) and the fourth equality from (F.9). We
find
b
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)− b(A˙(D x)1n, λ¯1n,D x)
= b
(
A˙(D)1n − A˙(D x)1n, λ¯1n,D x
)
+ b
(
λ¯
(
A˙(D)− A˙(D x))b(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D), λ¯1n,D x)
=
1
λ¯
1
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
b(ex, λ¯1n,D) + deg+D(x)ex −
1
λ¯
ex
+
bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
b(ex, λ¯1n,D)− deg+D(x)ex
=
1
λ¯
(
1
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
b(ex, λ¯1n,D)− ex
)
+
bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
b(ex, λ¯1n,D),
where the first equality is according to Proposition 3.24 and the second equality
follows from (F.14) and Proposition 3.25 (see also the proof thereof), in particular,
b
(
λ¯
(
A˙(D)− A˙(D x))b(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D), λ¯1n,D x)
=
bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
b(ex, λ¯1n,D)− deg+D(x)ex.
Let i ∈ I(n) \ {x}.
Proof of Result 3.31.1 Suppose λ¯ ≥ 0 and ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1. First, consider the case
λ¯ = 0. We find ∆x(D x,D) = −deg+D(x) ≤ 0 and ∆ i(D x,D) = − 1N+D (i)(x) ≤
0. Second, consider the case λ¯ > 0. We find
∆x(D x,D) = − bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
) ≤ 0
because bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) ≥ 0 (Result 3.15.1) and
∆ i(D x,D) = − bi(ex, λ¯1n,D)bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
(
1
λ¯
+ bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)) ≤ 0
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because bx(ex, λ¯1n,D) ≥ 1 (Result 3.19.1), bi(ex, λ¯1n,D) ≥ 0 (Result 3.19.1), and
bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) ≥ 0 (Result 3.15.1). 
Proof of Result 3.31.2 Suppose λ¯ ≥ 0, ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, and deg+D(x) > 0. We find
∆x(D x,D) = − bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) ≤ −deg+D(x) < 0
because bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) ≥ deg+D(x) (Result 3.15.1). 
Proof of Result 3.31.3 Suppose λ¯ > 0, ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1, and there exists a walk in D
from i to x. We find
∆ i(D x,D) = − bi(ex, λ¯1n,D)bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
(
1
λ¯
+ bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
))
< 0
because bx(ex, λ¯1n,D) ≥ 1 (Result 3.19.1), bi(ex, λ¯1n,D) > 0 (Result 3.19.2), and
bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D) ≥ 0 (Result 3.15.1). 
Proof of Lemma 3.32
Assume that ρ(A˙(D)) < (∑j∈N+D (x) deg
+
D(j))
1/2 =: L(D, x). Note that L(D, x) > 0.
Let the function f (D, x) : {λ˜ ∈ R++ | ρ(λ˜A˙(D)) < 1} → R be defined by
f (D, x)(t) :=
1
t
+ bx
(
A˙(D)1n, t1n,D
)
.
We find
∂ f (D, x)(t) = − 1
t2
+ eTx
(
In − tA˙(D)
)−1 A˙(D)b(A˙(D)1n, t1n,D)
= − 1
t2
+ eTx
(
In − tA˙(D)
)−1 − In
t
b
(
A˙(D)1n, t1n,D
)
=
1
t
(
bx
(
b
(
A˙(D)1n, t1n,D
)
, t1n,D
)− bx(A˙(D)1n, t1n,D)− 1t
)
= ∑
j∈N+D (x)
bj
(
b
(
A˙(D)1n, t1n,D
)
, t1n,D
)− 1
t2
,
where the second equality follows from(
In − tA˙(D)
)−1
= In + t
(
In − tA˙(D)
)−1 A˙(D) = In + tA˙(D)(In − tA˙(D))−1
(F.15)
and the last from
bx
(
b
(
A˙(D)1n, t1n,D
)
, t1n,D
)
= bx
(
A˙(D)1n, t1n,D
)
+ t ∑
j∈N+D (x)
bj
(
b
(
A˙(D)1n, t1n,D
)
, t1n,D
)
.
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Note that
∂ f (D, x)(t) ≥ ∑
j∈N+D (x)
deg+D(j)−
1
t2
because, for all j ∈ N+D (x), bj(b(A˙(D)1n, t1n,D), t1n,D) ≥ bj(A˙(D)1n, t1n,D) ≥
deg+D(j) (Result 3.15.1). It follows that ∂ f (D, x)(t) > 0 if t > 1/L(D, x). There
exists a t1 > 0 such that 1/L(D, x) < t1 in case ρ(A˙(D)) = 0 and 1/L(D, x) <
t1 < 1/ρ(A˙(D)) in case ρ(A˙(D)) > 0 because ρ(A˙(D)) < L(D, x). In both cases,
t1 lies in the domain of f (D, x). There exists a t0 < t1 in the domain of f (D, x)
such that ∂ f (D, x)(t0) < 0 because limt↓0 ∂ f (D, x)(t) = −∞. The function ∂ f (D, x)
has a root in the interval (t0, t1), denoted by c(D, x), because it is continuous with
∂ f (D, x)(t0) < 0 < ∂ f (D, x)(t1) (Bolzano’s theorem). This root is unique because
∂ f (D, x)(t) is strictly increasing. Indeed, we find
∂2 f (D, x)(t)
= ∑
j∈N+D (x)
eTj
∂
(
In − tA˙(D)
)−1b(A˙(D)1n, t1n,D)
∂t
+
2
t3
= 2 ∑
j∈N+D (x)
eTj
(
In − tA˙(D)
)−1(In − tA˙(D))−1 A˙(D)b(A˙(D)1n, t1n,D)+ 2t3
≥ 2 ∑
j∈N+D (x)
eTj A˙(D)A˙(D)1n +
2
t3
= 2 ∑
j∈N+D (x)
∑
k∈N+D (j)
deg+D(k) +
2
t3
> 0,
where the second equality follows from the fact that A˙(D) and (In− tA˙(D))−1 com-
mute (see (F.15)), and the first inequality from (In − tA˙(D))−1 ≥c In (Lemma B.6)
and b(A˙(D)1n, t1n,D) ≥c A˙(D)1n (Result 3.15.1). We conclude that the function
f (D, x) is strictly increasing on the set {λ˜ ∈ R++ | ρ(λ˜A˙(D)) < 1} ∩ (c(D, x),+∞),
which is a nonempty interval. 
Proof of Proposition 3.35
Suppose α(D⊖ x) = [α(D x)]−x and λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x.
Proof of Result 3.35.1 There exists a permutation matrix Px of order n, where
P−1x = PTx , such that
Qx := Px diag
(
λ(D x)
)
A˙(D x)P−1x =
(
0 0Tn−1
0n−1 diag
(
λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D⊖ x)
)
,
specifically, Px = (ex, e1, . . . , ex−1, ex+1, . . . , en)T. Note that, for all µ ∈ C,
det(µIn −Qx) = det
(
µ 0Tn−1
0n−1 µIn−1 − diag
(
λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D⊖ x)
)
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= µdet
(
µIn−1 − diag
(
λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D⊖ x)),
which implies that σ(Qx) \ {0} = σ(diag(λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D ⊖ x)) \ {0}. Note also
that σ(Qx) = σ(diag(λ(D x))A˙(D x)) because similar matrices have the same
spectrum. Combining the foregoing two results gives Result 3.35.1. 
Proof of Result 3.35.2 Suppose 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D ⊖ x)) ∪
σ(diag(λ(D))A˙(D)). Result 3.35.1 implies that the matrices In − diag(λ(D))A˙(D),
In − diag(λ(D x))A˙(D x), and In−1 − diag(λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D⊖ x) are nonsingu-
lar. We find
Pxb
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)
= Px
(
In − diag
(
λ(D x)
)
A˙(D x)
)−1P−1x Pxα(D x)
=
(
In − Px diag
(
λ(D x)
)
A˙(D x)P−1x
)−1Pxα(D x)
=
(
1 0Tn−1
0n−1 In−1 − diag
(
λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D⊖ x)
)−1 (
[Pxα(D x)]1
[Pxα(D x)]−1
)
=
(
1 0Tn−1
0n−1
(
In−1 − diag
(
λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D⊖ x))−1
)(
[α(D x)]x
α(D⊖ x)
)
.
Consequently,
bx
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)
=
[
Pxb
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)]
1
= [α(D x)]x
and [
b
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)]
−x
=
[
Pxb
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)]
−1
=
(
In−1 − diag
(
λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D⊖ x))−1α(D⊖ x)
= b
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x).
Finally, using the preceding result, we find
b
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)− [b(α(D),λ(D),D)]−x
=
[
b
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)− b(α(D),λ(D),D)]−x. 
Proof of Proposition 3.36
Suppose Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied, α(D⊖ x) = [α(D x)]−x, λ(D⊖ x)
= [λ(D x)]−x, and 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D ⊖ x)) ∪ σ(diag(λ(D))A˙(D)). It
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follows that In−1 − diag(λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D⊖ x) and In − diag(λ(D))A˙(D) are non-
singular. Result 3.35.1 implies that In − diag(λ(D x))A˙(D x) is nonsingular.
We find
b
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)− [b(α(D),λ(D),D)]−x
=
[
b
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)− b(α(D),λ(D),D)]−x
= αx(D)[ex]−x −
bx
(
α(D),λ(D),D
)
bx
(
ex,λ(D),D
) [b(ex,λ(D),D)]−x
= −bx
(
α(D),λ(D),D
)
bx
(
ex,λ(D),D
) [b(ex,λ(D),D)]−x,
where the first equality follows from Result 3.35.2, the second from Proposition 3.25,
and the last from [ex]−x = 0n−1. 
Proof of Proposition 3.37
Suppose α is as in Example 3.2, λ is as in Example 3.5, and 1 /∈ σ(λ¯A˙(D)) ∪
σ(λ¯A˙(D⊖ x)). It follows that In−1 − λ¯A˙(D⊖ x) and In − λ¯A˙(D) are nonsingular.
Result 3.35.1 implies that In − λ¯A˙(D x) is nonsingular. Note that α(D⊖ x) =
[α(D x)]−x and λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x. First, consider the case λ¯ = 0. We
find
b
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)− [b(α(D),λ(D),D)]−x
= A˙(D⊖ x)1n−1 − [A˙(D)1n]−x.
Second, consider the case λ¯ ̸= 0. We find
b
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)− [b(α(D),λ(D),D)]−x
=
[
b
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)− b(α(D),λ(D),D)]−x
=
1
λ¯
(
[ex]−x −
1
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
[
b(ex, λ¯1n,D)
]
−x
)
− bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
[
b(ex, λ¯1n,D)
]
−x
= − 1
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
(
1
λ¯
+ bx(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D)
)[
b(ex, λ¯1n,D)
]
−x,
where the first equality follows from Result 3.35.2, the second from Proposition 3.31,
and the last from [ex]−x = 0n−1. 
Proof of Proposition 3.38
Suppose the GKB centrality in D with profile of vertex idiosyncrasies α >c 0n
and profile of localness parameters λ exists and is unique and positive, that is,
b(α,λ,D) >c 0n. Suppose ‖·‖ is monotonic in the positive orthant.
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Proof of Result 3.38.1 The inequalities α >c 0n and b(α,λ,D) >c 0n imply that,
for all i ∈ I(n), VDI(i, α,λ,D) > 0, ADI(α,λ,D) > 0, and TDI(α,λ,D) > 0.
First, consider the case λ ≥c 0n. We have α ≤c b(α,λ,D) because b(α,λ,D) =
α + diag(λ)A˙(D)b(α,λ,D), λ ≥c 0n, and b(α,λ,D) >c 0n. It follows that, for
all i ∈ I(n), VDI(i, α,λ,D) ≤ 1, which in turn implies that ADI(α,λ,D) ≤ 1.
We have ‖α‖ ≤ ‖b(α,λ,D)‖ because α ≤c b(α,λ,D) and ‖·‖ is monotonic in the
positive orthant. If follows that TDI(α,λ,D) ≤ 1.
Second, consider the case λ ≤c 0n. We have b(α,λ,D) ≤c α because λ ≤c 0n and
b(α,λ,D) >c 0n. It follows that, for all i ∈ I(n), 1/VDI(i, α,λ,D) ≤ 1. This result
in turn implies that 1/ADI(α,λ,D) ≤ 1. Indeed, according to Jensen’s inequality,
1
ADI(α,λ,D)
=
1
1
n
n
∑
i=1
αi
bi(α,λ,D)
≤ 1
n
n
∑
i=1
bi(α,λ,D)
αi
≤ 1.
We have ‖b(α,λ,D)‖ ≤ ‖α‖ because b(α,λ,D) ≤c α and ‖·‖ is monotonic in the
positive orthant. If follows that 1/ TDI(α,λ,D) ≤ 1. 
Proof of Result 3.38.2 The statements follow from Proposition 3.23. 
Proof of Proposition 3.39
Suppose Conditions 3.39.1, 3.39.2, and 3.39.3 are satisfied.
Let Y⋆ ⊂ Rn++ denote the set of all interior NEs in pure strategies of Γ(α,λ,D).
I show that |Y⋆| = 1. Note that, for all y⋆ ∈ Rn+, y⋆ ∈ Y⋆ if and only if
y⋆ ∈ Rn++, (F.16)
∀i ∈ I ∂ui(y
⋆)
∂yi
= 0, (F.17)
and
∀i ∈ I ∂
2ui(y⋆)
∂yi
2 < 0. (F.18)
We find, for all y := (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn+ and for all i ∈ I ,
∂ui(y)
∂yi
= αi − yi + λi ∑
j∈I
a˙i,j(D)yj and
∂2ui(y)
∂yi
2 = −1 < 0.
It follows that (F.17) is equivalent to (In − diag(λ)A˙(D))y⋆ = α, which in turn
is equivalent to y⋆ = (In − diag(λ)A˙(D))−1α, that is, y⋆ = b(α,λ,D), because
Condition 3.39.2 implies that In − diag(λ)A˙(D) is nonsingular (Proposition 3.12).
Conditions 3.39.1, 3.39.2, and 3.39.3 imply that b(α,λ,D) >c 0n (Result 3.15.2).
The preceding arguments demonstrate that there exists a unique y⋆ ∈ Rn+, namely,
b(α,λ,D), that satisfies (F.16), (F.17), and (F.18).
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Table F.1. Possible types of boundary Nash equilibria of Γ(α,λ,D) (Propositions
3.39 and 3.40)
Action and set of actions
Type 0 R++
B-1 ×
B-2 × ×
In the remainder of the proof, I show that Γ(α,λ,D) has no boundary NEs.
Table F.1 gives an overview of all possible types of boundary NEs of Γ(α,λ,D).
First, I show that 0n (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-1 in Table F.1)
cannot be a boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D). Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, 0n
is a boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D). We must have
∀i ∈ I ∂ui(0n)
∂yi
≤ 0. (F.19)
We find, for all i ∈ I , ∂ui(0n)/∂yi = αi > 0 (Condition 3.39.3). The foregoing result
contradicts (F.19). Consequently, 0n cannot be a boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D).
Second, I show that a situation where some players play zero and the remaining
players play a positive action (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-2
in Table F.1) cannot be a boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D). Suppose, for the sake of
contradiction, y˜⋆ := (y˜⋆1 , . . . , y˜⋆n) ∈ Rn+ is a boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D) of type B-2.
Specifically, suppose there exists a J ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n such that (i) for
all i ∈ I \ J , y˜⋆i = 0, and (ii) for all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i ∈ R++. We must have
∀i ∈ I \ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≤ 0. (F.20)
We find
∀i ∈ I \ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
= αi + λi ∑
j∈I
a˙i,j(D)y˜⋆j ≥ αi > 0,
where the equality follows from y˜⋆i = 0, the first inequality from λi ≥ 0 (Condi-
tion 3.39.1) and ∑j∈I a˙i,j(D)y˜⋆j ≥ 0, and the second inequality from αi > 0 (Condi-
tion 3.39.3). The foregoing result contradicts (F.20). Consequently, y˜⋆ cannot be a
boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D) of type B-2. 
Proof of Proposition 3.40
Suppose Conditions 3.40.1 to 3.40.4 are satisfied.
Let Y⋆ ⊂ Rn++ denote the set of all interior NEs in pure strategies of Γ(α,λ,D).
I show that |Y⋆| = 1. Note that, for all y⋆ ∈ Rn+, y⋆ ∈ Y⋆ if and only if (F.16),
(F.17), and (F.18) are true. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.39, we find
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that there exists a unique y⋆ ∈ Rn+, namely, b(α,λ,D), that satisfies (F.16), (F.17),
and (F.18). As regards (F.16), note that Conditions 3.40.2 and 3.40.3 imply that
b(α,λ,D) >c 0n (Result 3.14.2).
In the remainder of the proof, I show that Γ(α,λ,D) has no boundary NEs.
Table F.1 gives an overview of all possible types of boundary NEs of Γ(α,λ,D).
First, 0n (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-1 in Table F.1) cannot
be a boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D). See the proof of Proposition 3.39 for the precise
argument (Conditions 3.40.2 and 3.40.3 imply that α >c 0n).
Second, I show that a situation where some players play zero and the remaining
players play a positive action (this is referred to as a boundary NE of type B-2
in Table F.1) cannot be a boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D). Suppose, for the sake of
contradiction, y˜⋆ := (y˜⋆1 , . . . , y˜⋆n) ∈ Rn+ is a boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D) of type B-2.
Specifically, suppose there exists a J ⊂ I with 0 < |J | < n such that (i) for
all i ∈ I \ J , y˜⋆i = 0, and (ii) for all i ∈ J , y˜⋆i ∈ R++. We must have
∀i ∈ I \ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
≤ 0. (F.21)
and
∀i ∈ J ∂ui(y˜
⋆)
∂yi
= 0. (F.22)
First, note that (F.21) is equivalent to
∀i ∈ I \ J αi + λi ∑
j∈J
a˙i,j(D)y˜⋆j ≤ 0,
which in turn is equivalent to
[α]I\J + [diag(λ)A˙(D)]I\J ,J [y˜
⋆]J ≤c 0|I\J |. (F.23)
Second, note that (F.22) is equivalent to
∀i ∈ J y˜⋆i − λi ∑
j∈J
a˙i,j(D)y˜⋆j = αi,
which in turn is equivalent to
[y˜⋆]J − [diag(λ)A˙(D)]J ,J [y˜⋆]J = [α]J .
Condition 3.40.4 implies that I|J |− [diag(λ)A˙(D)]J ,J is nonsingular (Lemma B.3).
It follows that
[y˜⋆]J =
(
I|J | − [diag(λ)A˙(D)]J ,J
)−1
[α]J . (F.24)
Combining results (F.23) and (F.24) gives
[α]I\J + [diag(λ)A˙(D)]I\J ,J
(
I|J | − [diag(λ)A˙(D)]J ,J
)−1
[α]J ≤c 0|I\J |.
The foregoing result contradicts Condition 3.40.4. Consequently, y˜⋆ cannot be a
boundary NE of Γ(α,λ,D) of type B-2. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.44
Suppose Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied and ρ(diag(|λ|)A˙(D)) < 1. Let
x ∈ I . Note that 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) ∪ σ(diag(λ)A˙(D x)) (Lemma 3.26). Note
also that bx(ex,λ,D) ̸= 0 (Proposition 3.25). We find
Υ(ω,D x)− Υ(ω,D) =
n
∑
i=1
ωi[∆(D x,D)]i
=
n
∑
i=1
ωi
(
αx[ex]i −
bx(α,λ,D)
bx(ex,λ,D)
[b(ex,λ,D)]i
)
=
n
∑
i=1
ωiαxδi,x − bx(α,λ,D)bx(ex,λ,D)
n
∑
i=1
ωi[b(ex,λ,D)]i
= ωxαx − bx(α,λ,D)bx(ex,λ,D) 〈ω, b(ex,λ,D)〉,
where the second equality follows from (3.8). 
Proof of Proposition 3.45
Suppose Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied, α >c 0n and λ ≥c 0n, and
ρ(diag(λ)A˙(D)) < 1. Note that Γ(α,λ,D) has a unique and interior NE, namely,
b(α,λ,D) (Proposition 3.39). Let x ∈ I . In what follows, ∆ΥI(x,ω,D) is abbrevi-
ated as ∆ΥI . We find, according to Definition CS and Proposition 3.44,
∆ΥI = −ωx
(
bx(α,λ,D)− αx
)− bx(α,λ,D) ∑
j∈I\{x}
ωjSD,j,x(λ) ≤ 0,
because ω = (ω1, . . . ,ωn) ∈ [0, 1]n, bx(α,λ,D) ≥ αx, bx(α,λ,D) > 0, and for
all j ∈ I \ {x}, SD,j,x(λ) ≥ 0 (Result 3.19.1).
Proof of Result 3.45.1 Suppose ωx > 0, λx > 0, and N+D (x) ̸= ∅. We find
bx(α,λ,D)− αx = λx ∑j∈N+D (x) bj(α,λ,D) > 0. It follows that ∆Υ
I < 0. 
Proof of Result 3.45.2 Suppose Condition (∗) is satisfied. It follows that ∆ΥI < 0
because ωi > 0, bx(α,λ,D) > 0 and SD,i,x(λ) > 0 (Results 3.19.1 and 3.19.2). 
Proof of Result 3.45.3 Suppose Conditions I-α-λ and (∗) are satisfied. We find
∂∆ΥI
∂αx
= −ωx
(
bx(ex,λ,D)− 1
)− bx(ex,λ,D) ∑
j∈I\{x}
ωjSD,j,x(λ) < 0,
where the equality follows from Proposition 3.22 and the inequality from ωi >
0, ωx ≥ 0, bx(ex,λ,D) ≥ 1 (Result 3.19.1), and SD,i,x(λ) > 0 (Results 3.19.1
and 3.19.2). 
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Proof of Result 3.45.4 Suppose Conditions I-α-λ and (∗) are satisfied and there ex-
ists a walk (k0, . . . , kq) in D of length q from x to i such that
(λk0 , . . . ,λkq−1) >c 0q. We find
∂∆ΥI
∂αi
= −ωx bx(ei,λ,D)− bx(ei,λ,D) ∑
j∈I\{x}
ωjSD,j,x(λ) < 0,
where the equality follows from Proposition 3.22 and the inequality from ωi >
0, ωx ≥ 0, bx(ei,λ,D) > 0 (Result 3.19.2), and SD,i,x(λ) > 0 (Results 3.19.1
and 3.19.2). 
Proof of Result 3.45.5 Suppose Conditions I-α-λ and (∗) are satisfied and
N+D (x) ̸= ∅. We find
∂∆ΥI
∂λx
= −ωx ∂ bx(α,λ,D)
∂λx
− ∂ bx(α,λ,D)
∂λx
∑
j∈I\{x}
ωjSD,j,x(λ) < 0,
where the equality follows from, for all j ∈ I \ {x}, ∂SD,j,x(λ)/∂λx = 0 (see the
proof of Proposition 3.30), and the inequality from
∂ bx(α,λ,D)
∂λx
= bx(ex,λ,D) ∑
k∈N+D (x)
bk(α,λ,D) > 0
(Proposition 3.23 and Result 3.19.1), ωi > 0, and SD,i,x(λ) > 0 (Results 3.19.1
and 3.19.2) 
Proof of Result 3.45.6 Suppose Conditions I-α-λ and (∗) are satisfied. We find
∂∆ΥI
∂λi
= −ωx ∂ bx(α,λ,D)
∂λi
− ∂ bx(α,λ,D)
∂λi
∑
j∈I\{x}
ωjSD,j,x(λ)
− bx(α,λ,D) ∑
j∈I\{x}
ωj
∂SD,j,x(λ)
∂λi
< 0,
where the inequality follows from ∂ bx(α,λ,D)/∂λi ≥ 0 (Proposition 3.23 and
Result 3.19.1) and ∂SD,i,x(λ)/∂λi > 0 (see the proof of Proposition 3.30). 
Proof of Corollary 3.46
Note that ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) = ρ(|λ¯|A˙(D)) (Lemma B.9). The statement follows from
Proposition 3.44 and (3.26). 
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Proof of Proposition 3.47
Suppose Conditions 3.47.1 and 3.47.2 are satisfied. Let I+0 (D) denote the set of all
players with zero out-degree in D, and let J := I \ I+0 (D).
Player i’s utility at the action profile y := (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn+ is given by
ui(y) =

−1
2
y2i if deg+D(i) = 0,(
deg+D(i) + λ¯∑
j∈I
a˙i,j(D)yj
)
yi − 12y
2
i if deg+D(i) > 0,
and satisfies ∂2ui(y)/∂yi2 = −1 < 0. It follows that player i’s best reply, which is
denoted by BRi(y), satisfies
BRi(y) =
{
0 if deg+D(i) = 0,
deg+D(i) + λ¯∑j∈I a˙i,j(D)yj if deg+D(i) > 0.
Condition 3.47.2 implies that the system of best replies has a unique solution, which
is given by y⋆ := b(A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D). Note that [y⋆]I\J = 0|I\J | and [y⋆]J satisfies
[y⋆]J = [A˙(D)1n]J + λ¯[A˙(D)]J ,J [y
⋆]J .
Note also that ρ(λ¯[A˙(D)]J ,J ) ≤ ρ(λ¯)A˙(D) because λ¯A˙(D) is nonnegative and
λ¯[A˙(D)]J ,J is a principal submatrix of λ¯A˙(D) (see, for example, Berman and
Plemmons 1994, Corollary 1.6 on p. 28). We find
[y⋆]J =
(
I|J | − λ¯[A˙(D)]J ,J
)−1
[A˙(D)1n]J ≥c [A˙(D)1n]J >c 0|J |,
where the equality follows from ρ(λ¯[A˙(D)]J ,J ) ≤ ρ(λ¯)A˙(D) and Condition 3.47.2,
the first inequality from Lemma B.6, and the second inequality from, for all i ∈ J ,
[A˙(D)1n]i = deg
+
D(i) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3.48
Suppose α is as in Example 3.2, λ is as in Example 3.5 with λ¯ ≥ 0, and ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1.
Note that 1 /∈ σ(λ¯A˙(D)) ∪ σ(λ¯A˙(D x)) (Lemma 3.26).
First, consider the case λ¯ = 0. We find
Υ(ω,D x)− Υ(ω,D) =
n
∑
i=1,i ̸=x
ωi∆ i(D x,D) +ωx∆x(D x,D)
= −
n
∑
i=1,i ̸=x
ωi 1N+D (i)(x)−ωxdeg
+
D(x)
= −
n
∑
i=1,i ̸=x
ωi 1N−D (x)(i)−ωxdeg
+
D(x)
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= − ∑
i∈N−D (x)
ωi −ωxdeg+D(x),
where the second equality follows from (3.14), the third from x ∈ N+D (i) if and
only if i ∈ N−D (x), and the last from x /∈ N−D (x) (because D has no self-loops).
Second, consider the case λ¯ > 0. We find
Υ(ω,D x)− Υ(ω,D)
=
n
∑
i=1
ωi[∆(D x,D)]i
=
1
λ¯
(
n
∑
i=1
ωi[ex]i −
1
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
n
∑
i=1
ωi
[
b(ex, λ¯1n,D)
]
i
)
− bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
n
∑
i=1
ωi
[
b(ex, λ¯1n,D)
]
i
=
1
λ¯
(
ωx −
〈
ω, b(ex, λ¯1n,D)
〉
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
)
− bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)〈
ω, b(ex, λ¯1n,D)
〉
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
=
1
λ¯
(
ωx − bx(ω, λ¯1n,D
T)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
)
− bx
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)
bx(ω, λ¯1n,DT)
bx(ex, λ¯1n,D)
,
where the second equality follows from (3.13) and the last from (3.26). 
Proof of Proposition 3.49
Suppose Conditions C-α and C-λ are satisfied, ρ(diag(|λ(D)|)A˙(D)) < 1, and
for all x ∈ I , α(D⊖ x) = [α(D x)]−x and λ(D⊖ x) = [λ(D x)]−x. Note that
λ(D) = λ(D x) and 1 /∈ σ(diag(λ(D⊖ x))A˙(D ⊖ x)) ∪ σ(diag(λ(D))A˙(D))
(Lemma 3.26 and Result 3.35.1). We find
Υ([ω]−x,D⊖ x)− Υ(ω,D)
=
〈
[ω]−x, b
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)〉− 〈ω, b(α(D),λ(D),D)〉
=
〈
[ω]−x,
[
b
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)]
−x
〉− 〈ω, b(α(D),λ(D),D)〉
=
n
∑
i=1
ωi bi
(
α(D),λ(D),D x
)− n∑
i=1
ωi bi
(
α(D),λ(D),D
)
−ωx bx
(
α(D),λ(D),D x
)
= Υ(ω,D x)− Υ(ω,D)−ωxαx(D),
where the second equality follows from Proposition 3.35, the third from α(D x) =
α(D) (Condition C-α) and λ(D x) = λ(D) (Condition C-λ), and the last from
bx(α(D),λ(D),D x) = αx(D) (because N+Dx(x) = ∅). 
Proof of Corollary 3.50
The statement follows from Proposition 3.49. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.51
Suppose α is as in Example 3.2, λ is as in Example 3.5 with λ¯ ≥ 0, and ρ(λ¯A˙(D)) < 1.
Note that 1 /∈ σ(λ¯A˙(D⊖ x)) ∪ σ(λ¯A˙(D)) (Lemma 3.26 and Result 3.35.1). We find
Υ([ω]−x,D⊖ x)− Υ(ω,D)
=
〈
[ω]−x, b
(
α(D⊖ x),λ(D⊖ x),D⊖ x)〉− 〈ω, b(α(D),λ(D),D)〉
=
〈
[ω]−x,
[
b
(
α(D x),λ(D x),D x
)]
−x
〉− 〈ω, b(α(D),λ(D),D)〉
=
n
∑
i=1
ωi bi
(
A˙(D x)1n, λ¯1n,D x
)− n∑
i=1
ωi bi
(
A˙(D)1n, λ¯1n,D
)
−ωx bx
(
A˙(D x)1n, λ¯1n,D x
)
= Υ(ω,D x)− Υ(ω,D),
where the second equality follows from Proposition 3.35 and the last equality from
bx(A˙(D x)1n, λ¯1n,D x) = [A˙(D x)1n]x = 0 (because N+Dx(x) = ∅). 
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